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Chapter	1:	Introduction,	Scope	and	Theoretical	
Framework	
	
1. Introduction	
		 On	12	December	2015,	when	French	Foreign	Minister,	Laurent	Fabius,	announced	that	a	new	climate	change	agreement	had	been	signed,	cheers	erupted	in	the	negotiation	hall	and	elsewhere	around	the	world.1	States	had	finally	concluded	more	than	two	decades	of	difficult	multilateral	negotiations.2	However,	there	should	be	no	illusions	that	we	are	on	track	to	averting	dangerous	human	interference	with	the	climate	system.3	As	“[noted]	with	concern”	in	the	Paris	decision,	based	on	the	mitigation	pledges	that	states	submitted	in	advance	of	the	Conference	of	the	Parties	(COP)	in	Paris,	global	greenhouse	gas	(GHG)	emission	levels	will	reach	55	gigatonnes	in	2030.4	This	far	exceeds	the	40	gigatonnes	limit	necessary	to	hold	the	increase	in	the	global	average	temperature	to	below	2	degree	Celsius	above	pre-industrial	levels.5	While	the	Paris	Agreement	requires	states	to	progressively	ratchet	up	their	climate	mitigation	targets,6	it	would	not	be	wise	to	rely	on	states	alone	to	address	climate	change.	Solving	a	complex	problem	in	a	complex	global	society	will	require	action	beyond	what	states	can	shoulder.	Tackling	climate	change	requires	pragmatic	deliberation	involving	multiple	sources	of	knowledge	and	experience,	not	simply	the	top-down	involvement	of	“increasingly	detached	and	
																																																								1	Fiona	Harvey,	“Paris	climate	change	agreement:	the	world’s	greatest	diplomatic	success”,	14	December	2015,	online:	http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/13/paris-climate-deal-cop-diplomacy-developing-united-nations	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).		2	For	discussion	of	the	Paris	Agreement,	see	e.g.	Daniel	Bodansky,	‘The	Legal	Character	of	the	Paris	Agreement’	(2016)	Review	of	European	Community	and	International	Environmental	Law,	DOI:	10.1111/reel.12154;	Christina	Voigt,	‘The	Compliance	and	Implementation	Mechanism	of	the	Paris	Agreement’	(2016)	Review	of	European	Community	and	International	Environmental	Law,	DOI:	10.1111/reel.12155.		3	Article	2	of	the	United	Nations	Convention	on	Climate	Change	1771	UNTS	163	(UNFCCC)	states	that	the	ultimate	objective	of	the	treaty	is	the	stabilization	of	greenhouse	gas	concentrations	in	the	atmosphere	at	a	level	that	would	prevent	dangerous	anthropogenic	interference	with	the	climate	system;	Such	a	level	should	be	achieved	within	a	time	frame	sufficient	to	allow	ecosystems	to	adapt	naturally	to	climate	change,	to	ensure	that	food	production	is	not	threatened	and	to	enable	economic	development	to	proceed	in	a	sustainable	manner.	Yamin	and	Depledge	argue	that	this	objective	is	akin	to	an	environmental	quality	standard;	Farhana	Yamin	and	Joanna	Depledge,	The	International	
Climate	Change	Regime:	A	Guide	to	Rules,	Institutions	and	Procedures	(Cambridge	University	Press	2004),	pg.	61.		4	Para.	17,	Decision	1/CP.	21:	Adoption	of	the	Paris	Agreement,	UNFCCC,	Report	of	the	Conference	of	the	Parties	on	its	twenty-first	session,	held	in	Paris	from	30	November	to	13	December	2015.		5	Ibid.		6	Article	4(3)	of	the	Paris	Agreement	states:	“Each	Party’s	successive	nationally	determined	contribution	will	represent	a	progression	beyond	the	Party’s	then	current	nationally	determined	
contribution	and	reflect	its	highest	possible	ambition,	reflecting	its	common	but	differentiated	responsibilities	and	respective	capabilities,	in	the	light	of	different	national	circumstances.”	(Emphasis	mine).	
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under-resourced	diplomats	paralyzed	by	geopolitical	power	plays,	hidden	value	systems,	or	zero-sum	distributional	calculations.”7		 While	government	delegates	were	in	marathon	negotiating	sessions	trying	to	conclude	the	Paris	Agreement,	banks,	corporations,	think	tanks,	consultancies,	and	various	other	organizations	were	holding	“side	events”	at	multiple	venues	across	Paris.8	At	the	Climate	Summit	for	Local	Leaders,	mayors	from	around	the	world	gathered	to	discuss	climate	change	and	to	highlight	the	significant	role	that	cities	play	in	reducing	GHG	emissions	and	increasing	society’s	resilience	to	the	impacts	of	climate	change.	At	the	end	of	the	summit,	the	city	leaders	delivered	a	declaration	intended	to	“demonstrate	their	global	leadership	on	climate	policies”.9		Mayors	who	signed	the	Paris	City	Hall	Declaration	undertook	commitments	to	“[a]dvance	and	exceed	the	expected	goals	of	the	2015	Paris	Agreement”	and	“deliver	up	to	3.7	gigatons	of	urban	[GHG]	emissions	reductions	annually	by	2030	–	the	equivalent	of	up	to	30%	of	the	difference	between	current	national	commitments	and	the	2	degree	emissions	reduction	pathway	identified	by	the	scientific	community”.10	Following	the	Paris	City	Hall	Declaration,	the	Lima-Paris	Action	Agenda	(Focus	on	Cities)	proposed	a	Five	Year	Vision	to	accelerate	climate	action	in	cities.11	The	aim	is	that,	by	the	year	2020,	“local	action	and	partnerships	should	be	the	new	norm	globally”.12	In	an	interview	with	the	Financial	Times,	the	mayor	of	Paris,	Anne	Hidalgo,	said,	“[cities]	are	more	practical;	we	have	the	capacity	to	act	faster	and	the	decisions	are	closer	to	reality.	We	can	mobilize	all	actors,	public	and	private…[which	is]more	complicated	for	the	state.”13		Mayor	Hidalgo’s	opinion	captures	the	essence	of	how	cities	perceive	and	situate	themselves	within	the	contemporary	global	effort	to	govern	climate	change.	Cities	do	not	claim	to	be	simply	implementers	of	international	climate	policy;	they																																																									7	Joost	Pauwelyn,	Ramses	Wessel	and	Jan	Wouters,	‘Informal	International	Lawmaking:	An	Assessment	and	Template	to	Keep	it	Both	Effective	and	Accountable’	in	Joost	Pauwelyn,	Ramses	Wessel	and	Jan	Wouters	(eds),	Informal	International	Lawmaking	(Oxford	University	Press	2012),	pg.	526.		8	For	details	of	the	official	side	events	coordinated	by	the	UNFCCC	secretariat	as	well	as	events	independently	organized	by	observer	organizations	relating	to	the	climate	change	negotiation	process,	see	UNFCCC,	Side	Events	and	Exhibits	One	Stop	Shop,	online:	http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/ngo/items/9325.php#Side%20events	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).		9	Climate	Summit	for	Local	Leaders:	Cities	for	Climate	(4	December	2015),	online:	http://climatesummitlocalleaders.paris	(accessed	on	1	March	2016).		10	Paris	City	Hall	Declaration:	A	decisive	contribution	to	COP21,	online:	http://climatesummitlocalleaders.paris/content/uploads/sites/16/2016/01/CLIMATE-SUMMIT-LOCAL-LEADERS-POLITICAL-DECLARATION-PARIS-DEC-4-2015.pdf	(accessed	on	1	March	2016).	11	Lima-Paris	Climate	Agenda,	“Cities	and	Regions	Launch	Major	Five-Year	Vision	to	Take	Action	on	Climate	Change”,	online:	http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa/cities-subnationals/lpaa-focus-cities-regions-across-the-world-unite-to-launch-major-five-year-vision-to-take-action-on-climate-change/	(accessed	on	1	March	2016).	12	Lima-Paris	Climate	Agenda,	“A	5-Year	Vision”,	online:	http://newsroom.unfccc.int/media/544092/lpaa-five-year-vision.pdf,	pg.	4	(accessed	on	1	March	2016).	13	Michael	Stothard,	‘Mayors	call	for	more	powers	to	fight	climate	change’	Financial	Times	(4	December	2015).	
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have	positioned	themselves	as	central	participants	and	stakeholders	of	the	global	climate	governance	effort	in	their	own	right.14	While	early	efforts	by	cities	to	address	climate	change	(1990s-	early	2000s)	were	mainly	concerned	with	driving	local	action	in	the	face	of	national	recalcitrance	and	stalemate	in	international	negotiations,	cities	today	aim	to	play	a	prominent	role	in	global	climate	change	governance	including	the	formal	international	lawmaking	process	–	the	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	(UNFCCC).15		The	ambition	to	take	on	a	global	role	may	be	viewed	as	a	natural	extension	of	the	increasingly	significant	participation	of	cities	in	multi-level	climate	governance	arrangements,	particularly	in	the	European	Union	(EU).	Within	the	EU,	cities	such	as	Southampton	(United	Kingdom)	and	Munich	(Germany)	are	leading	in	terms	of	their	development	of	local	climate	change	strategies	as	well	as	their	active	engagement	in	climate	protection	networks	such	as	Climate	Alliance	and	Energy	Cities.16	As	authority	within	the	EU	has	not	only	shifted	upwards	from	member	states	to	European	institutions	but	has	also	dispersed	downwards	to	sub-national	levels,	municipal	networks	cooperate	with	each	other	to	increase	their	influence	and	solicit	EU	funding.17	At	the	same	time,	these	networks	can	help	the	European	Commission	implement	EU	policies	through	the	exchange	of	best	practices	and	the	promulgation	of	standards	which	member	cities	are	required	to	implement.18	In	brief,	cities	have	evolved	from	being	“passive	implementers”	to	“active	co-decision	makers”	in	the	EU	climate	governance	context.19	Their	experience	of	working	across	various	levels	of	governance	and	cooperating	through	networks	to	develop	and	implement	governance	initiatives	has	created	fertile	ground	for	“up-scaling”	these	efforts	to	the	transnational	level.			 	 As	global	governors,	i.e.	“authorities	who	exercise	power	across	borders	for	
																																																								14	Michele	Acuto,	‘The	new	climate	leaders?’	(2013)	39	Review	of	International	Studies	835.	15	It	should	also	be	noted	that	earlier	urban	climate	action	efforts	primarily	focused	on	ways	to	link	climate	change	to	issues	already	on	the	local	agenda	such	as	improving	air	quality.	Since	the	2000s,	there	have	been	shifts	in	cities’	climate	governance	agendas	towards	the	need	to	scale	localized	actions	and	impacts	up	to	the	global	level	in	order	to	achieve	aggregate	global	effects;	Harriet	Bulkeley,	‘Cities	and	the	Governing	of	Climate	Change’	(2010)	35	Annual	Review	of	Environment	and	Resources	229.			16	In	terms	of	number	of	members,	Climate	Alliance	claims	to	be	the	“largest	European	city	network	dedicated	to	climate	action”;	Climate	Alliance,	“About	Us”,	online:	http://www.climatealliance.org/about-us.html;	Energy	Cities	is	a	European	network	of	local	authorities	focuses	on	energy	transition	and	sustainable	energy.	Amongst	its	key	objectives	is	“to	represent	[local	authorities’]	interests	and	influence	the	policies	and	proposals	made	by	European	Union	institutions	in	the	fields	of	energy,	environmental	protection	and	urban	policy”;	Energy	Cities,	“Main	Objectives”,	online:	http://www.energy-cities.eu/-Association,8-	(accessed	on	1	March	2016).	17	Kristine	Kern	and	Harriet	Bulkeley,	‘Cities,	Europeanization	and	multi-level	governance:	Governing	climate	change	through	transnational	municipal	networks’	(2009)	47	Journal	of	Common	Market	Studies	309,	pg.	313.		18	Ibid.		19	Kristine	Kern	and	Arthur	P.J.	Mol,	‘Cities	and	Global	Climate	Governance:	From	Passive	Implementers	to	Active	Co-Decision-Makers’	in	Mary	Kaldor	and	Joseph	E.	Stiglitz	(eds),	The	Quest	for	
Security:	Protection	Without	Protectionism	and	the	Challenge	of	Global	Governance	(Columbia	University	Press	2013),	pg.	288.	
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purposes	of	affecting	policy”20,	cities	have	created	networks	that	connect	thousands	of	cities	across	the	globe.	These	networks	operate	across	the	public-private	divide,	forming	partnerships	and	cooperating	with	other	actors,	be	they	multinational	corporations,	global	non-governmental	organizations	(NGOs)	or	philanthropic	foundations.21	They	seek	to	distil	and	disseminate	authoritative	and	credible	information	to	their	member	cities	throughout	the	world.	The	networks	also	aggregate	the	influence	of	cities	so	that	they	have	a	more	prominent	collective	voice	in	international	forums	such	as	the	UNFCCC.	 	 	 	 	 		 	 There	are	four	transnational	networks	working	in	the	area	of	city-focused	and	city-driven	climate	governance:	ICLEI-	Local	Governments	for	Sustainability	(ICLEI),	United	Cities	and	Local	Government	(UCLG),	the	World	Mayors	Council	on	Climate	Change	and	the	C40	Cities	Climate	Leadership	Group	(C40).	Through	these	networks,	cities	around	the	world	create	physical	and	virtual	platforms	to	share	best	practices	and	experience.	They	utilize	information	and	communication	technologies	to	create	collective	knowledge	as	well	as	enhance	transparency,	which	in	turn	fosters	legitimacy.22	For	ease	of	reference,	this	thesis	will	refer	to	these	transnational	networks	of	cities	as	city	networks.	 		 	 	 	 		 	 Briefly,	ICLEI	coordinates	local	government	representation	in	several	UN	processes	related	to	Agenda	21	and	the	Habitat	Agenda.23	It	has	observer	status	at	the	UNFCCC	and	has	been	a	leading	advocate	for	greater	recognition	of	the	role	of	local	and	subnational	governments	in	the	international	climate	change	regime.24	UCLG’s	stated	mission	is	“to	be	the	united	voice	and	world	advocate	of	democratic	local	self-government”	and	it	facilitates	programmes	and	partnerships	to	build	the	capacity	of	local	governments.25	UCLG’s	global	agenda	includes	disaster	risk	reduction,	the	2030	Agenda	for	Sustainable	Development,	water	and	sanitation,	and	climate	change.26	The	third	network	is	the	World	Mayors	Council	on	Climate	Change,	founded	in	December	2005	by	the	mayor	of	Kyoto	(Japan)	soon	after	the	Kyoto	
																																																								20	Deborah	D.	Avant,	Martha	Finnemore	and	Susan	K.	Sell	(eds),	Who	Governs	the	Globe?	(Cambridge	University	Press	2010),	pg.	2.		21	See	discussion	in	Chapter	5.		22	An	example	drawn	from	Chapter	5	is	the	carbonn	Climate	Registry.	This	is	an	online	reporting	platform	that	allows	subnational	governments	to	publicly	report	their	climate	actions.	Anyone	with	an	Internet	connection	can	gain	access	to	the	carbon	Climate	Registry	to	monitor	whether	a	city	has	fulfilled	its	climate	action	commitments.	Such	transparency	mechanisms	allow	the	media,	civil	society	and	citizens	to	play	a	quasi-monitoring	and	enforcement	function.	On	its	website,	carbonn	
Climate	Registry	is	described	as	“designed	as	the	global	response	of	local	and	subnational	governments	towards	measurable,	reportable	and	verifiable	climate	action”;	online:	http://carbonn.org	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	23	ICLEI,	“Recognizing,	engaging	and	resourcing	local	governments”,	online:	http://www.iclei.org/activities/advocacy.html	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	24	ICLEI	at	COP21,	online:	http://www.iclei.org/activities/advocacy/cop21.html	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	In	2010,	the	Cancun	Agreements	recognized	local	and	subnational	governments	as	“governmental	stakeholders”	of	the	UNFCCC	regime;	Decision	1/CP.16	The	Cancun	Agreements:	Outcome	of	the	work.	25	United	Cities	and	Local	Government,	online:	https://www.uclg.org/en	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).		26	Ibid.		
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Protocol	entered	into	force	in	February	2005.27	The	network	receives	technical	and	strategic	support	from	ICLEI.28	Since	the	adoption	of	the	2012	Seoul	Declaration	of	Local	Governments	on	Energy	and	Climate	Mitigation,	the	World	Mayors	Council	on	Climate	Change	has	been	relatively	quiet	and	primarily	involved	in	supporting	other	networks	(e.g.	ICLEI)	and	initiatives	such	as	the	Compact	of	Mayors	(which	will	be	discussed	in	detail	later).29	Finally,	C40	can	be	described	as	being	the	most	well	known	network	of	cities	addressing	climate	change.	C40	has	rapidly	gained	prominence	because	of	its	unique	focus	on	global	cities	and	climate	change	(while	the	other	three	networks	address	climate	change	as	one	of	many	issue	areas	that	they	work	in)	as	well	as	the	partnerships	it	has	fostered	with	high-profile	organizations	such	as	the	World	Bank	and	the	Clinton	Foundation.30	This	thesis	will	focus	on	C40	because	its	global	city	membership	and	modus	operandi	renders	it	well	suited	for	a	study	of	how	global	cities	engage	in	hybrid	public-private	governance	arrangements	in	addressing	climate	change	and	how	these	arrangements	produce	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards.		 	 		 	 The	United	Nations	(UN)	has	also	embraced	the	urban	agenda.	For	example,	in	support	of	the	above-mentioned	Five	Year	Vision,	the	UN	has	formed	a	“sub-national	action	hub”	that	will	entail	a	wide	mobilization	of	UN	agencies	to	help	cities	and	regions	increase	the	scale	and	number	of	climate	actions	and	plans.31	Cities	are	also	working	directly	with	international	organizations	like	the	UN	Human	Settlements	Programme	(UN-Habitat)	and	the	World	Bank	to	address	climate	change	as	part	of	a	larger,	multi-pronged	urban	sustainable	development	agenda.32	In	doing	so,	cities	are	engaging	in	transnational	relations	that	bypass	states	and	forging	a	direct	link	between	the	local	level	and	international	organizations.		
2. The	Subject	Matter	of	this	Thesis:	The	Lawmaking	Role	of	Cities	in	
Transnational	Climate	Change	Governance			 While	there	is	a	large	body	of	literature	on	“cities	and	climate	change	governance”	that	continues	to	grow	rapidly,	few	scholars	have	considered	the	legal	effect	and	normative	relevance	of	cities’	governance	activities.33	This	thesis	aims	to																																																									27	World	Mayors	Council	on	Climate	Change,	online:	http://www.worldmayorscouncil.org/home.html	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	28	Ibid.		29	2012	Seoul	Declaration	of	Local	Governments	on	Energy	and	Climate	Mitigation,	online:	http://www.worldmayorscouncil.org/fileadmin/Documents/Seoul/2012_SeoulDeclaration_ofLocalGovernments_onEnergyandClimateMitigation.pdf	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	30	See	discussion	in	Chapter	5.		31	Lima-Paris	Climate	Agenda,	“Cities	and	Regions	Launch	Major	Five-Year	Vision	to	Take	Action	on	Climate	Change.”	The	UN	agencies	include	the	UN	Environment	Programme	(UNEP),	the	UN	Development	Programme	(UNDP),	UN-Habitat,	the	World	Health	Organization	(WHO),	the	World	Bank	and	the	UN	Industrial	Development	Organization	(UNIDO).		32	For	example,	the	Low	Carbon,	Livable	Cities	initiative	sees	the	World	Bank	eschewing	the	traditional	approach	of	multilateral	cooperation	and	bypassing	the	state	to	work	directly	with	city	officials;	see	discussion	in	Part	3	of	Chapter	3.		33	On	cities	and	climate	change,	see	for	example,	Michele	M.	Betsill	and	Harriet	Bulkeley,	‘Transnational	Networks	and	Global	Environmental	Governance:	The	Cities	for	Climate	Protection	
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fill	this	gap	in	the	literature	by	examining	the	emergence	of	cities	as	actors	that	are	producing	and	implementing	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	that	transcend	state	boundaries	to	steer	the	behavior	of	cities	towards	reducing	GHG	emissions	and	developing	low	carbon	alternatives	for	the	future.	These	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	impose	limitations	on	how	cities	develop	by	requiring	them	to	take	climate	risks	into	account	and	to	consciously	develop	practices,	policies	and	regulations	to	reduce	their	emissions	of	harmful	GHGs	from,	for	example,	landfills,	transportation	systems	and	buildings.	On	this	basis	of	the	impact	or	effect	that	voluntary	standards	and	practices	have	on	cities	and	their	authorities,	it	can	be	argued	that	they	constitute	normative	products.		In	this	thesis,	I	adopt	a	pluralistic	conception	of	what	constitutes	law	and	therefore	use	the	term	law	in	a	broader	sense.34	It	includes	statements	and	guidelines	that	are	not,	strictly	speaking,	part	of	law	but	would	be	considered	part	of	a	broader	normative	or	legal	process.	The	divide	between	law	and	non-law	has	been	the	subject	of	long-standing	discourse	amongst	legal	theorists	and	I	do	not	intend	to	delve	into	that	debate.	This	thesis	situates	itself	firmly	within	the	tradition	that	eschews	a	binary	conception	of	law	(i.e.	an	instrument	is	either	law	or	it	is	not)	and	regards	legal	normativity	as	a	sliding	scale	of	varying	degrees	of	normativity.35	Within	this	tradition	are	the	‘law	as	process’	school	and	the	New	Haven	school	of	international	law.	Former	president	of	the	International	Court	of	Justice	Rosalyn	Higgins,	for	example,	is	a	proponent	of	‘law	as	process’	and	has	argued	that	“[i]nternational	law	is	not	rules”	or	“accumulated	past	decisions”	but	a	continuous	process	from	the	formation	of	rules	to	their	refinement	through	specific	application	by	various	actors	including	governments,	multinational	corporations,	international	
																																																																																																																																																																					Program’	48	International	Studies	Quarterley	471;	Harriet	Bulkeley	and	Michele	Betsill,	‘Rethinking	Sustainable	Cities:	Multilevel	Governance	and	the	'Urban'	Politics	of	Climate	Change’	(2005)	14	Environmmental	Politics	42;	Ute	Collier,	‘Local	authorities	and	climate	protection	in	the	European	Union:	Putting	subsidiarity	into	practice?’	(1997)	2	Local	Environment	39;	Gard	Lindseth,	‘The	Cities	for	Climate	Protection	Campaign	(CCPC)	and	the	framing	of	Local	Climate	Policy’	9	Local	Environment	325;	Renske	den	Exter,	Jennifer	Lenhart	and	Kristine		Kern,	‘Governing	climate	change	in	Dutch	cities:	anchoring	local	climate	strategies	in	organisation,	policy	and	practical	implementation	’	(2014)	Local	Environment:	The	International	Journal	of	Justice	and	Sustainability;	Joyeeta	Gupta,	Ralph	Lasage	and	Tjeerd	Stam,	‘National	Efforts	to	enhance	local	climate	polict	in	the	Netherlands’	(2007)	4	Environmental	Sciences	171;	Heleen	Lydeke	P.	Mees	and	Peter	P.	J.	Driessen,	‘Adaptation	to	climate	change	in	urban	areas:	Climate-greening	London,	Rotterdam,	and	Toronto’	(2011)	2	Climate	Law	251.	34	On	legal	pluralism,	see	e.g.,	Paul	Schiff	Berman,	Global	Legal	Pluralism:	A	Jurisprudence	of	Law	
beyond	Borders	(Cambridge	University	Press	2014);	Balakrishnan	Rajagopal,	‘The	Role	of	Law	in	Counter-hegemonic	Globalization	and	Global	Legal	Pluralism:	Lessons	from	the	Narmada	Valley	Struggle	in	India’	(2005)	18	Leiden	Journal	of	International	Law	345;	Gunther	Teubner,	‘’Global	Bukowina’:	Legal	Pluralism	in	the	World	Society’	in	Gunther	Teubner	(ed),	Global	Law	Without	a	
State	(Dartmouth	Publishing	Company	1997);	For	a	critique	of	the	lack	of	continuity	between	“global	legal	pluralism”	and	the	older	anthropological	and	socio-legal	accounts	of	legal	pluralism,	see	William	Twining,	“Normative	and	Legal	Pluralism:	A	Global	Perspective”	(2010)	Duke	Journal	of	International	and	Comparative	Law	473-517.	35	For	a	binary	conception	of	law,	see	Jan	Klabbers,	‘The	Redundancy	of	Soft	Law’	(1996)	65	Nordic	Journal	of	International	Law	167.	
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courts	and	tribunals.36	According	to	the	New	Haven	school,	lawmaking	is	a	“process	of	authoritative	decision	by	which	members	of	a	community	clarify	and	secure	their	common	interests.”37	It	is	a	broad	social	phenomenon	deeply	embedded	in	the	practices	and	beliefs	of	a	society	and	shaped	by	interactions	within	and	amongst	societies.38	Adopting	these	conceptions	of	international	lawmaking,	this	thesis	argues	that	when	cities	construct	and	implement	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards,	they	are	making	and	implementing	law.	The	emergence	of	cities	as	jurisgenerative	actors	in	the	context	of	transnational	climate	change	governance	is	the	focus	of	this	thesis.39	The	participation	of	cities	in	transnational	legal	processes	invites	us	to	reexamine	theories	of	international	lawmaking	that	posit	the	state	as	the	only	legally	relevant	actor	in	international	affairs.	From	a	classical	international	law	perspective,	a	city	does	not	have	international	legal	personality	as	it	is	deemed	to	be	a	part	of	the	state	in	which	it	is	physically	and	jurisdictionally	embedded.	Therefore,	according	to	classical	international	law,	the	actions	of	cities	are	attributable	solely	to	their	states.	If	Rotterdam	undertakes	to	reduce	its	GHG	emissions,	it	simply	counts	towards	the	Netherlands’	international	legal	obligations	to	mitigate	climate	change	and	does	not	have	independent	relevance	for	the	purposes	of	public	international	law.	The	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	that	cities	develop	and	convey	through	their	transnational	networks	are	also	not	recognized	to	be	international	law,	as	they	are	not	amongst	the	traditional	sources	identified	in	Article	38(1)	of	the	Statute	of	the	International	Court	of	Justice.		However,	in	the	first	decade	of	the	twenty-first	century,	international	law	scholars	(and	those	studying	law	and	globalization	more	generally)	increasingly	recognize	that	we	inhabit	a	world	of	multiple	normative	communities.	After	globalization,	privatization	and	trade	liberalization	swept	through	the	world	in	the	1980s	and	1990s,	regulation	and	standard	setting	have	ceased	to	be	the	exclusive	domain	of	states	and	international	organizations.	Business	actors,	professional	associations	and	NGOs	have	become	involved	in	developing	and	implementing	regulatory	initiatives	and	voluntary	codes	of	conduct,	for	example.40	Of	course,	these																																																									36	Rosalyn	Higgins,	Problems	and	Process:	International	Law	and	How	We	Use	It	(Clarendon	Press	1995),	pgs.	2-3.		37	Harold	D.	Lasswell	and	Myres	S.	McDougal,	Jurisprudence	for	a	Free	Society:	Studies	in	Law,	Science	
and	Policy	(Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers	1992),	pg.	xxi.	38	Levit	offers	an	account	of	“bottom-up	international	lawmaking”	in	which	lawmaking	“is	a	process	whereby	practices	and	behaviors	gel	as	law”	and	both	public	and	private	actors	“join	with	others	similarly	situated	in	avocation	(although	often	quite	distant	in	location)	to	share	experiences	and	standardize	practices	towards	shared	goals”;	Janet	Koven	Levit,	‘Bottom-up	International	Lawmaking:	Reflections	on	the	New	Haven	School	of	International	Law’	(2007)	32	Yale	Journal	of	International	Law	393,	pg.	409.		39	Steven	Wheatley	argues,	“the	defining	characteristic	of	a	non-state	‘jurisgenerative’	actor	is	its	capacity	to	establish	international	governance	norms	that	frame	the	context	for	action	by	states,	corporate	entities	and	individuals”.	Further,	it	can	be	said	that	non-state	actors	exercise	political	authority,	an	activity	traditionally	associated	with	the	state,	when	their	jurisgenerative	efforts	have	practical	effect;	Steven	Wheatley,	‘Democratic	governance	beyond	the	state:	the	legitimacy	of	non-state	actors	as	standard	setters’	in	Anne	Peters	et	al	(eds.),	Non-State	Actors	as	Standard	Setters	(Cambridge	University	Press	2009),	pg.	220.		40	See	Part	2	of	Chapter	6	for	discussion.		
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norms	have	varying	degrees	of	impact,	“but	it	has	become	clear	that	ignoring	such	normative	assertions	as	somehow	not	‘law’	is	not	a	useful	strategy”.41	Accordingly,	what	we	see	emerging	are	approaches	to	international	law	drawn	from	legal	pluralism	and	transnationalism.	Through	its	examination	of	cities	as	an	emerging	normative	community	in	the	sphere	of	transnational	climate	change	governance,	this	thesis	seeks	to	contribute	to	the	larger	discussions	about	the	evolving	nature	of	the	state	and	international	lawmaking	processes	in	a	world	of	increasing	global	pluralist	governance.42		This	thesis	is	also	likely	to	be	of	interest	to	scholars	of	climate	change	policy.	As	mentioned	earlier,	there	already	exists	an	abundant	literature	on	cities	and	climate	change.	There	are	numerous	studies	on	the	opportunities	and	barriers	that	cities	face	in	mitigating	and	adapting	to	climate	change,	comparative	case	studies,	and	analysis	of	urban	participation	in	hybrid	governance	initiatives.43	However,	to	the	best	of	my	knowledge,	none	have	considered	the	role	of	cities	as	norm-setters	and	the	legal	meaning	of	the	climate	governance	activities	in	which	cities	engage.	None	have	also,	to	the	best	of	my	knowledge,	considered	the	interaction	between	the	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	that	cities	have	generated	and	are	putting	into	effect	and	traditional	sources	of	climate	law	such	as	the	COP	decisions	of	the	UNFCCC	and	the	recently	concluded	Paris	Agreement.	This	thesis	therefore	attempts	to	shed	light	on	the	transnational	lawmaking	dimension	of	the	role	that	cities	play	in	governing	climate	change.	I	hope	that	this	thesis	will	enrich	our	understanding	of	a	complex	world	prolific	with	climate	change	governance	experiments	that	involve	many	public	and	private	actors.		
	
2.1	The	Focus	on	Global	Cities			 Thousands	of	cities	are	members	of	networks	like	the	C40,	the	Covenant	of	Mayors	for	Climate	and	Energy44,	Carbon	Neutral	Cities	Alliance45,	and	Eurocities46																																																									41	Paul	Schiff	Berman,	‘A	Pluralist	Approach	to	International	Law’	(2007)	32	Yale	Journal	of	International	Law	301,	pg	302.		42	For	discussion	of	pluralist	global	governance,	see	Grainne	de	Burca,	Robert	O.	Keohane	and	Charles	Sabel,	‘New	Modes	of	Pluralist	Global	Governance’	(2013)	45	New	York	University	Journal	of	International	Law	and	Politics	723.		43	In	addition	to	the	works	listed	in	Footnote	33,	see	e.g.	Melissa	Powers,	‘US	municipal	climate	plans:	what	role	will	cities	play	in	climate	change	mitigation’	and	Elizabeth	Schwartz,	‘Local	solutions	to	a	global	problem?	Climate	change	policy-making	in	Vancouver’	in	Local	Climate	Change	Law:	
Environmental	Regulation	in	Cities	and	Other	Localities	(Benjamin		Richardson	ed,	Edward	Elgar	Publishing	2012);	Mikael	Granberg	and	Ingemar	Elander,	‘Local	Governance	and	Climate	Change:	Reflections	on	the	Swedish	Experience’	(2007)	12	Local	Environment	537;	Benjamin	J.	Deangelo	and	L.	D.	Danny	Harvey,	‘The	jurisdictional	framework	for	municipal	action	to	reduce	greenhouse	gas	emissions:	Case	studies	from	Canada,	the	USA	and	Germany’	(1998)	3	Local	Environment	111.		44	The	European	Commission	launched	the	Covenant	of	Mayors	for	Climate	and	Energy	after	the	adoption	of	the	EU	Climate	and	Energy	Package	in	2008	to	support	local	authorities	in	the	implementation	of	climate	mitigation	and	sustainable	energy	plans.	Members	of	the	Covenant	of	Mayors	are	eligible	for	funding	opportunities	availed	by	the	Committee	of	Regions	and	the	European	Investment	Bank.	To	become	a	member	of	the	Covenant	of	Mayors,	a	local	authority	must	give	a	formal	undertaking	to	prepare	a	baseline	emissions	inventory,	submit	a	sustainable	energy	action	plan	and	submit	an	implementation	status	report	at	least	once	every	second	year	after	submission	of	
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to	name	a	few.	These	networks	have	emerged	to	facilitate	the	exchange	of	ideas,	information	and	best	practices	amongst	cities.	Some	networks	also	seek	to	give	collective	representation	to	urban	interests	and	engage	in	political	advocacy	at	the	international	level	(e.g.	ICLEI)	and	at	the	regional	level	(e.g.	Eurocities).	Many	mid-sized	cities	are	members	of	multiple	networks	and,	at	some	point,	may	decide	to	consolidate	their	resources	and	focus	on	participating	in	networks	that	confer	the	most	benefits.47	Many	cities	are	not	likely	to	have	the	resources	to	participate	in	transnational	networks	that	are	geared	towards	scaling	up	city	climate	actions	to	the	global	level.	For	example,	a	vice-mayor	of	a	mid-sized	city	in	Greece	shared	in	an	interview	that	her	city	participated	in	many	networks.	In	2016,	the	mayor’s	office	decided	that	it	was	a	priority	for	the	city	to	become	a	member	of	Eurocities,	the	regional	network	that	is	the	active	lobbyist	for	urban	interests	at	the	EU	level.48	The	annual	membership	fee	of	fifteen	thousand	euros	is	considered	hefty	for	a	city	of	its	size.	The	city’s	government	therefore	decided	to	withdraw	from	all	networks	that	require	membership	fees	in	order	to	pay	for	Eurocities	membership.	As	such,	a	working	assumption	I	adopted	at	an	early	stage	of	research	for	this	thesis	is	that	not	all	cities	have	the	motivation	and/or	the	resources	to	become	globally	relevant	actors	in	climate	governance.		Based	on	desktop	reviews	of	the	existing	literature	and	empirical	findings	drawn	from	field	visits	and	interviews,	it	became	clear	early	on	in	my	research	that	the	cities	that	are	proactive	leaders	in	the	climate	change	arena	tend	to	be	cities	that																																																																																																																																																																						the	sustainable	energy	action	plan.	Signatories	face	the	possibility	of	suspension	if	they	fail	to	submit	the	requisite	documents	within	established	deadlines.	See	the	Covenant	of	Mayors	for	Climate	and	Energy,	“Commitment	Document”,	online:	http://www.covenantofmayors.eu/IMG/pdf/CoM_CommitmentDocument_en.pdf	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).		45	The	Carbon	Neutral	Cities	Alliance	is	a	project	of	the	Urban	Sustainability	Directors	Network,	which	is	a	“peer-to-peer	network	of	local	government	professionals”	from	cities	across	North	America.	On	27	March	2015,	the	mayors	of	17	major	cities	(nearly	half	of	which	are	US	cities	including	Boston,	Washington	DC	and	New	York	City)	announced	the	launch	of	this	alliance	which	will	work	with	member	cities	to	achieve	the	goal	of	reducing	their	GHG	emissions	by	at	least	80%	by	2050	or	sooner.	See	Carbon	Neutral	Cities	Alliance,	online:	http://usdn.org/public/page/13/CNCA	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).		46	Eurocities	works	across	a	range	of	areas	including	environmental	sustainability,	social	cohesion	and	culture.	Its	“objective	is	to	reinforce	the	important	role	that	local	governments	should	play	in	a	multilevel	governance	structure”	and	to	represent	the	interests	of	municipal	authorities	at	the	EU	level.	The	Eurocities	project	team	monitors	relevant	EU	funding	calls	and	provide	members	with	funding	forecasts,	briefs	and	opportunities	to	find	project	partners.	Eurocities	also	works	with	EU	institutions	and	national	governments	to	ensure	that	EU	legislation	can	be	properly	implemented	at	the	local	level.	See	Eurocities,	online:	http://www.eurocities.eu/eurocities/about_us	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	47	Acuto	and	his	colleagues	have	made	a	similar	observation.	They	argue	that	the	vast	number	of	networks	presents	city	governments	with	the	dilemma	of	deciding	where	they	should	focus	their	networking	efforts,	bearing	in	mind	that	the	more	networks	a	city	participates	in,	the	greater	the	burden	placed	on	an	already	stretched	municipal	government	for	communication,	reporting	and	collaborative	engagement;	Michele	Acuto,	Mika	Morissette	and	Agis	Tsouros,	‘City	diplomacy:	Towards	More	Strategic	Networking?	Learning	with	WHO	Healthy	Cities’	(2016)	Global	Policy	DOI:	10.1111/1758-5899.12382.		48	Interview	No.	7.			
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command	significant	political	and	economic	resources.	These	cities	are	often	hubs	of	global	trade,	transnational	capital,	and	cultural	flows.	In	other	words,	the	cities	that	are	leading	the	current	wave	of	urban	climate	action	are	what	Saskia	Sassen	calls	
global	cities.	Sassen	defines	today’s	global	cities	as	“(1)	command	points	in	the	organization	of	the	world	economy,	(2)	key	locations	and	marketplaces	for	the	leading	industries	of	the	current	period	–	finance	and	specialized	services	for	firms,	and	(3)	major	sites	of	production,	including	the	production	of	innovations…”	According	to	this	model,	there	is	no	such	thing	as	a	single	global	city	or	the	global	economy.49	Global	cities	must	interact	with	each	other	in	order	to	fulfill	the	role	of	coordinating	and	providing	services	to	multinational	corporations	and	even	whole	economies	that	are	increasingly	transnational.	Such	interactions	amongst	cities	create	“inter-urban	networks”	or	“circuits	that	crisscross	the	world…that	connect	specific	areas,	most	of	which	are	cities”.50	For	Sassen,	‘global	city’	is	not	a	descriptive	term	for	a	distinctive	urban	form:	“It	is	an	analytic	construct	that	allows	one	to	detect	the	global	as	it	is	filtered	through	the	specifics	of	a	place,	its	institutional	orders,	and	its	socio-spatial	fragmentations.”51	In	other	words,	given	that	the	globalization	processes	create	global	cities	which,	in	turn,	are	territorial	spaces	in	which	the	processes	of	globalization	unfold	and	affect	local	communities,	the	global	city	is	a	theoretical	prism	through	which	the	connections	between	cities	and	globalization	can	be	studied.52		In	examining	the	rise	of	cities	as	transnational	governance	actors	in	this	thesis,	I	have	broadly	adopted	Sassen’s	conception	of	the	global	city	and	chosen	to	focus	on	the	role	of	global	cities	in	governing	climate	change	because	these	are	the	cities	that	are	seeking	to	assert	themselves	as	globally	relevant	actors.	This	choice	also	has	the	benefit	of	circumscribing	the	scope	of	this	thesis	so	as	to	ensure	that	the	research	agenda	is	a	feasible	and	realistic	one	given	the	constraints	of	time	and	resources.			
2.2	Defining	Transnational	Climate	Change	Governance	
	
	 Throughout	this	thesis,	I	will	refer	to	the	concept	of	transnational	climate	change	governance.	To	grasp	this	concept	requires	us	to	engage	with	its	three	core	components	-	transnationalism,	climate	change	and	governance	–	which	provide	a	rich	vocabulary	to	explore	and	analyze	the	involvement	of	multiple	actors	(apart	from	states	and	international	organizations)	in	governing	climate	change.	I	will	
																																																								49	Saskia	Sassen,	Cities	in	a	World	Economy	(4th	edn,	Sage	Publications	2012),	pgs.	7,	111.	50	Ibid,	pg.	111.	Different	circuits	will	include	different	countries	and	cities.	The	circuit	for	the	global	coffee	trade	(including	trading	coffee	as	a	commodity,	selling	it	as	a	consumer	product,	and	coffee	futures	trading,	for	example)	involves	cities	and	countries	that	are	different	from	those	in	the	circuit	for	the	biofuels	production	and	sale.	Sassen	points	out	that	the	proliferation	of	circuits	is	not	solely	driven	by	economic	forces.	Non-governmental	organizations	working	for	labour	rights	and	environmental	protection	also	create	and	develop	networks	(Sassen,	Cities	in	a	World	Economy,	pg.	113).		51	Ibid,	pg.	x.	52	The	concept	of	the	global	city	will	be	elaborated	upon	in	Chapter	2.	
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briefly	sketch	out	how	each	core	component	informs	my	understanding	of	transnational	climate	change	governance.		
Transnationalism:	Transnationalism	is	well	established	in	the	field	of	international	relations	as	the	study	of	“contacts,	coalitions	and	interactions”	that	bridge,	extend	or	occur	across	state	boundaries.53	By	definition,	transnational	phenomena	involve	non-state	actors	(such	as	NGOs,	businesses,	charities,	and	religious	orders)	and	sub-state	actors	(such	as	provinces	and	municipalities).54	While	international	affairs	involve	relations	between	states,	transnational	relations	occur	between	states	and	non-state	actors	as	they	interact	across	state	borders.55		What	has	been	of	growing	interest	to	scholars	of	trasnationalism	in	recent	years	are	novel,	hybrid	governance	arrangements	that	emerge	when	various	groups,	including	business	associations,	NGOs,	and	sometimes	government	representatives,	work	together	to	draw	up	rules	to	induce	more	responsible	business	behaviour.56	The	plurality	of	actors	involved	in	these	multi-stakeholder	partnerships	has	increased	and,	as	this	thesis	will	show,	cities	now	participate	in	some	of	these	initiatives	as	partners	alongside	states	and	international	organizations.	An	example	is	the	UN-supported	Cities	Climate	Finance	Leadership	Alliance	which	brings	cities,	multilateral	financial	institutions,	private	investors,	businesses	and	policymakers	together	to	create	and	implement	recommendations	on	how	to	mobilise	greater	flows	of	capital	into	“climate-smart”	infrastructure.57	Transnational	hybrid	initiatives	have	been	the	subject	of	a	florishing	body	of	scholarship,	which	needs	to	be	understood	against	the	background	of	a	wider	debate	on	the	rise	of	“private	regulation”	in	social,	economic	and	environmental	governance.	58	It	should	be	noted																																																									53	In	the	1970s,	in	an	attempt	to	challenge	the	dominant	state-centric	view	of	world	affairs,	Joseph	Nye	and	Robert	Keohane	sought	to	bring	attention	to	the	transnational	dimensions	of	world	affairs.	Defining	“transnational	relations”	as	“contacts,	coalitions	and	interactions	across	state	boundaries	that	are	not	controlled	by	the	central	foreign	policy	organs	of	governments”,	Nye	and	Keohane	edited	a	special	issue	of	International	Organization	devoted	to	theorizing	the	impact	of	transnational	relations	on	the	interstate	system.	They	also	advocated	a	world	politics	paradigm	that	broadens	the	conception	of	actors	to	include	non-state	actors	and	sub-units	of	governments;	Jr.	Nye	Joseph	S	and	Robert	O.	Keohane,	‘Transnational	Relations	and	World	Politics:	A	Conclusion’	(1971)	25	International	Organization	721.	54	Harriet	Bulkeley	and	others,	Transnational	Climate	Change	Governance	(Cambridge	University	Press	2014),	pg.	5.	On	religious	organizations	as	transnational	actors,	see	Jeff	Haynes,	‘Transnational	religious	actors	and	international	politics’	(2001)	22	Third	world	quarterly	143;	on	cities	as	transnational	actors,	see	Michele	Acuto,	‘Global	Cities	as	Actors:	A	Rejoinder	to	Calder	and	de	Freytas’	(2009)	29	SAIS	Review	of	International	Affairs	175.	On	regions	engaging	in	paradiplomacy,	see	for	example,	Hubert	Rioux	Ouimet,	‘From	Sub-state	Nationalism	to	Subnational	Competition	States:	The	Development	and	Institutionalization	of	Commercial	Paradiplomacy	in	Scotland	and	Quebec’	(2015)	25	Regional	and	Federal	Studies	109.		55	Bulkeley	and	others,	ibid.		56	See,	for	example,	Luc	W.	Fransen	and	Ans	Kolk,	‘Global	Rule-Setting	for	Business:	A	Critical	Analysis	of	Multi-Stakeholder	Standards’	(2007)	14	Organization	667.		57	Cities	Climate	Finance	Leadership	Alliance,	‘The	Bangkok-Johannesburg	Blueprint’,	online:	http://www.citiesclimatefinance.org/2015/12/the-bangkok-johannesburg-blueprint/	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).		58	Stefano	Ponte	and	Carsten	Daugbjerg,	‘Biofuel	sustainability	and	the	formation	of	transnational	hybrid	governance’	(2015)	24	Environmental	Politics	96,	pg.	100.	On	the	rise	of	private	regulation,	
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that,	nontheless,	states	remain	central	to	transnational	processes.	As	Saskia	Sassen’s	work	has	demonstrated,	the	state	remains	a	central	political	entity	and	contributes	to	its	own	evolution	through	its	active	collaboration	with	and	enabling	of	transnational	forces.59		In	the	legal	academy,	the	concept	of	the	transnational	has	gained	traction	as	lawyers	grapple	with	the	impact	of	globalization	on	the	ways	in	which	legal	norms	are	generated,	diffused	and	applied	across	jurisdictions.	In	order	to	understand	how	transnational	law	works,	one	must	understand	transnational	legal	process,	which	Harold	Hongju	Koh	defines	as	“the	transubstantive	process…whereby	states	and	other	transnational	private	actors	use	the	blend	of	domestic	and	international	legal	process	to	internalize	international	legal	norms	into	domestic	law”.60	These	definitions	help	capture	the	essence	of	contemporary	legal	ordering	whereby	legal	norms	apply	across	borders	and	are	conveyed	through	transnational	processes.61		This	thesis	seeks	to	contribute	to	the	transnational	law	literature	by	widening	its	analytical	ambit	to	include	sub-state	actors	such	as	cities.	As	I	will	argue	later	in	this	thesis,	traditional	conceptions	of	transnational	law	such	as	Koh’s	adopt	the	“states	versus	private	actors”	dischotomy.	As	sub-state	entities,	cities	cannot	be	accurately	described	as	being	private	actors	because,	in	many	ways,	their	interests	and	modes	of	behaviour	share	greater	similarity	with	states	rather	than	private	actors	such	as	NGOs	and	businesses.	Nijman	has	argued	that,	in	constituting	their	identities	as	global	actors,	cities	imitate	the	foreign	policy	and	international	law	practices	of	states	such	as	establishing	foreign	affairs	offices	and	modelling	UCLG,	the	global	organization	of	local	governments	that	aims	to	represent	the	world’s	cities	at	the	international	level,	on	the	UN.62	One	of	the	central	claims	of	this	thesis	is	that	the	unique	status	of	the	city	as	a	sub-state	actor	ought	to	be	recognized	both	in	practice	and	in	legal	scholarship	in	order	for	more	nuanced	treatment	of	the	role	of	cities	in	transnational	legal	ordering	to	occur.		
Climate	Change:	There	is	a	body	of	sound	scientific	evidence	for	international	action	to	address	the	causes	and	impacts	of	climate	change.	According	to	the	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change	(IPCC)’s	Fifth	Assessment	Report,	we	know	with	more	than	95%	certainty	that	human	activity	is	responsible	
																																																																																																																																																																					see	for	example,	Tim	Buthe	and	Walter	Mattli,	The	New	Global	Rulers:	The	Privatization	of	Regulation	
in	the	World	Economy	(Princeton	University	Press	2011).		59	“The	national	is	still	the	realm	where	formalization	and	institutionalization	have	all	reached	their	highest	level	of	development”	but	“the	national	is	also	often	one	of	the	key	enablers	and	enactors	of	the	emergent	global	scale”;	Saskia	Sassen,	Territory,	Authority,	Rights:	From	Medieval	to	Global	
Assemblages	(Princeton	University	Press	2008),	pg.	3.		60	Harold	H	Koh,	‘Why	Transnational	Law	Matters’	(2005-6)	24	Penn	State	International	Law	Review	745,	pgs.	745-6.	61	Gregory	Shaffer,	‘A	Transnational	Take	on	Krisch’s	Pluralist	Postnational	Law’	(2012)	23	European	Journal	of	International	Law	565,	pg.	577;	also	see	Gregory	C.	Shaffer	(ed)	Transnational	Legal	
Ordering	and	State	Change	(Cambridge	University	Press	2014).	62	Janne	E.	Nijman,	‘Renaissance	of	the	City	as	Global	Actor:	The	Role	of	Foreign	Policy	and	International	Law	Practices	in	the	Construction	of	Cities	as	Global	Actors’	in	Gunther	Hellmann,	Andreas	Fahrmeir	and	Milos	Vec	(eds),	The	Transformation	of	Foreign	Policy:	Drawing	and	Managing	
Boundaries	from	Antiquity	to	the	Present	(Oxford	University	Press	2016).		
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for	the	increase	in	global	average	temperature.63	The	emission	of	GHGs,	particularly	carbon	dioxide,	is	the	dominant	cause	of	the	observed	warming	since	the	mid-20th	century.64	Economic	and	population	growth	are	the	most	important	drivers	of	increases	in	carbon	dioxide	emissions,	mainly	from	the	burning	of	fossil	fuels.	Due	to	human	activity,	the	atmospheric	concentrations	of	carbon	dioxide,	methane	and	nitrous	oxide	have	all	increased	since	1750.65	Cities	currently	account	for	over	70%	of	global	energy	use	and	are	therefore	a	key	source	of	GHG	emissions.66	The	“carbon	footprint”	of	cities	will	continue	to	increase	if	efforts	are	not	taken	to	control	and	reduce	urban	emissions	as	urbanization	is	on	the	rise.67	By	2050,	the	number	of	people	living	in	cities	is	expected	to	increase	by	2.5	to	3	billion	relative	to	2009.68		Since	the	2009	UNFCCC	COP	in	Copenhagen,	the	target	to	limit	average	global	temperature	rise	to	no	more	than	2	degree	Celsius	above	pre-industrial	levels	has	become	firmly	entrenched	in	international	climate	policy	discourse.69	In	the	Paris	Agreement,	signatory	states	committed	to	strengthen	the	global	response	to	climate	change	by	“holding	the	increase	in	the	global	average	temperature	to	well	below	2	°C	above	pre-industrial	levels	and	pursuing	efforts	to	limit	the	temperature	increase	to	1.5	°C	above	pre-industrial	levels,	recognizing	that	this	would	significantly	reduce	the	risks	and	impacts	of	climate	change.”70	Deep	cuts	in	global	GHG	emissions	are	required	to	achieve	this	goal.	In	fact,	halting	the	global	average	temperature	rise	at	any	level	will	require	net	zero	global	carbon	dioxide	emissions	at	some	point	in	the	future.	The	IPCC,	UN	Environment	Programme	(UNEP)	and	UNFCCC	have	repeatedly	emphasized	that	the	longer	we	wait	to	bend	the	currently	increasing	curve	of	global	emissions	downwards,	the	steeper	we	will	have	to	bend	it.71	Limiting	global	warming	to	below	2	degrees	Celsius	“necessitates	a	radical	transition	(deep	decarbonization	now	and	going	forward),	not	merely	a	fine	tuning	of	current	trends”.72																																																										63	T.F.	Stocker	and	others,	IPCC,	2013:	Summary	for	Policymakers	in	Climate	Change	2013:	The	Physical	
Science	Basis.	Contribution	of	Working	Group	I	to	the	Fifth	Assessment	Report	of	the	Intergovernmental	
Panel	on	Climate	Change	(Cambridge	University	Press,	2013),	pg.	15.	64	Ibid,	pg.	17.		65	Ibid,	pg.	11.	66	Cambridge	Institute	for	Sustainability	Leadership,	Cambridge	Judge	Business	School	and	ICLEI,	
Climate	Change:	Implications	for	Cities	(Key	Findings	from	the	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	
Change	Fifth	Assessment	Report)	(2014),	pg.	5,	online:	www.cisl.cam.ac.uk/ipcc	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).			67	Ibid.		68	Ibid.	69	For	discussion	of	the	history	of	the	2	degrees	Celsius	target,	see	Samuel	Randalls,	‘History	of	the	2C	climate	target’	(2010)	1	WIREs	Climate	Change	598.	In	the	first	paragraph	of	the	Copenhagen	Accord,	signatories	pledge	that	“[t]o	achieve	the	ultimate	objective	of	the	Convention	to	stabilize	greenhouse	gas	concentration	in	the	atmosphere	at	a	level	that	would	prevent	dangerous	anthropogenic	interference	with	the	climate	system,	we	shall,	recognizing	the	scientific	view	that	the	increase	in	global	temperature	should	be	below	2	degrees	Celsius…enhance	our	long-term	cooperative	action	to	combat	climate	change”;	Decision	2/CP.15.		70	Article	2(1)(a)	of	the	Paris	Agreement.		71	UNFCCC,	Report	on	the	structured	expert	dialogue	on	the	2013–2015	review:	Note	by	the	co-
facilitators	of	the	structured	expert	dialogue	(FCCC/SB/2015/INF1,	4	May	2015),	pg.	11.		72	Ibid.		
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In	this	thesis,	my	framing	broadly	presents	climate	change	as	an	environmental	problem	caused	by	socio-economic	disruptions.	The	solutions	require	fundamental	economic	and	social	transformation	such	that	climate	change	governance	must	take	place	at	multiple	scales	of	governance	and	involve	many	actors.	This	includes	cities	and	their	governments	implementing	solutions	at	the	subnational	level	and	scaling	up	their	actions	through	transnational	cooperation.	In	general,	climate	action	can	be	divided	into	two	main	categories:	mitigation	and	adaptation.	Mitigation	refers	to	measures	to	reduce	GHG	sources	and	remove	GHGs	from	the	atmosphere.73	Examples	include	improving	the	energy	efficiency	of	buildings	so	that	they	use	less	electricity	and	planting	trees	to	absorb	atmospheric	carbon.	The	IPCC	defines	adaptation	as	“[a]djustment	in	natural	or	human	systems	in	response	to	actual	or	expected	climatic	stimuli	or	their	effects,	which	moderates	harm	or	exploits	beneficial	opportunities.”74	Examples	include	strengthening	a	city’s	defences	against	flooding	risks	and	improving	the	quality	of	road	surfaces	to	withstand	higher	temperatures.	Mitigation	and	adaptation	measures	can	often	lead	to	synergies.75	For	example,	increasing	tree	cover	in	a	city	not	only	mitigates	climate	change.76	It	also	cools	the	city,	reducing	the	likelihood	of	heatstroke	as	city	inhabitants	face	hotter	summers.	Increasing	a	city’s	tree	cover	also	delivers	a	range	of	other	benefits	including	improved	air	quality	and	more	biological	diversity.77		
Governance:	At	the	most	general	level,	governance	may	be	understood	as	“issues	of	social	coordination	and	the	nature	of	all	patterns	of	rule”.78	This	level	of	generality	and	definitional	flexibility	is	one	of	the	strengths	of	the	governance	concept	as	it	allows	for	the	exploration	of	phenomena	that	do	not	fit	well	into	established	categories.	However,	such	a	broad	definition	also	occasionally	makes	it	difficult	to	define	what,	exactly,	constitutes	governance.	Further,	there	are	multiple	definitions	of	governance	in	the	literature.	For	example,	Michael	Zurn	et	al.	define	governance	as	the	sum	of	regulations,	policy	processes	and	structures,	which	are	designed	to	remedy	a	public	problem	via	a	collective	course	of	action.79	Pattberg	and	Stripple	would	consider	governance	as	a	matter	of	shaping	the	conduct	of	actors	through	the	establishment	of	new	norms	and	practices	such	as	carbon	reporting.80	For	the	purposes	of	this	thesis,	I	adopt	Andonova	et	al.’s	definition	of	(transnational)	governance:	“when	networks	operating	in	the	transnational	sphere	authoritatively	
																																																								73	IPCC,	“Climate	Change	2007:	Working	Group	II:	Impacts,	Adaptation	and	Vulnerability”,	Glossary,	online:	https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/annexessglossary-a-d.html	74	Ibid.		75	See,	for	example,	AMICA,	online:	http://www.amica-climate.net/about_amica.html	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).		76	Kenton	Rogers	and	others,	Valuing	London's	Urban	Forest:	Results	of	London	i-Tree	Eco	Project	(Treeconomics	London,	2015).		77	Ibid,	pgs.	45-50.		78	Mark	Bevir,	The	SAGE	Handbook	of	Governance	(SAGE	Publishing	2011),	pg.	1.		79	Michael	Zurn	et	al,	“Introduction”	in	Handbook	on	Multi-level	governance	(Henrik	Enderlein,	Sonja		Walti	and	Michael	Zurn	eds,	Edward	Elgar	Publishing	2010),	pg.	2.		80	Philipp	Pattberg	and	Johannes	Stripple,	‘Beyond	the	public	and	private	divide:	remapping	transnational	climate	governance	in	the	21st	century’	(2008)	8	International	Environmental	Agreements	367.	
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steer	constituents	toward	public	goals”.81	There	are	three	elements	to	this	definition	that	are	worth	noting.	First,	it	is	concerned	with	realizing	public	goals.	Secondly,	steering	connotes	the	directive	and	intentional	nature	of	governance	processes.	Thirdly,	governance	is	regarded	as	authoritative,	defined	as	“the	ability	to	induce	deference	in	others”.82		 In	summary,	transnational	climate	change	governance	occurs	when	sub-state	actors,	private	actors,	states	and	international	organizations	engage	in	cross-border	cooperation,	thereby	forming	transnational	networks	to	transmit	knowledge,	best	practices	and	expertise.	Transnational	climate	change	governance	seeks	to	authoritatively	steer	and	have	a	constraining	impact	on	the	behavior	of	target	actors.	When	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	emerge,	it	can	be	argued	that	transnational	climate	change	governance	takes	on	a	normative	dimension.	Based	on	a	pluralistic	conception	of	law	making,	the	production	of	norms	and	voluntary	standards	that	are	usually	adopted	and	implemented	through	practices	can	be	viewed	as	law.	Transnational	climate	change	governance	is	specifically	concerned	with	constraining	the	GHG-emitting	behavior	of	target	actors,	with	the	goal	of	limiting	average	global	temperature	rise	to	no	more	than	2	degree	Celsius	above	pre-industrial	levels	in	mind.	It	is	also	concerned	with	building	the	resilience	of	communities	to	the	impacts	of	climate	change	such	as	increased	flood	risks.			
2.3	Research	Questions	
	
	 Summing	up	the	discussion	so	far,	the	central	claim	of	this	thesis	is	that	cities	are	beginning	to	perform	lawmaking	functions	in	the	context	of	transnational	climate	change	governance.	Through	transnational	networks	that	form	important	linkages	between	city	governments,	states,	international	organizations,	businesses,	and	civil	society,	cities	are	creating	and	implementing	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	across	national	boundaries.	The	impact	of	their	normative	output	is	to	steer	the	behavior	of	cities	towards	mitigating	climate	change	and	adapting	to	its	unavoidable	impacts.	Further,	the	multi-level,	multi-actor	partnerships	in	which	cities	participate	actively	today	transcend	the	public/private	divide	and	the	traditional	strictures	of	“domestic”	(internal)	versus	“international”	(external).	As	such,	the	transnational	governance	activities	of	cities	also	point	to	the	reconfiguration	of	the	state	in	modern	times	–	from	a	monolithic,	unitary	entity	to	a	mutable,	variegated	one	in	a	global	system	densely	populated	by	networks	of	components	of	the	state	(for	example,	networks	comprising	of	judges,	antitrust	enforcement	agencies,	and	central	banks).83			 To	examine	and	establish	the	above	claims,	the	following	questions	guide	this	research	agenda:																																																										81	Liliana	B.	Andonova,	Michele	M.	Betsill	and	Harriet	Bulkeley,	‘Transnational	Climate	Governance’	(2009)	9	Global	Environmental	Politics	52,	pg.	56.	82	Avant,	Finnemore	and	Sell,	pg.	9.	Deference	to	authority	can	take	various	forms.	In	the	present	case,	the	authority	of	“climate	leaders”	has	tended	to	create	new	preferences	or	persuaded	other	city	leaders/mayors	to	share	the	leaders’	views	on	climate	change	and	the	possible	solutions.		83	See	Anne-Marie	Slaughter,	A	New	World	Order	(Princeton	University	Press	2005).	This	point	will	be	further	explored	in	Chapter	7.		
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	 1. What	recent	developments	suggest	the	rise	of	cities	in	international	affairs?		2. What	have	cities	been	doing	to	govern	climate	change	and	which	of	these	governance	activities	generate	normative	effects	transnationally?		 3. How	do	the	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	generated	by	cities	and	transmitted	by	their	networks	lead	to	cities	reducing	their	GHG	emissions	and	increasing	their	climate	resilience?			 4. How	do	the	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	generated	by	cities	and	transmitted	by	their	networks	relate	to	those	of	the	UNFCCC	regime?			 5. Do	cities	make	a	positive	normative	contribution	to	the	global	constellation	of	climate	change	governance	activities?			These	questions	are	complemented	by	sub-questions	in	each	chapter.		
	
3.	Methodology				 	 In	the	first	phase	of	research	for	this	thesis,	I	mapped	out	the	development	of	the	UNFCCC	regime	and	the	wider	climate	change	regime	complex	in	order	to	identify	and	situate	the	emergence	of	a	focus	on	cities	in	the	climate	change	discourse	amongst	policy-makers,	practitioners,	and	researchers.84	In	carrying	out	this	mapping	exercise,	I	relied	on	(1)	reports	and	studies	published	by	international	organizations	including	the	Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development	(OECD),	World	Bank	and	UNFCCC,	(2)	secondary	literature	including	academic	journal	articles	and	treatises,	and	(3)	literature	published	by	ICLEI.	As	mentioned	earlier,	ICLEI	has	been	a	leading	advocate	for	greater	recognition	of	the	role	of	local	and	subnational	governments	at	the	UNFCCC.			 	 		 		 	 In	the	second	phase	of	research,	I	conducted	an	extensive	desktop	review	of	the	literature	to	identify	the	reasons	for	the	emergence	of	cities	as	actors	in	transnational	climate	governance	and,	more	broadly,	in	international	affairs.	The	literature	review	included	academic	journal	articles,	monographs,	leading	newspapers	and	magazines	such	as	The	Financial	Times,	The	Guardian,	Economist	and	Foreign	Policy.	I	carefully	studied	the	working	papers	of	research	institutes	and	policy	think	tanks	as	a	source	of	emerging	trends	and	new	thinking	about	cities	and	global	affairs.	Another	source	of	materials	for	my	desktop	review	was	the	research	publications	of	international	organizations	such	as	the	World	Bank,	United	Nations	Environment	Programme	and	the	OECD.	Finally,	I	scrutinized	the	press	releases	and	other	publicly	available	materials	that	cities	and	city	networks	have	produced	in	order	to	evaluate	how	cities	and	their	networks	use	certain	language	to	construct	their	identities	as	responsible	global	actors	who	are	important	partners	in	the	global																																																									84	Regime	complex	theory	will	be	explained	in	Chapter	2.		
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effort	to	address	climate	change.	For	example,	C40’s	website	states	that	cities	are	on	a	mission	because	of	the	belief	that	“the	battle	to	prevent	catastrophic	climate	change	will	be	won	or	lost	in	our	cities”.85	At	the	end	of	this	phase,	based	on	insights	I	derived	from	the	literature	and	empirical	data,	I	developed	a	theoretical	account	of	the	emergence	of	cities	as	actors	in	international	affairs.		 	 	 		 In	the	third	phase	of	the	research,	I	focused	on	identifying	global	cities	that	are	widely	recognized	as	proactive	frontrunners	in	transnational	climate	change	governance.	The	aim	was	to	include	a	chapter	in	this	thesis	on	what	global	cities	are	doing	locally	to	address	climate	change	so	as	to	ground	the	discussion	in	this	thesis	in	everyday	reality,	and	to	shed	light	on	the	connections	between	the	local	and	the	global	levels	of	governance.	I	identified	these	cities	based	on	a	review	of	the	literature,	and	publicly	available	data	on	carbon	Climate	Registry	which	enables	subnational	governments	to	publicly	report	their	climate	actions	on	a	regular	basis.	Case	studies	published	by	C40,	ICLEI	and	regional	city	networks	such	as	Cities	
Development	Initiative	for	Asia	also	constituted	a	useful	source	of	information	for	identifying	climate	frontrunners.86	The	choice	of	global	cities	that	are	featured	in	Chapter	4	was	also	dictated	by	the	availability	of	information	in	the	English	language	and	some	degree	of	familiarity	with	the	broader	social	and	legal	contexts	in	which	these	cities	functioned.	I	also	conducted	semi-structured	interviews	with	city	government	officials,	consultants	with	extensive	experience	working	with	cities	on	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation	strategies,	current	and	former	staff	at	C40	and	ICLEI	to	better	understand	how	these	global	cities	were	addressing	climate	change.	These	interviews	were	semi-structured	in	nature	so	as	to	allow	for	flexibility.	Each	interview	began	with	several	tailored	questions	to	understand	the	specific	perspective	and	expertise	of	the	interviewee.	The	interviews	were	primarily	conducted	by	video	calls,	while	some	were	conducted	face-to-face.	Before	each	interview	commenced,	interviewees	were	informed	that	their	responses	would	be	included	in	this	thesis	and	their	personal	anonymity	will	be	protected.	A	transcript	would	be	produced	after	each	interview,	and	I	would	seek	clarification	of	any	issues	by	email	correspondence.	A	list	of	the	interviews	is	included	at	the	end	of	this	thesis.		 	 The	fourth	phase	of	the	research	was	focused	on	the	networks	created	by	cities	to	diffuse	best	practices,	norms	and	information.	I	carried	out	an	extensive	desktop	literature	review	to	identify	the	most	active	and	prominent	networks	that	operated	transnationally	and	to	analyze	how	these	networks	served	as	mechanisms	for	the	dissemination	of	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	amongst	global	cities	and	their	governments.	I	carried	out	semi-structured	interviews	with	current	and	former	staff	of	C40	and	ICLEI,	as	well	as	employees	of	various	entities	that	work	in	partnership	with	C40	and	ICLEI	to	gain	a	better	understanding	of	the	differences	between	the	networks	and	C40’s	modus	operandi.	 	 	 	 		 	 	 In	the	fifth	stage	of	the	research,	I	focused	on	uncovering	the	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	that	global	cities	were	developing	and	implementing	through	their	networks.	I	carried	out	a	desktop	review	of	materials	available	on	the	Internet,	and	secondary	literature	in	the	form	of	academic	research																																																									85	C40,	online:	http://www.c40.org	(accessed	on	12	December	2016).		86	Cities	Development	Initiative	for	Asia,	online:	http://cdia.asia	(accessed	on	2	July	2016).		
	 18	
articles	and	monographs.	I	then	conducted	semi-structured	interviews	with	program	officers	responsible	for	implementing	these	practices	and	standards,	and	city	government	officials	with	formal	responsibilities	for	climate	change	policy.	Based	on	the	empirical	data	and	the	insights	I	drew	from	the	literature	on	norm	diffusion,	voluntary	standards,	and	soft	law,	I	developed	a	theoretical	account	of	how	cities	were	emerging	as	jurisgenerative	actors	in	transnational	climate	change	governance.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 In	the	final	stage	of	my	research,	I	sought	to	take	a	bird’s	eye	view	and	reflect	on	the	broader	theoretical	implications	of	the	rise	of	cities	as	lawmaking	actors	in	transnational	climate	change	governance.		
4.	Chapter	Outline		 This	thesis	comprises	of	eight	chapters,	including	this	introduction	and	the	conclusion.	Chapter	Two	sets	out	the	theoretical	framework	of	this	thesis.	It	will	set	out	the	theories	of	regime	complexity	and	transnational	legal	ordering,	Anne-Marie	Slaughter’s	theories	of	the	disaggregated	state	and	trans-governmental	networks,	and	Saskia	Sassen’s	theory	of	global	cities	which	I	combine	to	create	a	framework	for	conceptualizing	the	nature	of	transnational	climate	change	governance,	the	emergence	of	cities	in	this	governance	space,	and	to	lay	the	ground	for	subsequent	analysis	about	city	networks.	Chapter	Three	situates	the	emergence	of	cities	as	participants	in	transnational	climate	change	governance	within	the	broader	context	of	how	cities	increasingly	participate	directly	and	independently	in	international	affairs	and	global	politics.	It	starts	out	by	describing	instances	of	cities	developing	what	appear	to	be	their	own	independent	foreign	and	security	policies	despite	the	fact	that	such	policy	areas	have	traditionally	been	considered	the	core	domains	of	central	governments	and	states.	It	then	considers	instances	of	cities	implementing	international	law	despite	non-ratification	by	their	state.	Finally,	the	chapter	discusses	the	practices	of	international	organizations	like	the	World	Bank	that	empower	cities	to	exercise	agency	in	global	governance.		
Chapter	Four	examines	what	five	global	cities	-	London,	Mexico	City,	New	York	City,	Rotterdam	and	Seoul	-	are	doing	to	address	climate	change.	These	cities	are	internationally	recognized	by	policy-makers,	city	planners,	the	media,	international	organizations	and	researchers	to	be	‘climate	frontrunners’.	By	examining	the	governance	practices	of	these	five	cities,	this	chapter	provides	a	detailed	descriptive	account	of	cities	as	social	laboratories	for	climate	governance	experiments	and	the	inter-connections	between	actors,	practices	and	institutions	that	blur	the	divide	between	public	and	private,	local	and	international.		
Chapter	Five	posits	that	cities	do	not	act	alone.	They	form	networks	to	aggregate	their	bargaining	power	vis-à-vis	sellers	of	low-carbon	technologies,	facilitate	cooperation,	develop	voluntary	standards	and	convey	norms.	These	networks	often	establish	important	links	with	other	actors	at	other	scales	(e.g.,	regional	organizations	such	as	the	Association	of	Southeast	Asian	Nations	(ASEAN)).	The	network	structure	and	its	links	with	actors	at	multiple	governance	levels	provide	channels	for	cities	to	diffuse	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards.	C40	
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is	the	most	prominent	network	of	global	cities	committed	to	addressing	climate	change,	and	is	the	subject	of	detailed	analysis	in	this	chapter.		Drawing	on	the	descriptive	and	analytical	examination	in	the	previous	three	chapters,	Chapter	Six	advances	the	argument	that	cities	are	emerging	as	transnational	lawmakers.	I	coin	the	term	urban	climate	law	to	refer	to	the	voluntary	standards,	norms	and	practices	that	are	developed	by	cities	and	implemented	through	their	networks.	The	chapter	identifies	the	promotion	of	reflexivity	and	norm	diffusion	as	the	two	main	pathways	of	influence	that	are	critical	for	steering	cities	towards	climate	mitigation	and	low-carbon	development.	The	chapter	also	examines	how	urban	climate	law	relates	to	the	UNFCCC	regime,	and	argues	that	urban	climate	law	has	been	deliberately	designed	to	support	and	reinforce	the	UNFCCC	regime.	Consequently,	there	is	little	divergence	in	the	norms	and	practices	of	cities	and	those	of	the	UNFCCC	regime.		
Chapter	Seven	evaluates	the	contribution	of	urban	climate	law	to	the	overall	performance	of	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex	using	six	normative	criteria	proposed	by	Keohane	and	Victor.87	It	then	takes	a	step	back	to	consider	some	broad	question	posed	by	the	rise	of	global	cities	in	the	international	system,	for	example,	how	the	rise	of	the	city	challenges	certain	entrenched	notions	about	the	nature	of	the	modern	state	and	whether	the	emergence	of	another	actor	threatens	to	cause	fragmentation	of	the	international	legal	order.		
Chapter	Eight	concludes	this	thesis	with	a	series	of	reflections.	I	will	consider	the	implications	of	this	research	for	theorists	and	practitioners,	the	limitations	of	the	research	and	suggest	avenues	for	further	research.
																																																								87	Robert	O.	Keohane	and	David	G.	Victor,	‘The	Regime	Complex	for	Climate	Change’	(2011)	9		Perspectives	on	Politics	7.	
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Chapter	2:	Theoretical	Framework	
	
	
1. Introduction	In	order	to	generate	a	richer	understanding	of	the	emergence	of	cities	as	governors	and,	more	specifically,	law	making	actors	in	the	area	of	transnational	climate	change	governance,	I	have	found	it	useful	to	adopt	an	eclectic	analytical	framework	that	draws	upon	diverse	theoretical	perspectives.	Analytical	eclecticism	proceeds	on	the	basis	of	a	pragmatic	ethos.	It	is	said	that	the	researcher	who	adopts	an	analytical	eclectic	approach	is	searching	for	middle	range	theoretical	arguments	that	potentially	speak	to	concrete	issues	of	policy	and	practice.1	Drawing	upon	diverse	theoretical	perspectives	guards	against	excessive	simplification	that	can	arise	when	one	tries	to	apply	a	single	theoretical	lens	to	explain	messy,	real-world	situations.	In	other	words,	analytical	eclecticism	invites	us	to	refrain	from	being	“intellectually	aggressive	hedgehogs”2	and	to	embrace	the	possibilities	that	open	up	from	drawing	upon	theories	and	narratives	developed	in	different	research	traditions.	It	should,	however,	be	noted	that	analytical	eclecticism	is	not	a	tossed	salad	of	research	methods	and	theoretical	constructs	in	the	sense	that	“everything	matters”.	Eclectic	scholarship	ought	to	engage	with	the	well-organized	research	efforts	of	committed	adherents	of	various	traditions	in	an	integrated	framework	that	is	capable	of	generating	more	comprehensive	and	deeper	analysis	of	a	concrete	issue.3		This	chapter	provides	the	theoretical	underpinnings	for	the	thesis	by	bringing	together	theories	from	various	disciplines	including	political	science,	law,	international	relations	and	sociology	to	help	frame	the	participation	of	cities	in	transnational	climate	change	governance	processes.	Transnational	regime	complex	theory	provides	the	framing	of	transnational	climate	change	governance	as	a	space	that	is	densely	populated	with	many	institutions	that	perform	potentially	over-lapping	functions.	Cities	are	emerging	within	this	space	as	one	of	multiple	governance	actors.	After	introducing	the	regime	complex	theory,	the	chapter	moves	on	to	briefly	explain	the	theory	of	orchestration,	which	is	primarily	prescriptive	about	how	the	international	system	ought	to	manage	the	disadvantages	and	maximize	the	benefits	of	institutional	fragmentation.	While	regime	complex	theory	tends	to	emphasize	the	problems	of	rule	inconsistency	and	rule	conflict	that	can	arise	when	there	are	multiple	institutions	governing	an	issue	area,	orchestration	theory	emphasizes	the	benefits	of	institutional	multiplicity	such	as	the	potential	for	mutual	learning	and	experimenting	with	different	governance	approaches.																																																										1	Rudra	Sil	and	Peter	J.	Katzenstein,	‘Analytic	Eclecticism	in	the	Study	of	World	Politics:	Reconfiguring	Problems	and	Mechanisms	across	Research	Traditions’	(2010)	8	Perspectives	on	Politics	411.		2	Ibid,	pg.	414.	3	Ibid,	pg.	415.		
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Transnational	law	provides	an	alternative	theoretical	framework	for	analyzing	how	states	and	non-state	actors	are	involved	in	making	and	implementing	law	that	has	effect	transnationally.	The	shift	from	a	state-centric	view	of	international	law	is	necessary	in	order	to	consider	the	role	of	sub-state	actors	such	as	cities	and	their	local	governments	in	governing	climate	change	at	the	global	level.	Anne	Marie	Slaughter’s	theory	of	the	disaggregated	state	and	transgovernmental	networks	serves	as	a	point	of	departure	in	this	thesis	for	conceptualizing	the	possibility	of	cities	as	entities	that	are	capable	of	participating	in	transnational	governance	processes.	This	thesis	also	borrows	the	idea	of	transgovernmental	networks	and	adapts	it	to	understand	city	networks	as	a	tool	of	governance	in	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.	Finally,	the	body	of	literature	that	theorizes	the	global	city	as	an	actor	in	world	affairs	is	an	important	cornerstone	of	the	theoretical	framework	for	this	thesis	because	it	is	upon	this	foundational	idea	that	I	develop	my	argument	that	cities	are	emerging	as	law	making	actors.		
	
2. Theoretical	Overview		
	
2.1	Transnational	Regime	Complex			 From	the	mid-1990s	onwards,	patterns	of	institutionalization	in	global	governance	changed.	Efforts	to	develop	new	comprehensive	and	integrated	international	regimes	failed,	while	established	ones	began	to	fragment.	For	example,	intensive	negotiations	amongst	OECD	members	over	a	three-year	period	on	what	was	to	be	a	Multilateral	Agreement	on	Investment	(MAI)	eventually	collapsed.4	Apart	from	substantial	disagreement	amongst	the	negotiating	states,	a	global	coalition	of	environmental	and	development	NGOs,	citizen	groups	and	governments	of	developing	countries	successfully	put	pressure	on	OECD	governments	to	withdraw	from	the	negotiations.5		After	the	creation	of	the	World	Trade	Organization	(WTO),	officials	had	hoped	to	start	what	is	now	known	as	the	Doha	Round	of	negotiations	during	the	Seattle	WTO	ministerial	talks	in	November	1999.6	The	objective	of	these	negotiations	was	to	lower	trade	barriers	and	therefore	facilitate	global	trade.																																																									4	The	documents	relating	to	the	MAI	negotiations	between	1995	and	1998	can	be	found	in	an	online	database;	OECD,	“Multilateral	Agreement	on	Investment:	Documents	from	the	Negotiations”,	online:		http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/intro.htm	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).		5	Those	who	opposed	the	MAI	argued	that,	amongst	other	things,	the	agreement	would	lead	to	a	“race	to	the	bottom”	in	environmental	and	labour	standards.	See,	for	example,	Andrea	Durbin	and	Mark	Vallianatos,	Transnational	Corporate	Bill	of	Rights	-	Negotiations	for	a	Multilateral	Agreement	on	
Investment	(MAI)	(Friends	of	the	Earth,	1997),	online:	https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/209/43203.html;	Martin	Khor,	NGOs	
Mount	Protests	Against	MAI	(Third	World	Network	Features,	1998),	online:	https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/209-bwi-wto/43217.html		(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	For	discussion,	see	for	example,	Eric		Neumayer,	‘Multilateral	Agreement	on	Investment:	Lessons	for	the	WTO	from	the	failed	OECD-negotiations’	(1999)	46	Wirtschaftspolitische	Blätter	618.	6	World	Trade	Organization,	“The	Doha	Agenda”,	online:	https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/doha1_e.htm	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	
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However,	this	did	not	happen	because	the	Seattle	meeting	collapsed	in	the	face	of	anti-globalization	protests	that	escalated	into	riots,	looting,	and	the	use	of	tear	gas	to	quell	the	protesters.7	Negotiations	on	the	package	of	agreements	–	known	as	the	Doha	Development	Agenda	–	eventually	commenced	in	2001	but	WTO	Director-General	Pascal	Lamy	suspended	negotiations	in	July	2006	due	to	irreconcilable	differences	between	WTO	members.8	Since	then,	efforts	have	been	underway	to	resume	negotiations	but	there	is	little	optimism	about	achieving	a	breakthrough.9	The	impasse	in	the	Doha	Round	has	called	the	multilateral	approach	into	question;	some	argue	that	WTO	membership	has	grown	so	large	and	the	issues	that	have	been	taken	on	are	so	complex	such	that	it	is	almost	impossible	to	reach	consensus.10			A	final	example	would	be	the	international	climate	change	negotiations.	At	the	first	UNFCCC	COP	held	in	Berlin	in	1995,	member	states	agreed	that	the	absence	of	legally	binding	GHG	emission	reduction	targets	rendered	the	UNFCCC	a	relatively	weak	legal	instrument.11	They	therefore	agreed	to	negotiate	a	protocol	that	would	include	binding	targets.12	This	led	to	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	which	was	adopted	on	11	December	1997.13	In	line	with	the	principle	of	common	but	differentiated	responsibilities	and	respective	capabilities	(CBDRRC),	the	Kyoto	Protocol	required	developed	countries	to	adopt	binding	targets	but	developing	countries	were	not	required	to	do	so.	Without	emission	targets	imposed	on	China	and	other	rapidly	developing	countries,	the	US	Congress	strongly	opposed	the	Kyoto	Protocol	and	refused	to	ratify	it.14	Without	US	ratification,	the	protocol	could	only	enter	into	force																																																									7	John	Vidal,	‘Real	battle	for	Seattle’	The	Guardian	(5	December	1999);	Influential	environment	and	human	rights	groups	from	both	the	Global	North	and	Global	South	condemned	how	the	talks	were	being	conducted.	They	alleged	that	genuine	concerns	about	the	effects	of	another	round	of	trade	liberalization	on	the	environment,	jobs	and	cultural	issues	were	subordinated	to	pure	economic	interests	and	governments	of	Third	World	countries	were	marginalized	during	the	talks.		8	World	Trade	Organization,	“The	Doha	Agenda”.		9	See	for	example,	Jean-Pierre	Lehmann,	‘End	the	charade	in	talks	on	global	trade’	The	Financial	Times	(24	August	2011).	Lehmann	suggests	that	“…the	Doha	round	should	be	buried.	Some	suggest	it	should	be	declared	dead.	But	it	has	been	dead	for	some	time	and	the	corpse	is	putrefying:	so	a	burial,	a	wake,	and	some	appropriate	words	of	farewell.”	For	a	less	pessimistic	view,	see	Jagdish	Bhagwati,	‘From	Seattle	to	Hong	Kong’	(2005)	12	Foreign	Affairs,	online:	https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2005-12-01/seattle-hong-kong	(accessed	on	3	July	2016).		10	See	for	example,	Razeen	Sally,	‘The	End	of	the	Road	for	the	WTO?	A	snapshot	of	international	trade	policy	after	Cancun’	(2004)	5	World	Economics	1;	Alan	Beattie,	‘The	multilateral	approach	is	called	into	question’	The	Financial	Times	(15	November	2005).		11	UNFCCC	Decision	1/CP.	1,	preamble.	12	Ibid.		13	1997	Kyoto	Protocol	to	the	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change,	2303	UNTS	148.	The	individual	targets	for	Annex	I	parties	are	listed	in	Annex	B	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol.	14	The	Byrd-Hagel	Resolution	(US	Senate	Resolution	98),	105th	Congress,	1st	session,	25	July	1997,	states	that	“the	exemption	for	Developing	Country	Parties	is	inconsistent	with	the	need	for	global	action	on	climate	change	and	is	environmentally	flawed”	and	the	differentiated	treatment	of	Annex	I	parties	and	non-Annex	parties	“could	result	in	serious	harm	to	the	United	States	economy,	including	significant	job	loss,	trade	disadvantages,	increased	energy	and	consumer	costs,	or	any	combination	thereof”.	The	Senate	passed	the	resolution	unanimously	(95-0);	Council	on	Foreign	Relations,	Byrd-Hagel	Resolution,	online:	http://www.cfr.org/climate-change/byrd-hagel-resolution/p21331	(accessed	on	12	August	2015).	For	discussion,	see	Daniel	A.	Farber,	‘Climate	justice	and	the	China	Fallacy’	(2009)	15	Hastings	West-Northwest	Journal	of	Environmental	Law	and	Policy	15.	
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in	2005.15	Further,	without	the	participation	of	the	US,	one	of	the	world’s	largest	GHG	emitters	as	well	as	a	global	superpower,	the	Kyoto	Protocol	regime	was	hampered	from	the	outset.	The	negotiations	for	the	post-Kyoto	framework,	which	finally	culminated	in	the	Paris	Agreement,	have	been	similarly	fraught	with	difficulties	as	developed	and	developing	countries	struggled	to	find	accommodation	over	crucial	issues	such	as	financial	assistance	to	the	developing	countries	to	cope	with	climate	change.16		Against	this	background	of	dispersed	power,	disparate	interests	amongst	states,	and	the	inertia	of	established	international	organizations,	new	alternative	governance	arrangements	started	to	emerge	from	the	1990s	onwards.	One	of	these	novel	governance	arrangements	has	been	termed	regime	complex.	As	originally	defined	in	the	international	relations	scholarship,	a	regime	is	a	set	of	implicit	or	explicit	principles,	norms,	rules,	and	decision-making	procedures	around	which	actors’	expectations	converge	in	an	issue	area	such	as	climate	change.17	A	regime	complex	emerges	when	an	issue	area	is	no	longer	governed	by	a	single	regime.	Instead,	the	relevant	rules	are	found	in	a	number	of	regimes	that	overlap	in	their	scope	and	subject	matter.	In	their	pioneering	article,	Raustiala	and	Victor	define	a	regime	complex	to	be	“an	array	of	partially	overlapping	and	nonhierarchical	institutions	governing	a	particular	issue-area”.18	The	issue	of	overlap	has	been	a																																																									15	Pursuant	to	Article	25,	the	Kyoto	Protocol	could	only	enter	into	force	upon	ratification	by	“not	less	than	55	Parties	to	the	Convention,	incorporating	Parties	included	in	Annex	I	which	accounted	in	total	for	at	least	55	per	cent	of	the	total	carbon	dioxide	emissions	for	1990	of	the	Parties	included	in	Annex	I”.	Without	the	US	–	the	world’s	largest	GHG	emitter	at	that	time	-	on	board,	it	was	only	after	Russia	ratified	the	agreement	that	the	Kyoto	Protocol	finally	entered	into	force	on	16	February	2005.	Russia’s	ratification	was	allegedly	the	result	of	a	bargain	struck	with	the	EU	concerning	Russia’s	accession	to	the	World	Trade	Organization.	Andrey	Illarionov,	President	Vladimir	Putin’s	then	economic	policy	adviser,	went	as	far	as	to	characterise	the	Kyoto	Protocol	as	an	“economic	Auschwitz”	for	Russia	and	“an	assault	on	science,	economic	growth	and	human	freedom”.	However,	despite	internal	disagreements,	once	the	decision	was	made	at	the	political	level,	Russia	deposited	its	instrument	of	ratification	with	the	UN	within	weeks;	Yulia	Yamineva,	‘Climate	Law	and	Policy	in	Russia:	A	Peasant	Needs	Thunder	to	Cross	Himself	and	Wonder’	in	Erkki	J.	Hollo,	Kati	Kulovesi	and	Michael	Mehling	(eds),	Climate	Change	and	the	Law	(Springer	2013),	pg.	553-554.					16	For	a	sample	of	the	literature	on	the	negotiations	for	the	post-Kyoto	Protocol	framework,	see	Meinhard	Doelle,	‘The	Legacy	of	the	Climate	Talks	in	Copenhagen:	Hopenhagen	or	Brokenhagen?’	(2010)	1	Carbon	and	Climate	Law	Review	86;	Matthieu	Wemaere,	‘State	of	Play	of	International	Climate	Negotiations:	On	the	Road	to	Copenhagen’	(2009)	4	Carbon	and	Climate	Law	Review	497;	Richard	Black,	‘Why	did	Copenhagen	fail	to	deliver	a	climate	deal?’	BBC	(22	December	2009);	Francesco	Sindico,	‘The	Copenhagen	Accord	and	the	Future	of	the	International	Climate	Change	Regime’	(2010)	1	Revista	Catalana	de	Dret	Ambiental	1;	Harro	Van	Asselt,	Francesco	Sindico	and	Michael	a	Mehling,	‘Global	Climate	Change	and	the	Fragmentation	of	International	Law’	30	Law	&	Policy	423;	Lavanya	Rajamani,	‘The	Cancun	climate	agreements:	reading	the	text,	subtext	and	tea	leaves’	(2011)	60	International	and	Comparative	Law	Quarterly	499;	Remi	Moncel,	‘Unconstructive	Ambiguity	in	the	Durban	Climate	Deal	of	COP	17	/	CMP	7’	(2012)	12	Sustainable	Development	Law	&	Policy	6;	Pilita		Clark,	‘Climate	talks	struggle	into	overtime’	Financial	Times	(13	December	2014);Pilita	Clark,	‘UN	climate	agreement	reached	in	marathon	session’	Financial	Times	(14	December	2014).		17	Stephen	D.	Krasner,	‘Structural	Causes	and	Regime	Consequences:	Regimes	as	Intervening	Variables’	(1982)	36	International	Organization	185,	pg	2.		18	Kal	Raustiala	and	David	G.	Victor,	‘The	Regime	Complex	for	Plant	Genetic	Resources’	(2004)	58	International	Organization	277,	pg.	279.	Orsini	et	al	have	proposed	an	alternative	definition	of	a	
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core	concern	of	regime	complex	theory.	The	existence	of	multiple	institutions	can	lead	to	regime	shifting,	whereby	actors	move	issues	to	forums	that	most	suit	their	strategic	interests.19	Furthermore,	when	two	or	more	regimes	create	rules	that	govern	the	same	issue,	there	is	the	risk	of	inconsistent	rules.	Rule	inconsistency	creates	uncertainty	and	costs	for	institutions	and	their	members,	particularly	for	inter-governmental	organizations	that	administer	legally	binding	rules.	International	legal	scholarship	on	proliferation	of	institutions	tends	to	focus	on	the	question	of	coherence	or,	viewed	from	a	different	angle,	on	“fragmentation”,	which	is	understood	as	potential	for	“conflicts	between	rules	or	rule-systems,	deviating	institutional	practices	and,	possibly,	the	loss	of	an	overall	perspective	on	the	law”.20		Keohane	and	Victor	have	offered	a	broader	definition	of	a	regime	complex	in	the	case	of	climate	change,	whereby	a	regime	complex	comprises	of	a	collection	of	loosely	linked	regimes	that	are	“sometimes	conflicting,	usually	mutually	reinforcing”	(my	emphasis).21	This	definition	departs	from	the	traditional	one	that	emphasizes	overlap	in	the	regimes.	Keohane	and	Victor	argue	that,	in	the	case	of	climate	change,	the	diverse	interests	amongst	states	makes	it	more	likely	that	a	regime	complex	emerges	instead	of	a	single,	integrated	and	comprehensive	regime	for	managing	climate	change.22	Keohane	and	Victor’s	mapping	of	the	regime	complex	for	climate	change,	in	line	with	traditional	regime	complex	theory,	focuses	on	states	and	international	organizations.	Subsequently.	Abbott	has	contended	that	Keohane	and	Victor’s	conception	of	the	climate	change	regime	complex	provides	an	incomplete	picture	of	global	climate	change	governance	because	it	excludes	a	range	of	governance	initiatives	that	involve	non-state	actors	(such	as	environmental	NGOs,																																																																																																																																																																						regime	complex.	In	their	view,	Raustiala	and	Victor’s	definition	has	“several	ambiguous	features	that	impede	further	analysis”.	They	therefore	define	a	regime	complex	as	“a	network	of	three	or	more	international	regimes	that	relate	to	a	common	subject	matter;	exhibit	over-lapping	membership;	and	generate	substantive,	normative	or	operative	interactions	recognized	as	potentially	problematic	whether	or	not	they	are	managed	effectively”;	Amandine	Orsini,	Jean	Frédéric	Morin	and	Oran	Young,	‘Regime	complexes:	A	buzz,	a	boom,	or	a	boost	for	global	governance?’	(2013)	19	Global	Governance	27,	pg.	29.		19	For	discussion,	see,	for	example,	Laurence	R.	Helfer,	‘Regime	Shifting	in	the	International	Intellectual	Property	System’	(2009)	7	Perspectives	on	Politics	39;	Laurence	R.	Helfer,	‘Regime	Shifting:	the	TRIPS	Agreement	and	New	Dynamics	of	International	Intellectual	Property	Lawmaking’	(2004)	29	Yale	Journal	of	International	Law	1.		20	Martti		Koskenniemi,	Fragmentation	of	International	Law:	Difficulties	Arising	from	the	
Diversification	and	Expansion	of	International	Law:	Report	of	the	Study	Group	of	the	International	Law	
Commission	(UN	General	Assembly,	A/CN4/L682,	2006),	para.	8.	Simma	argues	that	fragmentation	is	not	a	crisis	but	a	sign	of	the	growing	maturity	of	the	international	legal	order;	Bruno	Simma,	‘Fragmentation	in	a	Positive	Light	’	(2004)	25	Michigan	Journal	of	International	Law	847.	Dupuy	and	Vinuales	are	of	the	view	that	the	challenge	is	not	one	of	fragmentation	but	one	of	“integration”	whereby	differences	in	legal	interpretation	are	resolved	by	the	development	of	principles	capable	of	integrating	different	solutions	within	a	common	framework;	Pierre-Marie	Dupuy	and	Jorge	E	Vinuales,	‘The	Challenge	of	"Proliferation":	An	Anatomy	of	the	Debate’	in	Cesare	Romano,	Karen	J	Alter	and	Yuval	Shany	(eds),	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	International	Adjudication	(Oxford	University	Press	2014),	pg.	148-9.		21	Robert	O.	Keohane	and	David	G.	Victor,	‘The	Regime	Complex	for	Climate	Change’	(2011)	9	Perspectives	on	Politics	7,	pg.	7.			22	Ibid.		
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technical	experts	and	business	associations)	and	operate	transnationally.23	In	advancing	the	notion	of	a	transnational	regime	complex	for	climate	change,	Abbott	refines	Keohane	and	Victor’s	conception	by	adding	the	transnational	dimension,	i.e.	the	involvement	of	private	actors	and	sub-state	actors	in	developing	and	implementing	governance	initiatives	that	often	have	cross-border	effects.	Thus,	a	transnational	regime	complex	for	climate	change	includes	international	organizations	and	treaty	bodies	such	as	the	UNFCCC	secretariat,	World	Bank	Prototype	Carbon	Fund,	Montreal	Protocol	on	Substances	that	Deplete	the	Ozone	Layer,	as	well	as	private	and	hybrid	(public-private)	governance	initiatives	such	as	the	World	Business	Council	for	Sustainable	Development,	Asian	Cities	Climate	Change	Resilience	Network,	and	the	International	Emissions	Trading	Association.24	In	this	thesis,	I	adopt	Abbott’s	conception	of	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex	as	a	framework	for	describing	and	analyzing	the	involvement	of																																																									23	Kenneth	W.	Abbott,	‘The	transnational	regime	complex	for	climate	change’	30	Environment	and	Planning	C:	Government	and	Policy	571,	pg.	574.		24	The	UNFCCC	Secretariat	describes	its	functions	as	follows:	“In	its	early	years,	the	main	task	of	the	secretariat	was	to	support	intergovernmental	climate	change	negotiations….	Currently,	a	major	part	of	our	work	involves	the	analysis	and	review	of	climate	change	information	and	data	reported	by	Parties.”;	UNFCCC,	“The	Secretariat”,	online:	http://unfccc.int/secretariat/items/1629.php	(accessed	on	1	April	2016).	The	World	Bank	Prototype	Carbon	Fund	is	the	first	carbon	fund	in	the	world.	Its	mission	is	to	pioneer	emissions	trading	on	a	global	scale.	Since	it	became	operation	in	April	2000,	the	fund	has	been	active	in	promoting	the	Kyoto	Protocol’s	Clean	Development	Mechanism	and	Joint	Implementation;	Charlotte	Streck,	‘World	Bank	Carbon	Finance	Business:	Contracts	and	Emission	Reductions	Purchase	Transactions’	in	David	Freestone	and	Charlotte	Streck	(eds),	Legal	Aspects	of	
Implementing	the	Kyoto	Protocol	Mechanisms:	Making	Kyoto	Work	(Oxford	University	Press	2005),	pg.	370.	The	Montreal	Protocol	on	Substances	that	Deplete	the	Ozone	Layer	1522	UNTS	3	(1987)	is	designed	to	reduce	the	production	and	consumption	of	substances	that	deplete	ozone	in	the	stratosphere.	Ozone	depleting	substances	include	chlorofluorocarbons	(CFCs)	and	hydrochlorofluorocarbons	(HCFCs).	CFCs	and	HCFCs	are	also	greenhouse	gases.	Hydrofluorocarbons	(HFCs)	and	perfluorocarbons	(PFCs)	are	used	as	substitutes	for	CFCs	and	HCFCs	in	some	applications	because	they	do	not	deplete	the	ozone	layer.	However,	these	substitutes	(i.e.	HFCs	and	PFCs)	are	greenhouse	gases	that	the	Kyoto	Protocol	aims	to	reduce.	Thus,	the	regulatory	choices	and	decisions	of	the	Montreal	Protocol	regime	have	implications	for	climate	change	governance	and	the	respective	treaty	secretariats	have	taken	steps	towards	coordination	and	information	sharing.	See	UNFCCC,	“Methodological	Issues	Relating	to	Hydrofluorocarbons	and	Perfluorocarbons”,	online:	http://unfccc.int/methods/other_methodological_issues/items/2311.php	(accessed	on	1	August	2016).	The	World	Business	Council	for	Sustainable	Development	(WBCSD)	brings	together	companies	that	seek	to	develop	and	implement	solutions	to	address	environmental	and	sustainability	challenges.	WBCSD	has	a	number	of	major	projects	related	to	cities.	For	example,	it	has	issued	a	set	of	Sustainable	Mobility	Indicators,	which	provides	cities	with	a	diagnostic	tool	to	assess	their	performance	and	to	develop	sustainable	urban	mobility	plans;	WBCSD,	“The	European	Commission	endorses	WBCSD	set	of	indicators	to	help	cities	advance	sustainable	mobility”,	online:	http://www.wbcsd.org/the-european-commission-endorses-wbcsd-set-of-indicators-to-help-cities-advance.aspx	(accessed	on	20	August	2016).	The	Asian	Cities	Climate	Change	Resilience	Network’s	mission	is	to	build	urban	climate	change	resilience	in	Bangladesh,	India,	Indonesia,	the	Philippines,	Thailand	and	Vietnam	through	partnerships	and	collaboration	with	local	and	international	stakeholders;	ACCRN,	online:	http://acccrn.net/about-acccrn	(accessed	on	1	August	2016).	The	International	Emissions	Trading	Association	(IETA)	is	a	coalition	of	companies	that	support	market-based	solutions	to	climate	change.	Its	members	include	Bank	of	America	Merril	Lynch,	BP,	Rio	Tinto,	and	American	Electric	Power;	IETA,	online:	http://www.ieta.org/Our-Members	(accessed	on	1	August	2016).	
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cities	and	their	networks	in	global	climate	change	governance.	Unlike	Keohane	and	Victor,	Abbott’s	definition	opens	up	the	conceptual	space	that	is	necessary	for	considering	a	larger	cast	of	actors,	apart	from	states	and	international	organizations,	in	governing	climate	change.	It	also	pays	more	attention	to	the	causes	and	effects	of	having	multiple	regimes	involved	in	climate	change	governance	and	how	existing	regimes	interact,	but	it	downplays	the	traditional	focus	on	overlapping	norms	and	rules.25	At	the	same	time,	because	Abbott’s	definition	builds	upon	traditional	regime	complex	theory,	it	allows	me	to	draw	on	a	rich	body	of	literature	on	institutional	multiplicity	that	offers	relevant	insights	about	transnational	climate	change	governance	even	though	regime	complex	theory	was	developed	with	states	in	mind.		For	example,	regime	complex	theory	identifies	the	benefits	and	drawbacks	of	having	multiple	actors	involved	in	governance.	On	advantages,	Keohane	and	Victor	argue	that	regime	complexes	offer	flexibility	across	issues	and	adaptability	over	time.	On	flexibility,	they	suggest	that	when	there	is	no	requirement	that	all	rules	be	bound	within	a	single	institution,	it	opens	up	the	possibility	of	adapting	rules	for	different	coalitions	of	actors	and	to	fine-tune	the	application	of	rules	for	different	conditions.26	As	I	will	discuss	in	Chapter	6,	flexibility	has	been	an	advantage	that	permits	cities	to	create	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	that	are	more	responsive	to	urban	needs	and	interests.	This	increases	the	likelihood	of	cities	adopting	these	norms	and	voluntary	standards,	thereby	expanding	the	reach	of	transnational	climate	change	governance.		Keohane	and	Victor	further	argue	that	regime	complexes	may	be	more	adaptable	than	regimes	and	can	therefore	respond	more	effectively	to	changing	social	and	political	circumstances.	International	organizations	tend	to	be	slow	in	responding	to	change;	to	meet	legitimacy	concerns,	decisions	within	inter-governmental	organizations	like	the	UNFCCC	are	made	by	universal	voting	rules.27	As	it	is	often	impossible	to	obtain	the	unanimity	of	so	many	countries	with	diverging	interests,	inertia	sets	in	and	renders	the	regime	in	question	increasingly	obsolete.	Keohane	and	Victor	argue	that	regime	complexes	(and	its	component	parts)	may	be	able	to	adapt	more	readily	in	comparison	because	they	are	not	hampered	in	the	way	that	an	international	regime	is.	They	also	argue	that	a	regime	complex,	with	multiple	sites	of	authority,	has	the	conditions	to	allow	the	free	market	of	ideas	and	practices	to	flourish.	The	assumption	is	that	the	invisible	hand	will	lead	to	a	better	distribution	of	governance	functions	within	the	regime	complex.		
																																																								25	Young	argues	that	regime	interaction	is	promoted	at	a	national	level	by	domestic	policy	coordination	and,	at	the	international	level,	by	mutual	learning	and	information-sharing	between	regimes;	Margaret	A.	Young,	Trading	Fish,	Saving	Fish:	The	Interaction	between	Regimes	in	
International	Law	(Cambridge	University	Press	2011),	pg,	249.		26	Keohane	and	Victor,	pg.	15.	27	Article	18	of	the	UNFCCC	states	that	each	member	state	has	one	vote	in	a	decision.	Further,	the	Rules	of	Procedure	of	the	Conference	of	the	Parties	state	that,	when	parties	cannot	reach	consensus,	decisions	should	be	made	by	majority	rule.	Tomlinson	points	out	that	as	these	rules	have	not	been	formally	adopted,	the	COP	usually	adopts	decisions	only	when	no	party	explicitly	expresses	objection;	Luke		Tomlinson,	Procedural	Justice	in	the	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	
Climate	Change:	Negotiating	Fairness	(Springer	2015),	pg.	157.		
	 27	
	 The	drawbacks	of	institutional	multiplicity	are	primarily	those	of	conflicting	norms	and	transaction	costs.		When	voluntary	standards	are	created	to	satisfy	an	unmet	demand	for	rule	guidance,	conflict	between	potentially	overlapping	rules	is	not	a	major	concern	given	that	there	are	few,	if	any,	existing	rules	with	which	new	rules	may	conflict.28	However,	when	there	are	multiple	institutions	developing	and	implementing	norms,	standards	and	practices	within	a	regime	complex,	there	remains	the	possibility	of	inefficient	duplicity	and	increased	transaction	costs	of	complying	with	different	schemes.	In	the	voluntary	carbon	market,	for	example,	as	of	December	2008,	there	were	already	at	least	thirteen	different	programmes	offering	voluntary	GHG	accounting	standards	and	methodologies.	As	the	various	programmes	offer	different	interpretations	and	level	of	guidance	about	the	accounting	standards,	this	has	caused	some	confusion	amongst	buyers	of	carbon	credits	and	project	developers	about	the	appropriate	standard	to	use.	This	has	led	to	harmonization	efforts	to	foster	more	consistency	and	transparency	amongst	voluntary	GHG	programme	accounting	standards.29	I	have	argued	elsewhere	that	the	proliferation	of	voluntary	standards	to	certify	the	sustainability	of	biofuels	production	creates	unnecessary	duplicity	and	harmonization	of	global	standards	is	necessary	to	reduce	transaction	costs.30		
2.2	Orchestration			 Orchestration	has	been	proposed	as	a	way	of	managing	the	disadvantages	and	maximizing	the	benefits	of	institutional	fragmentation.31	While	regime	complex	theory	typically	treats	the	co-existence	of	multiple	governance	actors	with	overlapping	mandates	as	a	threat	to	effective	governance	because	of	redundancy,	conflict	and	inconsistency,	orchestration	theory	emphasizes	how	institutional	multiplicity	can	create	gains	from	the	pooling	of	resources,	mutual	learning	and	specialization.	In	a	pioneering	work,	orchestration	is	said	to	take	place	when	an	international	organization	“enlists	and	supports	intermediary	actors	to	address	target	actors	in	pursuit	of	[international	organization]	governance	goals.	The	key	to	orchestration	is	that	the	[international	organization]	brings	third	parties	into	the	
																																																								28	Green	argues	that,	because	of	dissent	amongst	states	about	the	role	of	emissions	trading	and	thus	the	utility	of	greenhouse	gases	accounting	standards,	the	issue	of	accounting	methodologies	was	taken	off	the	international	agenda	and	deprived	the	UNFCCC,	the	international	actor	most	likely	to	take	on	such	a	role,	of	the	political	mandate	to	do	so.	This	then	created	an	opening	for	private	actors	to	develop	the	Greenhouse	Gas	Protocol	(GHG	Protocol)	when	no	accounting	standards	existed;	Jessica	Green,	‘Private	Standards	in	the	Climate	Regime:	The	Greenhouse	Gas	Protocol’	(2010)	12	Business	and	Politics	Article	3.		29	For	discussion,	see	Michelle	Passero,	‘The	Voluntary	Carbon	Market:	Its	Contributions	and	Potential	Legal	and	Policy	Issues’	in	David	Freestone	and	Charlotte	Streck	(eds),	Legal	Aspects	of	
Carbon	Trading:	Kyoto,	Copenhagen	and	Beyond	(Oxford	University	Press	2009),	pgs.	525-527.		30	Jolene	Lin,	‘The	Environmental	Regulation	of	Biofuels:	Limits	of	the	Meta-Standard	Approach’	(2011)	5	Carbon	&	Climate	Law	Review	34.		31	Kenneth	W.	Abbott,	‘Strengthening	the	Transnational	Regime	Complex	for	Climate	Change’	(2014)	3	Transnational	Environmental	Law	57.		
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governance	arrangement	to	act	as	intermediaries	between	itself	and	the	targets,	rather	than	trying	to	govern	the	targets	directly.”32		An	alternative	definition	by	Hale	and	Roger	emphasizes	the	relationship	between	orchestration	and	transnational	governance.	They	define	orchestration	to	be	“a	process	whereby	states	or	intergovernmental	organizations	initiate,	guide,	broaden,	and	strengthen	transnational	governance	by	non-state	and/or	sub-state	actors.”	The	transnational	governance	literature,	which	focuses	on	private	certification	schemes	such	as	the	Marine	Stewardship	Council	and	standard-setting	bodies	such	as	the	International	Accounting	Standards	Board	(IASB),	tends	to	treat	these	entities	as	stand-alone	governance	actors	and	pay	little	attention	to	their	institutional	context.	Orchestration	theory,	in	contrast,	places	the	analytical	focus	on	the	wider	relational	context	in	which	governance	actors	operate.	It	highlights	how	international	organizations	shape	the	capacities	and	agendas	of	transnational	governance	actors.	This	analytical	viewpoint	is	adopted	in	this	thesis,	particularly	in	my	discussion	of	the	interaction	between	the	C40	and	the	World	Bank	in	Chapter	5.		The	intermediaries	in	orchestration	governance	are	often	NGOs	but	may	also	include	business	organizations	and	transgovernmental	networks.	When	sub-state	actors,	such	as	elements	of	national	bureaucracies	and	city	mayors,	work	with	their	counterparts	across	borders,	they	form	transgovernmental	networks.33	These	networks	are	attractive	intermediaries	because	they	are	able	to	bypass	the	higher	levels	of	national	governments.	They	are	also	usually	composed	of	policy	experts	from	national	regulatory	agencies,	who	command	technical	expertise	and	control	of	national	bureaucracies.34	Kenneth	Abbott	et	al	point	out	that	intermediaries	voluntarily	participate	in	orchestration	because	they	share	the	international	organization’s	governance	goals	and	value	its	material	and	ideational	support.35	At	the	same	time,	when	international	organizations	provide	support	to	intermediaries,	this	strengthen	the	governance	capacities	of	these	intermediaries	while	providing	international	organizations	a	means	to	influence	their	agenda	and	activities.36	Material	support	would	include	financial	and	administrative	assistance	to	strengthen	the	intermediary’s	operational	capacity	to	pursue	governance	goals.	Ideational	support	would	include	technical	expertise,	formal	recognition	and	endorsement.	Endorsement	of	the	intermediary’s	activities	increases	its	legitimacy	and	the	social	authority	that	it	can	bring	to	bear	on	target	actors.	An	example	of	endorsement	is	the	support	that	General	Assembly	and	Security	Council	resolutions	have	given	to	the	Kimberley	Process	certification	scheme	for	blood	diamonds.37	Endorsement	can	also	be	legal,	as	when	the	WTO	accepts	that	consistency	with																																																									32	Kenneth	W.	Abbott	and	others,	‘Orchestration:	global	governance	through	intermediaries	’	in	Kenneth	W.	Abbott	and	others	(eds),	International	Organizations	as	Orchestrators	(Cambridge	University	Press	2015),	pg.	4.		33	See	discussion	in	“The	Disaggregated	State	and	Transgovernmental	Networks”	below.	34	Ibid.		35	Abbott	and	others,	pg.	6.		36	Ibid.,	pg.	14.		37	For	discussion,	see	Virginia	Haufler,	‘Orchestrating	peace?	Civil	war,	conflict	minerals	and	the	United	Nations	Security	Council’	in	Kenneth	W.	Abbott	and	others	(eds),	International	Organizations	
as	Orchestrators	(Cambridge	University	Press	2015).	
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standards	adopted	by	the	Codex	Alimentarius	Commission	satisfies	international	trade	law.38		In	Chapter	5,	I	examine	the	World	Bank’s	deepening	partnership	with	C40	through	the	lens	of	orchestration	theory.	The	Bank	provides	technical	capacity-building	opportunities,	a	range	of	specialized	advisory	services	and	exclusive	funding	channels	to	facilitate	action	by	C40	members.	C40	was	chosen	to	be	an	intermediary	because	it	shares	the	World	Bank’s	governance	objective	of	tackling	climate	change	in	cities	as	part	of	a	broader	agenda	of	sustainable	urban	development.	Further,	the	climate	solutions	that	C40	espouses	are	rooted	in	the	norms	of	liberal	environmentalism,	which	predicate	international	environmental	protection	on	the	promotion	and	maintenance	of	a	liberal	economic	order.39	This	commitment	to	liberal	environmentalism	aligns	well	with	the	underlying	philosophy	of	the	World	Bank’s	Strategic	Framework	that	guides	the	bank’s	operational	response	to	new	development	challenges	posed	by	climate	change.40	In	brief,	the	World	Bank’s	partnership	with	C40	is	an	example	of	orchestration	by	an	international	organization	that	plays	a	significant	role	in	the	transnational	regime	complex	for	climate	change	by,	amongst	other	things,	convening	and	endorsing	an	intermediary’s	urban	climate	governance	efforts.			
2.3	Transnational	Law		
		 Philip	Jessup	famously	coined	the	term	“transnational	law”	in	his	Storrs	Lectures	at	Yale	in	1955	as	he	looked	for	a	concept	to	capture	the	legal	regulation	of	actions	and	events	that	transcend	state	boundaries	and	which	can	accommodate	public	and	private	international	law.41	Jessup’s	new	term	also	encompassed	legal	relationships	amongst	individuals,	corporations,	international	organizations	as	well	as	states.42	Thus,	it	was	as	early	as	the	1950s	that	scholars	began	to	point	out	that	the	traditional	state-centric	conception	of	international	law	inadequately	captured	the	reality	of	multiple	actors	interacting	and	forming	legal	relationships	that	operated	across	state	boundaries.																																																										38	For	discussion,	see	Manfred	Elsig,	‘Orchestration	on	a	tight	leash:	state	oversight	of	the	WTO’	in	Kenneth	W.	Abbott	and	others	(eds),	International	Organizations	as	Orchestrators	(Cambridge	University	Press	2015).	39	For	discussion,	see	Steven	Bernstein,	The	Compromise	of	Liberal	Environmentalism	(Columbia	University	Press	2001).	40	Under	this	Strategic	Framework,	the	World	Bank	Group	commits	to	provide	new	adaptation	financing	to	vulnerable	countries,	share	lessons	to	improve	the	monitoring	of	climate-related	finance,	promote	the	development	of	carbon	markets	and	pilot	new	initiatives	to	support	the	development	and	dissemination	of	new	energy	technologies.	The	key	assumptions	that	underpin	this	framework	are	(1)	that	the	World	Bank	will	be	able	to	“maintain	the	effectiveness	of	its	core	mission	of	supporting	growth	and	overcoming	poverty	while	recognizing	the	added	costs	and	risks	of	climate	change”	and	(2)	that	the	basic	tenets	of	a	market	economy,	economic	growth,	and	environmental	protection	are	all	compatible.	See	Development	and	Climate	Change:	A	Strategic	Framework	for	the	
World	Bank	Group	(World	Bank,	Washington	DC,	2008),	pg.	xii,	online:		http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/05/16459433/development-climate-change-strategic-framework-world-bank-group	(accessed	on	2	April	2016).		41	Philip	Jessup,	Transnational	Law	(Yale	University	Press	1956),	pg.	1.		42	Ibid.		
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	 Harold	Koh’s	influential	work	introduced	the	notion	of	the	“transnational	legal	process”	as	a	predicate	of	“transnational	law”.43	Koh	defines	transnational	legal	process	as	“the	theory	and	practice	of	how	public	and	private	actors	–	nation	states,	international	organizations,	multinational	enterprises,	non-governmental	organizations,	and	private	individuals-	interact	in	a	variety	of	public	and	private,	domestic	and	international	fora	to	make,	interpret,	enforce,	and	ultimately,	internalize	rules	of	transnational	law.”44	According	to	Koh,	there	are	four	distinctive	features	of	the	transnational	legal	process.	First,	it	“breaks	down	two	traditional	dichotomies	that	have	historically	dominated	the	study	of	international	law:	between	domestic	and	international,	public	and	private”.45	Secondly,	the	transnational	legal	process	is	not	state-centric	in	nature:	“the	actors	in	this	process	are	not	just,	or	even	primarily,	nation-states,	but	include	nonstate	actors	as	well.”46	Thirdly,	the	process	is	dynamic.	“Transnational	law	transforms,	mutates,	and	percolates	up	and	down,	from	the	public	to	the	private,	from	the	domestic	to	the	international	level	and	back	down	again.”47	Finally,	it	is	a	normative	process.	The	concept	of	the	transnational	legal	process	“focuses	not	simply	upon	how	international	interaction	among	transnational	actors	shapes	law,	but	also	on	how	law	shapes	and	guides	future	interactions:	in	short,	how	law	influences	why	nations	obey.”48	The	crux	of	Koh’s	theory	of	the	transnational	legal	process	is,	in	fact,	internalization	through	interaction.49States	and	non-state	actors	obey	international	law	as	a	result	of	repeated	interaction	with	other	actors	in	the	international	realm.	“As	transnational	actors	interact,	they	create	patterns	of	behavior	and	generate	norms	of	external	conduct	which	they	in	turn	internalize.”50	Through	an	iterative	process	of	interaction	and	internalization,	“international	law	acquires	its	‘stickiness’.”51			 Building	from	Koh’s	theory	of	the	transnational	legal	process,	Gregory	Shaffer,	alongside	other	scholars,	has	developed	an	empirical,	socio-legal	framework	to	analyze	the	effects	of	transnational	law	on	national	legal	systems	and	to	explain	the	factors	determining	the	extent,	location,	and	limits	of	transnationally	induced	legal	change.52	Shaffer	defines	transnational	law	to	be	“law	in	which	transnational	actors,	be	they	institutions	or	networks	of	public	or	private	actors,	play	a	role	in	constructing	and	diffusing	legal	norms.”53	Legal	norms	are,	in	turn,	defined	as																																																									43	Maya	Steinitz,	‘Transnational	Legal	Process	Theories’	in	Cesare	Romano,	Karen	J	Alter	and	Yuval	Shany	(eds),	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	International	Adjudication	(Oxford	University	Press	2014),	pg.	341.		44	Harold	Hongju	Koh,	‘Transnational	Legal	Process’	(1996)	75	Nebraska	Law	Review	181,	pg.	184.		45	Ibid.		46	Ibid.	47	Ibid.	48	Ibid.	49	Steinitz,pg.	345.		50	Koh,	pg.	204.		51	Koh,	pg.	204.	52	Gregory	C.	Shaffer	(ed)	Transnational	Legal	Ordering	and	State	Change	(Cambridge	University	Press	2014).		53	Gregory	C.	Shaffer,	‘Transnational	Legal	Process	and	State	Change’	(2012)	37	Law	and	Social	Inquiry	229,	pg.	235.		
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“norms	that	lay	out	behavioral	prescriptions	issued	by	an	authoritative	source	that	take	written	form,	whether	or	not	formally	binding	or	backed	by	a	dispute	settlement	or	other	enforcement	system.”54	The	source	of	the	legal	norm	may	be	an	international	treaty,	private	certification	scheme,	or	a	foreign	legal	model	promoted	by	transnational	actors.	In	an	article	for	the	inaugural	issue	of	the	journal	
Transnational	Environmental	Law,	Gregory	Shaffer	and	Daniel	Bodansky	wrote	about	the	unilateral	nature	of	some	transnational	legal	processes.55	Such	unilateralism	usually	occurs	when	states	have	little	choice	but	to	adopt	the	regulatory	standards	of	dominant	market	actors	such	as	the	US	and	EU.		The	regulation	of	chemicals	is	a	case	in	point.	The	EU	passed	a	regulation	in	2006	known	as	REACH,	which	created	new	and	more	stringent	requirements	for	chemicals	intended	for	sale	in	the	EU.56	This	created	pressure	on	exporting	states	to	improve	their	regulation	and	production	methods,	and	ratcheted	up	chemicals	regulation	beyond	the	EU	without	any	international	treaty.57			 In	this	thesis,	I	draw	on	these	theories	of	the	transnational	legal	process	and	transnational	law	to	conceptualize	the	role	of	cities	as	transnational	actors	involved	in	the	creation	and	diffusion	of	norms	pertaining	to	climate	mitigation.	Chapter	4,	for	example,	describes	what	five	global	cities	are	doing	to	tackle	climate	change.	It	can	be	viewed	as	simply	an	account	of	local	climate	action.	However,	from	the	transnational	law	perspective,	local	climate	action	is	part	of	an	iterative	process	of	creating	and	implementing	legal	norms	that	have	transnational	significance.	Local	climate	action	is	part	of	the	dynamic	process	whereby	legal	norms	percolate	up	to	the	international	level	and	down	to	the	city	level,	and	between	the	public	and	private.	Chapter	5	is	devoted	to	examining	the	C40	network	as	the	horizontal	infrastructure	through	which	cities	create	and	diffuse	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards,	and	Chapter	6	explores	an	important	aspect	of	transnational	law	that	tends	to	be	underappreciated	in	the	literature:	the	interaction	between	transnational	law	and	international	treaty-based	law.			
2.4	The	Disaggregated	State	and	Transgovernmental	Networks		
	
		 In	a	book	by	that	name,	Anne-Marie	Slaughter	describes	A	New	World	Order	in	which	global	governance	in	a	wide	range	of	areas	such	as	food	safety	and	human	trafficking	is	conducted	by	national	government	officials	who	cooperate	with	one	another	through	cross-border	networks.58	Operating	across	state	borders,	these	networks	are	transnational	in	nature	and	they	are	mostly	made	up	by	government																																																									54	Ibid.,	pg.	234.	55	Gregory	C.	Shaffer	and	Daniel	Bodansky,	‘Transnationalism,	Unilateralism	and	International	Law’	(2012)	1	Transnational	Environmental	Law	31.		56	Regulation	No.	1907/2006	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	on	the	Registration,	Evaluation,	Authorisation	and	Restriction	of	Chemicals	(REACH).			57	For	discussion,	see	Joanne	Scott,	‘From	Brussels	with	love:	The	transatlantic	travels	of	European	law	and	the	chemistry	of	regulatory	attraction’	(2009)	57	American	Journal	of	Comparative	Law	897;	Yoshiko	Naiki,	‘Assessing	Policy	Reach:	Japan’s	Chemical	Policy	Reform	in	Response	to	the	EU’s	REACH	Regulation’	(2010)	22	Journal	of	Environmental	Law	171.		58	Anne-Marie	Slaughter,	A	New	World	Order	(Princeton	University	Press	2005).	
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officials.59	Slaughter	uses	the	term	“transgovernmental”	to	capture	these	two	characteristics	of	the	networks.60	Anne	Marie	Slaughter	argues	in	A	New	World	
Order	that	transgovernmental	networks,	unlike	formal	international	organizations	which	are	often	paralyzed	by	politics,	have	the	expertise,	flexibility,	and	inclusiveness	to	solve	global	collective	problems.61	She	further	argues	that,	once	a	transgovernmental	network	adopts	a	set	of	standards	or	rules,	the	domestic	implementation	by	national	regulators	lend	these	rules	‘hard	power’	and	make	them	effective.62	Moreover,	regulators	that	participate	in	a	transgovernmental	network	are	usually	government	officials	who	are	ultimately	accountable	to	their	domestic	constituencies.	Hence,	in	terms	of	accountability	and	legitimacy,	transgovernmental	networks	are	preferable	to	“amorphous	‘global	policy	networks’…in	which	it	is	never	clear	who	is	exercising	power	on	behalf	of	whom.”63		Slaughter	uses	the	terms	“horizontal”	and	“vertical”	to	connote	whether	a	particular	network	only	connects	actors	at	a	single	level	of	governance	(for	example,	at	the	national	level),	in	which	case	the	network	is	horizontal.	A	vertical	network	is	one	that	connects	actors	at	different	governance	levels	(for	example,	at	the	levels	of	the	city,	the	state	and	supranational	organizations).64	Horizontal	transgovernmental	networks	may	be	categorized	according	to	their	main	function	(information	sharing,	enforcement	and	harmonization)	although	there	is	often	functional	overlap	in	these	networks.	Information	networks,	as	the	name	suggests,	facilitate	the	exchange	of	information	and	experience.65	Further,	these	networks	often	actively	collect	and	distill	information	into	a	code	of	“best	practices”	for	achieving	a	desired	regulatory																																																									59	For	example,	the	Basel	Committee	of	Banking	Supervision	(BCBS)	is	made	up	of	the	central	bank	governors	from	twenty-seven	countries	and	the	European	Central	Bank;	Basel	Committee	Membership,	online:	http://www.bis.org/bcbs/	(accessed	on	8	July	2016).	Another	example	is	the	Asian	Judges	Network	on	Environment	(AJNE)	which	seeks	to	facilitate	judicial	capacity-building	through	sharing	information	and	experience;	AJNE,	online:	http://www.asianjudges.org	(accessed	on	8	July	2016).		60	Slaughter’s	work	on	transgovernmental	networks	has	its	intellectual	roots	in	the	“transgovernmental	relations”	approach	pioneered	by	political	scientists	Robert	Keohane	and	Joseph	Nye	in	the	1970s:	Robert	O.	Keohane	and	Joseph	S	Nye,	Power	and	Interdependence:	World	Politics	in	
Transition	(TBS	The	Book	Service	Ltd	1977);	Robert	O.	Keohane	and	Joseph	S	Nye,	‘Transgovernmental	Relations	and	International	Organizations’	(1974)	27	World	Politics	39.		61	Slaughter,	pg.	167.	62	Slaughter,	pg.	168-9.	For	discussion	of	how	the	EU,	advertently	and	sometimes	inadvertently,	institutionalizes	and	“hardens”	voluntary	standards	and	informal	best	practices	by	embedding	them	in	domestic	law,	thereby	shaping	the	dynamics	of	transnational	norm	diffusion	processes,	see	Abraham	Newman	and	David	Bach,	‘The	European	Union	as	Hardening	Agent:	Soft	Law	and	the	Diffusion	of	Global	Financial	Regulation’	(2014)	21	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy	430.		63	Slaughter,	pg.	4.	64	An	example	of	a	vertical	network	exists	between	national	courts	and	the	European	Court	of	Justice	in	the	EU.	For	discussion	of	trans-judicial	networks,	see	Elaine	Mak,	Judicial	Decision-Making	in	a	
Globalised	World:	A	Comparative	Analysis	of	the	Changing	Practices	of	Western	Highest	Courts	(First	edn,	Hart	Publishing	2013),	pgs.	83-95.	65	An	example	is	the	Pharmaceutical	Inspection	Co-operation	Scheme,	which	provides	for	the	exchange	of	information	amongst	health	authorities	on	good	manufacturing	practices,	and	also	undertakes	efforts	to	harmonize	technical	standards	and	procedures	regarding	inspection	of	the	manufacture	of	medicinal	products;	Pharmaceutical	Inspection	Co-operation	Scheme,	online:	http://www.picscheme.org/role.php	(accessed	on	8	April	2016).		
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objective.	Enforcement	networks	are	most	commonly	established	among	law	enforcers	such	as	police	officers	and	customs	authorities.	The	focus	of	enforcement	networks	is	on	enhancing	cooperation	among	domestic	regulators	to	enforce	national	laws	in	the	face	of	transboundary	illicit	activity	such	as	illegal	wildlife	trafficking.66	Finally,	harmonization	networks	tend	to	arise	when	regulators	work	together	to	seek	convergence	of	their	regulatory	policies	and	standards	(such	as	product	safety	standards).	Trade	agreements	such	as	the	WTO	and	the	North	American	Free	Trade	Agreement	(NAFTA)	often	require	harmonization,	“resulting	in	harmonization	networks	of	countries	moving	toward	a	single	standard.”67		In	Slaughter’s	vision,	these	transgovernmental	networks	will	not	replace	the	existing	infrastructure	of	international	institutions,	but	will	complement	and	strengthen	them.	In	some	cases,	transgovernmental	networks	emerge	because	states	fail	to	reach	international	consensus	and	therefore	are	unable	to	develop	common	rules	and	coordinate	responses	to	challenges	posed	by	globalization.	In	competition	law,	for	example,	Cheng	suggests	that	the	abandonment	of	the	Singapore	agenda	in	the	WTO	(which	included	competition	policy)	led	the	international	competition	community	to	focus	on	voluntary	convergence	through	transgovernmental	networks.68	As	such,	transngovernmental	networks	can	serve	to	fill	governance	gaps	and,	through	cooperation	amongst	government	officials,	create	the	degree	of	consensus	that	could	lead	to	a	treaty-based	regulatory	regime	if	that	is	a	desired	outcome.	Transgovernmental	networks	may	also	be	a	more	effective	governance	mechanism,	compared	to	a	treaty-based	regulatory	framework,	because	they	harness	the	benefits	of	the	network	form,	namely	speed	and	the	lack	of	bureaucratic	formality.	Simmons	argues	that,	in	the	case	of	international	finance,	its	nature	necessitates	that	governance	be	carried	out	mostly	through	transgovernmental	
																																																								66	Slaughter,	pgs.	55-58.		The	ASEAN	Wildlife	Enforcement	Network,	for	example,	seeks	to	promote	cooperation	and	collaboration	between	national	law	enforcement	agencies,	customs	agencies,	the	police,	and	prosecutors	to	enforce	wildlife	trafficking	laws;	ASEAN	Wildlife	Enforcement	Network,	online:	http://environment.asean.org/the-asean-wildlife-enforcement-network-asean-wen/	(accessed	on	8	April	2016).	For	discussion	about	the	role	of	enforcement	networks	in	environmental	governance,	see	Michael	Faure,	Peter	De	Smedt	and	An	Stas	(eds),	Environmental	Enforcement	
Networks:	Concepts,	Implementation	and	Effectiveness	(Edward	Elgar	Publishing	2015).		67	Slaughter,	pg.	59.	There	is	the	general	view	that	regulatory	convergence	is	beneficial	for	trade	because	it	reduces	the	costs	of	complying	with	differing	product	standards.	However,	for	a	critical	view	of	how	harmonization	lowers	regulatory	standards	concerning	drug	safety	and	makes	the	state	more	vulnerable	to	capture	by	commercial	interests,	see	John	Abraham	and	Tim	Reed,	‘Trading	risks	for	markets:	The	international	harmonisation	of	pharmaceuticals	regulation’	(2001)	3	Health,	Risk	&	Society	113.		68	Thomas	K.	Cheng,	‘Convergence	and	Its	Discontents:	A	Reconsideration	of	the	Merits	of	Convergence	of	Global	Competition	Law’	(2012)	12	Chicago	Journal	of	International	Law	433,	pg.	435.	The	International	Competition	Network	(ICN)	is	widely	credited	to	be	the	most	important	agent	of	regulatory	convergence	in	competition	policy	in	the	past	decade	and	is	said	to	“[exert]	its	greatest	influence	through	the	recommended	practices	and	other	work	products	produced	by	its	working	groups”;	Cheng,	pg.	443.	
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networks:	“Formal,	protracted	negotiations	would	be	rapidly	overtaken	by	technological	change,	financial	innovation,	and	other	market	developments.”69				 Underlying	this	vision	of	a	world	order	made	up	of	networks	is	a	major	shift	in	thinking	about	the	international	system.	Slaughter	argues	that	the	state	is	
disaggregating	and	its	component	governmental	institutions	–	regulators,	judges	and	even	legislators-	are	reaching	out	to	their	foreign	counterparts	and	creating	transnational	networks.70	Instead	of	thinking	of	the	international	system	as	comprising	of	states	as	“unitary	entities	like	billiard	balls	or	black	boxes”71,	recognizing	the	disaggregation	of	states	prompts	us	to	think	of	the	international	system	as	a	more	complex	landscape	made	up	of	international	organizations,	states	(in	their	unitary	form),	networks	made	up	of	parts	of	a	state	(for	example,	the	judiciary),	and	private	actors.	In	Slaughter’s	view,	states	can	be	disaggregated,	but	also	act	as	completely	unitary	actors	when	necessary	(for	example,	when	deciding	to	go	to	war).72		 Slaughter	argues	that	transgovernmental	networks	are	“a	key	feature	of	world	order	in	the	twenty-first	century,	but	they	are	underappreciated,	undersupported,	and	underused	to	address	the	central	problems	of	global	governance”.73	She	makes	the	claim	that	these	networks	should	be	“embraced”	as	“the	architecture	of	a	new	world	order.”74	However,	it	should	be	noted	that	other	commentators	have	expressed	reservations	about	the	ways	in	which	transgovernmental	networks	signal	a	shift	towards	global	governance	by	experts	acting	outside	the	constraints	of	domestic	political	structures	and	the	normal	foreign	affairs	processes.75	Philip	Alston	argues	that	the	formation	of	these	networks	“suggest	a	move	away	from	arenas	of	relative	transparency	into	the	back	room”	leading	to	“the	bypassing	of	the	national	political	arenas	to	which	the	United																																																									69	Beth	A.	Simmons,	‘The	International	Politics	of	Harmonization:	The	Case	of	Capital	Market	Regulation’	(2001)	55	International	Organization	589,	pg.	592.	70	Also	see	Kal	Raustiala,	‘The	Architecture	of	International	Cooperation:	Transgovernmental	Networks	and	the	Future	of	International	Law’	(2002)	43	Virginia	Journal	of	International	Law	1:		Instead	of	disappearing,	the	state	is	“disaggregating	for	purposes	of	cooperation:	domestic	officials	are	reaching	out	to	their	foreign	counterparts	regularly	and	directly	through	networks,	rather	than	through	state-to-state	negotiation	of	the	kind	that	dominated	20th	century	cooperation”;	pg.	10.		71	Slaughter,	pg.	5.	72	Ibid.,	pg.	19.		73	Ibid.,	pg.	1.		74	Ibid.,	pg.	213.	75	In	addition	to	the	views	expressed	in	the	remainder	of	this	paragraph,	also	see	David	Kennedy,	‘The	Politics	of	the	Invisible	College:	International	Governance	and	the	Politics	of	Expertise’	(2001)	5	European	Human	Rights	Law	Review	463;	Pierre-Hugues	Verdier,	‘Transnational	Regulatory	Networks	and	Their	Limits’	(2009)	34	The	Yale	Journal	of	International	Law	113.	Verdier	argues	that	the	existing	scholarship	has	tended	to	downplay	conflicts	of	interest	within	transgovernmental	networks.	He	points	out	that	most	of	the	scholarship	provides	highly	detailed	and	optimistic	accounts	of	successful	transgovernmental	networks	but	offer	few	accounts	of	networks	that	have	failed	in	their	mission.	There	is	also	limited	discussion	of	the	use	of	transgovernmental	networks	by	powerful	states	to	impose	their	preferred	standards	on	less	powerful	states	or	the	failure	of	transgovernmental	networks	to	prevent	non-adherence	to	their	standards.	After	all,	transgovernmental	networks	are	intrinsically	hampered	from	effectively	addressing	enforcement	problems	because	they	do	not	have	monitoring	and	enforcement	capabilities;	pgs.	121-122.		
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States	and	other	proponents	of	the	importance	of	healthy	democratic	institutions	attach	so	much	importance.”76	Alston	also	raises	an	interesting	point	that	Slaughter’s	analysis	brings	to	the	fore	two	key	issues:	“They	are:	(i)	what	is	the	nature	of	the	global	agenda	in	a	globalized	world?	and	(ii)	who	sets	and	implements	that	agenda?”77In	Sol	Picciotto’s	view,	transgovernmental	networks	result	in	the	dispersal	of	politics	into	functional	arenas	and	“[appear]	to	allow	particular	issues	to	be	regulated	in	a	depoliticized,	technocratic	manner,	by	mangers	or	professionals	who	are	directly	accountable	to	their	‘customers’.”78	Finally,	Stephen	Toope	argues	that	networks	are	no	different	from	regimes	in	that	they	are	also	sites	of	power	that	are	capable	of	exclusion	and	inequality.	Operating	outside	the	realm	of	public	scrutiny,	these	networks	may	be	even	less	accountable	than	some	states	in	Toope’s	view.79		In	response	to	these	critiques,	Slaughter	has	argued	that	accountability	of	transgovernmental	networks	has	to	be	fostered	at	the	national	and	global	levels.80	Further,	in	order	to	develop	or	adapt	accountability	mechanisms,	she	argues	that	distinctions	must	be	drawn	between	networks	that	operate	in	existing	international	organizations,	within	the	framework	of	an	executive	agreement,	or	outside	any	preexisting	formal	framework.81	Finally,	she	proposes	a	set	of	potential	global	norms	governing	members	of	transgovernmental	networks	in	their	relations	with	one	another.82	They	include	global	deliberative	equality,	legitimate	difference,	positive	comity,	checks	and	balances,	and	subsidiarity.83	These	norms	are	meant	to	set	the	ground	rules,	which	may	be	redundant	when	a	network	is	mainly	engaged	in	information	exchange	but	which	will	be	necessary	when	networks	engage	in	harmonization	and	enforcement	activities.84				 	Viewing	the	international	system	through	the	prism	of	disaggregated	states	has	allowed	me	to	identify	features	of	the	climate	change	governance	landscape	that	remain	hidden	from	a	traditional	statist	perspective.	The	most	prominent	revelation																																																									76	Philip	Alston,	‘The	Myopia	of	the	Handmaidens:	International	Lawyers	and	Globalization’	(1997)	8	European	Journal	of	International	Law	435,	pg.	441.		77	Ibid,	pg.	439.	78	Sol	Picciotto,	‘Fragmented	States	and	International	Rules	of	Law’	(1997)	6	Social	and	Legal	Studies	259,	pg.	273.			79	Stephen	Toope,	‘Emerging	Patterns	of	Governance	and	International	Law’	in	Michael	Byers	(ed),	
The	Role	of	Law	in	International	Politics:	Essays	in	International	Relations	and	International	Law	(Oxford	University	Press	2001),	pgs.	96-97.		80	Anne-Marie	Slaughter,	‘The	Accountability	of	Government	Networks’	(2001)	8	Indiana	Journal	of	Global	Legal	Studies	346.	See	Verdier,	who	questions	whether	domestic	political	constraints	operate	as	intended	in	the	context	of	international	regulatory	cooperation.	He	further	argues	that	if	domestic	political	constraints	were	to	act	as	accountability	mechanisms	for	individual	regulators	involved	in	a	transgovernmental	network,	then	these	regulators	will	be	bound	to	domestic	interests	rather	than	to	some	shared	sense	of	regulatory	common	good.	Domestic	interests	are	also	likely	to	cause	disagreement	on	issues	such	as	which	rules	to	adopt,	attempts	to	dilute	or	resist	standards	or	to	avoid	compliance;	pgs.	126-130.	81	Slaughter,	ibid,	pg.	349.		82	Anne-Marie	Slaughter,	‘Disaggregated	Sovereignty:	Towards	the	Public	Accountabiilty	of	Global	Government	Networks’	(2004)	39(2)	Government	and	Opposition	159.	83	Ibid,	pgs.	174-186.		84	Ibid,	pg.	175.		
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has	been	how	much	sub-national	governance	activity	was	occurring.	For	example,	city-level	government	officials	and	mayors	have	been	reaching	out	to	their	foreign	counterparts	and	creating	information	networks	that	are	beginning	to	play	a	role	in	the	generation	and	diffusion	of	practices	and	norms.	Using	the	literature	on	the	disaggregated	state	and	transgovernmental	networks	as	a	point	of	departure,	I	conceptualize	transnational	city	networks	as	a	variant	of	transgovernmental	networks.	Unlike	transgovernmental	networks,	transnational	city	networks	constitute	a	form	of	disaggregation	along	the	vertical	levels	of	government.	However,	like	transgovernmental	networks,	transnational	city	networks	have	emerged	as	a	tool	of	governance.	Cities	and	their	governments	are	using	these	networks	to	supplement	governance	gaps	in	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex	and	push	for	more	concerted	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation	efforts	at	the	local	level.	They	are	also	using	networks	to	develop	and	disseminate	standards	and	practices	that	are	specifically	tailored	to	meet	urban	needs.	The	critiques	of	transgovernmental	networks	serve	as	a	basis	for	reflecting	upon	the	limitations	of	transnational	city	networks	and	issues	of	accountability	and	transparency	that	may	arise	when	these	networks	grow	in	their	reach	and	normative	influence.	Finally,	the	questions	that	Philip	Alston	has	posed	concerning	the	contents	of	the	global	governance	agenda	and	who	sets	it	serve	as	a	departure	point	for	my	enquiry	in	Chapter	3	into	the	urban	sustainable	development	agenda	and	the	role	of	the	World	Bank	in	shaping	and	implementing	it.			
2.5	The	Global	City			 Global	city	theory	developed	in	the	late	1980s	as	scholars	sought	to	understand	how	the	world	economy	was	being	transformed.	Drawing	upon	traditional	urban	theory	(which	examined	how	cities	related	to	the	higher	levels	of	government	within	domestic	political	systems)	and	world	systems	theory	(which	analyzed	how	states	were	bound	in	unequal	structural	core-periphery	relationships	using	a	neo-Marxist	framework),	John	Friedmann	published	his	‘World	City	Hypothesis’	in	1986.85	Friedmann	understood	the	city	in	economic	terms	-	cities	were	“basing	points”	and	“organisational	nodes”	of	the	rapidly	changing	geography	of	global	capitalism	in	the	last	twentieth	century	–	and	sought	to	analyze	the	“spatial	organization	of	the	new	international	division	of	labour.”86	This	“new	division	of	labour”,	Brenner	explains,	is	largely	the	result	of	the	massive	expansion	in	the	role	of	transnational	corporations	in	the	production	and	exchange	of	commodities	globally	since	the	late	1960s.87	“Whereas	the	old	international	division	of	labour	was	based	upon	raw	materials	production	in	the	periphery	and	industrial	manufacturing	in	the	core,	the	[new	division	of	labour]	has	entailed	the	relocation	of	manufacturing	industries	to	semi-peripheral	and	peripheral	states	in	search	of	inexpensive	sources	
																																																								85	John	Friedmann,	‘The	World	City	Hypothesis’	(1986)	17	Development	and	Change	69.	86	Ibid.		87	Neil	Brenner,	‘Global	Cities,	Glocal	States:	Global	City	Formation	and	State	Territorial	Restructuring	in	Contemporary	Europe’	(1998)	5	Review	of	International	Political	Economy	1,	pg.	5.	
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of	labor	power”.88	Meanwhile,	business	services	began	to	concentrate	themselves	in	urban	centers,	and	these	“upper	tier	cities”	evolved	to	become	major	nodes	of	financial	planning	and	corporate	decision-making,	and	therefore	the	“central	basing	points	for	the	worldwide	activities	of	[transnational	corporations]”.89	Curtis	argues	“Friedmann’s	key	contribution	was	to	place	cities	back	on	the	agenda	of	international	political	economy,	showing	how	the	internal	life	of	cities…could	only	be	understood	by	reference	to	their	connections	at	the	international	level	and	the	functions	that	they	fulfill	for	the	global	economy.	At	the	same	time,	the	global	economy	could	only	be	properly	understood	by	reference	to	the	role	that	certain	cities	play	within	it.”90		The	1990s	witnessed	the	acceleration	of	economic	globalization	and	advances	in	information	and	communication	technologies.	Against	this	background,	Saskia	Sassen	produced	‘The	Global	City’	which	has	become	a	seminal	work	on	the	connection	between	certain	key	metropolises	and	the	broader	processes	of	globalization.91	Sassen	argues	that,	alongside	the	spatial	dispersal	of	economic	activities	and	the	increasing	digitizing	of	economic	activities	such	as	banking,	was	the	spatial	concentration	of	highly	specialized	professional	firms	and	top-level	management.	This	process	of	spatial	concentration	and,	consequently,	the	concentration	of	material	facilities	occurred	in	cities.	Sassen	explains	that	“[a]t	the	heart	of	this	deep	structural	trend	is	the	fact	that	even	the	most	material	economic	sectors	(mines,	factories,	transport	systems,	hospitals)	today	are	buying	more	insurance,	accounting,	legal,	financial,	consulting,	software	programming,	and	other	such	services	for	firms.	These	so-called	intermediate	services	tend	to	be	produced	in	cities,	no	matter	the	nonurban	location	of	the	mine	or	the	steel	plant	that	is	being	serviced”.92		 	 	 	 	Global	cities	stand	out	in	comparison	to	other	cities	because	they	are	able	to	handle	the	more	complex	needs	of	firms	that	have	global	supply	chains	or	have	operations	in	multiple	jurisdictions.	Sassen	posits	that	there	is	no	such	thing	as	a	single	global	city.93	A	global	city	can	only	exist	alongside	other	global	cities,	connected	by	networks	that	crisscross	the	world.	Each	network	may	include	different	cities	to	serve	various	global	economy	needs	and	provide	services	to	multinational	corporations.	For	example,	the	circuit	for	the	global	coffee	trade	(including	trading	coffee	as	a	commodity,	selling	it	as	a	consumer	product,	and	coffee	futures	trading,	for	example)	involves	cities	different	from	those	in	the	circuit	for	legal	services.	Sassen	points	out	that	the	proliferation	of	circuits	is	not	solely	driven	by	economic	forces.	Non-profit	organizations	working	for	labour	rights	and	environmental	protection	also	create	and	develop	global	city	networks.94																																																										88	Ibid.	89	Ibid.		90	Simon	Curtis,	‘Global	cities	and	the	transformation	of	the	International	System’	(2011)	37	Review	of	International	Studies	1923,	pg.	1930.		91	Saskia	Sassen,	The	Global	City:	New	York,	London,	Tokyo	(Princeton	University	Press	1991).	92	Saskia	Sassen,	Cities	in	a	World	Economy	(4th	edn,	Sage	Publications	2012),	pg.	110.		93	Ibid,	pgs.	7,	111.	Also	see	Saskia	Sassen,	‘The	Global	City:	Introducing	a	Concept	’	(2005)	XI	Brown	Journal	of	World	Affairs	27,	pg.	34.		94	Sassen,	Cities	in	a	World	Economy,	pg.	113.		
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As	Sassen	explains	in	her	later	work,	using	the	term	‘global	city’	was	a	conscious	decision	to	depart	from	the	“older	historical	term	world	city”.95	For	Sassen,	‘global	city’	is	not	a	descriptive	term	for	a	distinctive	urban	form:	“It	is	an	analytic	construct	that	allows	one	to	detect	the	global	as	it	is	filtered	through	the	specifics	of	a	place,	its	institutional	orders,	and	its	sociospatial	fragmentations.”96	In	other	words,	given	that	the	processes	of	globalization	create	global	cities	and	global	cities,	in	turn,	are	territorial	spaces	in	which	the	processes	of	globalization	unfold	and	affect	local	communities,	the	global	city	is	a	theoretical	prism	through	which	the	connections	between	cities	and	globalization	can	be	studied.		Most	global	city	researchers	focus	on	the	global	economy.97	However,	there	are	two	strands	of	scholarship	that	depart	from	this	focus	on	the	servicing	of	global	capital	and	meeting	the	corporate	needs	of	multinational	corporations.	One	strand	seeks	to	unravel	the	‘dark	side’	of	the	global	city	phenomenon	–	extreme	social	inequality	and	marginalization	of	the	poor	within	global	cities	as	well	as	the	detrimental	impact	of	a	global	city	on	the	rest	of	the	country	in	which	it	is	located	(e.g:	the	impact	of	London’s	“global	city-ness”	on	the	rest	of	the	United	Kingdom).98	The	other	strand	of	scholarship	makes	the	claim	that	the	global	city	has	become	an	actor	in	world	affairs.99	Acuto,	for	example,	seeks	to	highlight	the	agency	of	global	cities:	“Admitting	that	certain	cities	(if	not	all	cities)	perform	functions,	are	capable	of	innovation	and	retain	degrees	of	control,	implies,	in	my	view,	a	logical	corollary:	global	cities,	due	to	their	presence	as	loci	of	purposive	action	within	the	global	system	and	as	articulators	of	global	flows,	are	not	only	places	but	also	participants	in	world	affairs”.100	Acuto	further	points	out	that	this	is	an	important	analytical	step	to	take	because	recognizing	the	capacity	of	global	cities	to	act	permits	consideration	of	their	potential	role	in	solving	global	governance	challenges.101	Arguing	that	the	time	has	come	to	reexamine	what	it	means	to	be	and	to	govern	a	global	city	as	“many	local	governments	of	Global	Cities	around	the	world…have	broken	the	institutional	chains	of	municipal	politics	and	have	become	global	actors”,	Ljungkvist’s	The	Global	City	2.0	offers	a	rich	theoretical	examination	of	the	political	agency	of	cities	in	relation	to	foreign	and	security	affairs	that	explains	their																																																									95	Saskia	Sassen,	‘Foreword’	in	Mark	M.	Amen,	Kevin	Archer	and	Martin	M.	Bosman	(eds),	Relocating	
Global	Cities:	From	the	Center	to	the	Margins	(Rowman	&	Littlefield	Publishers	2006),	pg.	ix.	96	Ibid,	pg.	x.	97	For	overview	of	this	body	of	contemporary	scholarship,	see	Michele	Acuto,	‘Finding	the	Global	City:	An	Analytical	Journey	through	the	'Invisible	College'’	(2011)	48	Urban	Studies	2953,	pgs.	2964-2967.	98	See,	for	example,	Doreen	Massey,	World	City	(Polity	Press	2007).	99	See,	for	example,	Kent	E.	Calder	and	Mariko	de	Freytas,	‘Global	Political	Cities	as	Actors	in	Twenty-First	Century	International	Affairs’	(2009)	29	SAIS	Review	of	International	Affairs	79;	Michele	Acuto,	
Global	Cities,	Governance	and	Diplomacy:	The	Urban	Link	(Routledge	2013);	Yishai	Blank,	‘Localism	in	the	New	Global	Legal	Order’	(2006)	47	Harvard	International	Law	Journal	263;	Janne	E.	Nijman,	‘Renaissance	of	the	City	as	Global	Actor:	The	Role	of	Foreign	Policy	and	International	Law	Practices	in	the	Construction	of	Cities	as	Global	Actors’	in	Gunther	Hellmann,	Andreas	Fahrmeir	and	Milos	Vec	(eds),	The	Transformation	of	Foreign	Policy:	Drawing	and	Managing	Boundaries	from	Antiquity	to	the	
Present	(Oxford	University	Press	2016);	Kristin	Ljungkvist,	Global	City	2.0:	From	Strategic	Site	to	
Global	Actor	(Routledge	2016).	100	Acuto,	‘Finding	the	Global	City:	An	Analytical	Journey	through	the	'Invisible	College'’,	pg.	2967.	101	Ibid,	pg.	2968.		
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increasing	participation	in	global	politics.102	 	 	 	 	 		 This	thesis	taps	on	the	large	and	broad	research	programme	on	global	cities	as	a	point	of	departure	for	conceptualizing	cities	as	actors	and	the	involvement	of	cities	in	the	processes	of	globalization.		In	particular,	the	global	city	scholarship	has	been	important	in	shaping	my	understanding	of	how	certain	cities	are	capable	of	participating	in	global	climate	governance	processes	because	of	their	ability	to	forge	transnational,	networked	relations	and	why	global	cities	want	to	be	actors	in	world	affairs	(including	the	governance	of	climate	change).	This	has	created	the	basic	foundation	for	my	exploration	of	cities	as	transnational	law-making	actors	in	the	context	of	climate	change	governance.		
3. Conclusion		 This	chapter	has	set	out	the	overarching	theoretical	framework	for	this	thesis.	In	the	spirit	of	analytical	eclecticism,	I	have	drawn	on	diverse	theoretical	perspectives	to	create	a	framework	for	examining	the	emergence	of	cities	as	participants	in	transnational	climate	change	law	and	governance.	The	next	chapter	focuses	on	describing	the	rise	of	cities	as	participants	in	world	affairs	and	the	practices	of	international	organizations	like	the	UN-Habitat	that	augment	the	increasingly	popular	idea	that	in	the	face	of	grave	global	governance	challenges	-	such	as	climate	change,	pandemics	and	trafficking-	cities	can	offer	pragmatic	and	effective	solutions	while	states	appear	to	be	dysfunctional	and	ineffectual.103	These	practices	and	their	underlying	assumptions	about	the	role	that	cities	can	play	in	world	affairs	encourage	cities	to	exercise	their	agency	in	global	governance,	as	we	will	see	in	the	next	chapter.
																																																								102	Ljungkvist.		103	See,	for	example,	Benjamin	Barber,	If	Mayors	Ruled	the	World:	Dysfunctional	Nations,	Rising	Cities	(Yale	University	Press	2014);	Ljungkvist;	UN-HABITAT,	Cities	in	A	Globalizing	World	–	Global	Report	
on	Human	Settlements	2001	(Earthscan	2001).			
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Chapter	3:	The	Rise	of	the	City	in	International	
Affairs	
	
“In	short,	global	cities	are	increasingly	driving	world	affairs	–		
economically,	politically,	socially	and	culturally.		
They	are	no	longer	just	places	to	live	in.		
They	have	emerged	as	leading	actors	on	the	global	stage.”1			
	
Given	that	by	2050,	eight	out	of	ten	people	in	the	world	will	be	living	in	cities,	“the	
battle	for	a	more	sustainable	future	will	be	won	or	lost	in	cities.”2		
1. Introduction		 Cities	have	existed	since	pre-historic	times.	Over	the	last	two	thousand	years,	a	few	cities	have	emerged	as	international	political	centers.	These	were	mostly	imperial	cities,	like	Thebes,	Babylon,	Persepolis,	Rome	and	Constantinople,	which	were	“capitals	of	great	empires	and	their	conquered	territories”.3	In	China,	the	Spring	and	Autumn	Period	(771-481	B.C.)	was	the	age	of	the	city-state;	the	area	surrounding	the	Yellow	River	was	divided	into	hundreds	of	states,	most	of	which	consisted	of	a	single	city	and	its	hinterland.	4	In	more	recent	history,	cities	including	Vienna,	St	Petersburg,	Amsterdam	and	London	also	asserted	significant	social	and	political	influence	on	the	international	stage.	These	cities	wielded	a	significant	amount	of	power	and	influence	due	to	the	strength	and	wealth	of	the	empires	over	which	they	ruled.5		Urbanization	in	the	twentieth-first	century	differs	from	the	past	in	its	rate	and	scale.		In	1800,	when	the	global	population	was	around	1000	million	people,	Beijing	was	the	only	city	in	the	world	with	more	than	a	million	inhabitants.6	In	2014,	Tokyo	is	the	world’s	largest	city	with	thirty-eight	million	inhabitants.7	The	UN	projects	that	by	2030,	the	world	will	have	forty-one	mega-cities	with	a	population	of																																																									1	Ivo	Daalder,	‘A	New	Global	Order	of	Cities’	Financial	Times	(26	May	2015)	2	World	Urban	Campaign,	Manifesto	for	Cities:	The	Urban	Future	We	Want	(2012)	3	Siddhartha	Sen,	‘Imperial	Cities’	in	Roger	W.	Caves	(ed)	Encyclopedia	of	the	City	(Routledge	2005),	pg.	250-251.		4	Mark	Edward	Lewis,	‘The	City-State	in	Spring-and-Autumn	China’	in	Mogens	Herman	Hansen	(ed),	
A	Comparative	Study	of	Thirty	City-state	Cultures:	An	Investigation,	Volume	21	of	Historisk-filosofiske	
skrifter	(Kgl.	Danske	Videnskabernes	Selskab	2000),	pg.	359.	5	Kent	E.	Calder	and	Mariko	de	Freytas,	‘Global	Political	Cities	as	Actors	in	Twenty-First	Century	International	Affairs’	(2009)	29	SAIS	Review	of	International	Affairs	79,	pg.	81.		6	T	Chandler,	Four	thousand	years	of	urban	growth:	an	historical	census	(St.	David’s	University	Press	1987),	pg.	656.	7	UN,	World	Urbanization	Prospects:	The	2014	Revision,	Highlights	(ST/ESA/SER.A/352)	(Department	of	Economic	and	Social	Affairs,	Population	Division,	2014),	online:	http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Highlights/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf	(accessed	on	20	April	2016),	pg.	1.		
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at	least	ten	million	inhabitants.8	In	1950,	one-third	of	the	world’s	population	lived	in	cities.9	This	figure	is	expected	to	rise	to	two-thirds	by	2050.10	Rood	et	al	have	demonstrated	that	land	area	about	four	times	larger	than	the	Netherlands	is	used	to	meet	the	food	and	fiber	needs	of	this	highly	urbanized	country.11	Thus,	rural	places	are	also	invariably	connected	to	urban	metropolises.		In	short,	we	are	living	in	an	“urban	age”.12		It	has	been	argued	that	in	the	urban	age,	cities,	more	so	than	states,	“will	be	forced	into	the	frontlines	by	global	warming,	water	insecurity,	and	other	environmental	challenges”.13	Other	global	governance	challenges	increasingly	have	an	urban	face;	terrorism	and	ethnic	violence	are	just	two	examples.	As	cities	seek	to	protect	their	inhabitants	from	threats	such	as	terrorism	and	pandemics,	they	begin	to	claim	political	authority	and	to	develop	independent	policies	in	relation	to	foreign	affairs	and	security.	These	are	issue	areas	that	are	traditionally	deemed	to	be	core	responsibilities	of	central	governments.	Further,	by	forging	transnational	partnerships	and	creating	organizations	to	represent	their	collective	interests	at	the	global	level,	cities	no	longer	behave	like		“passive	players	in	a	global	game	played	out	among	and	between	national	and	international	actors”.14	Situated	at	the	conflux	of	urbanization	and	globalization,	global	cities,	in	particular,	are	leading	the	trend	of	increasingly	intense	and	broad	urban	participation	in	international	affairs.	Global	cities	are	“[demonstrating]	how	states	and	international	organizations	are	no	longer	the	only	problem-solving	units	in	world	politics”.15		However,	the	role	played	by	cities	in	international	affairs	has	received	very	little	attention	from	international	law	and	international	relations	scholars.	From	a	legal	perspective,	the	city	has	traditionally	been	constructed	from	within	a	national	legal	order.	As	Jerry	Frug	has	argued	in	his	seminal	work	on	American	local	government	law,	there	have	always	been	two	competing	notions	of	the	city	in	co-existence.16	The	bureaucratic	model	posits	the	city	as	a	creature	of	the	state,	subordinate	to	the	state	and	only	capable	of	exercising	powers	that	have	been	delegated	to	it.	The	democratic	model	posits	the	city	as	a	quasi-sovereign	that	has	limited	but	real	autonomy;	the	city	is	a	space	in	which	citizens	can	pursue	their																																																									8	Ibid.	For	a	helpful	graphical	representation	of	where	these	cities	are	and	their	projected	population	changes	from	2014	to	2030,	see	Bloomberg	Visual	Data,	“At	Home	in	a	Crowd”,	online:	http://www.bloomberg.com/infographics/2014-09-09/global-megacities-by-2030.html	(accessed	on	3	December	2016).	9	UN,	ibid.	10	Ibid.	11	G.A.	Rood	and	others,	Tracking	the	effects	of	inhabitants	on	biodiversity	in	the	Netherlands	and	
abroad:	An	ecological	footprint	model	(Netherlands	Environmental	Assessment	Agency/RIVM,	Publication	number	500013005	(Bilthoven,	the	Netherlands),	2004).	12	Ricky		Burdett	and	Deyan	Sudjic	(eds),	The	Endless	City	(Phaidon	Press	2008).		13	Saskia	Sassen,	‘A	Focus	on	Cities	Takes	Us	Beyond	Existing	Governance	Frameworks’,	in	Joseph	Stiglitz	and	Mary	Kaldor	(eds),	The	Quest	for	Security:	Protection	Without	Protectionism	and	the	
Challenge	of	Global	Governance	(Columbia	University	Press	2013),	pg.	244.		14	Ash	Amin	and	Nigel	Thrift,	‘Citizens	of	the	world:	Seeing	the	city	as	a	site	of	international	influence’	(2005)	27	Harvard	International	Review	14,	pg.	17.	15	Michele	Acuto,	‘City	leadership	in	global	governance’	(2013)	19	Global	Governance	481,	pg.	495.		16	G.	E.	Frug,	‘The	City	As	a	Legal	Concept’	(1980)	93(6)	Harvard	Law	Review	1057.	
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collective	vision	of	the	“commonwealth”	with	minimal	state	interference.17	At	different	points	in	history	and	in	different	places,	one	of	these	two	notions	of	the	city	would	gain	ascendency.	Further,	Frug	argues,	two	competing	narratives	about	the	city-state	relationship	have	emerged	from	this	tension	between	the	dual	notions	of	the	city.18	One	narrative	speaks	of	the	role	of	the	city	as	protector	of	citizens’	interests	against	the	encroachment	of	oppressive	state	power,	and	the	other	narrative	presents	the	state	as	the	protector	of	minority	interests	against	the	abuse	of	power	by	majoritarian	rule	in	cities.19	As	in	any	system	of	government	that	comprises	of	multiple	levels,	each	level	of	government	will	occasionally	seek	to	aggregate	its	power	relative	to	other	levels.	The	management	of	these	power	relations,	and	division	of	responsibilities	between	the	city	and	the	state,	has	traditionally	been	considered	a	purely	domestic	matter,	not	a	proper	matter	of	concern	for	the	international	community.		Further,	cities	have	traditionally	been	viewed	as	“policy	takers”	rather	than	policymakers	within	largely	hierarchical	domestic	political	systems.20	As	for	external	relations,	states	have	traditionally	been	reluctant	to	acknowledge	that	cities	may	have	a	role	to	play	outside	the	domestic	realm.	The	Dutch	national	government,	for	example,	explicitly	denied	the	possibility	of	local	governments	possessing	competences	on	foreign	policy	in	the	early	1990s.21	Thus,	even	though	scholars	of	international	law	and	international	relations	(except	the	realists)	have	long	acknowledged	that	states	are	not	the	only	actors	in	the	international	system,	and	there	is	an	extensive	literature	on	the	involvement	of	actors	‘beyond	the	state’	-	including	individuals,	multinational	corporations,	and	religious	organizations	-	in	international	lawmaking	and	world	politics,	cities	have	not	been	acknowledged	as	having	any	significant	role	to	play	in	the	international	sphere.22	This	chapter	makes	the	argument	that	correcting	this	scholarly	oversight	is	of	timely	importance	in	light	of	contemporary	developments.	As	the	empirical	account	in	this	chapter	will	show,	cities	are	increasingly	participating	in	global																																																									17	Frug,	pg.	1062-75.	18	Frug,	pg.	26-53.	19	Ibid	20	See	Claus	Schultze,	‘Cities	and	EU	governance:	policy-takers	or	policy-makers?’	(2003)	13	Regional	and	Federal	Studies	121,	in	which	the	author	argues	that	cities	are	increasingly	moving	from	policy	“taker”	to	maker,	signaling	a	move	towards	more	participative	governance	in	the	EU.		21	Letter	of	the	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	to	the	Second	Chamber	of	Parliament,	Tweede	Kamer,	26	Janaury	1990,	Vergaderjaar	1989-1990,	21	300	VII,	nr.	20.		22	For	a	sample	of	this	extensive	literature,	see,	for	example,	Philip	Alston	(ed)	Non-State	Actors	and	
Human	Rights	(Collected	Courses	of	the	Academy	of	European	Law)	(Oxford	University	Press	2005);	Steve		Charnovitz,	‘Nongovernmental	Organizations	and	International	Law’	(2006)	100	The	American	Journal	of	International	Law	348;	Elisa	Morgera,	Corporate	Accountability	in	International	
Environmental	Law	(Oxford	University	Press	2009).	On	the	under	appreciation	of	the	role	of	state	courts	in	international	law-making,	see	Janet	Koven	Levit,	‘A	Tale	of	International	Law	in	the	Heartland:	Torres	and	the	Role	of	State	Courts	in	Transnational	Legal	Conversation’	(2004)	12	Tulsa	Journal	of	Comparative	and	International	Law	163.	Exceptions	that	consider	the	relationship	between	cities	and	international	law	include:	Yishai	Blank,	‘Localism	in	the	New	Global	Legal	Order’	(2006)	47	Harvard	International	Law	Journal	263;	Lesley	Wexler,	‘The	Promise	and	Limits	of	Local	Human	Rights	Internationalism’	(2009)	37	Fordham	Urban	Law	Journal	599;	G.	E.	Frug	and	David	Barron,	‘International	Local	Government	Law’	(2006)	38	The	Urban	Lawyer	1.		
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governance	processes	and	international	affairs	in	various	ways.	They	are	engaging	in	inter-city	diplomacy	and	developing	external	relations	to	promote	trade	and	political	stability.23	Cities	are	also	independently	implementing	international	treaties	on	their	own	accord,	sometimes	in	opposition	to	the	stance	adopted	by	their	states,	thereby	challenging	traditional	conceptions	of	how	international	law	is	internalized	and	implemented	domestically.24	Cities	have	also	formed	organizations	to	represent	their	interests	in	international	forums	and	to	achieve	foreign	policy	objectives	such	as	nuclear	non-proliferation.25		The	“internationalization	of	cities”	has	also	gained	traction	due	to	a	shift	in	the	development	agenda	of	international	organizations,	particularly	the	World	Bank	and	UN-Habitat,	towards	sustainable	urbanization.26	This	shift	can	be	dated	to	the	late	2000s,	which	heralded	the	“Decade	of	the	City,	a	decade	that	will	be	remembered	for	recognizing	cities	at	the	core	of	growth	and	human	development.”27	The	contemporary	global	urban	agenda	has	created	programmes	and	mechanisms	that	link	cities	directly	to	international	organizations,	bypassing	the	state.	These	programmes	also	channel	resources	directly	to	cities,	which	enhances	their	position	vis-à-vis	the	state.	While	the	practical	effects	of	these	urban	programmes	and	policies	are	mostly	experienced	in	cities	in	developing	countries	and	least	developed	countries,	as	these	cities	are	usually	the	recipients	of	aid	and	technical	assistance	from	international	organizations,	the	ideological	influence	of	the	global	urban	agenda	is	indeed	global	and	creates	a	normative	environment	that	is	conducive	for	cities	to	play	an	increasingly	visible	role	in	international	affairs.		National	governments	increasingly	recognize	that	cities	can	play	a	meaningful	role	in	materializing	domestic	and	global	agendas,	especially	on	urban,	environmental	and	economic	issues.	Even	an	authoritarian	government	of	a	centralized	political	system	like	China’s	has	been	encouraging	of	Chinese	cities’	global	engagement.	Through	the	state-organized	China	Association	of	Mayors,	Chinese	mayors	have	recently	spent	time	in	the	US	and	Denmark	to	learn	from	their	counterparts	and	experts	about	a	range	of	sustainability	issues,	including	public	transportation,	protecting	open	spaces,	and	energy	conservation.28	In	2014,	the	mayors	of	Guangzhou,	Los	Angeles	and	Auckland	signed	a	memorandum	of	
																																																								23	See	Part	2.2	below.		24	See	Part	2.1	below.		25	See	Part	2.4	below.		26	I	borrow	the	term	“internationalization	of	cities”	from	Ileana		Porras,	‘The	City	and	International	Law:	In	Pursuit	of	Sustainable	Development	’	(2008)	36	Fordham	Urban	Law	Journal	537.		27		World	Bank,	Systems	of	Cities:	Harnessing	Urbanization	for	Growth	and	Poverty	Alleviation	(Washington,	DC:	World	Bank,	2009),	Foreword,	pg.	1.	28	Wen	Huang,	‘Delegation	of	Chinese	leaders	study	sustainable	urbanization’	Granham	Global	
Initiatives	(The	University	of	Chicago)	(7	August	2015),	online:	https://grahamglobal.uchicago.edu/news/delegation-chinese-leaders-study-sustainable-urbanization;	Grundfos,	Grundfos	to	train	Chinese	mayors	(27	November	2014),	online:	http://www.grundfos.com/about-us/news-and-press/news/grundfos-to-train-chinese-mayors.html	(both	webpages	accessed	on	1	May	2016).	
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understanding	(MOU)	to	promote	economic	cooperation.29	This	was	followed	by	the	launch	of	the	Tripartite	Ports	Alliance	in	2015,	which	aims	to	foster	collaboration	on	investments,	technologies	and	environmental	policies	amongst	the	three	cities’	port	authorities.30	As	of	February	2015,	444	Chinese	cities	have	established	2154	partnerships	with	cities	abroad.31		By	examining	various	ways	in	which	cities	play	a	part	in	global	governance	processes	and	international	organizations’	urban	policy,	this	third	chapter	provides	a	backdrop	for	subsequent	analysis	of	the	participation	of	cities	in	transnational	climate	change	governance.	Part	2	provides	an	overview	of	four	broad	categories	of	activity	that	exemplify	how	cities	are	emerging	as	participants	in	global	governance	processes,	usually	adopting	practices	and	policy	positions	that	are	independent	of	their	states.	These	four	categories	are:	(1)	a	city	implementing	international	law	on	its	own	accord	when	its	national	government	is	reluctant	or	refuses	to	do	so;	(2)	city	diplomacy;	(3)	cities	developing	their	independent	local	and	transnational	policies	and	strategies	to	manage	global	risks	such	as	terrorism;	(4)	cities	forming	organizations	to	represent	urban	interests	in	international	forums	and/or	to	pursue	governance	objectives	such	as	promoting	nuclear	non-proliferation.	Part	3	examines	the	normative	policy	platform	and	associated	practices	of	international	organizations,	particularly	UN-Habitat	and	the	World	Bank,	that	constitute	the	contemporary	global	urban	agenda.	Part	4	concludes	by	providing	an	overview	of	the	key	ideas	advanced	in	this	chapter.		
	
2. Urban	Participation	in	International	Legal	and	Political	Processes			
2.1	Cities	Implementing	International	Law			 According	to	most	orthodox	accounts	of	international	law,	when	a	state	signs	and	ratifies	a	treaty,	it	expresses	its	commitment	to	upholding	an	international	norm	or	set	of	norms.	Subsequently,	international	law	depends	on	domestic	legal	systems	for	implementation.32	The	act	of	incorporating	international	law	into	its																																																									29	Xinhua	News	Agency,	Leaders	from	China,	New	Zealand,	US	seek	common	prosperity	at	tripartite	
meeting	(16	May	2016),	online:	http://china.org.cn/world/2016-05/16/content_38460907.htm	(accessed	on	1	May	2016).	30	Port	of	Los	Angeles,	Ports	of	Los	Angeles,	Auckland	and	Guangzhou	Establish	Tripartite	Ports	
Alliance	(11	June	2015),	online:	https://www.portoflosangeles.org/newsroom/2015_releases/news_061115_tripartite.asp	(accessed	on	1	May	2016).	31	Danyang	Wang,	‘Analyzing	China's	'City	Diplomacy'’	Yicai	(21	May	2015	),	online:	http://www.yicai.com/news/4620833.html	(accessed	on	1	May	2016).	32	“At	the	heart	of	any	chapter	on	international	law	and	national	law	is	always	an	explanation	of	the	two	theories	of	monism	and	dualism”;	Rosalyn	Higgins,	Problems	and	Process:	International	Law	and	
How	We	Use	It	(Oxford	University	Press	1994),	pg.	205-6.	Monism	is	a	theory	positing	that	all	law,	including	international	law,	is	part	of	a	single	universal	legal	order.	Therefore,	international	law	exists	alongside	the	various	branches	of	domestic	law	(for	example,	labour	law	and	company	law).	Dualism	envisages	international	law	and	domestic	law	as	two	distinct	spheres.	In	order	for	international	law	to	become	part	of	a	domestic	legal	system,	it	must	be	“transformed”	into	domestic	legislation.	For	discussion,	see	Peter	Malanczuk,	Akehurst's	Modern	Introduction	to	International	Law	(7th	revised	edn,	Routledge	1997),	Chapter	4.		
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domestic	legal	and	political	structures,	through	executive	action,	legislation	and	judicial	decisions	is	an	expression	of	a	state’s	internalization	of	international	law.	Internalization	trickles	down	to	the	state	level	and	further	down	to	cities	when	these	sub-national	entities	implement	federal	law.	Thus,	according	to	orthodox	accounts,	sub-state	units	have	a	circumscribed	role	to	play	in	the	internalization	of	international	law	norms,	which	is	limited	to	implementing	national	laws	and	policies.	However,	the	internalization	of	international	law	can	occur	in	a	less	rigid,	bottom-up	manner	that	breaks	the	monopoly	of	nations	on	international	law	making	processes.	When	a	state	is	reluctant	or	refuses	to	ratify	a	treaty,	cities	have,	on	occasion,	been	points	of	entry	for	international	norms	into	a	state	when	they	introduce	policies	and	legislation	to	implement	international	law.		A	city	may	choose	to	implement	an	international	treaty	because	it	wishes	to	express	its	cosmopolitan	identity	by	signaling	its	membership	of	the	global	community.33	A	city	may	also	already	have	a	strong	domestic	commitment	to	the	subject	matter	of	the	international	treaty	and	chooses	to	implement	the	international	treaty	so	that	it	can	serve	as	a	focal	point	and	provide	widely	recognized	indicators	for	guidance.34	For	example,	a	city	that	is	committed	to	addressing	climate	change	may	choose	to	implement	the	Paris	Agreement	so	that	it	serves	as	a	focal	point	for	the	city’s	actions	and	policies.	The	two	degree	Celsius	target	and	the	Nationally	Determined	Commitments	(NDCs)	(known	as	the	Intended	Nationally	Determined	Commitments	before	the	Paris	Agreement	came	into	force	on	4	November	2016)	provide	a	framework	of	indicators	for	the	city	to	measure	its	performance.	The	city	can	choose	to	exceed	the	NDC	of	its	state,	it	can	endorse	the	temperature	target	in	its	climate	policies	and	action	plans,	or	it	can	pledge	the	equivalent	of	an	NDC	and	report	its	emissions	in	the	same	way	that	member	states	will	be	doing	pursuant	to	the	Paris	Agreement;	the	Compact	of	Mayors	provides	cities	with	the	platform	for	doing	so.35	A	city	may	elect	to	implement	a	treaty	or	base	its	policies	on	international	legal	norms	to	express	its	criticism	of	national	policy.36	The	UK	city	of	York	offers	an	interesting	example.	At	a	time	of	strong	resistance	to	the	Human	Rights	Act	in	the	country,	the	city	intentionally	chose	to	frame	its	local	policies	in	terms	of	international	human	rights.37	York	also	welcomed	refugees	in	order	to	mitigate	increasingly	severe	national	migration	policies.38	Behind	various	possible	motivations	to	implement	international	law,	the	extent	to	which	an	international	issue	becomes	part	of	a	city’s	agenda	will	depend	heavily	on	the																																																									33	Dan	Koon-hong	Chan,	‘City	diplomacy	and	“glocal”	governance:	revitalizing	cosmopolitan	democracy’	(2016)	29	Innovation:	The	European	Journal	of	Social	Science	Research,	DOI:	10.1080/13511610.2016.1157684.		34	Also	see	discussion	on	the	Convention	on	the	Elimination	of	All	Forms	of	Discrimination	Against	Women	below.		35	The	Compact	of	Mayors	is	discussed	in	detail	in	Chapter	5.		36	Lesley	Wexler,	‘Take	the	Long	Way	Home:	Sub-Federal	Integration	of	Unratified	and	Non-self-executing	Treaty	Law’	(2006)	28	Michigan	Journal	of	International	Law	1.		37	Esther	van	den	Berg	and	Barbara	Oomen,	‘Towards	a	Decentralisation	of	Human	Rights:	the	Rise	of	Human	Rights	Cities’	in	Thijs	van	Lindert	and	Doutje	Lettinga	Lettinga	(eds),	The	Future	of	Human	
Rights	in	an	Urban	World:	Exploring	Opportunities,	Threats	and	Challenges	(Amnesty	International	Netherlands	2014),	pg.	14.		38	Ibid.		
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strength	and	influence	of	constituency	demands,	interest	group	advocacy	and	lobbying	activities,	and	local	officials’	responsiveness.39		At	this	juncture,	I	give	two	examples	of	cities	implementing	treaties	on	their	own	accord	and	therefore	“bringing	international	law	home”	despite	non-ratification	by	their	national	government.40	The	US	had	signed	the	Kyoto	Protocol	on	12	November	1998.41	However,	one	year	after	the	White	House	came	under	the	control	of	the	Republican	Party	following	the	presidential	elections	in	2000,	the	Bush	administration	withdrew	the	US	signature	from	the	Kyoto	Protocol	on	the	basis	of	scientific	uncertainty	and	unfairness.42	Many	local	officials	in	the	US	did	not	share	President	Bush’s	opposition	to	the	Kyoto	Protocol.	On	the	day	that	the	Kyoto	Protocol	became	law	for	the	countries	that	had	signed	and	ratified	it,	the	Mayor	of	Seattle	Greg	Nickels	launched	the	US	Conference	of	Mayors	Climate	Protection	Agreement	whereby	signatory	cities	pledged	to	surpass	the	GHG	reduction	target	suggested	for	the	US	in	the	Kyoto	Protocol	(i.e.	7%	reduction	from	1990	levels	by	2012)	as	well	as	urge	the	US	Congress	to	pass	legislation	that	would	establish	a	national	emissions	trading	system.43	As	of	14	December	2015,	1060	cities	across	all	American	states	have	signed	the	Agreement,	thereby	internalizing	an	international	law	instrument,	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	within	the	US	despite	non-ratification	by	the	federal	government.	In	1981,	women’s	rights	activists	reached	a	remarkable	milestone	when	the	Convention	on	the	Elimination	of	All	Forms	of	Discrimination	Against	Women	(CEDAW)	entered	into	force.44	A	summary	of	the	treaty’s	objectives	can	be	found	in	Article	3,	which	requires	signatory	states	to	“take	in	all	fields,	in	particular	in	the	political,	social,	economic	and	cultural	fields,	all	appropriate	measures,	including	legislation,	to	ensure	the	full	development	and	advancement	of	women,	for	the	purpose	of	guaranteeing	them	the	exercise	and	enjoyment	of	human	rights	and	fundamental	freedoms	on	a	basis	of	equality	with	men.”45	US	President	Carter	signed	CEDAW	in	1980,	but	subsequent	administrations	either	have	failed	or	not	tried	to	secure	ratification	of	the	treaty	by	the	Senate.46	Many	opponents	of	CEDAW	ratification	are	concerned	that	the	treaty	threatens	American	norms	and	values,																																																									39	Heidi	Hobbs,	City	Hall	Goes	Abroad:	The	Foreign	Policy	of	Local	Politics	(Sage	Publishing	1994),	pg.	5.	40	I	borrow	the	term	“bringing	international	law	home”	from	Harold	H	Koh,	‘The	1998	Frankel	Lecture:	Bringing	International	Law	Home’	(1998)	35	Houston	Law	Review	623.		41	UNFCCC,	“Status	of	Ratification	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol”,	online:	http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php	(accessed	on	1	May	2016).	42	Greg	Kahn,	‘The	Fate	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol	under	the	Bush	Administration’	(2003)	21	Berkeley	Journal	of	International	Law	548,	pg.	551-559;	Julian	Borger,	‘Bush	kills	global	warming	treaty’	The	
Guardian	(29	March	2001),	online:		http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2001/mar/29/globalwarming.usnews	(accessed	on	1	May	2016).	43	US	Conference	of	Mayors	Climate	Protection	Agreement,	online:	https://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/agreement.htm	(accessed	on	1	May	2016).	44	1249	U.N.T.S.	13.		45	Ibid	46	Luisa	Blanchfield,	The	U.N.	Convention	on	the	Elimination	of	All	Forms	of	Discrimination	Against	
Women	(CEDAW):	Issues	in	the	U.S.	Ratification	Debate	(Congressional	Research	Service,	28	June	2011),	online:	https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40750.pdf,	pg.	1.		
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particularly	those	concerning	the	structure	of	the	family,47	abortion,48	and	family	planning.49	Often	using	provocative	language,	CEDAW’s	critics	have	highlighted	the	treaty’s	challenge	to	a	conception	of	women	as	obliged,	first	and	foremost,	to	their	households.50	As	with	the	case	of	climate	change,	cities	have	not	acquiesced.	As	Resnik	and	colleagues	put	it,	“…a	few	went	beyond	expressive	statements	and	aimed	to	turn	‘transnational’	law	into	‘local’	law”.51	In	1998,	San	Francisco	passed	a	local	ordinance	to	implement	CEDAW.52	The	city	committed	itself	to	the	CEDAW	technique	of	lawmaking	through	self-reflective	enquiry	about	the	effects	of	equality	norms	across	all	domains.	Specifically,	it	strives	to	“[r]eview	federal,	state	and	local	laws	and	public	policies	to	identify	systematic	and	structural	discrimination	against	women	and	girls”	and	ultimately	ensure	that	“[e]erything	that	happens	to	San	Francisco	women	and	girls	will	be	interpreted	and	acted	upon	using	the	CEDAW	conceptual	framework,	analysis	and	language.”53	San	Francisco	has	inspired	other	cities	–	Portland	(Oregon)	and	Berkeley	(California)	–	to	pass	similar	legislation.		In	2013,	an	NGO	launched	the	“Cities	for	CEDAW”	campaign	which	aims	“to	‘make	the	global	local’	by	harnessing	the	power	of	cities	and	promoting	the	adoption	of	CEDAW	as	a	municipal	ordinance	in	cities…in	order	to	create	a	framework	for	improving	the	status	of	women	and	girls”.54		There	is	a	growing	transnational	movement	of	“Human	Rights	Cities”	as	civil	society,	cities	and	international	organizations	try	to	realize	the	achievement	of	human	rights	at	the	local	level.	Through	their	comments,	declarations	and	statements,	UN	supervisory	bodies	and	regional	institutions	have	explicitly	recognized	the	role	of	local	authorities	in	giving	effect	to	human	rights.55	Human	rights	cities	can	be	defined	as	“cities	that	explicitly	refer	to	human	rights	norms	in	their	activities,	statements	or	policy.”56	Van	den	Berg	and	Oomen	have	shown	that	there	are	many	approaches	that	cities	can	take	to	implement	international	human	rights.	Some	cities	use	the	methodology	developed	by	the	NGO	known	as	The	
																																																								47	Ibid,	pg.	13.	48	Ibid,	pg.	15.		49	Ibid,	pg.	158.		50	Judith	Resnik,	Joshua	Civin	and	Joseph	Frueh,	‘Ratifying	Kyoto	at	the	Local	Level:	Sovereigntism,	Federalism,	and	Translocal	Organizations	of	Government	Actors	(TOGAs)’	(2008)	50	Arizona	Law	Review	709,	pg.	724.	51	Ibid.		52	For	discussion	of	San	Francisco’s	ordinance,	see	Stacy	Laira	Lozner,	‘Diffusion	of	Local	Regulatory	Innovations:	The	San	Francisco	CEDAW	Ordinance	and	the	New	York	City	Human	Rights	Initiative’	(2004)	104	Columbia	Law	Review	768.		53	City	and	County	of	San	Francisco,	Department	on	the	Status	of	Women,	“CEDAW	Action	Plan”,	online:	http://sfgov.org/dosw/cedaw-action-plan	(accessed	on	1	May	2016).		54	Cities	for	CEDAW,	“Implementing	CEDAW	as	a	local	ordinance”,	online:	http://citiesforcedaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Fact-Sheet-on-Implementing-CEDAW-as-a-Local-Ordinance.pdf	(accessed	on	1	May	2016).	55	See	discussion	in	Antoine	Meyer,	‘Local	Governments	and	Human	Rights	Implementation:	Taking	Stock	and	a	Closer	Strategic	Look’	(2009)	6	Pace	Diritti	Umani	7,	pgs.	11-13.		56	Van	den	Berg	and	Oomen,	pg.	13.		
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People’s	Movement	for	Human	Rights	Leaning	(PDHRE).57	Key	aspects	of	PDHRE’s	methodology	include	human	rights	education,	the	formation	of	a	steering	group	in	the	city,	the	development	and	implementation	of	action	plans,	and	evaluation	of	activities	to	foster	awareness	and	promote	realization	of	human	rights	by	various	stakeholders	in	society.	Human	rights	cities	that	have	put	this	methodology	into	practice	include	Rosario	(Argentina),	Graz	(Austria),	and	Nagpur	(India).58	Some	cities,	like	Utrecht	in	the	Netherlands,	base	their	policies	on	the	general	idea	of	human	rights	and	seek	to	incorporate	all	international	and	regional	human	rights	instruments	in	their	local	policies.59	In	their	conclusion,	Van	den	Berg	and	Oomen	suggest	that	“[i]n	referring	to	international	human	rights	as	a	basis	for	their	policies,	cities	can	also	demarcate	their	autonomy,	and	become	part	of	a	powerful	network	of	global	actors	instead	of	being	subservient	to	the	nation	states.	This	process	of	‘glocalization’	also	entails	a	new	type	of	citizenship	that	straddles	the	local	and	the	global.”60		
2.2	City	Diplomacy			 Diplomacy	is	predominantly	perceived	to	be	the	realm	of	inter-state	relations.	The	Oxford	Encyclopedia	of	the	Modern	World,	for	example,	defines	diplomacy	as	“the	formalized	system	of	procedures	or	the	process	by	which	sovereign	states,	usually	through	ambassadors	or	other	representatives,	conduct	their	official	relations.”61	Within	diplomatic	studies,	a	niche	literature	on	the	concept	of	“parallel	diplomacy”	or	“paradiplomacy”	considers	the	possibility	of	a	number	of	external	relations	“tracks”	running	across	countries.62	According	to	the	paradiplomacy	concept,	these	tracks	do	not	only	involve	traditional	diplomatic	actors	such	as	the	State	Department	or	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs.	Some	tracks	will	constitute	the	external	relations	of	sub-national	actors.	The	literature	on	paradiplomacy	tends	to	be	focused	on	regions,	provinces	and	states	within	federalist	systems.63	The	diplomatic	role	of	cities,	let	alone	global	cities,	has	received	little	consideration	to	date.																																																										57	PDHRE,	“Human	Rights	Cities	–	a	practical	way	to	learn	and	chart	the	future	of	humanity”,	online:	http://www.pdhre.org/projects/hrcommun.html	(accessed	on	1	May	2016).		58	Ibid.	59	Gemeente	Utrecht,	Mensenrechten	in	Utrecht:	hoe	geeft	Utrecht	invulling	aan	internationale	
mensenrechtenverdragen?	Een	stedelijke	zoektocht	naar	sociale	rechtvaardigheid	(2011),	online:	https://www.utrecht.nl/fileadmin/uploads/documenten/2.concern-bestuur-uitvoering/BIS/Mensenrechten_in_Utrecht__juni2011_.pdf	(accessed	on	1	May	2016).		60	Van	den	Berg	and	Oomen,	pg.	15.		61	Peter	Stearns	(ed)	Oxford	Encyclopedia	of	the	Modern	World	(Oxford	University	Press	2008).	62	See,	for	example,	Alexander	S	Kuznetsov,	Theory	and	Practice	of	Paradiplomacy:	Subnational	
Governments	in	International	Affairs	(Routledge	2014);	Ivo	D.	Duchacek,	Daniel	Latouche	and	Garth	Stevenson	(eds),	Perforated	Sovereignties	and	International	Relations:	Trans-Sovereign	Contacts	and	
Subnational	Governments	(Greenwood	Press	1988);	Carlos	R.	S.	Milani	and	Maria	Clotilde	Meirelles	Ribeiro,	‘International	Relations	and	the	Paradiplomacy	of	Brazilian	Cities:	Crafting	the	Concept	of	Local	International	Management’	(2011)	8	Brazilian	Administration	Review	21.		63	See,	for	example,	Hans	J.	Michelmann	and	Panayotis	Soldatos	(eds),	Federalism	and	International	
Relations:	The	Role	of	Subnational	Units	(Oxford	University	Press	1990);	Hubert	Rioux	Quimet,	‘From	Sub-state	Nationalism	to	Subnational	Competition	States:	The	Development	and	Institutionalization	
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Since	the	mid	2000s,	however,	there	has	been	increasing	discussion	of	inter-city	diplomacy.	In	2006,	the	Clingendael	(Netherlands	Institute	of	International	Relations)	launched	a	pilot	project	to	provide	an	overview	of	the	burgeoning	landscape	of	diplomatic	developments	taking	place	at	the	level	of	cities.64	This	project	defined	city	diplomacy	as	“the	institutions	and	processes	by	which	cities	engage	in	relations	with	actors	on	an	international	political	stage	with	the	aim	of	representing	themselves	and	their	interests	to	one	another”.65	From	this	point	of	view,	diplomacy	is	not	confined	to	ambassadorial	and	political	advocacy	activities	but	also	encompasses	trade	facilitation	and	cultural	exchange.	It	should	be	noted	that	United	Cities	Local	Governments	(UCLG)’s	Committee	on	City	Diplomacy,	Peace-building	and	Human	Rights,	established	in	2005,	define	“city	diplomacy	as	the	tool	of	local	governments	and	their	associations	for	promoting	social	cohesion,	conflict	prevention,	conflict	resolution	and	post-conflict	reconstruction	with	the	aim	of	creating	a	stable	environment,	in	which	the	citizens	can	live	together	in	peace,	democracy	and	prosperity”.66	This	definition	emphasizes	the	role	of	cities	in	conflict	resolution	and	peace	building.	This	committee	merged	with	the	Decentralized	Cooperation	Committee	in	2010.67	The	new	entity,	known	as	the	Committee	on	Development	Cooperation	and	City	Diplomacy,	has	a	broader	mandate	of	promoting	development	cooperation,	achieving	the	Millennium	Development	Goals	(which	were	replaced	by	the	Sustainable	Development	Goals	in	2015)	and	advising	UCLG	on	the	role	of	cities	in	preventing	violent	conflicts.68		In	some	regions	such	as	East	Asia	and	Europe,	there	has	been	a	rise	in	inter-city	diplomatic	activities	to	achieve	a	range	of	objectives	including	easing	long-standing	political	tensions	and	trade	promotion.69	For	example,	in	April	2014,	the	media	reported	that	Tokyo’s	governor	would	visit	Beijing	at	the	invitation	of	its	mayor	to	help	“heal	Japan	and	China’s	bruised	relations”.70	On	the	agenda	was	Tokyo	sharing	its	experience	of	tackling	air	pollution	(which	is	a	serious	problem	in																																																																																																																																																																						of	Commercial	Paradiplomacy	in	Scotland	and	Quebec’	(2015)	25	Regional	&	Federal	Studies	109;	Michael	Keating,	‘Regions	and	international	affairs:	Motives,	opportunities	and	strategies’	(1999)	9	Regional	and	Federal	Studies	1.	64	Rogier	van	der	Pluijm	and	Jan	Melissen,	City	Diplomacy:	The	Expanding	Role	of	Cities	in	
International	Politics	(Clingendael	Institute,	1	April	2007),	online:	http://www.clingendael.nl/publication/city-diplomacy-expanding-role-cities-international-politics	(accessed	on	20	December	2016),	pg.	11.	Also	see	the	‘Shanghai	Consensus	on	the	Role	of	Cities	in	International	Relations’,	online:	http://www.clingendael.nl/news/shanghai-consensus-cities-international-relations	(accessed	on	20	December	2016).	65	Ibid,	pg.	5.	66	The	Hague	Agenda	on	City	Diplomacy,	13	June	2008,	online:	http://www.peaceprize.uclg.org/documents-of-interest.html	(accessed	on	3	April	2015).		67	UCLG,	“Committees	and	Working	Groups:	Development	Cooperation	and	City	Diplomacy”,	online:	https://www.uclg.org/en/organisation/structure/committees-working-groups/development-cooperation-and-city-diplomacy	(accessed	on	3	December	2016).		68	Ibid.		69	Outside	Europe	and	East	Asia,	inter-city	diplomacy	has	also	been	recognized	for	its	role	in	building	peace	in	the	Middle	East;	see,	for	example,	European	Commission,	Palestinian	and	Israeli	Mayors	
praise	role	of	city-to-city	diplomacy	in	Middle	East	peace	process	(1	June	2007),	online:	http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_COR-07-73_en.htm	(accessed	on	3	April	2016).		70	‘Tokyo	governor	to	make	'city	diplomacy'	visit	to	Beijing	’	The	Straits	Times	(15	April	2014).		
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the	Chinese	capital)	and,	in	turn,	learning	more	about	organizing	the	Olympics	Games	from	the	Beijing	mayoralty.	Underlying	this	agenda	of	sharing	best	practices	and	inter-city	learning	is	the	quest	by	Beijing	and	Tokyo	to	“help	improve	Japan-China	relations	by	building	on	these	exchanges”.71	A	second	example	is	that	of	the	Taipei	city	government.	A	section	on	the	city	government’s	website	is	devoted	to	documenting	the	“city	diplomacy”	that	Taipei	engages	in	to	enhance	“the	attitude	and	vision	of	the	global	city	that	Taipei	has	become”.72	A	notable	initiative	is	the	Taipei-Shanghai	City	Forum,	which	serves	as	a	platform	for	advancing	city-to-city	ties	amidst	continuing	deep	divisions	in	relations	between	Taiwan	and	the	People’s	Republic	of	China.73	The	forum,	which	has	taken	place	annually	since	2010,	focuses	on	cultural	and	economic	issues,	and	rarely	touches	on	political	matters.74		A	third	recent	example	of	city	diplomacy	concerns	the	reaction	of	cities	around	the	world	to	the	passage	of	anti-gay	legislation	in	St	Petersburg,	Russia.	On	30	January	2013,	the	Huffington	Post	and	other	news	agencies	reported	that	Venice’s	City	Council	had	voted	to	suspend	its	relationship	with	St	Petersburg	after	the	city	passed	anti-gay	legislation	that	violates	global	norms	concerning	lesbian,	gay,	bisexual	and	transgender	(LGBT)	rights.75	The	law	criminalizes	“public	action	aimed	at	propagandising	sodomy,	lesbianism,	bisexualism,	and	transgenderism	among	minors”.76	Those	charged	with	breaking	the	law	will	be	fined	from	5,000	to	500,000	Russian	rubles	(approximately	68	to	6781	euros).77According	to	news	reports,	the	Venice	City	Council	voted	to	suspend	its	2006	cultural	cooperation	agreement	with	St	Petersburg	and	to	suspend	cultural	exchange	as	long	as	the	anti-gay	legislation	remained	in	force.78	As	Nijman	has	pointed	out,	instead	of	the	Italian	state	responding	to	the	human	rights	violation	by	another	member	state	of	the	Council	of	Europe,	this	is	a	case	of	an	Italian	city	upholding	global	human	rights	norms.79	Venice’s	actions	prompted	citizens	in	other	cities	such	as	Melbourne																																																									71	Ibid.		72	Taipei	City	Government,	“City	Diplomacy”,	online:	http://english.sec.gov.taipei/np.asp?ctNode=84311&mp=101002	(accessed	on	1	May	2016).	This	statement	is	indicative	of	how	some	cities	view	external	relations	as	a	means	of	demonstrating	its	global	city	status.	73	Russell	Flannery,	‘Taipei	Mayor	Ready	To	'Dance	With	Wolves'	In	Shanghai	Next	Week’	Forbes	(14	August	2015);	Pichi	Chuang,	‘Taipei	mayor	won't	publicly	back	'One	China',	Shanghai	forum	at	risk’	
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China	Morning	Post	(5	August	2015).	75	Glennisha	Morgan,	‘Venice	To	Cut	Ties	With	St.	Petersburg	Over	Anti-Gay	Law’	Huffington	Post	(30	January	2013),	online:	http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/30/venice-st-petersburg-anti-gaw-propaganda-law_n_2576044.html	(accessed	on	1	May	2016).	76	Miriam	Elder,	‘St	Petersburg	bans	'homosexual	propaganda’	The	Guardian	(12	March	2012),	online:	http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/12/st-petersburg-bans-homosexual-propaganda	(accessed	on	1	May	2016).	77	Ibid	78	Morgan.	79	Janne	E.	Nijman,	‘Renaissance	of	the	City	as	Global	Actor:	The	Role	of	Foreign	Policy	and	International	Law	Practices	in	the	Construction	of	Cities	as	Global	Actors’	in	Gunther	Hellmann,	Andreas	Fahrmeir	and	Milos	Vec	(eds),	The	Transformation	of	Foreign	Policy:	Drawing	and	Managing	
Boundaries	from	Antiquity	to	the	Present	(Oxford	University	Press	2016),	pg.	1.	
	 51	
(Australia),	Los	Angeles	(US),	and	Manchester	(UK)	to	urge	their	city	governments	to	suspend	their	twin-city	status	with	St	Petersburg.80	The	response	of	Melbourne’s	city	government	is	also	noteworthy	from	a	city	diplomacy	perspective.	While	the	city	council	decided	against	suspending	Melbourne’s	relationship	with	St	Petersburg,	it	justified	its	decision	on	the	basis	that	maintaining	the	relationship	with	St	Petersburg	would	allow	Melbourne	to	more	actively	advocate	for	the	revocation	of	the	anti-gay	law.81		The	cities	of	Istanbul	(Turkey)	and	Melbourne	(Australia)	have	expressed	commitment	to	business-oriented	city	diplomacy.	The	Greater	Istanbul	Municipality’s	Office	for	External	Relations	cooperates	with	the	Istanbul	Chamber	of	Commerce	to	organize	business	delegation	trips	abroad.82	It	also	provides	advisory	services	to	support	foreign	investors	in	Istanbul.83	Melbourne	has	an	“International	Engagement	Framework”,	endorsed	by	the	city’s	council	in	April	2010,	which	indicates	the	priority	areas	for	the	city’s	international	relations	and	the	amount	of	resources	that	ought	to	be	devoted	to	each	priority	area.84	It	is	noteworthy	that	the	framework	sets	out	that	the	city	ought	to	devote	50%	of	its	city	diplomatic	resources	to	“building	prosperity”	which	is	defined	as	“[increasing]	export	and	inward	investment	in	Melbourne’s	key	industry	sectors,	including	education,	tourism	and	services	sector”,	20%	towards	increasing	inter-city	learning,	20%	to	supporting	community	and	cultural	programmes	and	10%	towards	participation	in	international	governance.85	Melbourne	is	also	the	only	Australian	capital	city	council	to	operate	an	overseas	business	representative	office	in	Tianjin,	China,	to	strengthen	trade	links	between	the	two	cities.86			 A	final	example	is	that	of	the	European	Network	of	Local	Authorities	for	Peace	in	the	Middle	East.	This	network	of	city	governments	organizes	many	lobbying	activities	such	as	election	monitoring	and	aims	to	keep	the	Middle	East	
																																																								80	Claire	Bigg,	‘Sister	Cities	Ramp	Up	Russia	Boycott	Over	Antigay	Law’	Radio	Free	Europe	(19	July	2013),	online:	http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-sister-cities-gay-law/25051513.html	(accessed	on	1	May	2016);	‘Manchester	to	use	St	Petersburg	link	to	'pressure	Russia'’	BBC	News	(2	August	2013),	online:	http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-manchester-23536652	(accessed	on	1	May	2016).		81	Beau	Donelly,	‘Melbourne	won't	sever	ties	with	sister	city	over	anti-gay	laws’	The	Weekly	Review	(2	July	2013),	online:	http://www.theweeklyreview.com.au/uncategorized/1611790-melbourne-wont-sever-ties-with-sister-city-over-anti-gay-laws/;	Jason	Dowling,	‘Lord	mayor	tackles	Russia	over	gay	rights’	The	Age	(7	March	2013),	online:	http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/lord-mayor-tackles-russia-over-gay-rights-20130306-2flqg.html	(both	accessed	on	1	May	2016).		82	‘City	Diplomacy	and	Istanbul’	Turkish	Review	(1	August	2013).		83	Ibid.		84	City	of	Melbourne,	Our	international	strategy	-	Melbourne:	Doing	business	globally	(2014),	online:	http://www.melbourne.vic.gov.au/business/doing-business-globally/Pages/melbourne-doing-business-globally.aspx	(accessed	on	1	May	2016).	85	Ibid,	pg.	1.		86	Melbourne	Office	Tianjin,	online:	http://www.melbourne.vic.gov.au/business/doing-business-globally/international-programs/Pages/melbourne-office-tianjin.aspx	(accessed	on	1	May	2016).	
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peace	process	on	the	international	agenda.87	Proposed	by	the	Association	of	Palestinian	Local	Authorities	and	the	Union	of	Local	Authorities	in	Israel,	the	network	also	serves	as	a	forum	for	Israeli-	Palestinian	municipal	dialogue	with	contributions	from	foreign	cities	(including	Rome,	Barcelona	and	Cologne).88	Cooperation	is	based	on	tri-lateral	development	projects	in	the	areas	of	culture,	youth,	the	environment	and	municipal	management.89		As	the	above	discussion	indicates,	economic	activity	drives	quite	a	few	instances	of	modern	inter-city	diplomacy.	This	is	not	unexpected.	In	Europe,	Venetian	and	Byzantine	commercial	diplomacy	dates	back	to	the	early	Middle	Ages.90	From	the	twelfth	century	onwards,	commerce	became	a	crucial	topic	of	diplomatic	negotiations.91	Today,	city	diplomacy	with	an	eye	towards	trade	and	establishing	economic	contact	can	be	explained	by	declining	central	government	monies	for	cities	and	the	consequent	need	for	cities	to	generate	independent	sources	of	income.	While	decentralization	and	the	devolution	of	political	authority	from	higher	levels	of	government	to	cities	lead	to	municipal	governments	having	more	autonomy	to	establish	trade	and	diplomatic	links	with	other	cities,	decentralization	also	often	involves	the	state	and	provincial	government	delegating	more	responsibilities	to	cities	without	increasing	the	cities’	budgets.92	This	can	lead	to	failed	decentralization	in	some	instances.93	In	other	instances,	cities	manage	to	avoid	local	bankruptcy	and	fill	their	coffers	by	successfully	attracting	foreign	investment	and	creating	markets	for	the	businesses	that	reside	in	their	cities.94	Political	activities	represent	a	new	direction	for	cities	as	they	venture	beyond	their	political	boundaries	to	make	statements	on	more	far-reaching	issues	such	as	human	rights	and	nuclear	disarmament.			
2.3	Cities	Developing	Independent	Strategies	to	Manage	Global	Threats	
																																																								87	Alexandra	Sizoo	and	Arne	Musch,	‘City	diplomacy:	the	role	of	local	governments	in	conflict	prevention,	peace-building	and	post-conflict	reconstruction’	in	Arne	Musch	and	others	(eds),	City	
Diplomacy:	The	role	of	local	governments	in	conflict	prevention,	peace-building,	post-conflict	
reconstruction	(VNG	International,	The	Hague	2008),	pg.	17.		88	Chris	van	Hemert,	‘A	case	study	in	city	diplomacy:	the	Municipal	Alliance	for	Peace	in	the	Middle	East’	in	Arne	Musch	and	others	(eds),	City	Diplomacy:	The	role	of	local	governments	in	conflict	
prevention,	peace-building,	post-conflict	reconstruction	(VNG	International,	The	Hague	2008),	pg.	166.		89	Ibid.		90	Stearns.	91	Ibid.		92	The	goal	of	decentralization	is	to	disperse	authority	and	responsibility	to	lower	levels	of	decision-making.	In	theory,	the	two	main	benefits	of	decentralization	are	allocative	efficiency	and	improved	governance.	For	discussion,	see	Mark	Turner,	David	Hulme	and	Willy	McCourt,	Governance,	
Management	and	Development:	Making	the	State	Work	(Palgrave	Macmillan	2015),	chapter	8.	For	an	excellent	discussion	of	the	Indian	experience	with	decentralization,	see	Sharmila	L.		Murthy	and	Maya	J.		Mahin,	‘Constitutional	Impediments	to	Decentralization	in	the	World's	Largest	Federal	Country’	(2015)	26	Duke	Journal	of	Comparative	and	International	Law	79.	93	Ibid.		94	Earl	H.	Fry,	‘State	and	Local	Governments	in	the	International	Arena’	(1990)	509	The	Annals	of	the	American	Academy	of	Political	and	Social	Science	118,	pgs.	122-123.	
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	 Cities	face	many	global	risks	such	as	infectious	diseases	and	terrorism.95	This	section	focuses	on	counterterrorism	efforts	because	it	is	in	this	area	that	cities	have	developed	sophisticated	responses.	According	to	Hank	Savitch,	nearly	three-quarters	of	incidents	labeled	as	a	terror	attack	worldwide,	and	four	out	of	every	five	of	its	subsequent	casualties,	occur	in	cities.96	Savitch	argues	that	the	complexity	of	the	urban	landscape	makes	it	ideal	for	hiding	terrorist	plots.97	Densely	populated	cities	also	facilitate	extensive	loss	of	lives	and	damage	to	property,	generating	strong	symbolic	meaning,	fear	and	anxiety.	Counter-insurgency	expert	David	Kilcullen	believes	that	cities	are	the	target:	“The	goal	is	to	shut	[cities]	down	for	as	long	as	possible,	separate	people	from	one	another,	break	down	communities,	and	push	them	into	mental	fortresses”.98	The	breakdown	of	trust	in	communities	facilitates	further	exploitation.		 	 	 	 	 	 		 While	terrorism	has	traditionally	been	perceived	to	be	a	matter	of	national	security,	increasingly,	global	cities	are	acting	autonomously	as	they	develop	and	institutionalize	their	own	local	and	transnational	counterterrorism	strategies.99	New	York	City,	the	city	that	was	at	the	heart	of	the	September	11	attacks,	offers	a	prime	example	of	how	a	global	city	has	forged	ahead	with	internationalizing	its	municipal	policing	strategy	and	forming	transnational	partnerships	based	on	the	belief	that	cities	“must	serve	as	the	frontline	of	homeland	security”	and	cannot	rely	on	the	federal	government	to	provide	adequate	protection.100	 	 	 		 The	New	York	City	Police	Department	(NYPD)	is	the	largest	municipal	police	
																																																								95	On	the	risks	of	epidemics	and	infectious	diseases	that	a	global	city	faces,	see	Lance	Saker	and	others,	Globalization	and	infectious	diseases:	A	review	of	the	linkages	(UNDP/World	Bank/WHO	Special	Programme	for	Research	and	Training	in	Tropical	Diseases,	2004);	Harris	Ali	and	Roger	Keil,	‘Global	Cities	and	the	Spread	of	Infectious	Disease:	The	Case	of	Severe	Acute	Respiratory	Syndrome	(SARS)	in	Toronto,	Canada’	(2006)	43	Urban	Studies	491;	Roger	Keil	and	Harris	Ali,	‘Governing	the	Sick	City:	Urban	Governance	in	the	Age	of	Emerging	Infectious	Disease’	(2007)	39	Antipode	846.		96	Hank	V.	Savitch,	Cities	in	a	Time	of	Terror:	Space,	Territory,	and	Local	Resilience	(Routledge	2008),	pgs.	3-7.		97	Ibid.	98	Robert	Muggah,	‘Is	urban	terrorism	the	new	normal?	Probably’	World	Economic	Forum,	Davos	2016	(17	January	2016),	online:	https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/is-urban-terrorism-is-the-new-normal-probably/	(accessed	on	5	May	2016).		99	Kristin	Ljungkvist,	Global	City	2.0:	From	Strategic	Site	to	Global	Actor	(Routledge	2016),	pgs.	77-78.	A	few	hours	after	the	events	of	September	11,	New	York	City	Mayor	Rudolph	Giuliani	and	New	York	Governor	George	Pataki	jointly	gave	a	press	conference.	Mayor	Giuliani	indicated	that	it	was	not	up	to	him	or	the	city	of	New	York	but	to	the	US	President	to	take	charge	of	the	situation	and	respond.	As	Ljungkvist	notes,	this	is	not	surprising	because,	up	till	then,	counterterrorism	was	deemed	to	be	a	federal	concern.	This	perception	would	eventually	shift,	as	will	be	noted	later	in	this	chapter.		100	For	an	articulation	of	this	view,	see	for	example,	Eben	Kaplan,	‘New	York	Spurs	Counterterrorism	Efforts’	Council	on	Foreign	Relations	(28	December	2006	),	online:		http://www.cfr.org/world/new-york-spurs-counterterrorism-efforts/p12312;	the	mission	statement	of	the	New	York	Police	Department	Counterterrorism	Units	state	“Built	upon	the	realization	that	the	City	could	not	rely	solely	on	the	federal	government	for	its	defense,	the	Counterterrorism	Bureau	was	created.”,	online:	http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/administration/counterterrorism_units.shtml		(both	websites	accessed	on	3	May	2016).		
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department	in	the	US.101	With	about	36,000	officers	and	15,000	support	staff,	the	department	is	twice	the	size	of	the	Federal	Bureau	of	Investigation	(FBI),	which	is	the	federal	counter-terrorism	agency.102	Prior	to	the	September	11	attacks,	the	NYPD	focused	almost	solely	on	crime	reduction	but	after	the	attacks,	the	department	was	fundamentally	reorganized	and	counterterrorism	was	made	one	of	the	NYPD’s	key	priorities.103	An	entirely	new	Counterterrorism	Bureau	was	created	in	2002,	and	the	existing	intelligence	division	was	revamped.	The	Counterterrorism	Bureau	employs	250	full-time	officers,	of	which	about	half	of	them	are	part	of	the	New	York	Joint	Terrorism	Task	Force	with	the	FBI	and	other	federal	law	enforcement	agencies.104	These	officers	have	security	clearance	that	gives	them	access	to	national	and	international	sources	of	intelligence	and	to	investigations	conducted	overseas.105	Through	the	New	York	Joint	Terrorism	Task	Force,	NYPD	officers	have	been	able	to	interrogate	terrorist	suspects	in	Afghanistan	and	Pakistan	and	to	conduct	interviews	at	Guantanamo	Bay.106	The	Counterterrorism	Bureau	provides	some	level	of	counterterrorism	training	for	all	NYPD	officers	such	as	recognizing	suspicious	behavior	and	the	use	of	gear	that	protects	against	biological,	chemical	and	radioactive	weapons.107	The	Counterterrorism	Bureau	is	most	visible	when	it	carries	out	massive	deployment	of	heavily	armed,	paramilitary-style	units	at	high	profile	locations	around	the	city.	According	to	Nussbaum,	NYPD	leaders	stress	that	these	deployments	are	not	random	but	driven	by	intelligence	and	have	proven	to	be	effective.108		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 In	addition	to	the	establishment	of	the	Counterterrorism	Bureau,	under	the	leadership	of	Mayor	Bloomberg	and	Police	Commissioner	Ray	Kelly,	significant	resources	and	expertise	were	put	into	revamping	the	NYPD’s	intelligence	division	into	one	“that	rivals	the	security	services	of	many	small	countries...”109	The	division	is	staffed	by	approximately	eight	hundred	people.	About	half	of	the	division	focuses	specifically	on	terrorism,	while	the	other	half	focuses	on	criminal	activity	such	as	drug	trafficking	and	gang	violence.110	The	division	has	an	International	Liaison	Programme	whereby	NYPD	detectives	are	sent	to	live	in	Europe,	the	Middle	East	and	Southeast	Asia	where	they	serve	as	the	NYPD’s	liaison	to	that	country’s	law	enforcement	and	intelligence	community.111	These	officers	are	not	armed	and	do	
																																																								101	Office	of	Justice	Programs,	Bureau	of	Justice	Statistics,	latest	data	available:	2008;	see	Brian	Reaves,	Census	of	State	and	Local	Law	Enforcement	Agencies,	2008	(US	Department	of	Justice,	July	2011),	pg.	4,	online:	http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=249	(accessed	on	3	May	2016).	102	Brian	Nussbaum,	‘Protecting	Global	Cities:	New	York,	London	and	the	Internationalization	of	Municipal	Policing	for	Counter	Terrorism’	(2007)	8	Global	Crime	213,	pg.	218.		103	Ljungkvist,	pg.	78.	104	Ibid.		105	Ljungkvist,	pg.	75.	106	Ibid.	107	Nussbaum,	pg.	219.	108	Nussbaum,	pg.	220.	109	Ibid.		110	Ljungkvist,	pg.	72.		111	This	programme	is	funded	by	the	New	York	City	Police	Foundation,	a	non-profit	group	that	is	backed	by	private	multinational	corporations	such	as	JP	Morgan,	Goldman	Sachs	and	Barclays;	
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not	become	directly	involved	in	investigations	and	enforcement	actions	in	their	host	countries;	their	primary	objective	is	intelligence	gathering.112	Since	the	inception	of	the	International	Liaison	Programme,	there	has	been	a	senior	NYPD	officer	at	the	scene	of	most	terrorist	attacks	in	the	world,	such	as	the	ones	in	Istanbul,	Madrid,	and	Jakarta	to	assess	how	the	attack	might	be	relevant	to	New	York	City.113	It	is	noteworthy	that	the	NYPD’s	overseas	expansion	has	been	driven	mainly	by	the	desire	to	work	around	and	bypass	the	FBI.	The	need	for	New	York	City	to	develop	its	local	counterterrorism	capabilities	has	been	rationalized	on	the	basis	that	the	federal	government	has	proven	incapable	of	protecting	the	city	and	that	the	city’s	government	has	to	step	in	and	take	up	independent	responsibility	of	providing	security	for	its	citizens.114	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 It	can	be	argued	that,	regardless	of	whether	terrorism	is	perceived	to	be	a	local	or	international	threat,	most	cities	do	not	have	the	resources	or	the	autonomy	to	address	it	at	the	global	level.	The	US$200	million	that	New	York	City	spends	annually	on	counterterrorism	alone	vastly	exceeds	the	budgets	of	most	cities.115	As	such,	New	York	City	is	an	outlier.	This	may	well	be	the	case,	but	it	does	not	detract	from	the	main	point	advanced	here,	i.e.,	that	there	are	a	handful	of	global	cities,	of	which	New	York	and	London116	are	examples,	that	have	developed	sophisticated	local	and	transnational	counterterrorism	capabilities	independent	of	their	national	governments.	Further,	a	number	of	cities	such	as	Chicago	and	Los	Angeles,	inspired	by	New	York	City,	are	increasingly	developing	their	autonomous	counterterrorism	capabilities.117		  	
2.4	Global	Organizations	and	Global	Aims		
	 In	Expanding	Governmental	Diversity	in	Global	Governance:	Parliamentarians	
of	States	and	Local	Governments,	Alger	provides	an	overview	of	interstate	organizations	of	cities	and	local	governments	to	“challenge	readers	to	realize	that	global	governance	is	ever	more	complicated	and	does	not	only	involve	the	UN	system	and	organizations	involved	in	the	UN	system”.118	He	classifies	“global	organizations	of	local	authorities”	according	to	five	foci:	“general	purpose,	larger	cities,	environmental,	peace,	and	language”.119			
																																																																																																																																																																					http://www.nycpolicefoundation.org/programs/international-liaison-program/	(accessed	on	5	December	2016).		112	New	York	City	Police	Foundation,	“International	Liaison	Program”,	online:			http://www.nycpolicefoundation.org/programs/international-liaison-program/	(accessed	on	5	December	2016).	113	Ibid.		114	Ljungkvist,	pg.	107.		115	Kaplan.	116	See	Jon	Coaffee,	Terrorism,	Risk	and	the	Global	City:	Towards	Urban	Resilience	(Ashgate	Publishing	2009)	for	a	detailed	study	of	London’s	responses	to	terrorism	in	the	1990s.	117	Kaplan.		118	Chadwick	F.	Alger,	‘Expanding	governmental	diversity	in	global	governance:	Parliamentarians	of	States	and	Local	Governments’	(2010)	16	Global	Governance	59,	pg.	60.	119	Ibid,	pg.	63.	
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General	Purpose:	An	example	is	UCLG,	which	aims	to	“increase	the	role	and	influence	of	local	governments	in	global	governance”	and	facilitates	programmes	and	partnerships	that	build	the	capacities	of	local	governments.120	Since	its	creation	in	2004,	UCLG	has	advocated	for	a	formal	advisory	role	for	local	government	within	the	UN.	One	of	the	objectives	adopted	at	UCLG’s	Founding	Congress	is	“renewing	and	deepening	our	partnership	with	United	Nations	and	the	global	community,	and	building	an	effective	and	formal	role	for	local	government	as	a	pillar	of	the	international	system”.121	Indeed,	it	can	be	argued	that	UCLG	won	the	highest	accolade	of	recognition	as	the	unified	voice	of	cities	worldwide	when	the	2004	
Report	of	the	Panel	of	Eminent	Persons	on	United	Nations-Civil	Society	Relations	(the	Cardoso	Report)	made	the	specific	recommendation	that	“the	United	Nations	should	regard	United	Cities	and	Local	Governments	as	an	advisory	body	on	governance	matters.”122	
Larger	cities:	Created	in	1985,	Metropolis	(World	Association	of	the	Major	Metropolises)	brings	together	cities	and	metropolitan	regions	with	more	than	a	million	inhabitants.123	Its	mission	is	to	serve	“as	an	international	forum	for	exploring	issues	and	concerns	common	to	all	big	cities	and	metropolitan	regions”.124	Metropolis	also	manages	the	metropolitan	section	of	UCLG.	As	of	October	2014,	it	has	139	active	members	across	all	geographical	regions	including	Dubai,	Jakarta,	Madrid,	Mexico	City,	Moscow	and	Toronto.125		
Environmental:	ICLEI	is	one	of	the	world’s	largest	organization	of	local	governments.	Its	membership	in	2012	included	12	mega-cities,	100	super-cities	and	urban	regions,	450	large	cities	and	450	small	and	mid-sized	cities	in	84	countries.126	Formed	in	1990	by	the	International	Union	of	Local	Authorities	and	the	United	Nations	Environment	Programme	(UNEP)	to	represent	the	environmental	concerns	of	local	government	internationally,	the	network	was	formerly	known	simply	as	the	International	Council	for	Local	Environmental	Initiatives.	However,	in	order	to																																																									120	UCLG,	“About	Us”,	online:	http://www.uclg.org/en/organisation/about	(accessed	on	18	April	2016).		121	UCLG,	“International	Agenda”,	online:	http://www.uclg.org/en/issues/united-nations-advocacy	(accessed	on	18	April	2016).	122	We	the	peoples:	civil	society,	the	United	Nations	and	global	governance	(Panel	of	Eminent	Persons	on	UN-Civil	Society	Relations,	UN	General	Assembly,	Fifty-eighth	session,	Agenda	item	59:	Strengthening	of	the	United	Nations	System,	Doc	A/58/817,	11	June	2004),	pg.	20.	For	discussion	about	the	Cardoso	Report,	see		Peter	Willetts,	‘The	Cardoso	Report	on	the	UN	and	Civil	Society:	Functionalism,	Global	Corporatism,	or	Global	Democracy?’	(2006)	12	Global	Governance:	A	Review	of	Multilateralism	and	International	Organizations	305	123	Metropolis,	“Mission”,	http://www.metropolis.org/mission	(accessed	on	18	April	2016).	124	Ibid.		125	Metropolis,	“List	of	Active	Members”,	online:	http://www.metropolis.org/sites/default/files/pdf/list_of_active_members.pdf	(accessed	on	18	April	2016).	126	ICLEI,	ICLEI	-	Local	Governments	for	Sustainability	Corporate	Report	2011/12	(2012),	pg.	7,	online:	www.iclei.org	(accessed	on	3	December	2016).	Megacities	are	cities	with	a	population	of	at	least	10	million	people.	In	ICLEI	terminology,	a	super	city	has	a	population	of	one	to	ten	million	people,	a	large	city	has	a	hundred	thousand	to	one	million	people,	and	a	city	or	town	has	up	to	a	hundred	thousand	people.		
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highlight	the	network’s	approach	of	“look[ing]	beyond	mere	environmental	aspects	and	embrac[ing]	wider	sustainability	issues”,	the	ICLEI	council	renamed	the	association	ICLEI	–	Local	Governments	for	Sustainability.127	Amongst	other	things,	ICLEI	works	to	promote	biodiversity	conservation	and	resource	efficiency	at	the	local	level.128	Its	Cities	Biodiversity	Center	works	closely	with	the	Convention	on	Biological	Diversity	(CBD)	secretariat	to	organize	capacity-building	events	for	cities	and	side-events	parallel	to	COPs.		On	resource	efficiency,	ICLEI	focuses	on	helping	cities	better	manage	their	natural	resources	such	as	water	and	soil.	ICLEI	represents	its	members	in	major	sustainability	forums	such	as	UN-Water,	the	International	Water	Association	and	UN	Habitat.129		
Peace:	Mayors	for	Peace	was	established	in	1982	by	then-mayor	of	Hiroshima	who	proposed	a	new	Program	to	Promote	the	Solidarity	of	Cities	toward	the	Total	Abolition	of	Nuclear	Weapons	at	the	second	UN	Special	Session	on	Disarmament	held	at	the	UN	Headquarters	in	New	York.130	The	organization	aims	to	promote	the	abolition	of	nuclear	weapons;	its	2020	Vision	Campaign	has	the	ambitious	goal	of	abolishing	nuclear	weapons	by	the	year	2020.131	6,649	cities	are	members	of	Mayors	of	Peace	as	of	1	April	2015.132	The	role	of	cities	in	conflict	prevention,	peace-building	and	post-conflict	reconstruction	has	already	been	discussed	within	the	context	of	city	diplomacy.		
Language:	Founded	in	1979,	the	Association	Internationales	des	Maires	
Francophones	or	The	International	Association	of	Francophone	Mayors	(AIMF)	brings	together	mayors	and	officials	from	cities	where	French	is	the	official	language	or	is	widely	used.133	Its	members	include	Siem	Reap	and	Phnom	Penh	(Cambodia),	Edea	and	Garoua	(Cameroon),	Brazzaville	(Congo),	Paris	and	Lille	(France),	Montreal	(Canada),	Geneva	and	Lausanne	(Switzerland)	and	Hanoi	(Vietnam).134	AIMF’s	programs	aim	to	build	capacity	amongst	local	officials,	assist	cities	in	raising	funds	to	provide	essential	public	services,	provide	policy	training	and	tools	to	improve	local	finances	and	encourage	heritage	conservation	in	cities.135																																																										127	ICLEI,	“Who	is	ICLEI”,	online:	http://www.iclei.org/iclei-global/who-is-iclei.html	(accessed	on	3	December	2016).		128	Ibid.		129	Ibid.		130	Mayors	for	Peace,	“About	Us”,	online:	http://www.mayorsforpeace.org/english/outlines/index.html	(accessed	on	3	December	2016).		131	2020	Vision	Campaign,	online:	http://www.2020visioncampaign.org/en/about-us.html	(accessed	on	3	December	2016).		132	Mayors	for	Peace,	“Member	Cities”,	online:	http://www.mayorsforpeace.org/english/membercity/map.html(accessed	on	3	December	2016).	Van	der	Pluijm	and	Melissen	point	out	that,	despite	the	widespread	support	that	Mayors	for	Peace	enjoys,	“the	mayors	have	not	been	able	to	stop	the	process	of	nuclear	proliferation	in	various	countries	around	the	world”;	pg.	21.		133	AIMF,	“Qui	sommes-nous?”,	online:	http://www.aimf.asso.fr/default.asp?id=107	(accessed	on	3	April	2016).		134	AIMF,	“Liste	des	membres”,	online:	http://www.aimf.asso.fr/default.asp?id=40	(accessed	on	3	April	2016).	135	AIMF,	“Programmes”,	online:	http://www.aimf.asso.fr/default.asp?id=13	(accessed	on	3	April	2016).	
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These	examples	are	hardly	exhaustive,	but	provide	a	flavor	of	the	wide	range	of	organizations	that	cities	have	created	to	pursue	common	aims.	These	organizations	are	global	in	reach	and	often	seek	to	tackle	global	challenges	such	as	environmental	protection	and	gender	equality;	they	are	examples	of	how	cities	are	organizing	themselves	to	represent	their	interests	or	pursue	shared	objectives.	
	
3. The	Global	Urban	Agenda	
	 Two	international	organizations	play	a	key	role	in	setting	and	implementing	the	global	agenda	on	urbanization:	the	World	Bank	and	UN-Habitat.	By	exploring	the	ideas	underpinning	their	urban	policies,	this	section	argues	that	the	World	Bank	and	UN-Habitat	have	created	and	are	sustaining	an	ideological	narrative	that	supports	the	rise	of	cities	in	international	affairs.	The	values	and	interests	advanced	by	the	World	Bank	and	UN-Habitat	in	their	ideological	narrative	coincide	with	those	of	cities,	i.e.	greater	decentralization,	autonomy	and	ultimately,	a	role	for	cities	in	global	governance	processes.	Through	its	lending	policies	and	technical	assistance	programmes,	the	World	Bank	is	able	to	put	its	ideas	into	practice.	Further,	through	their	research,	conferences	and	capacity-building	programmes,	both	organizations	are	able	to	disseminate	their	ideas	widely,	thereby	exerting	considerable	influence	on	how	civil	society,	international	organizations,	the	private	sector	and	even	city	governments	view	cities.	This,	in	turn,	has	led	to	tangible	outcomes	such	as	public-private	partnership	initiatives,	programmes	and	policy	mechanisms	that	create	direct	linkages	between	the	local	and	international	levels,	channel	resources	to	cities	to	enhance	their	position	vis-à-vis	national	governments,	and	engage	the	city	as	a	‘strategic	partner’	in	global	governance.		
3.1	Livable,	Competitive,	Well	Governed,	and	Bankable			The	World	Bank,	one	of	the	most	powerful	multilateral	development	institutions	in	the	world,	has	been	involved	in	urban	development	since	the	1970s.136	With	an	annual	loan	budget	of	about	US$15-20	million	and	a	budget	of	US$25	million	for	research	alone,	the	World	Bank	has	the	financial	means	to	put	its	ideology	into	practice.137	Further,	the	Bank	has	consistently	throughout	its	history	managed	to	“appropriate	key	aspects	of	the	debates,	inflect	them	to	suit	its	own	agendas,	and	endorse	its	positions	such	that	they	become…the	official,	conventional,	or	commonsense	views	such	that	everyone	else	follows	suit	until	a	new	debate	arises.”138	Thus,	the	World	Bank’s	representations	on	cities	and	urbanization	have	hegemonic	influence	in	the	international	community;	they	create	an	ideological	platform	that	promotes	the	linkages	between	cities,	globalization	and	development,	and	in	some	ways,	support	the	rise	of	cities	in	international	affairs.																																																										136	Edward	Ramsamy,	World	Bank	and	Urban	Development:	From	Projects	to	Policy	(Routledge	2006),	pgs.	2-3.	137	The	World	Bank	is	the	largest	sources	of	official	finance	for	urban	development;	Christine	Kessides,	Cities	in	transition	:	World	Bank	urban	and	local	government	strategy	(Washington,	DC:	The	World	Bank,	2000),	pg.	58.				138	Ramsamy,	pg.	78.	
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	 Since	the	1970s,	the	World	Bank’s	urban	agenda	has	shifted	its	emphasis	from	project-based	lending	(to	improve	living	conditions	in	slum	settlements)	to	macroeconomic	management	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	and	eventually	towards	privatization.	At	the	core	of	Ramsamy’s	remarkable	study,	“The	World	Bank	and	Urban	Development”,	lies	the	argument	that	the	shifts	in	the	Bank’s	urban	policy	were	not	purely	the	results	of	technocratic	decision-making	based	on	technical	evaluations	of	projects,	but	responses	to	geopolitical	and	intellectual	trends	both	within	and	outside	the	Bank.139	Currently,	in	spite	of	references	to	civil	society,	sustainability,	and	“pro	poor	policies”,	the	Bank’s	urban	policy	retains	the	conservative	orientation	associated	with	neo-liberalism	and	market	fundamentalism.140		The	Bank’s	latest	urban	and	local	government	strategy,	published	in	2009,	and	its	earlier	strategy	that	was	published	in	2000,	contain	many	neo-liberal	policy	recommendations.	In	its	Cities	in	Transition	strategy	(2000),	the	bank	sets	forth	its	vision	of	sustainable	cities.	In	its	view,	in	order	to	be	sustainable	and	functional,	a	city	must	be	“competitive,	well	governed	and	managed,	and	financially	sustainable,	or	
bankable.”141	The	strategy	defines	“bankability”	as	“financial	soundness	in	the	treatment	of	revenue	sources	and	expenditures	–	and,	for	some	cities,	a	level	of	creditworthiness	permitting	access	to	the	capital	market.”142	It	goes	on	to	state	that	“[f]or	potentially	creditworthy	cities,	the	Bank’s	urban	assistance	should	be	geared	to	helping	them	access	the	capital	market…Creative	and	flexible	forms	of	Bank	Group	support	will	be	especially	important	where	central	governments,	often	wisely,	do	not	wish	to	continue	providing	sovereign	guarantees	to	subnational	governments	after	decentralization.”143		Since	2000,	the	World	Bank	has	been	promoting	a	suite	of	measures	to	facilitate	local	governments’	access	to	international	financial	markets.144	The	Bank	launched	a	major	programme,	“Capital	Markets	at	the	Sub-National	Level”,	in	2000	to	provide	officials	with	technical	assistance	to	improve	their	cities’	capacity	to	access	capital	markets	and	held	a	major	conference	in	New	York	on	subnational	government	financing.145	In	2013,	the	World	Bank	and	the	Public-Private																																																									139	Ramsamy,	pg	3.	140	I	prefer	to	avoid	using	the	term	“Washington	Consensus”	because	its	popular	contemporary	usage	to	connote	a	dogmatic	commitment	to	the	belief	that	the	market	offers	the	solution	to	every	policy	issue	is	a	wide	departure	from	its	original	meaning.	For	discussion,	see	John	Williamson,	‘What	Should	the	World	Bank	Think	about	the	Washington	Consensus?’	(2000)	15	The	World	Bank	Research	Observer	251;	John	Williamson,	A	Short	History	of	the	Washington	Consensus	(Paper	commissioned	by	Fundación	CIDOB	for	a	conference	“From	the	Washington	Consensus	towards	a	new	Global	Governance,”	Barcelona,	September	24–25,	2004),	online:	https://piie.com/sites/default/files/publications/papers/williamson0904-2.pdf	(accessed	on	3	May	2016).	141	Kessides,	pg.	8.	142	Ibid,	pg.	11.	143	Ibid,	pg.	12.	144	For	comprehensive	discussion	of	the	theory	and	practice	of	sub-national	lending,	see	Mila	Freire	and	others	(eds),	Subnational	Capital	Markets	in	Developing	Countries:	From	Theory	to	Practice	(The	World	Bank	and	Oxford	University	Press	2004).		145	Details	of	the	conference,	World	Bank:	Global	Conference	on	Capital	Markets	Development	at	the	
Subnational	Level		(New	York	City,	15-18	February	2000),	can	be	found	here:	http://www.ce-
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Infrastructure	Advisory	Facility	(PPIAF),	a	trust	fund	that	is	housed	within	the	World	Bank,	launched	the	City	Creditworthiness	Academy	to	work	with	developing	cities	to	improve	their	credit	ratings	and	secure	private	sector	financing	for	infrastructure	projects.146	Interestingly,	the	City	Creditworthiness	Academy	is	part	of	the	World	Bank	Group’s	Low	Carbon,	Livable	Cities	Initiative,	which	focuses	on	improving	cities’	planning	and	financing	capabilities	so	that	they	can	better	implement	low-carbon	development	strategies.	The	concept	of	bankability	has	therefore	been	deployed	to	enhance	cities’	ability	to	mitigate	and	adapt	to	climate	change	as	well.		On	one	hand,	it	can	be	argued	that	these	initiatives	to	improve	cities’	creditworthiness	and	access	to	capital	markets	empower	cities	and	increase	their	independence	from	higher	levels	of	government.	From	a	macro	perspective,	these	initiatives	constitute	processes	that	facilitate	the	disaggregation	of	the	state	and	the	rescaling	of	global	politics,	thereby	creating	space	for	cities	to	increase	their	involvement	in	international	affairs.	On	the	other	hand,	and	from	a	less	optimistic	viewpoint,	the	World	Bank’s	urban	strategy	will	primarily	affect	the	future	of	cities	in	developing	countries,	which	are	the	primary	recipients	of	World	Bank	technical	and	financial	assistance.	This	raises	the	concern	that	the	World	Bank	will	destroy	the	diversity	of	cities	in	the	quest	to	create	social	conditions	that	facilitate	global	capitalism.147	In	this	line	of	thinking,	as	cities	increasingly	become	“private	cities”,	that	is,	“[cities]	that	envision	city	power	principally	as	a	mechanism	for	promoting	private	economic	development”148,	they	create	a	network	of	sub-national	authorities	and	spaces	that	primarily	serve	the	needs	of	the	transnational	capitalist	class	at	the	risk	of	disenfranchising	the	less	well-off	sectors	of	urban	society.149		The	World	Bank	has	also	been	a	staunch	advocate	of	decentralization,	which	has	been	promoted	as	an	important	aspect	of	the	‘good	governance’	paradigm.	In	its	current	manifestation,	‘good	governance’	has	come	to	refer	to	the	institutional	conditions	that	will	enable	a	well-functioning	market	for	goods	and	services	to	emerge.150	It	is	strongly	associated	with	the	neo-liberal	commitment	to	free	markets	and	privatization.	As	the	concentration	of	power	and	resources	in	the	hands	of	central	governments	is	seen	as	a	significant	source	of	market	distortion	(e.g.	due	to	bureaucratic	red	tape	and	corruption),	decentralization	of	power	and	authority	is	
																																																																																																																																																																					review.org/00/1/wb1_factsheet.html	(accessed	on	1	May	2016).	146	City	Creditworthiness	Initiative:	A	Partnership	to	Deliver	Municipal	Finance:	online:	http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/urbandevelopment/brief/city-creditworthiness-initiative	(accessed	on	1	May	2016).		147	For	discussion,	see	Frug	and	Barron;	Janne	E.	Nijman,	‘The	Future	of	the	City	and	the	International	Law	of	the	Future’	in	Sam	Muller	and	others	(eds),	The	Law	of	the	Future	and	The	Future	of	Law	(Torkel	Opsahl	Academic	EPublisher	(Oslo,	Norway)	2011),	pgs.	217-218.		148	Frug	and	Barron,	pg.	4.		149	Transnational	capitalist	class	is	described	as	““comprised	of	the	owners	of	transnational	capital,	that	is,	the	group	that	owns	the	leading	worldwide	means	of	production	as	embodied	principally	in	the	transnational	corporations	and	private	financial	institutions”;	B.S.	Chimni,	‘International	Institutions	Today:	An	Imperial	Global	State	in	the	Making	’	(2004)	15	European	Journal	of	International	Law	1,	pg.	4.	150	Porras,	pg.	553.		
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seen	as	an	essential	step	towards	achieving	good	governance.151	At	the	same	time,	cities	are	perceived	to	be	level	of	government	that	is	closest	to	the	people.152	The	assumption	is	that	decentralization	will	bring	decision-making	closer	to	local	communities,	create	bureaucracies	that	are	locally	accountable	and	therefore	more	responsive	to	the	needs	of	the	people,	and	create	effective	ways	to	counter	corruption.153	This	thinking	on	the	part	of	international	organizations	coincides	with	the	campaign	by	cities	for	more	autonomy.	Basing	their	arguments	on	the	democratic	potential	of	cities	and	on	the	claim	that	city	government	is	the	level	of	government	that	is	closest	to	the	people	and	therefore	most	responsive	to	their	needs,	organizations	like	UCLG	have	been	advocating	for	greater	autonomy	for	cities	as	well	as	more	decentralization.154	The	nexus	of	values	and	interests	has	led	to	cities	and	international	organizations	cooperating	to	promote	decentralization	and	subsidiarity	(a	principle	borrowed	from	EU	law).155	One	of	the	consequences	has	been	the	embrace	by	international	organizations	of	the	city	as	a	“partner”	and	an	alternative	interlocutor	to	the	state.	This	lays	the	groundwork	for	cities	to	claim	and	assert	political	authority	in	the	global	order.			
3.2	Make	Cities	and	Human	Settlements	Inclusive,	Safe,	Resilient	and	
Sustainable156			 The	UN	system	officially	recognized	the	challenges	of	urbanization	for	the	first	time	when	the	first	Conference	on	Human	Settlements	was	held	in	Vancouver	in	1976.157	This	conference	(Habitat	I)	resulted	in	the	creation	of	the	UN	Commission	on	Human	Settlements	and	the	UN	Centre	for	Human	Settlements	(which	served	as	the	secretariat	of	the	Commission).158	From	1978	to	1996,	these	two	entities,	“with	meager	financial	and	political	support”,	struggled	to	address	the	problems	of	rapid	urbanization,	especially	in	the	developing	world.159	The	second	Conference	on																																																									151	Porras	,	pg.	554.		152	See,	for	example,	Kessides,	pg.	35;	Muhammad	Amjad	Saqib,	‘Introduction’	in	Syed	Mubashir	Ali	and	Muhammad	Amjad	Saqib	(eds),	Devolution	and	Governance:	Reforms	in	Pakistan	(Oxford	University	Press	2008),	pg.	1.	153	Saqib,	ibid.		Also	see	UN	Development	Programme,	Decentralised	Governance	for	Development:	A	
Combined	Practice	Note	on	Decentralisation,	Local	Governance	and	Urban/Rural	Development	(April	2004),	online:	http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/democratic-governance/dg-publications-for-website/decentralised-governance-for-development-a-combined-practice-note-on-decentralisation-local-governance-and-urban-rural-development/DLGUD_PN_English.pdf	(accessed	on	20	May	2016).		154	UCLG,	“About	Us”,	online:	https://www.uclg.org/en/organisation/about	(accessed	on	20	May	2016).	155	On	the	subsidiarity	principle	in	EU	law,	see	Antonio	Estella,	The	EU	Principle	of	Subsidiarity	and	its	
Critique	(Oxford	University	Press	2002).		156	UN,	“Transforming	our	world:	the	2030	Agenda	for	Sustainable	Development”,	Sustainable	Development	Goals	(SDGs),	Goal	11,	online:	https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg11	(accessed	on	1	May	2016).	157	UN	Habitat,	“About	Us”.		158	Ibid.	159	Ibid.		
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Human	Settlements	(Habitat	II)	took	place	in	Istanbul	in	1996,	resulting	in	the	Habitat	Agenda,	which	contained	over	a	hundred	commitments	and	six	hundred	recommendations.160	The	concept	of	sustainable	development	is	at	the	heart	of	the	Habitat	Agenda,	which	UN-Habitat	was	tasked	to	implement.	Eventually,	in	2002,	the	UN	General	Assembly	adopted	a	resolution	that	transformed	the	Commission	and	its	Centre	for	Human	Settlements	into	what	is	now	known	as	the	UN	Human	Settlements	Programme	or	UN-Habitat.	This	Resolution	also	recognized	UN-Habitat	as	a	subsidiary	organ	of	the	General	Assembly161	and	the	focal	point	for	all	human	settlements	matters	within	the	UN	system.162	UN-Habitat’s	mandate	is	to	promote	socially	and	environmentally	sustainable	towns	and	cities.163		In	preparation	for	the	Conference	on	Housing	and	Sustainable	Urban	Development	(Habitat	III)	that	took	place	in	Quito,	Ecuador	in	October	2016,	there	has	been	a	renewed	global	commitment	to	the	concept	of	sustainable	urbanization.164	Led	by	UN-Habitat	and	driven	by	a	range	of	partners	including	NGOs,	private	foundations,	local	authorities	and	national	governments,	the	World	Urban	Campaign	is	a	global	platform	“to	promote	dialogue,	sharing,	and	learning	about	our	urban	future”	ahead	of	the	Habitat	III	conference.165	In	its	Manifesto	for	Cities,	the	Campaign	called	on	the	international	community	to	recognize	that	the	current	models	of	urbanization	are	socially,	environmentally	and	economically	unsustainable	and	that	a	new	paradigm	is	needed	to	achieve	a	more	sustainable	future.166	This	message	is	reinforced	in	the	World	Cities	Report	2016,	the	global	flagship	report	on	sustainable	urban	development	launched	by	UN-Habitat	in	May	2016.167	Sustainable	urbanization	envisions	“equitable,	resilient,	livable,	creative	and	productive	cities”	and	will	incorporate	measures	for	poverty	reduction,	environmental	preservation,	and	good	governance.168	In	addition,	sustainable	urbanization	calls	for	the	reduction	of	the	ecological	footprint	of	cities	through	“integrated	and	holistic	urban	development	policies,	effective	and	participatory																																																									160	United	Nations	Conference	on	Human	Settlements	(Habitat	II),	The	Habitat	Agenda	(UN	Doc	A/Conf195/14,	7	August	1996).		161	Para.	A1,	UN	General	Assembly,	56/206	Strengthening	the	mandate	and	status	of	the	Commission	
on	Human	Settlements	and	the	status,	role	and	functions	of	the	United	Nations	Centre	for	Human	
Settlements	(Habitat)	(UN	General	Assembly	56th	Sess,	Agenda	Item	102,	A/RES/56/206,	26	February	2002).		162	Para	B1,	ibid.			163	UN-Habitat’s	mandate	is	set	out	in	various	UN	documents,	including	Resolution	56/206	and	the	Istanbul	Declaration	on	Human	Settlements	(Habitat	II)	and	the	Habitat	Agenda.	For	details,	see	UN-Habitat,	“Mandate	and	Role	within	the	UN	System”,	online:	http://unhabitat.org/about-us/history-mandate-role-in-the-un-system/	(accessed	on	1	May	2016).	164	Habitat	III,	“About	Habitat	III”,	online:	https://www.habitat3.org/the-new-urban-agenda	(accessed	on	1	May	2016).	165	UN-Habitat,	World	Urban	Campaign,	online:	http://unhabitat.org/urban-initiatives/world-urban-campaign/	(accessed	on	1	May	2016).	166	Manifesto	for	Cities:	The	Urban	Future	We	Want,	pg.	5.		167	UN-Habitat,	“UN-Habitat	launches	the	World	Cities	Report	2016,	Urbanization	and	Development:	Emerging	Futures”,	online:	http://unhabitat.org/un-habitat-launches-the-world-cities-report-2016/	(accessed	on	1	May	2016).	168	Manifesto	for	Cities:	The	Urban	Future	We	Want,	pg.	6.		
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planning	and	management…and	the	use	of	methodologies	and	tools	to	track	urban	sustainable	development.”169	It	is	believed	that	the	promotion	of	the	rule	of	law	is	essential	to	the	success	of	sustainable	urban	development.	In	this	regard,	rule	of	law	in	cities,	otherwise	referred	to	as	urban	law	in	the	policy	literature,	includes	promoting	accountability	and	transparency	as	well	as	participation	by	citizens	in	public	decision-making	processes.170	This	in	turn	will	help	secure	the	rights	of	city	dwellers	and	the	key	principles	of	the	New	Urban	Agenda.		The	New	Urban	Agenda	is	the	outcome	document	agreed	upon	at	the	Habitat	III	conference.171	The	implementation	of	the	New	Urban	Agenda	is	envisioned	to	contribute	to	the	“implementation	and	localization”	of	the	2030	Agenda	for	Sustainable	Development,	otherwise	known	as	the	Sustainable	Development	Goals,	particularly	Goal	11	(which	is	set	out	as	the	heading	of	this	section).172	The	Agenda	is	underpinned	by	three	principles.	The	first	principle	is	to	“[l]eave	no	one	behind”,	which	entails	addressing	social	inequality,	poverty	and	providing	equitable	access	to	physical	and	social	infrastructure	in	the	city.173	The	second	principle	is	to	achieve	sustainable	economic	development	through	enhancing	productivity,	innovation	and	competitiveness.174	The	third	principle	is	to	foster	ecological	and	resilient	human	settlements	by,	amongst	a	number	of	things,	protecting	biodiversity	and	addressing	climate	change.175	The	Agenda	affirms	the	need	for	strengthened	urban	governance,	“with	sound	institutions	and	mechanisms	to	empower	and	include	urban	stakeholders…”176	It	also	calls	for	the	strengthening	of	municipal	finance	and	local	fiscal	systems,	and	supports	the	creation	of	legal	and	regulatory	frameworks	to	facilitate	municipal	borrowing	from	public	and	private	sources.177	Mechanisms	to	support	expanded	borrowing	by	city	authorities	include	developing	municipal	debt	markets,	and	establishing	regional,	national	and	subnational	development	funds.178		On	addressing	climate	change,	the	New	Urban	Agenda	sets	out	some	points	that	are																																																									169	Ibid.		170	Urban	law	is	defined	as	“the	collection	of	policies,	laws,	decisions	and	practices	that	govern	the	management	and	development	of	the	urban	environment”;	UN-H1.	Another	useful	definition	of	urban	law	is	that	it	refers	to	a	“an	expansive	discipline	that	considers	a	range	of	traditional	legal	questions	–	local	government	authority,	judicial	review	of	regulatory	processes	and	individual	rights,	among	others	–	as	they	inform	the	life	of	cities”;	Nestor	M.	Davidson,	‘What	is	Urban	Law	Today?	An	Introductory	Essay	in	Honor	of	the	Fortieth	Anniversary	of	the	Fordham	Urban	Law	Journal’	(2013)	40	Fordham	Urban	Law	Journal	1579,	pg.	1588.	Davidson	also	notes	that,	in	the	US,	urban	law	has	faded	as	a	discipline	in	recent	years	because	much	of	the	subject	matter	that	would	be	considered	urban	has	shifted	to	other	areas	such	as	planning	law,	criminal	justice	and	tax	law.	171	United	Nations	Conference	on	Housing	and	Sustainable	Urban	Development	(Habitat	III),	Draft	
outcome	document	of	the	United	Nations	Conference	on	Housing	and	Sustainable	Urban	Development	
(Habitat	III),	Doc.	A/CONF.226/4*,	29	September	2016,	online:	https://habitat3.org/the-new-urban-agenda	(accessed	on	25	November	2016).	Annexed	to	this	document	is	the	New	Urban	Agenda:	Quito	Declaration	on	Sustainable	Cities	and	Human	Settlements	for	All.		172	Ibid,	Para.	9,	Preamble	of	the	Quito	Declaration.	173	Para.	14(a),	Quito	Declaration.		174	Para.	14(b),	Quito	Declaration.	175	Para.	14(c),	Quito	Declaration.	176	Para.	15(c)(ii),	Quito	Declaration.	177	Para.	139,	Quito	Declaration.	178	Ibid.			
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worth	noting.	Paragraph	75	states	a	commitment	“to	[encouraging]	national,	subnational	and	local	governments…to	develop	sustainable,	renewable	and	affordable	energy,	energy-efficient	buildings	and	construction	modes;	and	to	promoting	energy	conservation	and	efficiency,	which	are	essential	to	enable	the	reduction	of	greenhouse	gas	and	black	carbon	emissions…”179	Paragraph	79	sets	out	an	explicit	commitment	in	support	of	the	Paris	Agreement.	It	states	that	signatories	to	the	Quito	Declaration	commit	themselves	“to	promoting	international,	national,	subnational	and	local	climate	action,	including	climate	change	adaptation	and	mitigation,	and	to	supporting	the	efforts	of	cities	and	human	settlements…to	be	important	implementers.	We	further	commit	ourselves	to	supporting	building	resilience	and	reducing	emissions	of	greenhouse	gases…Such	measures	should	be	consistent	with	the	goals	of	the	Paris	Agreement	adopted	under	the	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change,	including	holding	the	increase	in	the	global	average	temperature	to	well	below	2°C	above	pre-industrial	levels	and	pursuing	efforts	to	limit	the	temperature	increase	to	1.5°C	above	pre-industrial	levels.”180	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 The	New	Urban	Agenda,	like	the	earlier	Habitat	Agenda,	will	provide	guidance	to	states,	city	governments,	civil	society,	private	foundations,	and	international	organizations	in	their	thinking	about	cities,	urbanization	and	sustainable	development.	There	are	a	number	of	observations	to	be	made	about	the	UN-Habitat	and	the	New	Urban	Agenda	in	relation	to	the	emergence	of	cities	in	international	affairs.	The	Habitat	III	process	has	increased	the	visibility	and	prominence	of	cities	not	just	as	sites	of	urbanization	processes	but	also	as	strategic	partners	to	achieve	the	global	development	agenda.	Since	the	late	2000s,	international	organizations,	private	foundations,	and	other	actors	have	created	multiple	platforms	and	programmes	to	work	with	city	governments	on	a	range	of	issues.181	In	March	2004,	the	UN	Educational,	Scientific	and	Cultural	Organization	(UNESCO)	launched	an	initiative	known	as	the	International	Coalition	of	Cities	against	Racism.182	This	initiative	established	a	network	of	cities	interested	in	sharing	information	and	experience	in	order	to	improve	their	anti-discrimination	policies.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 The	description	of	the	International	Coalition	of	Cities	against	Racism	on	UNESCO’s	website	is	noteworthy	because	of	what	it	reveals	about	the	official																																																									179	Para.	75,	Quito	Declaration.	180	Para.	79,	Quito	Declaration.	181	While	there	has	been	a	surge	of	interest	on	the	part	of	UN	agencies,	the	EU	and	the	World	Bank	in	cities	since	the	2000s,	it	ought	to	be	clarified	that	there	are	partnerships	between	international	organizations	and	cities	that	pre-date	this	recent	surge	of	interest.	For	example,	the	World	Health	Organization’s	(WHO)	European	Healthy	Cities	network	has	been	in	operation	for	over	twenty-five	years.	In	its	first	phase	of	implementation	(1987-1992),	the	network	was	designed	to	serve	as	a	social	laboratory	for	testing	health	initiatives	at	the	local	level	and	providing	feedback	to	WHO	and	states;	Michele	Acuto,	Mika	Morissette	and	Agis	Tsouros,	‘City	diplomacy:	Towards	More	Strategic	Networking?	Learning	with	WHO	Healthy	Cities’	(2016)	Global	Policy	DOI:	10.1111/1758-5899.12382,	pg.	3.	182	UNESCO,	International	Coalition	of	Cities	against	Racism,	online:	http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/fight-against-discrimination/coalition-of-cities/	(accessed	on	1	May	2016).	
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thinking	on	the	governance	potential	of	cities.	The	website	states:		The	international	conventions,	recommendations	or	declarations	elaborated	at	the	upstream	level	need	to	be	ratified	and	implemented	by	the	States.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	extremely	important	to	involve	actors	on	the	ground	including	the	targets	of	discriminations,	to	make	sure	that	those	instruments	are	applied	to	respond	to	concrete	problems.	UNESCO	chose	
cities	as	the	privileged	space	to	link	upstream	and	downstream	actions.	The	role	of	city	authorities	as	policy-makers	at	the	local	level,	is	considered	here	as	the	key	to	create	dynamic	synergies.183		By	bypassing	the	state,	UNESCO	is	seeking	more	effective	and	responsive	domestic	implementation	of	international	law.	Once	the	New	Urban	Agenda	is	underway,	it	can	be	argued	that	such	initiatives	will	expand	in	number	and	scope,	creating	yet	more	space	and	opportunities	for	cities	to	assert	their	role	in	global	development	and	international	affairs.		It	was	mentioned	earlier	that	the	New	Urban	Agenda	affirms	a	commitment	to	decentralization,	subsidiarity	and	local	self-governance.	The	Agenda	also	calls	for	cities	to	work	with	the	private	sector	and	to	improve	their	fiscal	systems.	By	reaffirming	commitment	to	these	ideas,	the	New	Urban	Agenda	throws	normative	weight	behind	the	policy	discourse	about	harnessing	the	benefits	and	minimizing	the	ills	of	urbanization,	and	by	extension,	the	indispensable	role	that	cities	will	play	in	the	global	quest	for	sustainable	urban	development.	In	other	words,	UN-Habitat’s	ideology	on	sustainable	urbanization	very	closely	resembles	the	World	Bank’s	urban	strategy.	While	UN-Habitat	tries	to	pay	more	attention	to	poverty	alleviation	and	securing	human	rights	such	as	the	right	to	clean	water	and	the	right	to	shelter,	there	is	striking	consensus	between	the	New	Urban	Agenda	and	the	Bank’s	strategy.			
4. Conclusion			This	chapter	concludes	Part	I	of	this	thesis,	which	aims	to	provide	a	rich	foundation	for	exploring	the	role	of	cities	in	governing	climate	change.	This	chapter	drew	from	a	wide	variety	of	empirical	data	and	secondary	literature	to	make	the	claim	that	cities	are	on	the	rise	in	international	affairs.	As	globalization	and	urbanization	continues	apace,	cities	have	sought	to	play	a	role	in	global	governance	processes.	Often,	cities	are	motivated	to	do	so	because	they	are	at	the	frontline	of	global	governance	challenges	such	as	terrorism	and	pandemics.	In	some	cases,	cities	seek	to	engage	in	diplomacy	to	facilitate	trade,	cultural	exchange	and	make	pronouncements	on	issues	such	as	LGBT	rights.		As	for	the	urban	policies	of	international	organizations,	we	saw	in	this	chapter	the	pivotal	role	that	the	World	Bank	plays	in	shaping	the	development	of	cities	and	the	policy	discourse	about	the	role	of	cities	in	the	quest	for	sustainable	development.	Through	its	technical	assistance,	lending	policies	and	research,	the	World	Bank	is	able	to	exercise	significant	influence	on	the	international																																																									183	Ibid.		
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community’s	thinking	about	cities,	globalization,	and	development.	The	Bank	advocates	decentralization	and	the	principle	of	subsidiarity	as	part	of	its	‘good	governance’	paradigm	for	development;	cities	are	seen	as	the	level	of	government	that	is	closest	to	the	people	and	therefore	most	suited	for	facilitating	democratic	participation	in	grassroots	decision-making	processes	and	developing	mechanisms	for	accountability.	In	contrast,	central	governments	are	seen	as	distant	bureaucratic	machineries	that	are	detached	from	the	lives	of	the	people	and	therefore	unable	to	respond	to	their	needs	and	aspirations.	As	such,	the	World	Bank	and	other	international	organizations	are	increasingly	bypassing	the	state	and	working	directly	with	cities	to	achieve	global	governance	objectives	such	as	climate	mitigation	and	countering	discrimination.	It	is	in	this	context	that	cities	have	the	space	in	which	they	can	engage	directly	in	governance	partnerships	involving	civil	society,	multinational	corporations	and	international	organizations.	It	is	also	in	this	context	that	cities	are	proactively	taking	measures	to	respond	to	climate	change	and	forming	networks	to	share	best	practices.	Through	these	networks,	cities	are	also	developing	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	that	transcend	national	boundaries	to	steer	municipal	governments	and	other	actors	towards	climate	change	mitigation	and	low-carbon	development	in	the	cities	of	today	and	the	future.	
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Chapter	4:	City	Action	on	Climate	Change		
1. Introduction		 In	the	previous	chapter,	the	analysis	showed	how	global	cities	are	beginning	to	exert	their	presence	in	international	affairs	through	acts	of	inter-city	diplomacy	and	implementation	of	international	law	on	their	own	accord.	Global	cities	are	also	beginning	to	emerge	as	governance	actors,	and	it	is	in	the	area	of	climate	change	that	cities	have	been	particularly	active.	To	date,	over	two	thousand	cities	have	specific	plans	to	scale	up	their	efforts	at	climate	adaptation	as	well	as	strategies	for	GHG	emission	reductions.1	These	cities	do	not	act	alone.	They	work	in	partnership	with	venture	capitalists,	research	laboratories,	universities	as	well	as	with	other	cities.2	Urban	partnerships	are	often	both	local	and	transnational,	and	blur	the	boundaries	between	private	and	public.		This	chapter	showcases	what	five	global	cities	-	London,	Mexico	City,	New	York	City,	Rotterdam	and	Seoul	-	are	doing	to	address	climate	change.	These	global	cities	have	consciously	styled	themselves	as	‘climate	frontrunners’.	Through	their	proactive	climate	change	policies	and	strategies,	they	have	gained	widespread	recognition	by	policy-makers,	urban	planners,	the	media,	international	organizations	and	researchers.	The	aim	of	this	chapter	is	not	to	provide	detailed	case	studies	or	a	comprehensive	account	of	each	city’s	mitigation	and	adaptation	efforts.	This	chapter	also	does	not	purport	to	analyze	how	and	why	various	cities	differ	in	their	laws	and	policies.3	Instead,	this	chapter	aims	to	provide	an	overview	
																																																								1	United	Nations	Climate	Summit	2014,	“Mayors	at	UN	climate	summit	announce	pledges	towards	major	carbon	cuts	in	cities”,	online:	http://www.un.org/climatechange/summit/2014/09/mayors-un-climate-summit-announce-pledges-towards-major-carbon-cuts-cities/	(accessed	on	15	November	2016).		2	For	example,	Clean	Tech	Delta	is	a	Dutch	initiative	that	brings	together	the	city	governments	of	Rotterdam	and	Delft,	the	business	sector,	research	institutions	and	laboratories	to	support	the	development	of	clean	technologies	in	the	Delft-Rotterdam-Drechtsteden	region.	Clean	Tech	Delta	describes	itself	as	a	“triple	helix	organization”,	referring	to	the	concept	of	the	Triple	Helix	of	university-industry-government	in	the	knowledge	society;	Interview	No.	8.	For	a	concise	overview	of	the	Triple	Helix	concept,	see	Stanford	University,	The	Triple	Helix	Concept,	online:	http://triplehelix.stanford.edu/3helix_concept	(accessed	on	15	June	2016).		3	Why	a	city	does	or	does	not	implement	a	initiative	or	policy	is	often	dictated	by	local	politics	and	other	highly	localized	factors.	As	one	of	the	city	government	officials	I	interviewed	puts	it,	“Cities	are	political	entities	at	the	end	of	the	day.	They	have	to	respond	to	local	political	demands	and	local	electoral	cycles.	Municipal	governments	cannot	implement	policies	if	they	do	not	have	the	support	of	the	key	stakeholders”;	Interview	Number	1.	Interview	No.	9	gave	the	example	of	the	recent	New	York	City	Council’s	approval	to	levy	a	5-cent	(US	currency)	levy	on	plastic	bags.	That	New	York	City	has	been	relatively	late	in	introducing	a	tax	to	reduce	the	use	of	plastic	bags	“is	not	for	the	lack	of	trying.	We	have	faced	a	lot	of	political	push-back”.	The	Wall	Street	Journal	also	reported	that	the	deliberations	on	this	5-cent	fee	levy	in	the	New	York	City	Council	was	unusually	heated,	and	the	“28-20	vote	to	approve	the	bill	came	only	after	a	fierce	debate	centering	on	lofty	themes	of	regressive	taxation,	income	inequality	and	environmental	policy.”;	Mara	Gay,	‘New	York	City	Council	Approves	5-Cent	Fee	on	Plastic	Bags’	The	Wall	Street	Journal	(6	May	2016).		
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that	will	give	readers	a	sense	of	what	global	cities	are	doing	‘on	the	ground’	within	their	territories	to	govern	climate	change.4		An	appreciation	of	the	localized	practices	and	practical	aspects	of	global	city	action	on	climate	change	is	important	in	at	least	two	respects.	One	of	the	key	ideas	this	thesis	seeks	to	advance	is	that	the	practices,	policies	and	strategies	taken	at	the	local	level	bear	wider	significance	and	contribute	towards	transnational	climate	change	governance	when	global	cities	seek	to	scale	up	their	actions	and	pursue	cooperation	through	cross-border	networks.	In	this	chapter,	one	observes	the	intertwined	connections	between	urban	institutions	and	global	organizations,	between	local	practices	and	transnational	norms.	In	some	cases,	there	are	causal	connections	between	practices	at	the	local	and	global	levels,	which	brings	to	mind	Koh’s	concept	of	the	transnational	legal	process	whereby	norms	and	practices	are	‘uploaded’	and	‘downloaded’	from	the	international	to	lower	levels	of	governance	and	vice	versa.	Further,	it	can	be	observed	that	a	number	of	commonalities	unite	these	climate	frontrunner	global	cities.	The	features	that	these	cities	share	include	visionary	leadership	by	a	mayor	who	is	able	to	secure	‘buy-in’	from	the	city’s	administrative	agencies,	the	private	sector,	civil	society	and	other	major	stakeholders;	public	support	for	strong	climate	action	and	more	broadly,	creating	a	more	sustainable	and	livable	home;	and	active	participation	in	global	networks	such	as	the	C40,	which	is	the	focus	of	Chapter	5.5	This	helps	put	into	perspective	the	role	that	global	cities	can	play	in	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.	While	all	cities,	large	and	small,	may	seek	to	contribute	to	the	global	effort	to	mitigate	climate	change,	only	a	select	few	global	cities	with	the	money,	administrative	resources,	political	will	and	cosmopolitan	vision	of	the	common	good	will	be	active	participants	in	transnational	governance	and	rule-making	processes.			
	
2. London,	the	United	Kingdom		 With	a	population	of	8.4	million	in	mid-2013,	London	is	the	most	populous	city	in	Europe,	drawing	vast	numbers	of	people	from	the	rest	of	the	UK	and	the	world.6	London’s	economy,	heavily	dominated	by	the	financial	sector,	contributes	
																																																								4	Thus,	a	conscious	choice	has	been	made	to	highlight	each	city’s	most	notable	climate	strategies,	policies	regulations	rather	than	seek	consistency	in	the	type	of	information	provided	for	each	global	city	featured	in	this	chapter.	5	For	discussion	on	the	motivational	effects	of	city	participation	in	networks,	see	Taedong	Lee	and	Chris	Koski,	‘Mitigating	Global	Warming	in	Global	Cities:	Comparing	Participation	and	Climate	Change	Policies	of	C40	Cities’	[2014]	Journal	of	Comparative	Policy	Analysis:	Research	and	Practice,	DOI:	10.1080/13876988.2014.910938,	pg.	15.			
6	Office	for	National	Statistics	(United	Kingdom),	Population	Estimates	for	the	UK	(2013),	online:	http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/pop-estimate/population-estimates-for-uk--england-and-wales--scotland-and-northern-ireland/2013/sty-population-estimates.html	(accessed	on	1	October	2016);	European	Commission,	Eurostat,	“Statistics	on	European	Cities”,	online:		http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Statistics_on_European_cities	(accessed	on	3	October	2016).		
	 69	
20%	to	the	country’s	national	output	(measured	by	Gross	Value	Added	(GVA)).7	London	is	also	widely	considered	to	be	one	of	the	world’s	great	cities;	It	is	“..the	city	of	Empire,	the	most	multicultural	city	in	the	world,	a	centre	of	financial	globalization.”8	At	the	same	time,	London	has	a	sizable	carbon	footprint:	the	city	emits	as	much	GHGs	as	Greece	or	Portugal,9	which	brings	home	the	point	that	effective	climate	policies	to	reduce	the	GHG	emissions	of	a	city	can	have	as	much	impact	as	addressing	those	of	a	country.		Seizing	upon	its	resources	and	the	desire	to	play	a	leadership	role	in	addressing	climate	change,	London	has	set	the	high	water	mark	in	urban	efforts	to	mitigate	and	adapt	to	climate	change.	Bulkeley	and	Schroeder	argue	that	London’s	climate	policy	is	so	advanced	and	well-developed	vis-à-vis	other	global	cities	because	of	the	following	factors:			 “[t]he	drivers	and	motivations…are	necessarily	multiple	and	complex,	but	include	the	commitment	of	critical	individuals,	the	courage	of	conviction	born	in	part	from	interim	policy	success,	a	positive	climate	of	public	opinion,	a	lack	of	overt	opposition	from	key	interest	groups	and	the	emergence	of	new	market	opportunities	in	the	carbon	economy.”10			Those	‘critical	individuals’	include	the	former	Mayor	Ken	Livingstone	and	his	Deputy	Mayor,	Nicky	Gavron	(2000	to	2008).11	They	made	addressing	the	causes	of	climate	change	one	of	the	main	priorities	of	their	mayoralty	and	set	ambitious	targets	and	policies	for	both	mitigation	and	adaptation.12	The	C40	network	is	also	former	Mayor	Livingstone’s	brainchild.	Since	its	inception,	the	network	has	had	multiplier	effects	across	the	globe	and	has	also	brought	London	significant	economic	benefits	and	extended	its	‘soft	power’.	The	C40	will	be	the	subject	of	detailed																																																									7	Office	for	National	Statistics	(United	Kingdom),	“London's	economy	has	outperformed	other	regions	since	2007”,	online:	http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/regional-trends/regional-economic-indicators/march-2013/sum-london.html	(accessed	on	3	October	2016);	For	discussion	on	whether	having	a	global	financial	centre	like	London	boosts	or	harms	the	UK	economy,	see	Howard	Davies,	“Does	London's	financial	centre	boost	or	harm	the	UK	economy?”,	The	Guardian	(25	February	2014),	online:	http://www.theguardian.com/business/economics-blog/2014/feb/25/london-financial-centre-boost-or-harm-uk-economy	(accessed	on	3	October	2016).		8	Jennifer	Robinson,	‘Making	London,	through	other	cities	’	in	Bell	Sarah	and	Paskins		J	(eds),	
Imagining	the	Future	City:	London	2062	(London:	Ubiquity	Press	2013),	pg.	24.		9	London	Climate	Change	Agency,	Moving	London	Towards	a	Sustainable	Low-Carbon	City:	An	
Implementation	Strategy	(2007),	pg.	1.	10	H.	Bulkeley	and	H.	Schroeder,	Governing	Climate	Change	Post-2012:	The	Role	of	Global	Cities	-	
London	(Tyndall	Centre	for	Climate	Change	Research	Working	Paper	123,	2008),	pg.	8.		11	Ibid.,	pg.	10;	Heleen	Lydeke	P.	Mees	and	Peter	P.	J.	Driessen,	‘Adaptation	to	climate	change	in	urban	areas:	Climate-greening	London,	Rotterdam,	and	Toronto’	(2011)	2	Climate	Law	251,	pg.	271.	It	should	be	noted	that	London	has	a	two-tier	government	structure:	The	Greater	London	Authority	is	the	regional	body	that	consists	of	the	Mayor	and	an	Assembly	that	provides	oversight	of	the	Mayor’s	work,	and	there	are	33	boroughs	or	local	authorities.	12	Ibid;	also	see	John	Vidal,	“Ken	Livingstone,	the	mayor	of	London,	is	on	a	mission	to	tackle	climate	change”	The	Guardian	1	November	2006,	online:	http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2006/nov/01/travelsenvironmentalimpact.localgovernment	(accessed	on	3	October	2016).			
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discussion	in	Chapter	5,	the	salient	point	for	present	purposes	is	to	note	the	pivotal	role	that	London,	particularly	its	former	mayor,	played	in	establishing	the	C40.			The	following	section	will	first	discuss	London’s	mitigation	efforts	led	by	the	strategic	vision	of	former	Mayor	Livingstone,	which	continues	to	exercise	considerable	influence.	London’s	mitigation	efforts	focus	on	retrofitting	the	city’s	existing	buildings	to	be	more	energy	efficient,	promoting	renewable	energy	and,	in	the	long	term,	transiting	to	a	‘hydrogen	economy’.	It	then	examines	London’s	adaptation	initiatives,	which	are	largely	led	by	the	boroughs	because	of	their	jurisdictional	control	over	spatial	planning.			
2.1	London’s	Mitigation	Policies	and	Programmes				 During	his	first	term,	then	Mayor	Livingstone	developed	an	Energy	Strategy	for	London.13	Climate	change	was	at	the	heart	of	this	Energy	Strategy,	which	committed	London	to	reducing	carbon	dioxide	emissions	by	20%	below	1990	levels	by	2010	as	a	first	step	to	a	reduction	of	60%	by	2050.14	This	strategy	focused	on	promoting	the	use	of	on-site	renewable	energy	generation	(e.g.	by	the	use	of	solar	panels)	and	Combined	Heat	and	Power	(CHP).	To	promote	renewable	energy	or	‘decentralised	energy	generation’,	Livingstone	used	his	powers	in	the	planning	system	–	which	included	approving	large-scale	developments	and	devising	the	London	Plan	who	sets	the	over-arching	framework	for	spatial	development	across	the	London	boroughs	–	to	ensure	that	new	developments	included	decentralized	energy	generation.15	The	Mayor’s	Office	and	the	London	Development	Agency	also	publicly	backed	high-profile	projects	that	demonstrate	the	technical	feasibility	of	renewable	energy	and	CHP.	Livingstone’s	office	also	developed	multi-stakeholder	partnerships	focused	on	adaptation	(the	London	Climate	Change	Partnership)	and	research	and	development	for	new	hydrogen	technologies	(the	London	Hydrogen	Partnership,	established	in	2002).16	Schroeder	and	Bulkeley	describe	the	period	from	2000	to	2004	as	“one	of	experimentation	with	the	formal	powers	of	the	mayor	in	relation	to	energy	and	transport	policy,	and	the	emergence	of	a	partnership	approach	to	climate	governance	in	London.”17			 The	period	of	2004	to	2008	was	marked	by	even	more	concerted	efforts	to	galvanize	climate	change	action	in	London.	The	momentum	continued	apace	with	the	establishment	of	the	London	Climate	Change	Agency	to	deliver	Livingstone’s	Energy	Strategy	by	implementing	projects	in	the	sectors	that	impact	climate	change,																																																									13	Greater	London	Authority,	Green	light	to	clean	power:	The	Mayor's	Energy	Strategy	(Greater	London	Authority,	2004).		14	Ibid.		15	The	Greater	London	Authority	Act	bestowed	the	Mayor	and	the	London	Assembly	with	a	range	of	new	powers	that	expanded	the	Mayor’s	ability	to	direct	local	planning	authorities.	For	discussion,	see	Christopher	Stanwell,	“Devil	lies	in	the	detail	as	mayor	increases	powers”,	Planning	Resource,	online:	http://www.planningresource.co.uk/article/767412/legal-report	(accessed	on	6	October	2016).		16	London	Climate	Change	Partnership	website:	http://climatelondon.org.uk/lccp/;	London	Hydrogen	Partnership	website:	http://www.hydrogenlondon.org	(accessed	on	6	December	2016).	17	H.	Schroeder	and	H.	Bulkeley,	‘Global	cities	and	the	governance	of	climate	change	:	what	is	the	role	of	law	in	cities	?’	36	Fordham	Urban	Law	Journal	313,	pg.	335.		
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especially	in	the	energy,	transport,	waste	and	water	sectors.18	The	2007	London	Climate	Change	Action	Plan	set	out	in	greater	detail	how	technical	and	regulatory	barriers	to	promoting	renewable	energy,	energy	efficiency	in	commercial	and	residential	buildings	and	developing	a	hydrogen	energy	infrastructure	would	be	overcome.	The	2007	London	Climate	Change	Action	Plan	also	established	a	more	ambitious	policy	goal:	“to	stabilize	carbon	dioxide	emissions	in	2025	at	60%	below	1990	levels,	with	steady	progress	towards	this	over	the	next	twenty	years.”19	However,	the	Action	Plan	recognizes	that	the	“difficult	truth	is	that	in	preparing	this	action	plan	we	have	been	unable	to	present	any	realistic	scenario	in	which	we	can	achieve	the	2025	target	set	out	above,	without	major	national	regulatory	and	policy	change.”20							 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 To	ensure	continuity	of	London’s	climate-focused	development	agenda,	the	Greater	London	Authority	Act	2007	imposed	a	new	statutory	duty	on	the	Mayor	of	London	to	contribute	towards	adaptation	and	mitigation.21	In	fulfillment	of	this	duty,	the	Mayor	is	required	to	produce	statutory	mitigation	and	adaptation	strategies	for	London.22	Thus,	while	some	of	the	above-mentioned	drivers	or	motivations	may	alter,	this	legal	requirement	to	address	climate	change	constitutes	a	firm	substantive	basis	upon	which	future	climate	policy	for	London	can	be	built.	Following	the	removal	of	Livingstone	and	Gavron	from	office	after	the	May	2008	elections	and	the	appointment	of	a	new	Conservative	Mayor,	Boris	Johnson,	it	was	unclear	whether	the	new	Mayor	would	place	the	same	degree	of	emphasis	on	climate	change	and	whether	London	will	continue	to	be	a	global	leader	on	climate	change.	Developments	from	2008	to	2014	indicated	that	Mayor	Johnson	did	not	detract	from	the	commitments	made	in	the	London	Climate	Change	Action	Plan.	The	policies	and	strategies	envisioned	and	pursued	by	the	Livingstone	mayoralty	were	still	implemented,	even	though	Mayor	Johnson	was	not	personally	committed	to	addressing	climate	change	the	way	his	predecessor	was	and	there	was	a	tendency	by	Johnson’s	office	to	emphasize	the	‘business	case’	for	addressing	climate	change.23																																																										18	London	Climate	Change	Agency,	pg.	3.			19	Greater	London	Authority,	Action	Today	to	Protect	Tomorrow:	The	Mayor's	Climate	Change	Action	
Plan	(2007),	pg.	19.		20	Ibid.		21	Section	42,	Greater	London	Authority	Act	2007.		22	Sections	43	and	44,	ibid.	23	See	Greater	London	Authority,	The	Mayor’s	Climate	Change	Mitigation	and	Energy	Annual	Report	
(With	updated	carbon	dioxide	emissions	for	2011	and	updated	activity	for	2011-2013)	(Greater	London	Authority,	2014);	For	evidence	of	personal	commitment	to	addressing	climate	change,	see	Boris	Johnson,	“It’s	snowing,	and	it	really	feels	like	the	start	of	a	mini	ice	age”,	The	Telegraph,	20	January	2013,	online:	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/borisjohnson/9814618/Its-snowing-and-it-really-feels-like-the-start-of-a-mini-ice-age.html	(accessed	on	8	October	2014).	For	emphasis	on	the	‘business	case’	of	tackling	climate	change,	see	the	second	objective	of	Mayor	Johnson’s	climate	change	strategy:	“The	global	market	for	low	carbon	goods	and	services	is	around	£3	trillion.	In	addition	to	this,	it	is	estimated	that	if	global	CO2	emission	targets	are	met,	this	market	could	increase	by	at	least	£368	billion	per	year	through	to	2030.	London	is	well	placed	to	capitalise	on	this	economic	opportunity.	The	Mayor	is	using	London’s	inherent	strengths	and	his	climate	change	mitigation	programmes	to	build	on	this”;	Greater	London	Authority,	‘Delivering	London's	Energy	Future:	The	Mayor's	Climate	Change	Mitigation	and	Energy	Strategy	’,	Eexcutive	Summary,	
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	 In	May	2016,	Sadiq	Khan	won	the	election	contest	and	replaced	Boris	Johnson	as	mayor	of	London.24	Within	the	first	few	months	of	Khan’s	mayoralty,	it	was	already	evident	that	climate	change	would	become	a	more	central	concern	than	it	had	been	for	the	previous	mayor.	Keen	to	work	with	other	global	cities	to	address	climate	change	and	for	London	to	revive	its	role	as	a	climate	frontrunner	amongst	European	cities,	Sadiq	Khan	increased	contact	with	C40	and	put	himself	up	as	a	candidate	for	the	role	of	Vice	Chair	on	the	C40	Steering	Committee.25	On	25	July	2016,	C40	announced	that	Sadiq	Khan	was	elected	to	the	Vice	Chair	position	and	will	represent	European	cities	alongside	the	mayor	of	Copenhagen.26	In	addition,	while	Sadiq	Khan’s	office	has	yet	to	publish	its	climate	change	strategy	for	the	city	at	the	time	of	writing,	Khan	has	already	made	it	clear	that	he	wants	to	establish	London	as	a	“low-carbon	beacon”	and	will	commit	London	to	become	a	zero-carbon	city	by	2050.27	Finally,	it	is	expected	that	Sadiq	Khan	will	support	more	integrated	approaches	such	as	enhancing	the	synergies	between	climate	adaptation,	expanding	green	spaces	and	reducing	air	pollution.28	
2.2	Adaptation:	Implementation	at	the	local	authority	level		
	 In	pursuance	of	its	obligations	under	the	Greater	London	Authority	Act	2007,	the	Greater	London	Authority	issued	the	Draft	Climate	Change	Adaptation	Strategy	for	London	(Adaptation	Strategy)	in	2008	(followed	by	an	updated	version	in	2010).	Mees	and	Driessen	note	that	“[a]lthough	flood	risk	is	a	major	driver	of	adaptation,	heat	stress	has	become	more	important	after	the	heat	waves	of	2003	and	2006.”29	This	reality	is	also	reflected	in	the	Adaptation	Strategy,	which	highlights	flooding,	drought	and	overheating	as	the	three	main	climate	change	impacts	that	London	has	to	manage.			A	significant	prong	of	London’s	Adaptation	Strategy	consists	of	an	Urban	Greening	Programme	to	reduce	the	impacts	of	and	prevent	further	intensification	of	London’s	urban	heat	island	effect.	The	Urban	Greening	Programmes	consists	of	a	green	roof	policy,	a	tree-planting	programme	and	establishing	a	green	grid	across	the	Greater	London	area.30	In	the	Adaptation	Strategy,	Mayor	Johnson	committed	to																																																																																																																																																																						pg.	viii.		
24	Robert	Booth,	“Labour’s	Sadiq	Khan	elected	mayor	of	London”,	The	Guardian,	7	May	2016,	online:	https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/07/sadiq-khan-elected-mayor-of-london-labour	(accessed	on	10	December	2016).		25	The	Steering	Committee	is	the	governing	body	that	provides	strategic	direction	to	the	C40	network.		26	C40,	“Press	Release:	London	Mayor	Sadiq	Khan	Elected	C40	Vice	Chair”,	online:	http://www.c40.org/press_releases/press-release-london-mayor-sadiq-khan-elected-c40-vice-chair	(accessed	on	1	November	2016).	27	Sadiq	Khan	for	London,	online:	http://www.sadiq.london/a_greener_cleaner_london	(accessed	on	1	November	2016).	28	Interview	No.	12.	29	Mees	and	Driessen,	pg.	261.		30	See	London	Climate	Change	Partnership,	Adapting	to	Climate	Change:	Lessons	for	London	(Greater	London	Authority,	2006)	for	detailed	consideration	of	case	studies	that	informed	London’s	adaptation	strategy,	for	example,	Linz’s	and	Basel’s	established	green	roof	policies;	see	City	of	
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working	with	partners	“…to	increase	green	cover	in	central	London	by	five	per	cent	by	2030	and	a	further	five	per	cent	by	2050,	to	manage	temperatures	in	the	hottest	part	of	London…	increase	tree	cover	across	London	by	five	per	cent	(from	20	to	25	per	cent)	by	2025…[and]	enable	the	delivery	of	100,000m2	of	new	green	roofs	by	2012	(from	2008/09	baseline).”31	Here,	partners	include	the	boroughs	that	play	a	critical	role	in	developing	and	implementing	locality-specific	adaptation	policies	and	initiatives	under	the	broad	framework	established	at	the	mayoral	level.		At	the	local	authority	level,	some	boroughs	such	as	Barking	and	Dagenham	have	issued	a	Planning	Advice	Note	on	Green	Roofs.32	The	borough	of	Barking	and	Dagenham	has	also	issued	a	Planning	Advice	Note	on	Sustainable	Design	and	Construction	which	“strongly	[encourages	developers]	to	consider	energy	efficient	building	design,	community	heating	and	CHP,	as	well	as	renewable	energy	generation	from	the	outset	of	their	plans.”33	Further,	the	Planning	Advice	Note	states	“Developers	in	Barking	and	Dagenham	are	expected	to	achieve	a	further	20%	reduction	in	carbon	emissions	beyond	Building	Regulations	2006	in	new	developments.	10%	of	this	reduction	has	to	be	achieved	through	on-site	generation	of	renewable	energy.	The	remainder	10%	can	be	achieved	through	increased	energy	efficiency,	CHP	or	through	further	generation	of	renewable	energy.”34	Thus,	at	the	local	authority	level,	there	is	discretion	for	boroughs	to	be	ambitious	in	their	climate	change	agenda	and	go	beyond	statutory	requirements.		London	is	vulnerable	to	a	number	of	flood	risks:	from	the	North	Sea	(tidal	flooding),	the	Thames	river	and	its	tributaries	to	the	Thames	(fluvial	flooding)	and	from	heavy	rainfall	(surface	water	flooding).35	The	Draft	Adaptation	Strategy	assessed	that	“[c]urrently,	there	is	a	low	likelihood	of	tidal	flooding,	a	medium	probability	of	river	flooding	and	high	probability	of	surface	water	flooding.”36	However,	the	risks	will	increase	as	sea	levels	rise,	tidal	surges	increase	in	height,	the																																																																																																																																																																						London	Corporation,	Green	Roof	Case	Studies	(City	of	London	Corporation	2011),	online:	http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/services/environment-and-planning/planning/heritage-and-design/Documents/Green-roof-case-studies-28Nov11.pdf	(accessed	on	7	October	2016)	for	successful	examples	of	London’s	fledging	green	roofs	initiative.		31	Greater	London	Authority,	The	draft	climate	change	adaptation	strategy	for	London	(Greater	London	Authority,	2010),	pg.	12,	online:	https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Draft_Climate_Change_Adaptation_Strategy.pdf	(accessed	on	10	October	2016).		32	Planning	Advice	Notes	provide	developers	and	planners	guidance	on	how	a	borough	seeks	to	implement	its	Local	Development	Framework.	While	they	are	not	binding	and	do	not	have	to	be	adhered	to	in	applications	for	planning	permission,	the	borough	will	take	into	account	whether	these	Notes	have	been	followed	when	it	decides	on	a	planning	application;	London	Borough	of	Barking	and	Dagenham,	“Planning	Advice	Notes”,	online:	http://www.lbbd.gov.uk/Environment/PlanningPolicy/Pages/Planningadvicenotes.aspx	(accessed	on	10	October	2016).		33	London	Borough	of	Barking	and	Dagenham,	Sustainable	Design	and	Construction	(Planning	Advice	Note	5),	pg.	24,	online:	http://www.lbbd.gov.uk/Environment/PlanningPolicy/Documents/PAN5SustainableDesign.pdf	(accessed	on	10	October	2016).		34	Ibid.,	pg.	27.		35	Greater	London	Authority,	The	draft	climate	change	adaptation	strategy	for	London,	pg.	7.		36	Ibid.		
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amount	and	intensity	of	winter	rainfall	increases.	Currently,	flood	risk	in	London	is	managed	primarily	by	a	system	of	flood	defences	(walls,	gates	and	the	Thames	Barrier)	and	drainage	networks.	However,	spatial	planning	is	also	a	critical	adaptation	tool,	which	involves	avoiding	the	creation	of	flood-vulnerable	land	uses	in	high-risk	areas	and	using	the	planning	process	to	reduce	flood	risks.	As	the	London	boroughs	are	the	primary	decision-makers	in	the	planning	process,	they	have	prepared	a	range	of	spatial	planning	policies	targeted	at	adaptation	to	flooding.	The	borough	of	Sutton,	for	example,	has	adopted	a	holistic	“green-blue	infrastructure”	approach	to	manage	flood	risks	to	and	from	new	developments	and	to	promote	sustainable	urban	drainage	systems	to	manage	surface	water	flooding.37	This	firm	focus	on	green	and	blue	spaces	was	the	result	of	Sutton’s	participation	in	the	Green	and	Blue	Space	Adaptation	for	Urban	Areas	and	Eco	Towns	(GRaBS)	project,	a	network	of	fourteen	partners	drawn	from	eight	EU	member	states	that	aims	to	share	experience	and	best	practices	in	integrating	adaptation	into	regional	planning	and	development.38			
3. Mexico	City,	Mexico		With	nearly	20	million	inhabitants,	3.5	million	vehicles,	and	35,000	industrial	facilities,	Mexico	City’s	per	capita	carbon	emissions	is	estimated	at	3.6	tons,	which	is	low	compared	to	those	of	wealthier	cities	like	Los	Angeles	which	has	per	capita	emissions	of	15.6	tons.39	Mexico	City’s	carbon	emissions	represent	4.18%	of	the	total	national	emissions	–	a	relatively	small	percentage	because	of	the	absence	of	the	petrochemical	industry	in	the	city	(one	of	the	main	sources	of	GHGs	in	Mexico)	and	increasing	deindustrialization	of	the	city.40	However,	Mexico	City,	like	other	urban	centres	in	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean	(LAC)	is	a	growing	source	of	GHG	emissions	because	of	urban	sprawl	and	population	growth.41	Mexico	City	also	
																																																								37	See	Patrick	Whitter,	‘London	Borough	of	Sutton:	Adaptation	to	flooding	via	local	planning	policies	’	in	Aleksandra	Kazmierczak	and	Jeremy	Carter	(eds),	Adaptation	to	climate	change	using	green	and	
blue	infrastructure:	A	database	of	case	studies	(Database	prepared	for	the	Interreg	IVC	Green	and	blue	space	adaptation	for	urban	areas	and	eco	towns	(GRaBS)	project.	2010),	online:	http://www.grabs-eu.org/membersArea/files/Database_Final_no_hyperlinks.pdf	(accessed	on	8	October	2016).		38	The	GRaBS	project	is	financed	by	the	European	Union's	Regional	Development	Fund.	More	information	is	available	online:	http://www.grabs-eu.org	(accessed	on	8	October	2016).		39	Patricia	Romero	Lankao,	‘How	do	Local	Governments	in	Mexico	City	Manage	Global	Warming?’	(2007)	12	Local	Environment	519,	pg.	520.		40	Fabiola	S.		Sosa-Rodriguez,	‘From	federal	to	city	mitigation	and	adaptation:	climate	change	policy	in	Mexico	City’	(2014)	19	Mitigation	and	Adaptation	Strategies	for	Global	Change	969,	pg.	989.	As	people	move	away	from	the	core	areas	of	the	city	to	suburban	areas,	they	have	to	travel	longer	distances	for	work	and	recreational	purposes.	Private	automobile	ownership	has	been	steadily	increasing	because	of	the	poor	public	transportation	system	in	Mexico	City.	In	LAC,	emissions	from	transportation	are	the	fastest	growing	source	of	carbon.	Mexico	City	is	no	exception.	41	Jorgelina	Hardoy	and	Patricia	Romero	Lankao,	‘Latin	American	cities	and	climate	change:	challenges	and	options	to	mitigation	and	adaptation	responses	’	(2011)	3	Current	Opinion	in	Environmental	Sustainability	158.	
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suffers	from	some	of	the	worst	air	pollution	problems	in	the	world.42	In	1992,	the	United	Nations	reported	that	Mexico	City	was	the	most	polluted	city	on	the	planet.43		 Studies	of	the	impacts	of	climate	change	across	Mexico	indicate	that	Mexico	City	is	likely	to	experience	the	greatest	effects	because	of	its	existing	environmental	problems	(induced	by	rapid	urbanization)	and	its	susceptibility	to	climatic	events.44	Historically,	Mexico	City	has	experienced	catastrophic	floods	and	severe	droughts.	Projected	changes	in	temperature	and	precipitation	may	increase	the	frequency	and	severity	of	floods	and	droughts,	increasing	the	city’s	susceptibility	to	rain	and	wastewater	flooding	and	landslides	as	well	as	dramatically	reduce	residents’	access	to	clean	drinking	water.	Further,	large-scale	rapid	urban	expansion,	coupled	with	changes	in	atmospheric	emissions,	has	resulted	in	temperature	rises,	high	levels	of	air	pollution,	and	loss	of	ecosystem	services	for	Mexico	City.	Since	the	early	1990s,	the	city’s	average	temperature	has	risen	by	almost	four	degree	Celsius.45	The	city	also	faces	significant	challenges	meeting	the	water,	sanitation	and	housing	demands	of	its	population,	of	which	some	14%	live	in	slum	settlements	on	flood-prone	areas.46	Despite	its	inland	location,	Mexico	City	is	prone	to	flooding	because	it	has	no	natural	drainage	outlet	and	the	city	is	located	on	the	marshy	bed	of	what	was	once	a	series	of	lakes	in	a	valley.47	The	poor	and	marginalized	are	the	most	vulnerable	to	the	impacts	of	climate	change.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 These	challenges	have	rendered	it	imperative	for	Mexico	City	to	increase	its	climate	resilience.	In	recent	years,	Mexico	City	has	emerged	as	a	‘climate	frontrunner’	amongst	global	cities	in	developing	countries.48	For	many	developing	country	cities	which	generally	emit	less	GHGs	compared	to	wealthy	cities	in	developed	countries,	“[c]urbing	carbon	emissions	may…not	be	the	current	‘local	environmental	priority’.	Rather,	the	local	priority	may	be	vulnerability	and	adaptation	to	the	impacts	of	climate	change.”49	This	has	not	been	the	case	for	Mexico	City.	Unusually	for	an	emerging	economy,	domestic	climate	policy	discussions	in	Mexico	and	its	capital,	Mexico	City,	have	not	focused	solely	on	impacts	and																																																									42	Galen		McKinley	and	others,	The	Local	Benefits	of	Global	Air	Pollution	Control	in	Mexico	City:	Final	
Report	of	the	Second	Phase	of	the	Integrated	Envionmental	Strategies	Program	in	Mexico	(Instituto	Nacional	de	Ecología,	México	Instituto	Nacional	de	Salud	Publica,	México,	2003),	pg.	6.		43	World	Health	Organization	and	United	Nations	Environment	Programme,	Urban	Air	Pollution	in	
Megacities	of	the	World	(Blackwell,	Oxford	1992),	pg.	39.		44	Patricia	Romero	Lankao	and	others,	‘Institutional	Capacity	for	Climate	Change	Responses:	An	Examination	of	Constuction	and	Pathways	in	Mexico	City	and	Santiago	’	(2013)	31	Environment	and	Planning	C:	Government	and	Policy	785,	pg.	789.		45	Sosa-Rodriguez,	pg.	972.		46	Romero	Lankao	and	others,	pg.	790	(Table	2).	There	is	also	wide	income	disparity	between	the	rich	and	the	poor	in	Mexico	City,	which	has	a	GINI	coefficient	of	0.56.		47	Priscilla	Connolly,	The	Case	of	Mexico	City,	Mexico	(Case	study	report	prepared	for	Understanding	Slums:	Case	Studies	for	the	Global	Urban	Report,	2003),	online:	http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/Global_Report/home.htm	(accessed	on	6	November	2016).		48	The	term	“developing	country”	is	used	to	refer	to	low	and	middle	income	economies.	Mexico	is	classified	as	a	upper-middle-income	economy	(Gross	National	Income	(GNI)	of	US$4,126	to	US$12,	745)	because	its	GNI	per	capita	stands	at	US$9,940	(2003	data);	World	Bank,	online:	http://data.worldbank.org/country/mexico		(accessed	on	6	November	2016).		49	Romero	Lankao,	pg.	520.		
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adaptation	but	also	include	mitigation	responsibilities.50	This	is	all	the	more	remarkable	because	Mexico	City,	like	many	major	cities	in	rapidly	emerging	economies,	faces	tremendous	challenges	such	as	high	levels	of	migration	from	rural	areas	into	the	city	as	it	contemplates	a	transition	towards	a	more	climate-friendly	and	sustainable	future.51	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 The	discussion	below	will	first	set	out	Mexico	City’s	climate	policies	as	well	as	explain	the	main	drivers	behind	the	city’s	ambitions	to	address	climate	change.	These	factors	include	(1)	the	coincidence	of	a	presidency	(for	the	country)	and	a	mayoralty	(for	the	city)	being	held	by	individuals	who	were	committed	to	addressing	environmental	governance	and	climate	change	issues,	(2)	Mexico	City’s	involvement	in	transnational	networks	particularly	C40,	and	(3)	the	availability	of	external	funding	from	international	organizations	like	the	World	Bank	and	the	Kyoto	Protocol’s	Clean	Development	Mechanism	(CDM).	The	section	concludes	with	a	brief	discussion	of	the	Programa	para	Mejorar	la	Calidad	del	Aire	en	el	Valle	de	México	(ProAire)	program	which	has	led	to	impressive	reductions	in	conventional	air	pollution	and	carbon	emissions	in	Mexico	City.		
3.1	Strong	Mayoral	Commitment	to	Tackling	Climate	Change				From	2000	to	2005,	Andrés	Manuel	López	Obrador	served	as	the	mayor	of	Mexico	City.	Described	as	a	visionary,	Mayor	Obrador	“did	not	need	convincing	that	climate	change	was	a	serious	problem	and	one	that	Mexico	City	needed	to	address.”52	Under	Mayor	Obrador’s	leadership,	Mexico	City	produced	its	first	Local	Climate	Action	Strategy	in	2004,	establishing	guidelines	for	local	governmental	agencies,	the	private	sector	and	civil	society	to	promote	mitigation	and	adaptation.53	The	mitigation	measures	focused	on	improving	Mexico	City’s	public	transportation	system,	improving	energy	efficiency,	and	increasing	green	acreage	in	the	city.	To	build	the	city’s	climate	resilience,	the	strategy	identified	that	the	immediate	priority	was	to	increase	public	education	of	risks	such	as	heat	stroke	and	enhancing	early	warning	systems.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 While	Mayor	Obrador	was	responsible	for	placing	climate	change	on	the	city’s	agenda	and	putting	the	institutional	framework	in	place,	it	was	during	Marcelo	Ebrard’s	mayoralty	(2006-2012)	that	Mexico	City	displayed	a	high	level	of	commitment	and	invested	significant	resources	to	developing	and	implementing	an	ambitious	range	of	policies	and	programmes	to	curb	the	city’s	GHG	emissions	and	increase	its	climate	resilience.	Marcelo	Ebrard	was	committed	to	improving	quality																																																									50	Simone	Pulver,	‘A	Climate	Leader?	The	Politics	and	Practice	of	Climate	Governance	in	Mexico	’	in	David	Held,	Charles	Roger	and	Eva-	Maria		Nag	(eds),	Climate	Governance	in	the	Developing	World	(Wiley	2013),	pg.	175.	Mexico	is	the	only	developing	country	to	have	enshrined	long-term	GHG	emissions	reduction	targets	in	national	legislation	and,	in	fact,	is	the	second	country	in	the	world	to	do	so	(the	first	being	the	United	Kingdom);	Richard	Black,	‘Inside	Mexico's	climate	revolution’	BBC	
News	(20	April	2012	),	online:	http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-17777327	(accessed	on	4	November	2016).			51	Interview	No.	10.		52	Ibid.		53	Secretaría	del	Medio	Ambiente	del	Gobierno	del	Distrito	Federal,	(Ministry	of	Environment	of	the	Federal	District),	Estrategia	Local	de	Acción	Climática	de	la	Ciudad	de	México,	2004.	
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of	life	for	his	city’s	twenty	million	inhabitants,	and	that	included	reducing	drug-related	violence,	improving	access	to	education,	and	‘greening’	the	city.54	A	crucial	component	of	Mayor	Ebrard’s	‘green	city’	strategy	was	to	realize	the	co-benefits	of	reducing	Mexico	City’s	severe	air	pollution	and	realizing	GHG	emissions	reductions	at	the	same	time.55	As	transportation	and	fossil	fuel-based	energy	production	are	key	sources	of	carbon	emissions	and	conventional	air	pollutants	(such	as	nitrogen	oxide	and	sulphur	dioxide),	a	climate	mitigation	strategy	will	produce	the	co-benefit	of	improved	air	quality.56			 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 There	are	two	key	factors	that	motivated	Mayor	Marcelo	Ebrard	to	undertake	ambitious	climate	action.	The	first	factor	was	Mexico	City’s	participation	in	transnational	climate	networks,	particularly	C40	and	the	World	Mayors	Council	on	Climate	Change.57	C40	first	emerged	in	2005	and	rapidly	built	a	reputation	for	being	an	elite	group	of	leading	global	cities	that	are	strongly	committed	to	tackling	climate	change.58	Mexico	City	was	keen	to	be	part	of	C40	and	to	prove	its	credentials	as	a	progressive	global	city	that	is	pursuing	ambitious	climate	action.	C40’s	membership	criteria	are	widely	known	to	be	demanding	and	the	quest	to	meet	C40’s	membership	requirements	motivated	Mayor	Ebrard’s	administration	to	pursue	an	ambitious	climate	change	agenda.	Once	Mexico	City	officially	became	a	C40	member,	it	can	be	said	that	frequent	interactions	with	other	cities	and	participation	in	the	network	provided	a	healthy	dose	of	peer	pressure	that	added	impetus	to	Mayor	Ebrard’s	climate	change	agenda.59		 	 	 	 	 	 		 Mayor	Ebrard	was	also	active	in	another	transnational	network	known	as	the	World	Mayors	Council	on	Climate	Change.60	The	mayor	of	Kyoto,	Yorikane	Masumoto,	initiated	the	founding	of	the	World	Mayors	Council	on	Climate	Change	soon	after	the	Kyoto	Protocol	entered	into	force	in	February	2005.61	This	network	of	mayors	seeks	to	represent	and	advocate	for	cities	on	matters	pertaining	to	global	sustainability.62	Mayor	Ebrard	was	not	only	an	active	participant;	in	2009,	he	was	elected	to	be	the	chairman	of	the	World	Mayors	Council	on	Climate	Change,	and	Mexico	City	hosted	the	2010	World	Mayors	Summit	on	Climate	Change.63		This	was	a																																																									54	Joel	Jaeger,	‘Reflecting	on	Marcelo	Ebrard's	Tenure	as	the	Mayor	of	Mexico	City’	Council	on	
Hemispheric	Affairs	(Mexico,	20	September	2012)	Front	Page,	online:	http://www.coha.org/reflecting-on-marcelo-ebrards-tenure-as-the-mayor-of-mexico-city/	(accessed	on	4	November	2016).	55	Interview	No.	10.	On	the	co-benefit	approach,	see	Netherlands	Environmental	Assessment	Agency	(PBL),	Co-benefits	of	climate	policy	(PBL	Report	no	500116005,	2009),	online:	http://www.unep.org/transport/gfei/autotool/understanding_the_problem/Netherlands%20Environment%20Agency.pdf	(accessed	on	4	November	2016).	56	Ibid.		57	Interview	No.	10.		58	See	detailed	discussion	of	C40	in	Chapter	5.		59	Ibid.		60	World	Mayors	Council	on	Climate	Change,	online:	http://www.worldmayorscouncil.org	(accessed	on	8	November	2016).	61	Ibid.	62	Ibid.	63	Local	Government	Climate	Roadmap,	“World	Mayors	Summit	on	Climate	–	Mayors	push	for	hope	after	Copenhagen”,	online:	http://www.iclei.org/climate-roadmap/advocacy/global-lg-events/2010-world-mayors-summit-on-climate-mexico-city.html	(accessed	on	8	November	2016).		
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proud	moment	for	Mexico	City	and	its	mayor.	The	summit	resulted	in	the	Global	Cities	Covenant	on	Climate,	otherwise	known	as	the	Mexico	City	Pact.64	More	than	two	hundred	and	fifty	cities	in	fifty-seven	countries	have	signed	the	pledge	to	reduce	GHG	emissions	and	undertake	adaptation	measures,	and	furthermore,	to	record	“…their	climate	actions…and	provide	regular	information	and	data	so	that	[their]	efforts	can	be	measured,	reported	and	verified.”65		 	 	 		 The	second	factor	is	the	coincidence	in	timing	between	Marcelo	Ebrard’s	mayoralty	and	Felipe	Calderon’s	presidency	of	the	country.		When	Felipe	Calderon	assumed	office	in	2006,	it	marked	a	turning	point	in	the	national	discourse	on	climate	change.	President	Calderon	made	climate	change	a	focus	of	his	presidency.	His	administration	produced	a	National	Strategy	for	Climate	Change	outlining	the	various	mitigation	and	adaptation	options	that	would	be	taken	to	achieve	climate	resilience	as	well	as	the	long-term	goal	of	a	fifty	per	cent	reduction	in	GHG	reductions	by	2050.66	This	coincidence	helped	create	synergistic	energy	between		Mexico	City’s	climate	governance	ambitions	and	the	national	agenda.67	For	example,	the	national	government	was	supportive	of	Mexico	City’s	ambitious	climate	change	programs	because	it	was	open	to	the	idea	of	the	city	serving	as	a	social	laboratory	to	test	policies	and	initiatives	that	can	be	scaled	up	to	the	national	level.	During	the	2006-2012	period,	this	coincidence	in	domestic	politics	meant	that	Mexico	City	was	well	placed	to	take	ambitious	local	climate	change	action	as	well	as	participate	actively	in	transnational	climate	change	governance	through	C40	and	the	World	Mayors	Council	on	Climate	Change.		 	 	 	 	 		 In	2008,	Mexico	City	was	the	first	municipality	in	LAC	to	implement	a	Local	Climate	Action	Program	(2008–2012).	In	this	program,	the	city	set	itself	two	objectives:	First,	to	reduce	carbon	dioxide	equivalent	(CO2e)	emissions	by	seven	million	tons	during	2008	to	2012;	and	secondly,	to	initiate	an	integrated	and	fully	functional	climate	adaptation	program	by	2012.68		This	program	consisted	of	twenty-six	mitigation	strategies,	which	included	programs	to	replace	the	city’s	streetlamps	with	energy-efficient	Light	Emitting	Diodes	(LED)	lamps,	increasing	the	use	of	solar	energy	in	hospitals	and	government	buildings,	building	the	Ecobus	system	to	transport	150,000	passengers	daily,	as	well	as	nine	Metrobus	(bus	rapid	transit)	systems	and	the	Line	12	of	the	Metro	(subway)	to	transport	437,000	passengers	daily,	and	introducing	more	sustainable	waste	management	policies.	The																																																									64	Global	Cities	Covenant	on	Climate	“Mexico	City	Pact”,	online:	http://www.mexicocitypact.org/downloads/texto-original/Global%20Cities%20Covenant%20on%20Climate%20OFICIAL.pdf	(accessed	on	8	November	2016).		65	Ibid.	The	carbonn	Cities	Climate	Registry	is	a	public	online	database	that	has	been	established	to	support	cities	in	their	voluntary	adherence	to	Article	4;	online:	http://carbonn.org/	(accessed	on	8	November	2016).	
66	Pulver,	pg.	184.		67	Interview	No.	10.	68	Ministry	of	the	Environment	and	Federal	Government	of	the	District	of	Mexico	City,	Mexico	City	
Climate	Action	Program	2008-2012	(Summary)	(2008),	pg.	11,	online:	http://www.planningclimatechange.org/joomla/0_upload/PDF_unico.pdf	(accessed	on	6	November	
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capture	and	use	of	biogas	at	the	Bordo	Poniente	Stage	4	landfill	represented	nearly	90%	of	the	emission	reductions	in	the	waste	sector,	while	the	construction	of	Line	12	of	the	city’s	subway	system	and	an	obligatory	school	transportation	program	(whereby	educational	institutions	require	their	students	to	take	public	transportation	to	school)	are	estimated	to	be	responsible	for	half	the	emission	reductions	in	the	transport	sector.			 	 	 	The	twelve	adaptation	strategies	included	improving	watershed	management,	building	flood	protection	infrastructure	in	urban	ravines,	soil	remediation	programs	to	improve	the	city’s	natural	rainwater	absorption	capacity,	and	providing	social	assistance	to	vulnerable	social	groups	such	as	distribution	of	free	food	and	establishing	shelters	for	the	homeless	during	heat	waves.69	Long-term	adaptation	measures	are	mainly	geared	towards	developing	adaptive	capacity	in	rural	areas	that	face	severe	marginalization	by	promoting	organic	farming,	development,	and	natural	resource	conservation.70	It	should	be	noted	that	the	Local	Climate	Action	Program	(2008–2012)	integrates	strategies	from	the	city’s	General	Program	of	Development	(2006–2012)	and	the	Green	Plan	(2006–2012).71	These	strategies	may	not	have	been	developed	with	climate	change	in	mind,	but	they	assist	in	reducing	the	city’s	GHG	emissions	and	increasing	its	adaptive	capacity.	In	2010,	Mexico	City	passed	the	Climate	Change	Mitigation	and	Adaptation	Law	which	authorizes	the	city’s	government	to	take	certain	regulatory	measures	for	mitigation	and	adaptation,	authorizes	the	city’s	government	to	regulate	actions	for	addressing	climate	change,	establishes	the	Climate	Change	Environmental	Fund	to	provide	funding	for	programs	and	initiatives,	establish	and	manage	GHG	emission	inventories,	and	create	a	carbon	emissions	trading	system.72	 	 	 		 In	2012,	Mayor	Marcelo	Ebrard	announced	that	not	only	did	Mexico	City	meet	its	goal	of	reducing	CO2e	emissions	by	seven	million	tons	during	2008	to	2012,	it	surpassed	this	goal	by	ten	percent	with	a	7.7	million	ton	reduction	of	CO2e	emissions	over	the	four-year	period.73	Mayor	Ebrard	also	announced	that	Mexico	City	met	all	the	adaptation	objectives	laid	out	in	the	Local	Climate	Action	Program.74	However,	academic	commentators	have	been	less	positive	in	their	assessment	of	Mexico	City’s	achievements.	Sosa-Rodriguez,	for	example,	points	out	that	there	is	limited	inter-institutional	coordination	and	collaboration	because	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation	is	viewed	as	the	responsibility	of	the	Ministry	of	the	Environment.75	Further,	some	national	adaptation	strategies	such	as	implementing	drought	alert	systems	have	yet	to	be	introduced	in	Mexico	City.	Sosa-Rodroguez	explains	that	the																																																																																																																																																																						2016).	The	information	in	the	rest	of	this	paragraph	is	taken	from	this	document,	unless	otherwise	indicated.		69	Ibid,	pg.	18.		70	Ibid.		71	Ibid,	pg.	4.	72	Romero	Lankao	and	others,	pg.	792.			73	C40	News	Team,	‘Mexico	City	meets,	exceeds	Climate	Action	Program	Goals	’	National	Geographic	(13	September	2012)	Voices,	online:	http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2012/09/13/mexico-city-meets-exceeds-climate-action-program-goals/	(accessed	on	4	November	2016).			74	Ibid.		75	Sosa-Rodriguez,	pg.	985.		
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“[i]dentified	obstacles	to	successful	[mitigation	and	adaptation]	in	the	city	include	a	lack	of	understanding	of	the	strategies’	objectives,	process	and	outcomes	by	governmental	agencies	and	inhabitants,…a	lack	of	participation	and	public	awareness	about	climate	change.”76	These	problems	have	resulted	in	poor	coordination	and	collaboration	among	these	participants	to	address	climate	change	impacts.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	after	the	current	mayor	of	Mexico	City,	Miguel	Mancera,	assumed	office	in	2012,	he	significantly	restructured	the	city’s	administration	and	this	contributed	to	confusion	and	lack	of	coordination	amongst	various	agencies	that	should	be	working	together	to	implement	the	city’s	climate	change	strategy.77	Furthermore,	problems	of	corruption	have	stood	in	the	way	of	developing	the	city’s	mitigation	and	adaptation	capacity.78	These	institutional	and	societal	barriers	to	action	are	more	common	in	cities	located	in	the	developing	world,	and	reflect	broader	socio-economic	and	governance	challenges.	Thus,	unlike	cities	such	as	Rotterdam,	London	and	New	York	which	enjoy	more	stable	legal	and	political	institutions	to	support	climate	action,	a	city	like	Mexico	City	emerges	as	a	climate	frontrunner	in	the	face	of	far	greater	social	and	political	resistance.		
3.2	The	ProAire	Programs		
	 Air	pollution	has	been	a	critical	issue	in	Mexico	City	and	the	authorities	continue	to	face	an	uphill	battle	in	improving	the	city’s	air	quality.79	Since	the	1990s,	a	series	of	comprehensive	air	quality	improvement	programs	have	improved	air	quality,	and	in	recent	years,	have	also	served	as	a	platform	for	reducing	GHG	emissions.	The	first	plan,	Programa	Integral	para	el	Control	de	la	Contaminación	Atmosférica	(PICCA)	was	initiated	in	1990	and	met	with	considerable	success	in	introducing	two-way	catalytic	converters,	phasing	out	the	use	of	leaded	gasoline,	and	establishing	vehicle	emissions	standards.80	The	second	program,	ProAire	II	(1995-2000)	introduced	restrictions	on	the	aromatic	content	of	fuels	and	reduction	of	sulfur	content	in	industrial	fuel.81	Notwithstanding	significant	improvements	in	ambient	air	quality,	levels	of	conventional	air	pollutants	still	far	exceeded	World	Health	Organisation	(WHO)	guidelines,	compelling	the	city	government	to	extend	the	ProAire	program.82	While	air	quality	remained	the	key	focus	of	the	ProAire	III	(2002-2010)	program,	there	was	greater	recognition	of	the	linkages	between	air	pollution,	urbanization,	transportation	and	climate	change.83	The	ProAire	III	program	includes	eighty-nine	control	measures,	which	range	from	closing	the	city’s	most	polluting	factories	to	banning	cars	one	day	per	week	in	the	city´s	metropolitan	area.	Its	Metrobus	(bus	rapid	transit)	system,	launched	in	2005,	is	the	longest	such	system	in	Latin	America.	It	is	estimated	that,	by																																																									76	Ibid.	77	Interview	No.	10.		78	Sosa-Rodriguez,	pg.	986.	79	David	Agren,	‘Mexico	City	chokes	on	its	congestion	problem’	The	Guardian	(6	July	2016).	80	McKinley	and	others,	pg.	6.		81	Ibid.		82	Ibid.		83	Romero	Lankao,	pg.	525.		
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introducing	cleaner,	more	efficient	buses,	and	convincing	many	commuters	to	leave	their	cars	at	home,	Metrobus	has	reduced	carbon	dioxide	emissions	from	Mexico	City	traffic	by	an	estimated	80,000	tons	a	year.84		The	new	fleet	of	buses,	operating	on	clean-burning	ultra	low	sulfur	diesel	fuel,	make	more	than	450,000	trips	per	day.85	In	2009,	the	Mexico	City	Metrobus	System	was	awarded	the	Roy	Family	Award	for	Environmental	Partnerships	by	the	John	F.	Kennedy	School	of	Government	at	Harvard	University.	The	award	recognises	outstanding	public-private	partnership	projects	that	enhances	environmental	quality	through	the	use	of	novel	and	creative	approaches.86	The	city’s	Ecobici	bike-sharing	program	is	also	the	largest	in	the	LAC	and	has	been	replicated	in	other	cities	in	the	region.	The	ProAire	IV	program	(2011-2020)	contains	measures	across	eight	strategy	areas	including	energy	consumption,	greening	of	the	municipal	transport	fleets,	education,	green	roofing	and	reforestation,	capacity	building	and	scientific	research.87	In	2013,	the	long-term	approach	and	success	of	the	ProAire	Programs	garnered	Mexico	City	the	City	Climate	Leadership	Award	in	the	air	quality	category.88	
	
4. New	York	City,	The	United	States	of	America		New	York	City	(NYC)	is	the	largest	city	in	the	US	and	a	global	financial	centre.89	The	city	has	a	population	of	about	8.4	million	(as	of	July	2013)	that	is	estimated	to	reach	nine	million	in	2040.90	NYC’s	high	population	density	of	over	10,000	people	per	square	kilometre,	extensive	public	transit	system,	and	dominance	of	the	financial	sector	in	its	local	economy	shape	its	GHG	emissions	patterns.	In	general,	NYC’s	total	emissions	are	high	but	its	per	capita	emissions	are	relatively																																																									84	Belfer	Centre	for	Science	and	International	Affairs,	Harvard	Kennedy	School’s	Belfer	Center	
Announces	2009	Roy	Family	Award	for	Environmental	Partnership,	online:	http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19541/harvard_kennedy_schools_belfer_center_announces_2009_roy_family_award_for_environmental_partnership.html	(accessed	on	8	November	2016).		85	Ibid.		86	Ibid.	The	Metrobus	system	is	a	result	of	a	partnership	launched	by	the	World	Resources	Institute	Center	for	Sustainable	Transport,	together	with	CEIBA	(a	Mexican	NGO)	and	the	Mexico	City	government.	The	project	received	funding	from	Shell	Foundation,	Caterpillar	Foundation,	Hewlett	Foundation	and	the	World	Bank.		87	City	Climate	Leadership	Awards,	“2013-The	Winners”,	online:	http://cityclimateleadershipawards.com/2013-city-climate-leadership-awards-winners/	(accessed	on	8	November	2016).	88	Ibid.		89	NYC	usually	takes	second	place	(after	London)	by	a	narrow	margin	in	the	Global	Financial	Centres	Index;	see	Long	Finance’s	‘Financial	Centres	Futures’	Program,	“The	Global	Financial	Centres	Index	13”,	March	2013,	online:	http://www.geneve-finance.ch/sites/default/files/pdf/2013_gfci_25march.pdf	(accessed	on	9	November	2016).	90	NYC	Department	of	City	Planning,	“Current	Estimates	of	New	York	City's	Population	for	July	2013”,	online:	http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/census/popcur.shtml	(accessed	on	11	November	2016);	NYC	Department	of	City	Planning,	“New	York	City	Population	Projections	by	Age/Sex	&	Borough,	2010-2040”	online:	http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/census/projections_report_2010_2040.pdf,	pg.	2		(accessed	on	11	November	2016).	
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low	compared	to	other	urban	areas	in	the	US.91	NYC’s	total	GHG	emissions	were	estimated	to	be	61.5	million	metric	tons	of	CO2e	in	2007.92	The	city’s	per	capita	emissions	were	estimated	to	be	7.1	metric	tons	of	CO2e	-	higher	than	London’s	estimated	5.9	metric	tons,	but	lower	than	estimates	for	San	Diego	(11.1),	and	San	Francisco	(11.2).93	A	key	reason	for	NYC’s	relatively	low	emissions	compared	to	other	American	cities	is	the	prevalent	use	of	public	transport	amongst	NYC’s	residents.	Across	the	US,	transportation	is	the	second	largest	source	of	GHG	emissions,	accounting	for	28%	percent	of	total	emissions.94	NYC	is	the	only	US	city	where	more	than	50%	of	the	population	does	not	drive	to	work	and	has	the	highest	rate	of	commuting	by	public	transit	across	the	country.95	NYC’s	GHG	emissions	profile	comprises	largely	of	energy-related	CO2	emissions	since	there	is	little	agricultural	or	forested	land	within	the	city	and	75	percent	of	the	methane	produced	at	the	city’s	landfills	and	wastewater	treatment	plants	is	captured.96	NYC’s	first	GHG	emissions	inventory,	completed	in	2007,	showed	that	more	than	two-thirds	of	the	city’s	emissions	are	due	to	electricity	consumption	in	residential,	commercial	and	institutional	buildings.		 	 	 	 	 	 		 Hurricane	Sandy,	the	most	destructive	hurricane	of	the	2012	Atlantic	hurricane	season,	caused	severe	flooding,	power	cuts	and	forty-four	deaths	in	NYC.	While	it	took	“an	improbable	set	of	factors	coming	together	to	give	rise	to	the	catastrophic	effects	of	the	storm”97,	Hurricane	Sandy	represents	a	fraction	of	the	climate	risks	that	NYC	faces.	The	NYC	Panel	on	Climate	Change	has	projected	that,	by	2050,	sea	levels	could	rise	up	to	30	inches.98	This	will	pose	a	significant	threat	to	NYC’s	many	low-lying	neighborhoods	during	storms	and	tidal	flooding.	The	panel	also	predicts	that,	by	2050,	there	will	be	an	increase	in	the	most	intense	hurricanes																																																									91	Lily	Parshall	and	others,	The	Contribution	of	Urban	Areas	to	Climate	Change:	New	York	City	Case	
Study	(Case	study	prepared	for	Cities	and	Climate	Change:	Global	Report	on	Human	Settlements	2011),	pg.	6.		
92	City	of	New	York,	“Inventory	of	New	York	City	Greenhouse	Gas	Emissions	(2007)”,	online:	http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/downloads/pdf/emissions_inventory.pdf	(accessed	on	11	November	2016).	
93	Parshall	and	others,	pg.	7.		94	United	States	Environmental	Protection	Agency	(US	EPA),	“National	Greenhouse	Gas	Emissions	Data”,	online:	http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html	(accessed	on	11	November	2016).	95	Parshall	and	others,	pg.	7.	96	Ibid.		97	PLANYC,	“The	Risks	we	Face:	Sandy	and	its	Impacts”,	online:	http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/html/resiliency/sandy-impacts.shtml	(accessed	on	11	November	2016).	98	The	information	included	in	this	sentence	and	the	rest	of	this	paragraph	is	drawn	from	PLANYC,		“The	Risks	we	Face:	Climate	Change”,	online:	http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/html/resiliency/climate-change.shtml	(accessed	on	11	November	2016).	The	New	York	City	Panel	on	Climate	Change	produces	updated,	peer	reviewed	local	projections	for	the	climate	risks	that	NYC	faces.	The	Mayor’s	offices	in	charge	of	sustainability	and	resilience	rely	on	the	climate	science	provided	by	the	New	York	City	Panel	on	Climate	Change	and	there	is	frequent	interaction	between	the	mayor’s	offices	and	the	Panel;	Interview	No.	9.		
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occurring	in	the	North	Atlantic	Basin	and	heat	waves	could	triple	in	frequency	due	to	the	city’s	dense	built	environment	and	the	urban	heat	island	effect	that	causes	temperatures	in	NYC	to	be	up	to	seven	degrees	(Fahrenheit)	higher	than	in	surrounding	areas.	According	to	the	NYC	Panel	on	Climate	Change,	there	is	a	ninety	percent	probability	that	NYC	will	experience	more	frequent	heavy	downpours.		 The	discussion	below	sets	out	the	policies	and	measures	that	have	been	implemented	since	NYC’s	then-Mayor	Michael	Bloomberg	decided	to	take	concerted	action	on	climate	change	in	his	second	term	(2005-2013).	PLANYC	is	a	comprehensive	plan	outlining	the	Mayor’s	vision	for	a	more	sustainable	city	and,	for	the	first	time,	set	a	GHG	emissions	reduction	goal	for	NYC.	Since	the	launch	of	PLANYC,	the	city	has	passed	more	than	a	hundred	laws	and	regulations	to	address	climate	change.99	As	has	been	observed	about	the	other	cities	discussed	in	this	chapter,	a	crucial	element	behind	a	city’s	ability	to	undertake	ambitious	climate	action	is	high-level	political	leadership.	NYC	is	no	exception,	with	then-Mayor	Bloomberg	acting	as	“the	champion	of	the	climate	change	issue	for	the	city,	guiding	the	overall	process	with	great	foresight	and	courage.”100		 	 		 Succeeding	Michael	Bloomberg	in	2014,	the	current	mayor	of	NYC	is	Bill	de	Blasio.	Mayor	de	Blasio	campaigned	on	a	platform	focused	on	tackling	NYC’s	growing	income	and	social	inequality.101	Therefore,	his	agenda	so	far,	while	demonstrating	a	very	high	level	of	commitment	to	mitigation	and	building	the	city’s	climate	resilience,	is	built	on	a	broad	understanding	of	social,	environmental	and	economic	sustainability;	tackling	climate	change	has	become	one	of	four	core	issues	instead	of	the	main	focus	of	his	mayoralty	as	it	had	been	for	Michael	Bloomberg.102		
4.1	PLANYC:	A	Sustainability	and	Climate	Change	Blueprint	for	the	“City	that	
Never	Sleeps”		As	early	as	the	mid-1990s,	policy	experts	and	scientists	were	producing	studies	that	warned	of	the	climate	vulnerabilities	that	NYC	faced	and	how	climate	change	would	drive	up	risks	such	as	heat-stress	mortality	and	mosquito-borne	diseases.103	However,	these	warnings	were	ignored	by	the	Giuliani	mayoral	administration	(1994-2001)	which	took	the	position	that	“…that	if	action	was	indeed	necessary,	it	could	be	delayed,	because	climate	change	was	a	long-term	problem.”104		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 When	the	Bloomberg	mayoral	administration	(2002-2013)	took	office,	its																																																									99	New	York	City	Council,	Comprehensive	Platform	to	Combat	Climate	Change	(2014),	online:	http://council.nyc.gov/html/pr/climateagenda.pdf	(accessed	on	11	November	2016).		100	Katherine		Bagley	and	Maria		Gallucci,	‘How	Mayor	Michael	Bloomberg	Thought	Big	on	Climate’	
Scientific	American	(20	December	2013	),	online:	http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/bloomberg-climate-plan-genesis-excerpt/	(accessed	on	11	November	2016).	101	For	discussion,	see	for	example,	George	Packer,	‘Bill	de	Blasio's	Vision’	The	New	Yorker	(12	August	2013).		102	See	discussion	below	about	Mayor	de	Blasio’s	climate	agenda.		103	Cynthia		Rosenzweig	and	William	Solecki,	‘Chapter	1:	New	York	City	adaptation	in	context’	(2010)	1196	Annals	of	the	New	York	Academy	of	Sciences	19,	pg.	20.		104	Bagley	and	Gallucci,	ibid.		
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first	term	was	consumed	by	the	aftermath	of	the	terrorist	attacks	on	September	11,	2001.105	However,	according	to	Bagley	and	Gallucci,	Mayor	Bloomberg’	s	interest	in	climate	change	started	to	increase	in	the	mid-2000s.	Mayor	Bloomberg	was	also	concerned	about	how	NYC	was	going	to	cope	with	nine	million	residents	in	the	near	future	given	that	the	densely	populated	city’s	transportation,	housing	and	public	spaces	were	already	under	significant	strain.106	Bloomberg’s	administration,	alongside	over	twenty-five	city	agencies,	began	the	process	of	developing	a	strategy	for	how	NYC	was	to	prepare	for	its	growing	population,	become	more	resilient,	and	reduce	its	carbon	footprint.	This	process	culminated	in	the	publication	of	PLANYC.			 Released	in	April	2007,	PLANYC	is	a	comprehensive	program	of	action	comprising	of	one	hundred	and	twenty-seven	initiatives	in	the	key	areas	of	land,	water,	transportation,	energy,	air	quality,	and	climate	change.107	The	key	objectives	of	PLANYC	are,	inter	alia,	“to	create	homes	for	almost	a	million	more	New	Yorkers	while	making	housing	and	neighbors	more	affordable	and	sustainable,	ensure	all	New	Yorkers	live	within	a	ten	minute	walk	of	a	park,	and	reduce	energy	consumption	and	make	our	energy	systems	cleaner	and	more	reliable.”108	In	relation	to	climate	change,	the	goal	is	a	30%	reduction	of	GHG	emissions	by	2030	from	2005	levels	and	to	“[i]ncrease	the	resiliency	of	our	communities,	natural	systems,	and	infrastructure	to	climate	risks.”109	A	central	objective	of	PLANYC	was	the	establishment	of	an	inter-agency	taskforce	that	would	identify	climate	risks	and	implement	adaptation	strategies	across	agencies.110	Other	objectives	include	updating	the	city’s	Federal	Emergency	Management	Administration	(FEMA)	100-year	floodplain	maps,	documenting	the	city's	floodplain	management	strategies	to	secure	discounted	flood	insurance	for	New	Yorkers,	and	amending	the	building	code	to	address	the	impacts	of	climate	change.		 	 	 	 	 	 		 The	MillionTreesNYC	campaign	is	one	of	the	PLANYC	initiatives:	it	aims	to	plant	a	million	trees	in	NYC	by	2017.	The	campaign	is	a	public-private	partnership	between	the	NYC	Department	of	Parks	&	Recreation	(NYC	Parks)	and	a	non-profit	group,	the	New	York	Restoration	Project.111	Since	its	launch,	public,	private	and	non-profit	organizations	have	organized	nearly	four	thousand	citizen	volunteers	to	plant	
																																																								105	Ibid.		106	Ibid.		107	PLANYC,	“About	PLANYC”,	online:	http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/html/about/about.shtml	(accessed	on	11	November	2016).	108	Ibid.		109	Ibid.	On	7	July	2008,	Mayor	Bloomberg	announced	a	long-term	plan	to	reduce	energy	consumption	from	municipal	buildings	and	operations	and	a	goal	of	reducing	GHG	emissions	by	30%	by	2017.	It	was	estimated	that	this	would	reduce	NYC’s	annual	output	of	GHGs	by	nearly	1.7	million	metric	tons;	Rosenzweig	and	Solecki,	pg.	21.		
110	Ibid.		111	Lisa	Foderaro,	‘As	City	Plants	Trees,	Some	Say	a	Million	Are	Too	Many’	The	New	York	Times	(18	October	2011	),	online:	http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/19/nyregion/new-york-planting-a-million-treestoo-many-some-say.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0	(accessed	on	11	November	2014).		
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trees	across	the	city.112	One	aspect	of	the	MillionTreesNYC	campaign	directs	the	planting	of	nearly	four	hundred	thousand	trees	to	establish	two	thousand	acres	of	new	forest	on	NYC	parkland	and	other	public	open	spaces.	The	aim	is	to	create	multi-level,	ecologically	functioning	forests	that	will	provide	the	city	with	numerous	benefits	such	as	filtering	pollution	from	the	local	atmosphere,	storing	and	sequestering	carbon	dioxide,	and	trapping	rainwater	during	heavy	storms.	According	to	the	PLANYC	2014	progress	report,	the	MillionTreesNYC	campaign	is	27	percent	ahead	of	schedule,	having	planted	over	830,000	trees	(of	over	one	hundred	and	twenty	species)	and	held	numerous	events	to	teach	New	Yorkers	how	to	care	for	the	trees.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 PLANYC	stands	out	for	three	reasons:	First,	it	is	a	comprehensive	strategy	that	integrates	climate	change,	environmental	protection	and	remediation,	population	planning,	transportation	management	and	many	other	aspects	that	go	towards	making	a	city	a	truly	sustainable	one	that	is	also	enjoyable	and	exciting	to	live	in.	Many	cities	and	states	produce	climate	action	plans,	which	as	the	name	suggests,	focus	on	climate	change	and	then	seek	to	implement	the	initiatives	by	‘mainstreaming’	them	across	various	policy	areas	such	as	housing	and	transportation,	usually	with	a	degree	of	difficulty	because	the	agencies	responsible	for	these	policy	areas	view	climate	change	as	the	sole	responsibility	of	the	environmental	agency.113	To	a	large	extent,	this	‘silo	effect’	was	avoided	by	getting	all	the	city	agencies	involved	in	the	development	of	PLANYC,	a	process	that	would	have	been	an	important	learning	experience	for	the	city	servants	who	would	eventually	bear	the	bulk	of	the	responsibility	for	the	strategy’s	eventual	implementation.	Further,	then-Mayor	Bloomberg	saw	the	importance	of	establishing	a	new	office	dedicated	to	overseeing	the	development	of	PLANYC.	Established	by	Local	Law	17	of	2008,	the	Mayor’s	Office	of	Long-Term	Planning	and	Sustainability	(OLTPS)	works	with	all	other	city	agencies	to		“develop	and	coordinate	the	implementation	of	policies,	programs	and	actions	to	meet	the	long-term	needs	of	the	city,	with	respect	to	its	infrastructure,	environment	and	overall	sustainability	citywide,	including	but	not	limited	to	the	categories	of	housing,	open	space,	brownfields,	transportation,	water	quality	and	infrastructure,	air	quality,	energy,	and	climate	change”	and	track	the	progress	of	PLANYC.114		 	 		 Secondly,	NYC	depended	heavily	on	legislative	action	to	implement	PLANYC.	More	than	a	hundred	new	laws	have	been	introduced	and	many	more	amended	to																																																									112	P.	Timon	McPhearson	et	al,	‘Assessing	the	Effects	of	the	Urban	Forest	Restoration	Effort	of	MillionTreesNYC	on	the	Structure	and	Functioning	of	New	York	City	Ecosystems’	(2010)	3	Cities	and	the	Environment	1,	pg.	2.		113	On	the	same	point,	see	discussion	in	Edoardo	Croci,	Sabrina		Melandri	and	Tania	Molteni,	A	
Comparative	Analysis	of	Global	City	Policies	in	Climate	Change	Mitigation:	London,	New	York,	Milan,	
Mexico	City	and	Bangkok	(Working	Paper	No.	32)	(The	Center	for	Research	on	Energy	and	Environmental	Economics	and	Policy	at	Bocconi	University,	2010),	pg.	29.	For	an	example	of	a	city	facing	such	difficulties,	see	discussion	on	Mexico	City	in	this	chapter.	For	discussion	of	the	silo	effect	hindering	climate	action	at	the	state	or	provincial	level,	see,	for	example,	Jolene	Lin,	'Climate	
Governance	in	China:	Using	the	“Iron	Hand”’	in	Local	Climate	Change	Law:	Environmental	Regulation	in	Cities	and	other	Localities,	Benjamin	J.	Richardson	(ed.),	Edward	Elgar,	2012.	114	The	New	York	City	Council,	Local	Law	17	of	2008:	Creation	and	implementation	of	a	comprehensive	environmental	sustainability	action	plan	for	NYC,	section	2.		
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update	NYC’s	historic	zoning	regulations	and	address	relatively	novel	issues	such	as	electric	car	charging	stations.115		In	relation	to	adaptation,	the	land	use	planning	process	and	regulations	in	the	Zoning	Resolution	(which	is	the	city’s	zoning	policy	document)	have	been	recognized	as	powerful	tools	to	implement	adaptation	measures.		For	example,	two	amendments	to	the	Zoning	Resolution	impose	minimum	requirements	for	landscaping	and	planting	in	yards	and	increase	requirements	for	planting	street	trees.116	The	amendments	aim	to	increase	the	city’s	vegetated	and	pervious	surfaces	to	assist	in	storm	water	management.	On	the	mitigation	front,	an	example	would	be	the	Greener,	Greater	Buildings	Plan	(GGBP)	legislative	package	enacted	in	December	2009	to	reduce	energy	consumption	and	increase	energy	efficiency.117		The	GGBP	package	consists	of	Local	Law	85	(NYC	Energy	Conservation	Code),	Local	Law	84	(Energy	and	Water	Benchmarking),	Local	Law	87	(Energy	Audits	and	Retro-commissioning)	and	Local	Law	88	(Lighting	Upgrades	and	Sub-metering).118	 	 	 	 	 		 Thirdly,	it	is	clear	that	vast	amount	of	resources	are	being	devoted	to	the	implementation	of	PLANYC,	a	luxury	that	many	other	cities	simply	cannot	afford.	In	April	each	year,	a	PLANYC	progress	report	is	published	and	made	available	to	the	public.	Each	progress	report	typically	runs	into	more	than	a	hundred	pages	and	includes	a	highly	detailed	checklist	and	status	update	on	the	various	initiatives.	The	2014	PLANYC	progress	report,	for	example,	provides	an	update	on	more	than	four	hundred	specific	milestones	that	include	launching	a	consumer	education	campaign	on	flood	insurance,	working	with	pipeline	operators	to	expand	the	city’s	natural	gas	supply,	supporting	the	Health	and	Hospital’s	Corporation	effort	to	protect	public	hospital	emergency	departments	from	flooding,	fortifying	all	marinas	and	piers,	and	implementing	economic	revitalization	programs	for	areas	devastated	by	Hurricane	Sandy.119	In	addition,	Local	Law	17	of	2008	requires	the	OLTPS	to	issue	an	update	to	PLANYC	every	four	years.	The	plan	was	updated	in	2011	to	include	five	more	initiatives.120	After	Hurricane	Sandy,	more	federal	funding	was	made	available	to																																																									115	NYC	enacted	the	first	comprehensive	zoning	resolution	in	the	country	in	1916.	It	is	therefore	regarded	as	a	pioneer	in	this	field	of	zoning	policy,	which	“determines	the	types	of	uses	permitted	in	different	districts	and	the	relationships	among	those	districts”;	Edna		Sussman	et	al,	‘Climate	Change	Adaptation:	Fostering	Progress	through	Law	and	Regulation’	(2010)	18	New	York	University	Environmental	Law	Journal	55,	pg.	64.		116	Ibid,	pg.	66.		117	PLANYC,	“Greener,	Greater	Buildings	Plan”,	online:	http://www.nyc.gov/html/gbee/html/plan/plan.shtml	(accessed	on	11	November	2016).	118	“Local	laws	that	conflict	with	state	statutes	are	expressly	not	authorized	under	the	home	rule	powers	of	local	government.	Further,	local	laws	that	are	authorized	under	the	home	rule	powers	may	nevertheless	be	preempted	if	the	state	legislature	chooses	to	occupy	that	particular	field	of	regulation”;	Sussman	et	al,	pg.	132.	Thus,	the	extent	to	which	NYC	can	use	local	laws	to	implement	PLANYC	is	subject	to	limitations	imposed	by	federal	and	state	law.		
119	The	City	of	New	York,	Progress	Report	2014:	A	Greener,	Greater	New	York/	A	Stronger,	More	
Resilient	New	York	(2014),	online:	http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/downloads/pdf/140422_PlaNYCP-Report_FINAL_Web.pdf	(accessed	on	13	November	2016).	120	Ibid.,	pg.	5.		
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NYC	to	repair	and	restore	the	affected	areas	and,	in	the	process,	implement	climate	resilience	measures	and	improve	the	energy	efficiency	of	new	buildings.121		
4.2	One	New	York:	The	Plan	for	a	Strong	and	Just	City		
	 Since	Mayor	Bill	de	Blasio	took	office,	the	OLTPS	now	comprises	of	the	Mayor’s	Office	of	Recovery	and	Resiliency	(responsible	for	climate	resilience)	and	the	Office	of	Sustainability	(responsible	for	the	city’s	mitigation	efforts).	Following	Hurricane	Sandy,	the	Bloomberg	administration	had	drawn	up	a	detailed	recovery	plan	known	as	A	Stronger,	More	Resilient	New	York.	This	plan	outlined	a	US$3.7	billion	initial	phase	of	thirty-seven	coastal	protection	initiatives	designed	to	protect	vulnerable	neighbourhoods	and	infrastructure	from	storm	surge	and	sea	level	rise	by	increasing	coastal	edge	elevations	and	improving	coastal	management.122	Under	Mayor	de	Blasio’s	leadership,	PLANYC	and	A	Stronger,	More	Resilient	New	York	have	been	incorporated	into	the	flagship	strategy	of	his	new	administration,	One	New	
York:	The	Plan	for	a	Strong	and	Just	City.		 	 	 	 	 	 		 As	mentioned	earlier,	Mayor	de	Blasio’s	mayoral	campaign	focused	on	tackling	inequality	in	NYC.	In	One	New	York:	The	Plan	for	a	Strong	and	Just	City,	Mayor	de	Blasio	states	that	this	blueprint	for	the	city’s	development	will	“embrace	equity	as	central	to	that	work.”123	One	New	York	is	built	on	four	pillars:	job	growth/economic	development,	reducing	social	inequality,	reducing	the	city’s	environmental	and	carbon	footprint,	and	improving	the	city’s	resilience	to	the	impacts	of	climate	change.124	NYC	has	set	itself	the	goal	of	reducing	its	GHG	emissions	by	80%	(from	a	2005	baseline)	by	2050.125	The	OneNYC	2016	Progress	
Report	shows	that	the	city	has	been	making	good	strides	towards	achieving	the	targets	and	implementing	the	numerous	initiatives	outlined	in	One	New	York.126	 There	are	concerns	that	the	current	mayoralty	is	trying	to	do	too	much	and	therefore	losing	the	discipline	to	act	concertedly	on	climate	change.127	However,	at																																																									121	Interview	No.	9;	For	information	about	the	federal	funds	NYC	received	to	repair	and	restore	areas	affected	by	Hurricane	Sandy,	see	“NYC	Recovery:	Community	Development	Block	Grant	Disaster	Recovery”,	online:	http://www.nyc.gov/html/cdbg/html/home/home.shtml	(accessed	on	13	June	2016).	122	The	City	of	New	York,	pg.	58.		123	One	New	York:	The	Plan	for	a	Strong	and	Just	City,	online:	http://www.nyc.gov/html/onenyc/downloads/pdf/publications/OneNYC.pdf,	pg.	3	(accessed	on	13	June	2016).	124	Ibid,	pgs.	5-7.		125	On	19	September	2014,	just	days	ahead	of	the	UN	Climate	Summit	held	in	NYC	on	23	September	2014,	the	NYC	Council	announced	a	comprehensive	package	of	legislation	and	policies	which,	inter	alia,	set	a	new,	more	ambitious	target	of	reducing	the	city’s	GHG	emissions	by	80%	(from	a	2005	baseline)	by	2050	and	commits	to	passing	new	legislation	to	require	the	city	to	build	“zero	carbon”	buildings;	New	York	City	Council,	Comprehensive	Platform	to	Combat	Climate	Change.	The	GHG	emissions	reduction	goal	has	been	incorporated	into	One	New	York:	The	Plan	for	a	Strong	and	Just	
City.	126	OneNYC	2016	Progress	Report,	online:	http://www1.nyc.gov/html/onenyc/downloads/pdf/publications/OneNYC-2016-Progress-Report.pdf	(accessed	on	13	June	2016).	127	Interview	No.	9.		
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the	same	time,	it	is	recognized	that	NYC	is	markedly	ahead	of	many	other	cities	as	a	climate	frontrunner	because	of	the	early	and	ambitious	start	that	the	Bloomberg	administration	had	given	the	city.128	Furthermore,	the	Mayor’s	Office	of	Recovery	and	Resiliency	and	Office	of	Sustainability	presently	constitute	a	full-time	staff	of	around	fifty	people.129	This	represents	a	significant	amount	of	human	resources	devoted	to	addressing	climate	change,	which	puts	NYC	in	the	enviable	position	of	being	able	to	continue	developing	and	implementing	ambitious	and	innovative	urban	climate	governance	solutions.	Finally,	during	de	Blasio’s	mayoralty,	NYC	continues	to	actively	participate	in	C40	and	100	Resilient	Cities	(a	network	pioneered	and	financially	supported	by	the	Rockefeller	Foundation).130	Employees	of	the	Mayor’s	Office	regularly	participate	in	C40	workshops	to	share	NYC’s	experiences	and	best	practices.131	NYC’s	interactions	with	other	global	cities	on	issues	of	climate	change	take	place	primarily	through	these	two	networks	and	such	engagement	is	viewed	as	an	important	component	of	NYC’s	contribution	towards	global	climate	governance	efforts.132		
5.	Rotterdam,	the	Netherlands	For	a	city	with	a	population	size	of	about	620,000,	Rotterdam	has	high	emissions.133	In	2014,	the	city	emitted	30,414	kilo-tonnes	of	carbon	dioxide134,	making	it	one	of	the	highest	carbon	dioxide	emitting	cities	in	Europe.135	Within	the	national	context,	the	Rijnmond	economy	(Rijnmond	is	the	conurbation	surrounding	Rotterdam)	is	responsible	for	8.5%	of	the	Netherland’s	Gross	Domestic	Product	(GDP)	while	also	generating	about	18%	of	the	country’s	total	carbon	dioxide	emissions.136	A	significant	portion	of	Rotterdam’s	emissions	are	port-related	–	which	is	not	surprising	given	that	Rotterdam’s	port	is	the	largest	in	Europe,	with	a	total	cargo	throughput	of	430	million	tons	in	2010.137	Using	vessel	movements	to	estimate	shipping-related	emissions	in	ports,	it	has	been	shown	that	shipping-related	emissions	in	Rotterdam	represent	10%	of	the	shipping	emissions	in	all																																																									128	Ibid.		129	Ibid.		130	Ibid.	131	Ibid.	132	Ibid.	133	City	of	Rotterdam,	Facts	and	Figures	2013,	online:	http://www.rotterdam.nl/Clusters/Stadsontwikkeling/Document%202014/Informatiepunt%20Arbeidsmarkt/ZigZag2013-Engels-DEF.pdf	(accessed	on	13	June	2016).	134	Rotterdam	Climate	Initiative,	CO2	Monitor	2014,	version	1.0	(10	June	2015),	pg.	1	(on	file	with	author).	135	Daniel	Hoornweg,	Lorraine	Sugar	and	Claudia	Lorena	Trejos	Gomez,	‘Cities	and	greenhouse	gas	emissions:	moving	forward’	(2011)	20	Environment	and	Urbanization	1,	pg.	6.		136	City	of	Rotterdam,	Investing	in	Sustainable	Growth:	Rotterdam	Programme	on	Sustainability	and	
Climate	Change	2010-2014	(City	of	Rotterdam),	pg.	25.	137	Olaf	Merk	and	Theo	Notteboom,	The	Competitiveness	of	Global	Port-Cities:	The	case	of	
Rotterdam/Amsterdam	-	the	Netherlands	(OECD	Regional	Development	Working	Papers	2013/06,	2013),	pg.	21.	Rotterdam	is	also	the	largest	port	for	Switzerland,	the	second	largest	in	Austria,	and	is	an	important	port	for	central	European	countries,	such	as	Slovak	Republic,	Hungary	and	the	Czech	Republic;	ibid,	pg.	31.		
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European	ports.138	Efforts	to	manage	Rotterdam’s	port-related	GHG	emissions	can	therefore	have	a	significant	global	impact,	a	realization	not	lost	on	Rotterdam’s	city	government	who	spearheaded	the	World	Ports	Climate	Initiative.		 	 		 The	following	section	will	first	describe	the	city	of	Rotterdam’s	climate	mitigation	initiatives,	followed	by	an	account	of	the	port	of	Rotterdam’s	climate	mitigation	efforts.	With	regard	to	port-related	efforts	to	address	climate	change,	particular	emphasis	will	be	placed	on	Rotterdam’s	founding	role	in	the	World	Ports	Climate	Initiative,	a	voluntary	effort	undertaken	by	55	of	the	world’s	largest	ports	to	individually	and	jointly	work	together	to	reduce	the	climate	impacts	of	port	operations	and	the	global	shipping	industry.	The	focus	then	shifts	to	Rotterdam’s	innovative	and	ambitious	adaptation	efforts	that	have	earned	it	the	reputation	as	a	leading,	if	not	the	leading,	“climate-proof”	delta	city.		 	 	 		 A	common	thread	that	runs	through	all	of	Rotterdam’s	climate	initiatives	is	the	significant	role	that	C40	participation	played	in	motivating	Rotterdam	to	take	ambitious	climate	change	action	and,	furthermore,	to	take	a	leadership	role	on	the	global	stage	in	the	areas	of	port-related	mitigation	and	building	resilience	in	delta	cities.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	in	2013,	Rotterdam	was	selected	to	participate	in	the	100	Resilient	Cities	program,	pioneered	by	the	Rockefeller	Foundation	to	empower	cities	to	develop	resilience.139	Resilience	is	understood	as	“[t]he	capacity	of	individuals,	communities,	institutions,	businesses,	and	systems	within	a	city	to	survive,	adapt,	and	grow	no	matter	what	kinds	of	chronic	stresses	and	acute	shocks	they	experience.”140	Becoming	a	member	of	this	program	marked	a	turning	point	in	Rotterdam’s	climate	change	strategy.	In	the	process	of	developing	its	resilience	strategy,	the	city	government	began	to	approach	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation	as	part	of	a	broader	attempt	to	build	the	city’s	resilience.141	As	set	out	in	its	resilience	strategy,	Rotterdam’s	vision	is	that	in	2030,	the	city	will	be	one	where	“the	energy	infrastructure	provides	for	an	efficient	and	sustainable	energy	supply”	and	“climate	adaptation	has	penetrated	into	mainstream	city	operations.”142	Thinking	in	terms	of	resilience	has	helped	the	city	create	synergistic	links	between	climate	change,	social	inclusion,	health,	and	a	host	of	other	dimensions	that	make	up	the	fabric	of	a	city’s	life.143		
5.1	Urban	climate	mitigation		Compared	to	other	Dutch	cities	like	Amsterdam,	Rotterdam	had	a	late	start	in	addressing	climate	change.144	In	2002,	the	Klimaatcovenant,	a	national	multi-level																																																									138	Ibid.	pg.	61.		139	100	Resilient	Cities,	‘First	Resilient	Cities	Announced	by	Rockefeller	Foundation’,online:		http://www.100resilientcities.org/blog/entry/33-resilient-cities-announced#/-_/(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	140	Gemeente	Rotterdam,	Rotterdam	Climate	Initiative,	and	100	Resilient	Cities,	‘Rotterdam	Resilience	Strategy’,	pg.	18.		141	Interview	Number	11.		142	Rotterdam	Resilience	Strategy,	pg.	24.		143	See	Part	3.2.1	of	Chapter	6	for	more	discussion	about	Rotterdam’s	resilience	strategy.	144	Joyeeta	Gupta,	Ralph	Lasage	and	Tjeerd	Stam,	‘National	Efforts	to	enhance	local	climate	polict	in	the	Netherlands’	(2007)	4	Environmental	Sciences	171,	pg.	174.		
	 90	
arrangement	involving	local	government,	provinces	and	several	ministries	was	launched.145	The	Klimaatcovenant	provides	local	authorities	additional	funding	targeted	directly	at	climate	change	mitigation;	these	subsidies	were	instrumental	in	steering	Rotterdam	towards	developing	a	climate	policy	and	building	capacity	to	implement	specific	measures.	With	national	funding,	Rotterdam	has	implemented	some	20	projects;	these	projects	range	from	awareness	raising	amongst	city	officials	on	the	impacts	of	their	commuting	habits	to	the	use	of	residual	industrial	heat	in	housing	projects.146		 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 Tackling	climate	change	rose	on	Rotterdam’s	political	agenda	after	representatives	of	C40	and	the	Clinton	Climate	Initiative	(CCI)	made	a	compelling	case	during	an	official	visit	to	the	city	in	the	mid-2000s.147	They	convinced	the	city’s	mayor	at	that	time,	Ivo	Opstelten,	that	Rotterdam	had	to	prioritize	climate	adaptation	and	that	the	city	could	make	an	important	contribution	towards	climate	mitigation	by	focusing	on	its	port’s	carbon	footprint.148	In	the	process,	Rotterdam	was	well	placed	to	share	its	experience	and	knowledge	with	other	global	port	cities.	C40	invited	Rotterdam	to	join	the	network,	and	this	gave	the	additional	impetus	that	motivated	Opstelten’s	government	to	act	on	climate	change.149	Soon	after,	the	Rotterdam	Climate	Initiative	(RCI)	was	launched	in	2006.150	RCI	brings	together	the	Port	of	Rotterdam	Authority,	the	regional	environmental	protection	agency	(DCMR	Rijnmond),	the	city	government,	and	Deltalinqs	(an	organization	that	represents	the	business	and	industry	sector	of	Rotterdam)	to	develop	and	implement	Rotterdam’s	climate	change	strategy.151	Mayor	Opstelten	committed	the	city	to	a	target	of	50%	reduction	of	carbon	dioxide	emissions	in	2025	compared	to	1990.152	The	Rotterdam	Climate	Office,	an	agency	tasked	with	implementing	the	RCI,	was	the	first	of	its	kind	in	the	Netherlands.153		
5.2	Reducing	the	carbon	footprint	of	Europe’s	largest	port		
																																																								145	OECD,	‘Competitive	Cities	and	Climate	Change	’	(Competitive	Cities	and	Climate	Change	,	Milan,	Italy,	9-10	October	2008),	pg.	142.	Under	the	Klimaatcovenant	framework,	subsidies	amounting	to	some	36	million	euros	were	made	available	for	the	initial	five	years.	This	provided	for	several	hundred	local	climate	assessments	and	more	than	250	municipal	implementation	plans.	The	second	phase	of	the	scheme	was	launched	in	2008,	and	included	another	35	million	euros	of	subsidies	up	to	2011;	‘Competitive	Cities	and	Climate	Change	’,	pg.	147.		146	Interview	Number	11;	Gupta,	Lasage	and	Stam,	pg.	175.	Most	of	these	climate	initiatives	also	aim	to	improve	Rotterdam’s	air	quality,	which	is	much	poorer	compared	to	the	rest	of	the	Netherlands	due	to	emissions	from	industries	in	the	port	area	and	from	port-related	transport,	high	population	density,	and	limited	amount	of	green	spaces.	Population	exposure	to	particulate	matter	(PM2.5)	in	Rotterdam	is	50%	higher	than	in	the	average	OECD	port	region;	see	Merk	and	Notteboom,	pg.	11.		147	Interview	Number	11.		148	Ibid.	149	Ibid;	Gupta,	Lasage	and	Stam,	pg.	176.		150	Rotterdam	Climate	Initiative,	online:	http://www.rotterdamclimateinitiative.nl	(accessed	on	28	September	2014).	151	Ibid.		152	Rotterdam	Climate	Initiative,	online:	http://www.rotterdamclimateinitiative.nl/en/50procent-reduction	(accessed	on	28	September	2014).		153	Mees	and	Driessen,	pg.	272.		
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Industry	and	energy-generating	facilities	in	the	port	area	are	responsible	for	nearly	90%	of	Rotterdam’s	carbon	dioxide	emissions.154	Rotterdam	will	not	be	able	to	meet	its	“50%	by	2025”	target	without	significant	efforts	to	reduce	port-related	emissions.	In	this	respect,	since	late	2000s,	the	port	of	Rotterdam	has	invested	significantly	in	developing	its	capabilities	in	energy	efficiency,	production	of	renewable	energy	and	carbon	capture	and	storage	(CCS),	thereby	earning	itself	an	international	reputation	as	a	model	“green	port”.155	The	port’s	key	energy	efficiency	initiative	lies	in	the	development	of	GHG-neutral	networks,	in	particular,	a	system	that	transmits	heat	amongst	the	firms	operating	in	the	port	area	via	a	pipeline.	In	the	area	of	renewable	energy,	in	2009,	the	port	signed	an	agreement	for	the	extension	of	windmill	parks	that	will	double	the	production	of	wind	energy	from	151	MW	to	300MW	between	2009	and	2020.156	Further,	since	2007,	there	have	been	ongoing	experiments	to	use	on-shore	electricity	for	inland	barges.	Rotterdam’s	port	is	also	working	with	a	consortium	of	private	firms	to	develop	technologies	and	knowledge	that	would	allow	for	the	capture	and	storage	of	carbon	dioxide	under	the	North	Sea.157	The	Rotterdam	Capture	and	Storage	Demonstration	Project	(ROAD)	is	one	of	the	largest	CCS	demonstration	projects	in	the	world.158		 	 	 		 While	Rotterdam	was	(and	remains)	keen	to	address	the	climate	impact	of	port	and	shipping	activities,	it	also	had	to	keep	another	important	consideration	in	mind	–	that	is,	any	measures	to	improve	the	port’s	environmental	performance	should	not	hinder	its	competitiveness.	As	Fenton	points	out,	“[t]his	meant	cooperation	with	other	ports	and	stakeholders	would	be	essential,	as	individual	actions	by	a	lone	first-mover	potentially	risked	generating	negative	socio-economic	impacts,	whilst	moving	environmental	problems	elsewhere.	Other	ports	faced	similar	challenges,	making	collective	action	essential	and	win-win	solutions	desirable...”159	Consequently,	Rotterdam	approached	C40	and	CCI	to	request	support	in	developing	a	programme	for	world	ports	to	address	climate	change	as	well	as	build	political	support	in	large	port	cities	for	such	climate	initiatives.160	This	marked	the	beginning	of	a	partnership	between	Rotterdam	and	C40	to	develop	a	World	Ports	Climate	Conference	and	Declaration,	which	has	since	continued	fulfilling	its	agenda	as	the	World	Ports	Climate	Initiative.161	The	conference	took	place	in	Rotterdam	on	9-11	July	2008;	representatives	from	many	of	the	world’s	largest	ports,	shipping	companies,	terminal	operators,	fuel	suppliers,	environmental	NGOS																																																									154	Rotterdam	Climate	Initiative,	CO2	Monitor	2014,	version	1.0	(10	June	2015),	pg.	1.	155	Ibid.,	pg	71.		156	Ibid.,	pg	71.		157		Rotterdam,	pg.	27.		158	Ibid;	Rotterdam	Capture	and	Storage	Demonstration	Project,	online:	http://road2020.nl/en/	(accessed	on	1	October	2015).			159	Paul	Fenton,	‘The	role	of	port	cities	and	networks:	reflections	on	the	World	Ports	Climate	Initiative’	(Shipping	in	a	Changing	Climate	–	Liverpool	18-19	June	2014),	pg.	7.		160	Ibid.		161	The	Initiative	continues	under	the	auspices	of	the	International	Association	of	Ports	and	Harbours,	which,	inter	alia,	organizes	biannual	conferences,	maintains	a	dedicated	website,	disseminates	information,	develops	projects	such	as	the	Environmental	Shipping	Index	(ESI);	World	Ports	Climate	Initiative	website,	online:	http://wpci.iaphworldports.org	(accessed	on	1	October	2014).			
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participated.	The	conference	culminated	in	the	adoption	of	the	World	Ports	Climate	Declaration,	whereby	ports	pledged	to	use	the	Declaration	to	“guide	action	to	combat	global	climate	change	and	improve	air	quality”.162		
5.3	A	Leader	in	Climate	Adaptation					 Nearly	half	of	the	Netherlands	lies	below	sea	level,	rendering	the	country	highly	vulnerable	to	sea	level	rises	and	other	impacts	of	climate	change.	Adaptation	is	therefore	a	pertinent	reality,	particularly	for	delta	cities	like	Rotterdam.	In	the	spirit	of	innovation	and	turning	risks	into	opportunities,	Rotterdam	has	developed	and	implemented	numerous	adaptation	measures	that	have	earned	the	city	both	national	and	global	recognition	as	a	leader	in	climate	adaptation.163			 Rotterdam	is	one	of	only	three	cities	in	the	Netherlands	to	have	a	clear	adaptation	goal,	which	is	to	be	“100%	climate	proof	in	2025”.164	The	Rotterdam	
Climate	Change	Adaptation	Strategy	explains	that	the	term	“climate	proof”	has	a	two-pronged	meaning:	(1)	that	by	2025,	the	city	would	already	have	taken	measures	“to	ensure	that	every	specific	region	is	minimally	disrupted	by,	and	maximally	benefits	from,	climate	change”	and	(2)	that	the	city	authorities	will	“structurally	[take]	into	account	the	long-term	foreseeable	climate	change	in	all	spatial	development	of	Rotterdam”.165	In	terms	of	the	institutional	framework,	the	“Rotterdam	Climate	Proof”	programme	is	part	of	the	Rotterdam	Climate	Initiative	and	was	established	with	a	budget	of	31	million	euros	for	the	first	four	years	(2008-2012).166	That	there	are	six	“Rotterdam	Climate	Proof”	staff	dedicated	to	adaptation	planning	is	rather	unusual	and	symbolizes	the	political	importance	attached	to	the	climate	programme.167		The	basis	of	Rotterdam’s	adaptation	strategy	is	to	build	upon	its	current	system	for	the	supply	of	urban	water	and	flood	protection,	which	consists	of	storm	surge	barriers	and	dikes,	canals	and	lakes,	sewers	and	pumping	stations.	However,	the	innovation	of	Rotterdam’s	approach	lies	in	the	city’s	attempt	to	integrate	adaptation	projects	into	the	urban	landscape	and	improve	quality	of	life	for	the	city’s	residents.	“Water	squares”,	such	as	the	Bellamyplein	water	square,	serve	as																																																									162	World	Ports	Climate	Declaration,	online:	http://wpci.iaphworldports.org/data/docs/about-us/Declaration.pdf	(accessed	on	1	October	2016).		163	In	the	first	systematic	survey	of	the	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation	activities	of	the	25	largest	municipalities	in	the	Netherlands	(population	over	100,000),	den	Exter	et	al	identify	Rotterdam	as	one	of	four	best-performing	cities	(alongside	Amsterdam,	Tilburg	and	The	Hague).	Furthermore,	Rotterdam	is	the	only	city	recognized	for	its	innovative	and	effective	adaptation	activities	(e.g.,	flood	management,	storm	water	storage	and	adaptive	building	practices);	Renske	den	Exter,	Jennifer	Lenhart	and	Kristine		Kern,	‘Governing	climate	change	in	Dutch	cities:	anchoring	local	climate	strategies	in	organisation,	policy	and	practical	implementation	’	(2014)	Local	Environment:	The	International	Journal	of	Justice	and	Sustainability,	pg.	6.		164	City	of	Rotterdam,	Rotterdam	Climate	Change	Adaptation	Strategy	(2013).	The	other	two	cities	are	The	Hague	and	Tilburg;	see	Renske	den	Exter,	Jennifer	Lenhart	and	Kristine		Kern,	pg.	7.		165	City	of	Rotterdam,	ibid.,	pg.	22.		166	Rotterdam	Climate	Proof	(2009	Adaptation	Programme)	,online:	http://www.rotterdamclimateinitiative.nl/documents/RCP/English/RCP_adaptatie_eng.pdf	(accessed	on	3	October	2016).		167	Mees	and	Driessen,	pg.	275.		
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both	water	storage	facilities	as	well	as	attractive	public	spaces	for	residents	to	spend	leisure	time.	In	the	Eendragtspolder	district,	extra	water	storage	has	been	intelligently	combined	with	a	rowing	course	and	other	sport	facilities.168	The	city	has	also	increased	the	amount	of	natural	vegetation	and	flora	to	combat	the	urban	heat	effect,	a	‘no	regrets	measure’	which	has	also	improved	air	quality	and	made	Rotterdam	a	more	attractive	place	to	live	and	work	in.	169	Rotterdam’s	approach	of	leveraging	more	‘green	solutions’	to	protect	residential	areas	rather	than	implement	high-technology	and	costly	solutions	has	had	strong	appeal	to	other	delta	cities	which	are	keen	to	learn	from	Rotterdam’s	experience.170		 		 Finally,	Rotterdam	is	also	the	founder	of	“Connecting	Delta	Cities”	(CDC),	a	network	within	C40’s	Water	and	Adaptation	Initiative	that	enables	delta	cities	to	share	knowledge	and	best	practices	in	developing	their	adaptation	strategies.171	Amongst	the	global	cities	that	are	vulnerable	to	rising	sea	levels	and	are	CDC	members	are	Jakarta,	New	Orleans,	London,	Melbourne,	Copenhagen	and	Tokyo.	CDC	links	cities	at	the	policy	level	through	bilateral	MOUs	and	Letters	of	Intent	between	the	CDC	cities.	To	facilitate	the	flow	of	information	between	the	CDC	cities,	a	small	secretariat	has	been	installed	in	Rotterdam.		
6.	Seoul,	South	Korea	The	largest	city	and	capital	of	South	Korea,	Seoul	is	home	to	25%	of	the	country’s	population.172	The	city’s	10.4	million	residents	live	within	605	square	kilometres,	making	Seoul	one	of	the	most	densely	populated	cities	in	the	world.173	It	is	also	a	wealthy	city	that	has	prospered	greatly	since	the	1960s	after	the	Korean	War	ended	and	the	country	began	a	process	of	reconstruction.	In	this	regard,	it	should	be	noted	that	in	the	1960s,	“[South	Korea]	was	poorer	than	Bolivia	and	Mozambique;	today,	it	is	richer	than	New	Zealand	and	Spain,	with	a	per	capita	income	of	almost	[US]$23,000”.174	As	such,	amongst	Asian	cities,	Seoul	is	in	the	unique	and	enviable	position	of	having	the	financial	resources	(as	well	as	political	leadership	and	impressive	record	of	technological	innovation)	to	undertake	ambitious	climate	change	action.	To	indicate	the	extent	of	Seoul’s	resources,	the	city’s	administrative	body,	the	Seoul	Metropolitan	Government,	had	an	operating	budget	of	US$18.4	billion	in	2010.175		 	 	 	 	 	 																																																									168	City	of	Rotterdam,	pg.	28.		169	Ibid.,	pg.	29.	Also	see,	‘Can	Rotterdam	become	the	world's	most	sustainable	port	city?’	CNN	(26	August	2013).		170	Connecting	Delta	Cities	newsletter,	“International	delta	conference	in	Rotterdam”,	online:	http://www.deltacities.com/newsletter/international-delta-conference-in-rotterdam?news_id=66	(accessed	on	1	October	2016).		171	Connecting	Delta	Cities,	online:	http://www.deltacities.com/about-c40-and-cdc	(accessed	on	1	October	2016).		172	Seoul	Metropolitan	Government,	“Ranking”,	online:		http://english.seoul.go.kr/gtk/gcs/ranking.php	(accessed	on	20	October	2016).		173	Ibid.		174	Marcus	Noland,	‘Six	Markets	to	Watch:	South	Korea’	[2014]	Foreign	Affairs		175	Seoul	Metropolitan	Government,	“Ranking”,	online:		http://english.seoul.go.kr/gtk/gcs/ranking.php	(accessed	on	20	October	2016).		
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	 However,	like	many	cities	that	have	enjoyed	rapid	economic	growth,	Seoul	has	serious	environmental	problems	such	as	severe	air	pollution.176	Seoul	is	also	highly	vulnerable	to	the	impacts	of	climate	change,	particularly	rising	temperatures	and	the	urban	heat	island	effect,	increased	risks	of	flash	floods	and	rain	storms.177	Research	has	shown	that	Seoul	has	registered	a	1.5	degree	Celsius	temperature	increase	in	a	period	of	just	thirty	years,	two	and	a	half	times	more	than	the	temperature	increase	of	the	surrounding	rural	areas.178	The	daily	mortality	rates	for	Seoul	as	a	result	of	increased	heat	ranges	from	2.7	to	16.3	percent.179	Since	the	mid-2000s,	Seoul	has	attracted	global	attention	for	its	“low-carbon	green	growth”	policies	and	programs	as	the	city	commits	itself	to	reducing	its	significant	GHG	emissions	and	adapting	to	climate	change.	In	2009,	Seoul	hosted	the	third	Summit	of	the	C40	Large	Cities	Climate	Leadership	Group,	an	event	that	“…gave	visibility	to	Seoul’s	and	Korea’s	climate	change	initiatives	while	at	the	same	time	applying	pressure	on	the	city	and	the	nation	to	perform”.180	While	Seoul’s	commitment	to	addressing	climate	change	is	very	much	influenced	by	national	policies	and	laws,	its	involvement	in	transnational	climate	change	networks	has	provided	valuable	access	to	information	about	how	other	cities	were	performing	and	to	learn	from	their	experiences.	In	the	words	of	Deputy	Mayor	of	Seoul	Kim	Sang	Bum	during	an	interview	at	the	C40	Mayors	Summit	in	Johannesburg	(4-6	February	2014),	“[w]hen	Seoul	hosted	the	C40	Mayors	Summit	in	2009,	we	had	little	to	no	experience	with	how	to	improve	energy	efficiency	in	buildings”	and	sharing	knowledge	with	other	C40	cities	gave	Seoul	the	confidence	to	improve	its	energy	efficiency.181	 		 The	following	discussion	proceeds	by	first	briefly	setting	out	the	national	context	for	Seoul’s	climate	change	initiatives	because	Seoul	has	been	the	de	facto	national	laboratory	for	the	country’s	climate	change	policies	and	programmes.	Korea’s	climate	change	strategy	places	a	heavy	emphasis	on	technological																																																									176	In	addition	to	high	volumes	of	traffic	emissions	that	is	a	common	cause	of	poor	air	quality	in	highly	congested	cities,	Seoul	is	badly	affected	by	the	dust	clouds	from	Mongolia	and	China	which	arrive	annually	and	engulf	the	city	in	fine	yellow	dust;	see,	for	example,	Alex	Kirby,	“Asia’s	dust	storm	misery	mounts”,	BBC	News,	31	March	2004,	online:	http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/3585223.stm	(accessed	on	20	October	2016).		177	H	Lee	and	JG	Oh,	‘Integrating	Climate	Change	Policy	with	a	Green	Growth	Strategy:	The	case	of	Korea	’	in	Bryce	Wakefield	(ed),	Green	Tigers:	The	Politics	and	Policy	of	Climate	Change	in	Northeast	
Asian	Democracies	(Woodrow	Wilson	International	Center	for	Scholars	(Asia	Program	Special	Report)	2010),	pg.	18.		178	Barry	Munslow	and	Tim	O'Dempsey,	‘Globalisation	and	climate	change	in	Asia:	the	urban	health	impact’	(2010)	31	Third	world	quarterly	1339,	pg.	1343.	179	Ibid.		180	Miranda	A.	Schreurs,	‘Multi-level	Governance	and	Global	Climate	Change	in	East	Asia’	5	Asian	Economic	Policy	Review	88,	pg.	100.	Acuto	argues	that	the	hosting	of	key	C40	events	by	Tokyo	(in	2008),	Seoul	(in	2009),	and	Hong	Kong	(in	2010)	is	an	indication	of	how	key	global	cities	in	Asia	progressively	gained	prominence	in	the	C40	network,	possibly	influencing	the	network’s	pace	and	agenda;	Acuto.	Michele,	‘The	new	climate	leaders?’	(2013)	39	Review	of	International	Studies	835,	pg.	853.		181	C40	Summit	Video	Blog	Series:	Kim	Sang	Bum,	Deputy	Mayor	of	Seoul	–	“sharing	knowledge	with	other	cities	is	one	of	the	benefits	of	C40”,	online:	http://www.c40.org/blog_posts/c40-summit-video-blog-series-kim-sang-bum-deputy-mayor-of-seoul-sharing-knowledge-with-other-cities-is-one-of-the-benefits-of-c40	(accessed	on	20	October	2016).		
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advancement,	fostering	research	and	development,	and	capital	investment	in	climate-proof	infrastructure.	A	significant	proportion	of	resources	has	inevitably	been	channeled	to	Seoul,	the	country’s	most	advanced	and	populous	city.	Thus,	an	understanding	of	the	national	climate	policy	would	shed	light	on	Seoul’s	approach.	At	the	same	time,	the	city’s	metropolitan	government	and	mayor	actively	participate	in	numerous	pan-Asian	and	transnational	city	climate	change	networks	which	exercise	a	strong	motivational	influence	on	Seoul’s	quest	to	reinvent	itself	as	a	“global	climate-friendly	city”	(a	term	borrowed	from	its	Low	Carbon	Green	Growth	
Master	Plan).	The	section	then	describes	Seoul’s	mitigation	and	adaptation	programmes,	some	of	which	have	garnered	international	awards	and	recognition.		
6.1	Korea’s	Low	Carbon	Green	Growth	Vision	As	a	non-Annex	I	party	to	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	Korea	did	not	face	any	international	legal	obligations	to	reduce	its	GHG	emissions.	However,	since	the	negotiations	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	the	Korean	economy	has	grown	and	the	country	now	has	a	higher	per	capita	GDP	than	approximately	half	of	the	Annex	I	parties.182	It	is	also	the	world’s	fifteenth-largest	source	of	emissions.183	In	the	negotiations	for	the	post-2012	climate	change	legal	regime,	it	was	assumed	that	Korea	will	be	regarded	as	a	developed	country	and	expected	to	undertake	binding	GHG	reduction	commitments	just	like	its	developed	country	counterparts.184	In	this	context,	under	the	Paris	Agreement,	Korea	has	pledged	to	reduce	its	GHG	emissions	by	37	percent	of	‘business	as	usual’	estimates	by	2030.185		Korea	embarked	on	a	national	‘green	growth’	strategy	as	a	response	to	climate	change	and	the	2008	global	financial	crisis.	In	August	2008,	President	Lee	Myung-bak	launched	the	Low	Carbon	Green	Growth	vision.	Initially	formulated	as	a	US$38.5	billion	‘Green	New	Deal’	to	lift	the	Korean	economy	out	of	recession,	the	Low	Carbon	Green	Growth	strategy	was	subsequently	reframed	as	the	nation’s	vision	to	guide	development	for	the	next	fifty	years.186	This	vision	has	since	been	implemented	via	the	National	Strategy	for	Green	Growth,	the	Five	Year	Green	Growth	Plan	(2009-2013)	and	an	array	of	institutional	programs	to	ensure	inter-ministerial	cooperation	and	effective	implementation	at	the	local	level.187	The	“green	growth”	strategy	also	aims	to	reduce	Korean	dependence	on	energy	imports,	which	account	for	86%	of	the	country’s	primacy	energy	supply,	and																																																									182	Central	Intelligence	Agency	(US),	“The	World	Factbook”,	online:	https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html	(accessed	on	20	October	2016).		183	RS	Jones	and	B	Yoo,	Achieving	the	“	low	carbon	,	green	growth	”	vision	in	Korea	(OECD	Economics	Department	Working	Papers	No	964,	2012),	pg.	8.		184	JH	Lee,	John	M	Leitner	and	Minjung		Chung,	‘The	Road	to	Doha	through	Seoul:	The	Diplomatic	and	Legal	Implications	of	the	Pre-COP	18	Ministerial	Meeting’	(2012)	12	Journal	of	Korean	Law	55,	pg.	66.		185	Submission	by	the	Republic	of	Korea,	“Intended	Nationally	Determined	Contribution”,	online:	http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Republic%20of%20Korea/1/INDC%20Submission%20by%20the%20Republic%20of%20Korea%20on%20June%2030.pdf	(accessed	on	2	November	2016).		186	Jones	and	Yoo,	pg.	6.		187	Ibid.,	pg.	5.		
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to	improve	quality	of	life	for	Koreans	by	reversing	some	of	the	worst	environmental	degradation.188	However,	the	emphasis	is	on	green	technologies	as	new	engines	of	growth	and	job	creation	for	an	economy	facing	rapid	population	ageing	and	slowing	growth.	As	Matthews	elaborates,			 “[w]hat	is	distinctive	about	Korea’s	approach	to	[green	growth]	is	that	it	is	an	industrial	strategy…framed	around	the	promotion	of	key	technologies	and	industries	that	are	viewed	as	providing	the	growth	engines	for	the	next	stage	of	Korea’s	development,	and	as	export	platforms	for	the	21st	century,	as	well	as	means	to	reduce	carbon	emissions.	Although	climate	objectives	are	mentioned	prominently,	it	is	fundamentally	an	industrial	upgrading	strategy…”189		Since	2008,	there	has	been	a	sharp	increase	in	investments	by	Korean	firms	in	“green	industries”.	According	to	a	government	survey,	investment	by	the	thirty	largest	businesses	was	three	times	higher	in	2010	than	in	2008.	This	amounted	to	US$13.7	billion	over	the	three-year	period	(1.5%	of	2009	GDP).	The	major	investment	areas	were	renewable	energy,	next-generation	electric	equipment,	and	green	cars.	Korea	is	now	the	world’s	second-largest	producer	of	lithium	rechargeable	batteries	and	LED	devices.	Economists	are	of	the	view	that	it	is	still	too	early	to	assess	the	impact	of	the	Green	Growth	Strategy	on	economic	growth.190	However,	for	current	purposes,	the	salient	point	is	that	Seoul	benefits	from	a	strong	national	political	and	business	consensus	on	the	value	of	‘green	growth’	and	tackling	climate	change,	rendering	it	easier	to	foster	private-public,	multi-stakeholder	partnerships	to	implement	its	climate	change	programs.		
6.2	“A	Global	Climate-Friendly	City	by	2030”	Seoul	was	the	first	city	in	Korea	to	establish	its	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation	strategy,	which	is	known	as	the	“Master	Plan	for	Low	Carbon	Green	Growth”.	The	key	features	of	Seoul’s	Low	Carbon	Green	Growth	Master	Plan	are:191	
• By	2030,	the	city	aims	to	reduce	GHG	emissions	by	40%	from	1990	levels,	reduce	energy	consumption	by	20%,	and	increase	renewable	energy	use	by	20%;																																																										188	Ibid.	The	Four	Major	Rivers	Restoration	Project,	hailed	as	a	major	climate	change	adaptation	project	to	mitigate	flood	risks	and	to	restore	water	quality,	has	been	controversial	because	of	its	ambiguous	environmental	benefits:	see	James	Card,	“Korea’s	Four	Rivers	Project:	Economic	Boost	or	Boondoggle?”,	Yale	Environment	360,	21	September	2009,	online:	http://e360.yale.edu/feature/koreas_four_rivers_project_economic_boost_or_boondoggle/2188/	(accessed	on	22	October	2016).		189	John	A.	Mathews,	‘Green	growth	strategies-Korean	initiatives’	44	Futures	761,	pg.	762.		190	Kang,	Jin-gyu	and	Hongseok,	pg.	13.		191	The	information	below	is	reproduced	from	the	Master	Plan,	a	copy	of	which	can	be	found	online:	http://planning.cityenergy.org.za/Pdf_files/world_cities/asia/city_of_seoul/Seoul%20Climate%20Change%20Action%20Plan.pdf	(accessed	on	22	October	2016).	
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• By	2030,	all	new	buildings	will	be	required	by	law	to	attain	‘‘green’’	building	certification;		
• By	2030,	buildings	older	than	20	years	will	be	required	to	undergo	mandatory	energy	auditing;		
• By	2030,	all	public	transportation	will	rely	on	electric	and	other	“green”	vehicles;		
• By	2020,	the	aim	is	to	increase	bike	ridership	to	10%	and	public	transport	usage	to	70%;	
• By	2020,	all	street	lighting	and	indoor	lighting	in	public	buildings	will	use	LED;	
• Seoul	will	revise	its	urban	planning	laws	to	promote	the	addition	of	11	square	kilometres	green	space	to	the	city;		
• By	2030,	Seoul	aims	to	invest	US$2	billion	in	research	and	development	(R&D)	of	selected	green	technologies	and	support	eventual	commercialization.	These	technologies	are:	Next	generation	hydrogen	fuel	cell,	photovoltaic	cell,	“smart	grid”	technologies	(the	use	of	information	technologies	in	buildings	to	maximize	energy	efficiency),	LED	lighting,	electric	cars,	urban	environmental	restoration	systems,	waste-to-energy	technologies,	and	climate	change	adaptation	technologies.	In	addition,	the	metropolitan	government	will	establish	partnerships	and	platforms	for	business,	academia	and	other	stakeholders	to	facilitate	R&D.	These	partnerships	and	platforms	extend	from	the	city-level	to	transnational	research	consortiums	such	as	the	Global	CCS	Institute.192	The	Master	Plan	also	identifies	five	focal	areas	for	adaptation:	infectious	diseases	(certain	disease	infection	rates	will	increase	because	of	the	warmer	climate),	rising	urban	temperatures	and	heat	waves,	significant	fluctuations	in	water	supply	ranging	from	drought	to	flooding,	and	disruptions	to	ecosystems.		 	 	 		 	 Within	a	short	span	of	five	years	since	the	announcement	of	the	Master	Plan	in	2009,	an	impressive	number	of	high-profile	climate	projects	have	been	successfully	implemented.	Three	projects	that	have	received	international	attention	because	they	showcase	best	practices	and	feasibility	are	briefly	described	below.	These	examples	have	been	shared	at	international	conferences,	workshops,	publications	and	databases	such	as	Connected	Urban	Development,	C40	and	ICLEI	–	Local	Governments	for	Sustainability	of	which	Seoul	is	a	member.193		
Hydrogen	Fuel	Cells:	Seoul	has	been	increasing	its	capabilities	to	generate	more	power	from	hydrogen	fuel	cells.	The	city	aims	to	meet	10%	of	its	total	energy	needs																																																									192	The	Global	CCS	Institute’s	mission	is	to	accelerate	the	development,	demonstration	and	deployment	of	carbon	capture	and	storage.	It	is	headquartered	in	Melbourne,	Australia	where	it	was	established	in	200	with	initial	funding	from	the	Australian	government;	online:	http://www.globalccsinstitute.com	(accessed	on	22	October	2016).	193	Seoul	is	a	founding	city	of	Connected	Urban	Development	(CUD).	CUD	brings	cities,	business	partners	and	NGOs	together	in	a	global	platform	committed	to	the	use	of	information	and	communications	technology	in	urban	infrastructure	to	reduce	carbon	emissions	(online:	http://www.connectedurbandevelopment.org).		
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from	hydrogen	fuel	cells	by	2030	–	enough	power	to	supply	some	400,000	households.	By	2014,	Seoul	has	opened	29	fuel	cell	power	stations.	It	is	supporting	the	deployment	of	fuel	cells	in	commercial	buildings	with	a	combination	of	subsidies,	technical	support	and	low-interest	loans.	This	project	qualified	as	a	finalist	in	the	green	energy	category	of	the	2013	City	Climate	Leadership	Awards,	which	confer	global	recognition	on	cities	that	are	demonstrating	leadership	in	addressing	climate	change.194				
Car-	Free	Days:	This	program	has	effectively	reduced	Seoul’s	annual	carbon	dioxide	emissions	by	ten	per	cent	–	about	2	million	tons	of	carbon	dioxide	every	year	–	by	keeping	2	million	cars	off	the	road.	Drivers	can	select	one	day	a	week	as	their	‘no	driving	day’	on	a	website	(www.no-driving.seoul.go.kr)	and	receive	an	electronic	tag.	Once	registered	in	this	program,	public-sector	participants	qualify	for	incentives	such	as	a	five	per	cent	discount	on	the	annual	vehicle	tax,	a	fifty	percent	discount	on	charges	levied	by	the	city’s	congestion	charging	scheme,	and	free	parking.	Private	participants	qualify	for	discounts	on	fuel,	car	maintenance	costs,	and	free	car	washes.	The	city	monitors	compliance	through	Radio	Frequency	Identification	that	detects	the	electronic	tags	on	participating	vehicles.195		
Star	City	Rainwater	Project:	Star	City	is	a	major	real	estate	development	project	with	more	than	1,300	apartment	units	in	Gwangjin-gu,	a	district	in	Seoul.	In	2007,	a	rainwater	harvesting	system	with	a	catchment	area	of	6,200	square	meters	of	rooftop	and	45,000	square	meters	of	terrace	was	installed.	The	system	collects	up	to	100	millimeters	of	rainwater,	which	is	used	for	gardening	and	public	toilets.	The	Star	City	rainwater	harvesting	system	has	proven	to	be	a	highly	effective	adaptation	response	to	the	risks	of	flooding,	and	in	the	long	run,	will	reduce	energy	consumption	for	water	treatment	and	conveyance.	The	success	of	Star	City	motivated	the	city’s	metropolitan	government	to	pass	a	regulation	in	2004	that	requires	all	new	public	buildings,	new	town	projects	and	large	private	buildings	to	install	rainwater	harvesting	systems.	The	central	disaster	prevention	agency	located	in	the	city	government	headquarters	monitors	the	water	levels	in	all	water	tanks	and	if	required,	issues	orders	to	building	owners	to	empty	their	rainwater	tanks	in	anticipation	of	heavy	rainfall.196																																																										194	This	paragraph	is	derived	from	the	information	found	on	the	2013	City	Climate	Leadership	Awards	finalists	webpage,	online:	http://cityclimateleadershipawards.com/seoul-hydrogen-fuel-cells/	(accessed	on	22	October	2016).		195	This	paragraph	is	derived	from	the	information	found	on	the	C40	case	study	section,	“Seoul	Car-Free	Days	have	Reduced	CO2	Emissions	by	10%	Annually”,	online:	http://c40.org/case_studies/seoul-car-free-days-have-reduced-co2-emissions-by-10-annually	(accessed	on	22	October	2016).		196	This	paragraph	relies	on	the	information	found	in	MY	Han,	JS	Mun	and	HJ	Kim,	‘An	Example	of	Climate	Change	Adaptation	by	Rainwater	Management	at	the	Star	City	Rainwater	Project’	(3rd	IWA	Rainwater	Harvesting	Management	International	Conference,	Gyeongnam,	Goseong	County,	Republic	of	Korea,	20-24	May	2012),	online:	http://www.iwahq.org/ContentSuite/upload/iwa/Document/session%20a%2001.pdf	(accessed	on	22	October	2016).		
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7.	Conclusion	In	this	chapter,	we	learnt	about	the	policies,	strategies	and	programs	that	five	global	cities	-	London,	Mexico	City,	New	York	City,	Rotterdam	and	Seoul	–	have	put	in	place	in	response	to	the	risks	of	climate	change	as	well	as	to	reduce	their	GHG	emissions.	As	much	of	the	chapter	pays	attention	to	local	circumstances	and	efforts,	it	is	easy	to	get	lost	in	the	details	and	lose	sight	of	how	this	chapter	fits	into	the	larger	narrative	of	this	thesis.	Thus,	this	conclusion	will	highlight	a	few	salient	points	that	arise	from	the	preceding	discussion	and	relate	them	to	the	central	analysis	of	the	emergence	of	global	cities	as	governance	actors	who	are	beginning	to	exercising	law-making	functions	in	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 First,	the	purpose	of	this	chapter	was	to	inform	the	reader	of	the	extent	and	type	of	governance	activities	global	cities	around	the	world	are	engaging	in.	From	the	outset,	Mayor	Livingstone	of	London	recognized	that	cities	ought	to	learn	from	one	another,	inspire	and	support	each	other’s	efforts,	and	in	the	process	of	repeated	interactions,	cultivate	norms	and	practices	concerning	urban	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation.	That	cities	could	play	a	meaningful	role	in	addressing	a	global	environmental	problem	like	climate	change	even	when	states	appeared	incapable	of	taking	concerted	action	is	a	norm	that	began	to	emerge	during	Livingstone’s	mayoralty.	It	soon	became	internalized	by	city	officials	and	other	actors,	and	gained	transnational	traction	especially	as	a	result	of	C40’s	public	relations	campaigns,	as	we	will	see	in	the	next	chapter.	Eventually,	it	has	become	a	norm	within	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.	In	this	regard,	the	local	influenced	the	global,	just	as	the	global	agenda	shaped	the	local	one.	 	 	 		 Secondly,	a	factor	that	has	enabled	cities	to	govern	climate	change	is	the	resources	made	available	by	transnational	actors	including	international	organizations,	private	foundations	and	global	environmental	NGOs.	For	example,	Mexico	City’s	Metrobus	System	project,	which	has	significantly	improved	air	quality	and	reduced	GHG	emissions	in	the	city,	enjoyed	the	support	of	World	Resources	Institute	(a	leading	global	environmental	NGO)	and	funding	from	the	World	Bank,	Shell	Foundation	and	Caterpillar	Foundation.197	The	availability	of	financial	support	from	external	parties	will,	of	course,	be	particularly	relevant	for	less	wealthy	cities.	However,	even	for	wealthier	cities	such	as	Rotterdam	in	the	Netherlands,	support	from	transnational	actors	has	also	made	a	difference.	For	example,	Rotterdam	approached	C40	to	initiate	a	program	for	ports	to	address	climate	change	because	it	did	not	want	to	go	at	it	alone	at	the	risk	of	its	port	losing	its	competitive	advantage.	The	city’s	involvement	in	Rockefeller	Foundation’s	100	Resilient	Cities	program	also	significantly	shaped	and	has	had	lasting	influence	on	Rotterdam’s	strategic	approach	and	programs	on	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation.	In	the	case	of	Seoul,	the	city	had	the	financial	resources	but	lacked	the	policy	and	technical	know-how.	Participation	in	a	transnational	network,	the	C40,	helped	it	to	gain	critical	knowledge	and	overcome	its	learning	curve	more	quickly	than	it	would	otherwise																																																									197	See	Footnote	85	of	this	chapter.			
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have.198	By	lending	financial	and	technical	assistance	to	cities,	global	civil	society	actors,	private	foundations	and	international	organizations	help	shape	the	transnational	climate	governance	agenda	by	spreading	policy	concepts	such	as	resilience.	They	also	exercise	considerable	influence	on	a	city’s	low	carbon	development	choices	when	they	decide	on	the	projects	that	would	receive	international	funding	or	otherwise.	As	such,	technical	and	financial	assistance	is	not	neutral	and	free	from	ideological	influences	and	politics.	 	 	 		 Finally,	this	chapter	captures	some	of	the	innovative	experimentation	that	is	currently	happening	in	cities	across	the	world.	These	experiments	contribute	towards	transnational	climate	change	governance	when	global	cities	seek	to	scale	up	their	actions,	pursue	cooperation	and	develop	harmonized	standards	through	cross-border	networks.	In	the	next	chapter,	we	turn	our	attention	to	one	such	network	that	has	become	highly	influential	in	the	transnational	climate	change	governance	landscape	within	a	short	span	of	time	–	the	C40.
																																																								198	Interview	Number	1,	on	file	with	author.		
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Chapter	5:	Transnational	Urban	Climate	
Governance	via	Networks	–	the	case	of	C40	
	
1. Introduction		
	In	their	attempts	to	govern	climate	change,	cities	have	found	it	helpful	to	establish	networks	through	which	they	can	facilitate	policy	learning	and	develop	new	governance	approaches.1	The	information	and	communications	revolution	has	made	such	networking	easier,	more	affordable	and	quicker.	These	networks	connect	city	officials	across	the	world	-	they	are	therefore	cross-border	and	transnational	in	nature.2	Transnational	municipal	networks	also	serve	as	conduits	through	which	cities	can	create	and	implement	urban-specific	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	that	support	and	complement	the	international	legal	regime	on	climate	change.	In	addition,	these	networks	have	formed	linkages	and	partnerships	with	national	authorities,	international	organizations,	multinational	corporations	and	civil	society.	They	therefore	also	perform	the	function	of	linking	cities	to	other	actors	in	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.	By	disseminating	knowledge	about	urban	climate	change	practices	to	other	governance	actors	through	these	networks,	cities	have	the	potential	to	shape	the	norms	and	practices	of	other	actors.3		This	thesis,	however,	is	not	concerned	with	cities	broadly	speaking	but	with	global	cities	that	command	significant	economic	and	political	resources	and	which	are	leading	the	current	wave	of	urban	climate	action.	As	such,	this	chapter	focuses	on	C40,	which	has	become	widely	recognized	as	the	leading	network	of	global	cities	addressing	climate	change	within	a	decade	of	its	founding	in	2005.4	C40	positions																																																									1	Bouteligier	points	out	that	such	networks	allow	for	the	conceptualization	of	cities,	traditionally	linked	to	local	policies,	as	actors	in	global	governance;	Sofie	Bouteligier,	‘Inequality	in	new	global	governance	arrangements:	the	North-South	divide	in	transnational	municipal	networks’	(2013)	26	Innovation:	The	European	Journal	of	Social	Science	Research	251,	pg.	252.		2	That	cities	are	forming	networks	to	address	climate	change	is	consistent	with	the	trend	(that	emerged	in	the	1990s)	of	cities	actively	forming	networks	to	address	common	environmental	problems	such	as	air	pollution	and	biodiversity	loss.	This	trend	is	mostly	ascribed	to	chapter	28	of	Agenda	21,	which	recognizes	the	role	of	local	authorities	in	the	promotion	of	sustainable	development	and	advocates	exchange	and	cooperation	between	them;	Agenda	21:	Programme	of	Action	for	Sustainable	Development,	U.N.	GAOR,	46th	Sess.,	Agenda	Item	21,	UN	Doc	A/Conf.151/26	(1992),	online:	https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf	(accessed	on	10	July	2016).		3	Toly	notes	that	the	horizontal	and	vertical	relationships	fostered	by	a	transnational	city	network	“may	permit	cities	a	significant	role	in	the	diffusion	of	both	techniques	and	norms,	important	functions	of	governance	and	politics”;	Noah	J.	Toly,	‘Transnational	Municipal	Networks	in	Climate	Politics:	From	Global	Governance	to	Global	Politics’	(2008)	5	Globalizations	341,	pg.	344.		4	C40	also	enjoys	significant	coverage	by	highly	respected	global	media	outlets;	see,	for	example,	‘Greening	the	concrete	jungle’	The	Economist	(3	Septermber	2011),	online:		http://www.economist.com/node/21528272;		Rene		Vollgraaff	and	Janice		Kew,	‘Cities	Almost	Double	Climate	Actions	Over	2	Years,	C40	Says’	Bloomberg	(5	February	2014	),	online:	http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-05/cities-almost-double-climate-actions-over-two-years-c40-says.html;	Alison	Kemper	and	Roger		Martin,	‘Cities	are	businesses'	best	allies	in	the	battle	
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itself	as	a	gathering	of	the	top	echelon	of	the	world’s	major	cities,	a	“space	of	engagement”	for	cities	gathered	to	exchange	expertise	and	knowledge	on	climate	change	as	well	as	a	catalyst	representing	(as	well	as	creating	more)	connections	amongst	major	cities.5	In	seeking	to	present	cities	as	significant	actors	in	the	global	response	to	climate	change,	C40	has	emphasized	the	global	nature	of	its	cities	because	global	cities	are	widely	understood	to	be	of	pivotal	importance	in	the	global	economy	and	enjoy	a	higher	status	compared	to	other	cities.6	C40	seeks	to	support	the	UNFCCC	regime	but	also	underpins	its	legitimacy	on	the	claim	that	cities	are	forging	ahead	with	practical	and	innovative	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation	measures	while	international	climate	negotiations	have	proceeded	at	a	glacial	pace	(at	least	until	the	COP	in	Paris	in	December	2015).7	One	of	C40’s	central	messages	is	that	“cities	act	while	states	only	talk”.	As	former	chairman	of	C40	and	current	UN	Special	Envoy	on	Cities	and	Climate	Change,	Michael	Bloomberg,	has	put	it,	“[c]ities	are	where	you	deliver	services.	Federal	governments	and	state	governments	sit	around	talking	and	passing	laws	or	recommendations	that	don’t	have	any	teeth”.8		C40	seeks	to	play	the	role	of	a	knowledge	broker	in	the	transnational	climate	change	governance	arena.	C40’s	aspiration	is	that,	through	its	role	as	an	information-sharing	platform,	individual	global	cities	will	be	empowered	with	technical	knowledge,	shared	resources,	and	technology	that	the	cities	would	not	be	able	to	obtain	on	their	own.	Through	such	empowerment,	global	cities	will	be	better	placed	to	engage	in	policy	experimentation	and	implement	transformative	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation	projects.	Another	key	aspect	of	C40’s	governance	mode	is	to	facilitate	corporation	between	its	member	cities	and	other	transnational	actors.	This	includes	establishing	and	coordinating	public-private	partnerships	with	multinational	corporations	like	Siemens,	NGOs	such	as	the	World	Resource	Institute,	
																																																																																																																																																																					against	climate	change’	The	Guardian	(14	October	2014	),	online:	http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2014/oct/14/cities-businesses-best-allies-battle-against-climate-change	(all	three	articles	accessed	on	23	December	2014).	Further,	C40	has	been	put	forward	as	part	of	a	“Coalition	of	the	Working	between	countries,	companies	and	cities”	to	inject	energy	into	the	repeatedly	stalled	multilateral	efforts	and	prompt	practical	action	in	the	highly	influential	and	authoritative	report	of	the	Oxford	Martin	Commission	for	Future	Generations,	“Now	for	the	Long	Term”	(Oxford	Martin	School,	October	2013),	online:	http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/commission/Oxford_Martin_Now_for_the_Long_Term.pdf	(accessed	on	30	November	2016).		5	The	term	“space	of	engagement”	is	from	Kevin	R.	Cox,	‘Spaces	of	dependence,	spaces	of	engagement	and	the	politics	of	scale,	or:	looking	for	local	politics’	(1998)	17	Political	Geography	1.		6	Michele	Acuto,	‘The	new	climate	leaders?’	(2013)	39	Review	of	International	Studies	835,	pg.	841.	Lee	has	sought	to	quantitatively	test	the	hypothesis	that	global	cities	are	more	likely	to	become	members	of	transnational	climate	change	networks	because,	in	addition	to	their	economic	interests	regarding	climate	change,	“they	provide	underlying	conditions	facilitating	information	sharing	and	diffusion”	as	hubs	of	international	economic	and	policy	interactions;	Taedong	Lee,	‘Global	Cities	and	Transnational	Climate	Change	Networks’	(2013)	13	Global	Environmental	Politics	108,	pg.	109.		7	Sofie	Bouteligier,	Cities,	Networks	and	Global	Environmental	Governance:	Spaces	of	Innovation,	Places	
of	Leadership	(Routledge	2013	),	pg.	85.		8	Quoted	in	Alexei	Barrionuevo,	‘World	Bank	to	Help	Cities	Control	Climate	Change	’	The	New	York	
Times	(1	June	2011).		
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and	international	financial	institutions	like	the	World	Bank.9	In	early	2016,	C40	formed	a	partnership	with	the	International	Cleantech	Network	–	a	transnational	network	of	clean	technology	cluster	organizations	–	to	create	the	City	Solutions	Platform.	This	Platform	serves	as	a	forum	of	engagement	for	clean	technology	developers,	entrepreneurs	and	city	authorities	seeking	clean	technology	solutions	for	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation.10	In	addition	to	increasing	C40’s	capacity	to	assist	its	members	to	make	GHG	reductions,	these	public-private	partnerships	(PPPs)	enhance	the	status	of	C40	as	a	network	that	is	actively	engaged	with	major	political	and	business	actors	on	the	international	stage.		From	a	different	perspective,	through	these	PPPs,	international	organizations	are	able	to	enlist	C40	as	an	intermediary	to	address	cities	in	pursuit	of	the	goal	of	addressing	climate	change.	The	C40-World	Bank	partnership	is	an	interesting	example	of		“orchestration”,	whereby	the	World	Bank	seeks	to	initiate,	steer	and	strengthen	governance	within	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex	by,	amongst	other	things,	facilitating	and	endorsing	C40’s	governance	efforts.	In	Chapter	3,	there	was	discussion	about	the	role	of	the	World	Bank	in	creating	and	sustaining	an	ideological	platform	that	promotes	the	linkages	between	cities,	globalization	and	development.	The	World	Bank’s	vision	of	sustainable	urban	development	is	that	of	“competitive,	well	governed,	and	bankable”	cities.	In	pursuit	of	this	vision,	the	World	Bank	has	introduced	a	range	of	initiatives	to	facilitate	city	governments’	access	to	international	financial	markets.	The	range	of	initiatives	to	improve	the	creditworthiness	of	cities	so	that	they	are	able	to	independently	raise	money	to	provide	services	and	invest	in	infrastructure	has	recently	been	extended	to	include	the	climate	change	agenda.	As	will	be	discussed	below,	the	C40-World	Bank	partnership	involves	giving	C40	member	cities	preferential	access	to	the	Low	Carbon,	Livable	Cities	Initiative,	which	provides	training	programs	and	technical	assistance	to	improve	cities’	financial	transparency	and	planning	capabilities	so	that	they	are	better	able	to	obtain	financing	from	public	sector	investors	and	the	private	sector.		Finally,	in	the	run-up	to	the	UNFCCC	COP	in	Paris,	C40	was	actively	involved	in	various	partnerships	to	promote	the	development	of	standardized	GHG	accounting	methodologies	for	cities.		This	will	be	discussed	briefly	in	this	chapter	to	lay	the	groundwork	for	subsequent	analysis	in	Chapter	6,	which	argues	that	global	cities,	through	a	network	like	C40,	are	playing	a	jurisgenerative	function	at	the	transnational	level.	Part	2	of	this	chapter	provides	a	brief	literature	review	on	transnational	networks	of	cities	in	the	area	of	climate	change.	Part	3	delves	into	a	detailed	discussion	of	the	C40,	including	its	partnership	with	the	World	Bank	and	its	attempts	to	develop	harmonized	standards	for	urban	GHG	accounting.	Part	4	draws																																																									9	C40,	“Our	Partners	and	Funders”,	online:	http://www.c40.org/partners	(accessed	on	23	October	2016).		10	Interview	No.	8;	International	Cleantech	Network,	“Collaboration	between	C40	and	ICN:	When	Cities	Meet	Clean	Technologies”	(Copenhagen,	5	December	2015),	online:	http://internationalcleantechnetwork.com/project/collaboration-between-c40-and-icn-when-cities-meet-clean-technologies/	(accessed	on	3	July	2016).			
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concluding	remarks	about	the	role	of	C40	as	a	network	through	which	global	cities	exercise	governance	functions.			
2. A	Brief	Introduction	to	Transnational	Municipal	Networks	in	the	Area	of	
Climate	Change		
	 According	to	Kern	and	Bulkeley,	transnational	municipal	networks	have	three	defining	characteristics.	First,	member	cities	are	free	to	join	or	leave	the	network.11	Secondly,	such	networks	are	often	characterized	as	a	form	of	self-governance	as	they	appear	to	be	non-hierarchical	and	horizontal	forms	of	governance.12	Thirdly,	decisions	taken	within	these	networks	are	usually	directly	implemented	by	member	cities.13		Cities	join	transnational	networks	because	they	perceive	certain	advantages	such	as	learning	from	other	cities,	expanding	their	links	to	international	institutions,	and	access	to	funding.14	In	large	networks,	it	is	not	uncommon	for	there	to	be	a	‘core	group’	of	active	member	cities	while	the	majority	of	the	member	cities	are	relatively	passive.	In	the	latter	case,	membership	may	be	symbolic	–	for	example,	a	city	may	have	joined	the	network	only	because	neighbouring	cities	did	so.15	Passive	members	also	often	lack	the	financial	and	human	resources	required	to	participate	in	network	activities	such	as	conferences,	participating	in	funding	bids	and	implementation	of	work	programmes	and	standards	developed	by	the	network.16	In	contrast,	some	network	members	are	active	locally	and	transnationally.17	They	take	proactive	steps	to	develop	the	network	by,	for	example,	organizing	and	hosting	workshops	and	frequently	uploading	best	practice	case	studies	on	the	network’s	internet	database.	Kern	and	Bulkeley’s	findings	on	transnational	city	networks	in	Europe	suggest	that	“networks	are	networks	of	pioneers	for	pioneers”	(pioneers	referring	to	active	member	cities),	and	within	a	network,	“…it	is	easy	to	distinguish	between	a	hard	core	of	pioneers	and	a	periphery	consisting	of	relatively	passive	cities	which	have	scarcely	changed	their	behavior	since	joining	the	network.”18																																																										11	Kristine	Kern	and	Harriet	Bulkeley,	‘Cities,	Europeanization	and	multi-level	governance:	Governing	climate	change	through	transnational	municipal	networks’	(2009)	47	Journal	of	Common	Market	Studies	309,	pg.	309.		12	Ibid.		13	Ibid.		14	Ibid.;	Interview	Nos.	2	and	3.		15	In	Krause’s	empirical	study	of	two	city	networks	in	the	US,	ICLEI	and	the	US	Conference	of	Mayors’	Climate	Protection	Agreement	(MCPA),	she	finds	that	ICLEI	appears	to	play	a	more	effective	role	in	promoting	GHG	reductions	compared	to	MCPA.	Amongst	the	reasons	is	that	ICLEI	requires	cities	to	achieve	certain	milestones	or	targets	and	to	pay	an	annual	membership	fee,	unlike	MCPA,	which	offers	free	membership	and	there	is	no	monitoring	of	cities’	activities.	She	suggests	that	weakly	committed	cities	that	are	motivated	by	public	“credit	claiming”	find	it	easy	to	join	networks	with	minimal	political	and	financial	costs	such	as	MCPA.	In	such	cases,	membership	in	a	network	does	not	effectively	steer	the	city	towards	climate	protection;	Rachel	M.	Krause,	‘An	assessment	of	the	impact	that	participation	in	local	climate	networks	has	on	cities'	implementation	of	climate,	energy,	and	transportation	policies’	(2012)	29	Review	of	Policy	Research	585,	pgs.	587,	601.			16	Kern	and	Bulkeley,	pg.	327.	17	Ibid.,	pg.	326.	18	Ibid.	pg.	329.	
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While	scholars	like	Sassen	hypothesize	that	networks	that	include	cities	from	the	Global	North	and	cities	from	the	Global	South	go	beyond	the	traditional	North-South	divide,	Bouteligier’s	empirical	research	on	C40	and	Metropolis	(a	global	network	that	covers	environmental,	social,	economic	and	cultural	issues)	show	otherwise.19	Briefly,	the	greater	involvement	of	some	members	(which	are	usually	cities	from	the	Global	North	that	have	the	human	and	financial	resources	to	support	active	involvement)	than	others	concentrates	power,	“which	results	in	power	relations	and	the	persistence	of	(structural)	inequalities.	These	inequalities	run	along	dividing	lines	we	know	from	the	past…”20	Bouteligier	finds	that	those	cities	that	are	important	to	the	network	in	question	shape	the	agenda,	determine	choices	regarding	best	practices	and	influence	how	problems	and	solutions	are	framed.	She	concludes	that,	as	long	as	transnational	municipal	networks	perpetuate	inequalities,	they	will	face	difficulties	in	dealing	with	contemporary	urbanization	problems	and	therefore	will	ultimately	fail	to	meet	their	goals.21		Finally,	in	the	early	stage	of	urban	climate	governance	in	the	1990s,	networks	like	ICLEI	focused	on	supporting	cities	in	implementing	local	climate	policies.	ICLEI’s	Cities	for	Climate	Protection	Program	(CCP),	established	in	1993,	is	widely	recognized	to	be	the	first	global	program	supporting	cities	in	pursuing	climate	action.22	CCP’s	founding	document	states	that	one	of	CCP’s	key	objectives	was	to	enlist	one	hundred	municipalities	worldwide	that	emit	one	billion	tonnes	of	global	CO2	(five	to	ten	percent	of	the	global	total)	by	1995.23	To	join	CCP,	a	city	had	to	pass	a	“local	declaration”	committing	itself	to	reducing	GHG	emissions	by	meeting	five	milestones:	(1)	conducting	a	baseline	energy	and	emissions	inventory;	(2)	adopting	an	emissions	reduction	target;	(3)	developing	a	local	action	plan;	(4)	implementing	policies	and	measures;	and	(5)	monitoring	and	verifying	outcomes.24	Betsill	and	Bulkeley	argue	that“[b]oth	the	milestone	framework	and	the	use	of	quantification	reflect	the	CCP	program’s	emphasis	on	the	need	to	evaluate	performance	and	improve	local	accountability.”25	Further,	“…through	adhering	to	the	CCP	program	framework	and	participating	in	its	activities,	members	share	both	normative	goals,	that	climate	change	is	a	problem	and	can	be	addressed	locally,	and	a	commitment	to																																																									19	Ibid.		20	Bouteligier,	‘Inequality	in	new	global	governance	arrangements:	the	North-South	divide	in	transnational	municipal	networks’,	pg.	263.		21	Ibid,	pg.	264.		22	ICLEI,	“Connecting	Leaders:	Connect.	Innovate.	Accelerate.	Solve.”,	online:	http://incheon2010.iclei.org/fileadmin/templates/incheon2010/Download/Media_and_Press_Downloads/Connecting_Leaders-www.pdf	(accessed	on	3	December	2016).	23	ICLEI,	“Cities	for	Climate	Protection:	An	International	Campaign	to	Reduce	Urban	Emissions	of	Greenhouse	Gases”,	15	February	1993,	pg.	2,	online:	http://www.iclei.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ICLEI_WS/Documents/advocacy/Bonn_2014/ADP2.5-Support_Files/ICLEI_TheBirthofCCP_1993.pdf	(accessed	on	3	December	2016).		24	ICLEI,	Municipal	Leader’s	Declaration	on	Climate	Change	and	the	Urban	Environment,	Article	2	(This	declaration	is	found	as	an	appendix	to	“Cities	for	Climate	Protection:	An	International	Campaign	to	Reduce	Urban	Emissions	of	Greenhouse	Gases”,	ibid).			25	Michele	M.	Betsill	and	Harriet	Bulkeley,	‘Transnational	Networks	and	Global	Environmental	Governance:	The	Cities	for	Climate	Protection	Program’	48	International	Studies	Quarterley	471,	pg.	478.		
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a	particular	policy	approach	based	on	the	measurement	and	monitoring	of	greenhouse	gas	emissions.”26		Other	networks,	including	C40,	have	subsequently	embraced	this	approach.	Gordon	points	out	that	younger	networks	like	C40	seek	to	surpass	the	limitations	of	the	older	networks	by	“[shifting]	the	emphasis	towards	coordinating	and	scaling	city	climate	policy	with	the	aim	of	achieving	aggregate	effect,	encouraging	the	diffusion	of	ideas	and	practices,	and	offering	an	alternative	(albeit	intersecting)	architecture	of	global	climate	governance.”27		
	 This	summary	of	some	of	the	key	findings	about	how	transnational	city	networks	perform	in	reality	provides	an	introductory	platform	for	the	discussion	about	C40	to	follow.	Like	other	transnational	city	networks,	C40	is	concerned	about	laggard	cities	that	do	not	contribute	proactively	to	achieving	the	network’s	mission.	As	a	voluntary	tool	of	governance,	transnational	city	networks	depend	heavily	on	persuasion,	mutual	benefit	and	reciprocity	to	encourage	the	spread	of	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	amongst	member	cities.	As	will	be	seen	in	the	discussion	below,	C40	seeks	to	reduce	disparities	in	the	commitment	and	performance	of	its	member	cities	by	being	very	selective	in	its	membership	and	providing	additional	support	to	less	active	cities.28	Transparency	mechanisms	are	also	viewed	as	a	means	to	encourage	passive	cities	into	action	as	these	reporting	platforms	provide	various	stakeholders,	including	citizens	and	civil	society	groups,	the	means	to	monitor	and	hold	their	cities	accountable.29	Secondly,	one	of	the	key	issues	raised	above	is	the	North-South	divide.	It	is	not	surprising	that	the	socio-economic	conditions	in	Global	South	cities	restrict	their	capabilities	to	participate	as	actively	as	their	Global	North	counterparts	in	a	transnational	city	network.	The	salient	response	is	not	to	lament	the	potential	marginalization	of	the	Global	South	cities,	but	to	identify	ways	to	create	inclusion	and	equitable	participation.	First,	the	principle	of	common	but	differentiated	responsibilities	and	respective	capabilities	(CBDRRC)	is	a	foundational	pillar	of	the	international	climate	change	regime	and	is	regarded	as	key	to	ensuring	equitable	and	fair	treatment.	By	taking	the	CBCRRC	principle	into	account	in	their norm-setting actions, C40	recognizes	the	need	for	more	developed	and	wealthier	member	cities	to	assist	the	efforts	of	poorer	and	developing	cities.30	Cities	with	more	resources	are	expected	to	take	the	lead	in	organizing	and	hosting	C40	events	and	some	cities	go	further	by	subsidizing	the	travel	and	accommodation	arrangements	of	participants	from	less	wealthy	cities.31	Secondly,	mayors	serve	on	a	rotating	basis	on	C40’s	Steering	Committee	to	provide	overall	strategic	direction.32	The	mayors	on	the	committee	represent	various	geographical	regions	to	ensure	fair	representation	of	all	C40	cities.	Finally,	it	has	been	noted	that,	in	order	for	networks	like	C40	to	succeed,	the	interactions	amongst	member	cities	must	be	pursued	in	a	spirit	of	mutual	respect,	appreciation	of	the																																																									26	Ibid.		27	David.	J.		Gordon,	‘Between	local	innovation	and	global	impact:	cities,	networks,	and	the	governance	of	climate	change’	(2013)	19	Canadian	Foreign	Policy	Journal	288,	pg.	293.	28	See	discussion	in	Section	3.3	below.		29	Ibid.		30	See	discussion	in	Section	4.2	of	Chapter	6.		31	Interview	No.	1.	32	C40,	online:	http://www.c40.org/about	(accessed	on	1	November	2016).		
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differences	amongst	global	cities,	and	a	shared	common	goal	to	address	climate	change.33	It	can	be	argued	that	articulating	these	values	as	guiding	principles	will	go	some	way	towards	creating	a	firmer	normative	basis	for	overcoming	some	of	the	North-South	inequalities.		
	
3. C40		
	 This	part	of	the	chapter	explores	the	origins	of	C40,	followed	by	a	brief	description	of	its	membership	and	governance	structure.	The	discussion	then	turns	its	focus	onto	C40’s	climate	programs	and	initiatives	to	shed	light	on	the	ways	in	which	C40	seeks	to	fulfill	its	role	of	facilitating	collaboration	amongst	global	cities	and	how	these	cities,	in	turn,	use	C40	to	exercise	agency	and	influence	in	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.	The	partnership	between	the	C40	and	the	World	Bank,	and	C40’s	attempts	at	developing	a	GHG	accounting	standard	will	also	be	examined	here.				
3.1	The	Origins	of	C40		
	 On	3-5	October	2005,	at	the	initiative	of	then-Mayor	of	London,	Ken	Livingstone,	the	Greater	London	Authority	convened	a	two-day	World	Cities	Leadership	and	Climate	Summit.34	This	meeting	of	eighteen	major	cities	was	carefully	timed	to	coincide	with	the	Group	of	Eight	(G8)	Summit	in	Gleaneagles,	Scotland,	the	annual	gathering	of	the	leaders	of	the	world’s	major	powers	to	address	major	economic	and	political	issues.35	“Livingstone’s	original	idea	was	much	in	parallel	with	that	year’s	G8…as	the	Group	gathered	the	largest	economies,	he	gathered	the	largest	cities,	where	‘large’	was	not	just	a	measure	of	size	but	of	importance.”36	Thus,	Livingstone’s	vision	was	one	of	“the	elite	of	core	cities”	that,	because	of	sheer	population	and	global	prominence,	would	lead	the	urban	response	to	climate	change.37	Originally	known	as	the	C20,	the	cities	that	took	part	in	the	network’s	inaugural	summit	included	Barcelona,	Beijing,	Berlin,	Brussels,	Chicago,	London,	Madrid,	Mexico	City,	New	Delhi,	New	York,	Paris,	Philadelphia,	Rome,	San	Francisco,	Sao	Paulo,	Shanghai,	Stockholm,	Toronto,	and	Zurich.38		The	C20	Climate	Change	Summit	Communique	that	was	issued	at	the	close	of	the	World	Cities	Leadership	and	Climate	Summit	gives	some	insight	into	how	the																																																									33	Interview	No.	1.		34	The	Summit	was	convened	in	partnership	with	ICLEI	and	the	Climate	Group,	an	international	non-profit	group	founded	in	2004	that	works	with	states,	cities	and	businesses	to	develop	climate	finance	mechanisms	and	low-carbon	business	models;	online:	http://www.theclimategroup.org	(accessed	on	27	November	2016).		35	For	analysis	of	the	role	of	the	G8	in	international	relations,	see	New	Directions	in	Global	Political	
Governance:	The	G8	and	International	Order	in	the	Twenty-First	Century	(John	Kirton	and	Junichi		Takase	eds,	Ashgate	2002).		36	Greater	London	Authority	political	officer,	quoted	in	Acuto,	pg.	854.		37	Acuto,	pg.	854.		38	Greater	London	Authority,	‘Mayor	brings	together	major	cities	to	take	lead	on	climate	change’,	online:	https://www.london.gov.uk/media/mayor-press-releases/2005/10/mayor-brings-together-major-cities-to-take-lead-on-climate-change	(accessed	on	27	November	2016).	
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founders	envisioned	the	role	of	the	network	in	the	global	response	to	climate	change	as	well	as	its	goals	in	the	short	and	long	term.	First,	the	declaration	refers	to	“the	C20	Large	World	Cities.”39	“The	C20	cities	recognize	[their]	role	as	large	city	governments”	and	that	C20	will	work	with	ICLEI	that	represents	“cities	of	all	sizes.”40	In	the	Communique,	the	size	of	the	populations	that	the	C20	cities	represent	is	the	main	basis	for	differentiating	C20	cities	from	other	cities	and	sub-national	governments	and	is	the	precursor	to	subsequent	attempts	to	highlight	the	global	standing	of	C40	cities	in	the	network’s	branding	strategy.		Secondly,	in	the	Communique,	C20	portrays	cities	as	indispensible	partners	in	the	global	effort	to	tackle	climate	change	because	cities	are	both	a	significant	cause	and	a	solution	to	the	problem	of	climate	change.	The	Communique	states	that	cities	are	a	significant	source	of	GHGs	“from	cars,	trucks,	industries,	manufacturing,	buildings	and	waste”	and	are	“growing	in	significance	as	more	of	the	world’s	population	reside	there.”41	At	the	same	time,	“[l]arge	cities	have	sizeable	economies	that	are	ideal	markets	to	incubate,	develop,	and	commercialise	greenhouse	gas	reducing	and	adaptation	technologies,	including	those	to	improve	energy	efficiency,	waste	management,	water	conservation,	and	renewable	energy.”42	Thus,	large	cities	are	conceived	as	being	uniquely	placed	in	the	global	economy	to	develop	innovative	climate	solutions	that	straddle	the	public-private	divide	and	serve	as	social	laboratories	for	research	and	development.	On	a	related	note,	C40	endorses	the	IPCC’s	findings	that	larger	cities	consume	two-thirds	of	the	world’s	energy	and	are	responsible	for	more	than	three-quarters	of	global	GHG	emissions.43	With	this	endorsement,	C40	portrays	its	members	as	being	responsible	global	stakeholders	that	aim	to	do	something	to	reduce	their	contribution	to	climate	change	and	that	C40	itself	plays	a	critical	role	by	facilitating	what	current	chairman	of	C40,	Eduardo	Paes,	calls	“city	diplomacy.”44	“By	engaging	in	city	diplomacy,	mayors	and	city	officials	exchange	information	and	experience.	They	facilitate	the	spread	of	new	technologies	and	access	to	innovative	public	policies.	Creative	ideas	and	projects	in	one	city	can	be	replicated	in	another,	and	that	exchange	of	knowledge	is	taking	place,	far	from	lengthy	and	politically	charged	treaties”	(emphasis	added).45																																																										39	C20	Climate	Change	Summit	Communique	(5	October	2005).		40	Ibid.	41	Ibid.		42	Ibid.	43	C40,	‘Ending	Climate	Change	Begins	in	the	City’,	online:	http://www.c40.org/ending-climate-change-begins-in-the-city;	IPCC,	‘ADP	Technical	Expert	Meeting:	Urban	Environment,	Statement	by	Renate	Christ,	Secretary	of	the	International	Panel	on	Climate	Change’	(Bonn,	10	June	2014),	online:	http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/unfccc/sbsta40/140610_urban_environment_Christ.pdf	(both	resources	accessed	on	29	November	2016).		44	On	C40’s	endorsement	of	the	latest	IPCC	report,	“Climate	Change	2014:	Impacts,	Adaptation	and	Vulnerability”	which	showed	that	many	climate	change	risks	are	concentrated	in	urban	areas,	see	C40,	“Mayor	Paes,	“IPCC	report	highlights	need	for	‘city	diplomacy’	to	spur	climate	action”,	online:	http://c40.org/blog_posts/mayor-paes-ipcc-report-highlights-need-for-city-diplomacy	(accessed	on	30	November	2016).	45	Eduardo	Paes,	‘C40	City	Diplomacy	Addresses	Climate	Change’,	The	Huffington	Post	(10	December	2013),	online:	http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eduardo-paes/c40-city-diplomacy-addresses-climate-change_b_4419898.html	(accessed	on	30	November	2016).	
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	 The	Communique	sets	out	6	specific	actions:46		
 Action	#1:	Commit	to	work	together	to	set	ambitious	collective	and	individual,	targets	for	reducing	greenhouse	gas	emissions;		Action	#2:	Commit	to	ensure	that	we	have	highly	effective	agencies	or	programs	dedicated	to	accelerating	investments	in	municipal	and	community	greenhouse	gas	emissions	reductions	and	adaptation;		Action	#3:	Commit	to	develop,	exchange,	and	implement	best	practices	and	strategies	on	emissions	reductions	and	climate	adaptation;		Action	#4:	Commit	to	develop	and	share	communications	strategies	that	sensitize	citizens	and	stakeholders	to	climate	change	issues;		Action	#5:	Commit	to	create	sustainable	municipal	procurement	alliances	and	procurement	policies	that	accelerate	the	uptake	of	climate	friendly	technologies	and	measurably	influence	the	marketplace,	including	products	containing	greenhouse	gases	such	as	certain	CFCs	not	covered	by	the	UNFCCC;		Action	#6:	Meet	again	within	18	months	in	New	York	City	to	measure	our	progress	and	report	back	to	the	UN.				The	2007	New	York	City	Summit	communiqué,	the	2009	Seoul	Summit	declaration,	the	2011	communiqué,	reflected	the	same	aims:	to	be	a	catalyst	for	climate	action	in	cities	around	the	world,	to	demonstrate	that	cities	are	taking	up	responsibility	for	climate	change	and	are	uniquely	placed	to	craft	innovation	solutions,	and	to	urge	national	governments	to	empower	cities	to	undertake	climate	actions.47	
	
3.2	Relationship	with	the	Clinton	Climate	Initiative			 After	C20	realized	that	its	ambitions	exceeded	its	institutional	capacity,	the	network	took	steps	to	find	a	partner	that	it	could	work	with	to	augment	its																																																									46	C40,	“Mayor	Paes,	“IPCC	report	highlights	need	for	‘city	diplomacy’	to	spur	climate	action”,	online:	http://c40.org/blog_posts/mayor-paes-ipcc-report-highlights-need-for-city-diplomacy	(accessed	on	30	November	2016).	47	The	2011	communiqué	also	served	as	a	submission	to	the	Rio+20	UN	Conference	on	Sustainable	Development	as	C40	wanted	to	highlight	the	link	between	cities’	climate	actions	and	wider	sustainability	goals	(e.g.	global	environmental	protection	and	poverty	eradication);	C40,	‘C40	Cities	Climate	Leadership	Group	(C40)	Communiqué	and	Resolution	for	the	Rio+20	UN	Conference	on	Sustainable	Development’	(3	June	2011),	online:	http://c40-production.herokuapp.com/blog_posts/c40-cities-climate-leadership-group-c40-communiqué-and-resolution-for-the-rio20-un-conference-on-sustainable-development	(accessed	on	30	November	2016).	
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resources.	On	1	August	2006,	C20	signed	a	MOU	with	the	Clinton	Foundation.	Under	the	MOU,	the	foundation’s	Clinton	Climate	Initiative	(CCI)	would	serve	as	C20’s	delivery	partner	and	“utilize	the	global	influence	of	President	Clinton	and	the	skills	that	it	has	developed	in	global	mobilization	to	confront	crises	such	as	AIDS	to	help	initiate	programs	that	directly	result	in	substantial	reductions	in	[GHGs].”48	The	MOU	states	that	CCI’s	efforts	would	include,	first,	organizing	a	consortium	that	aggregates	the	purchasing	power	of	cities	to	buy	energy	saving	products	and	technologies	at	lower	prices.49	This	idea	is	similar	to	the	Clinton	Foundation’s	AIDS	Initiative	total	quality	management	approach	that	has	substantially	lowered	AIDS	drug	prices	for	members	of	its	purchasing	consortium.50	Secondly,	CCI	will	mobilize	experts	from	the	private	sector	to	provide	technical	assistance	to	cities.51	Thirdly,	CCI	would	create	and	deploy	common	measurement	tools	and	internet-based	communication	systems	to	assist	cities	in	creating	emissions	baselines,	measuring	the	effectiveness	of	mitigation	programs	and	sharing	best	practices.52	CCI	also	committed	to	raise	funds	to	support	the	C20	agenda,	which	made	cities	like	Melbourne	perceive	participation	in	C20	to	be	more	beneficial	and	meaningful	compared	to	other	transnational	city	networks	that	lack	the	financial	resources	to	undertake	ambitious	action.53		 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 The	Energy	Efficiency	Building	Retrofit	Program	(EEBRP)	exemplifies	the	mode	of	cooperation	between	C20	and	CCI.	As	mentioned	earlier,	under	the	terms	of	the	MOU,	CCI	committed	to	organizing	a	global	procurement	process	that	would	enable	C20	cities	to	purchase	energy-saving	technologies	at	preferential	prices.	CCI	
																																																								48	Memorandum	of	Understanding	between	the	Large	Cities	Climate	Leadership	Group	and	the	William	J	Clinton	Foundation,	pg.	2;	Also	see,	“Press	Release:	President	Clinton	Launches	Clinton	Climate	Initiative”,	1	August	2006,	online:	https://www.clintonfoundation.org/main/news-and-media/press-releases-and-statements/press-release-president-clinton-launches-clinton-climate-initiative.html	(accessed	on	27	November	2016).		49	MOU,	ibid.	50	Jeremy	Youde,	Global	Health	Governance	(Polity	Press,	2012),	pg	85;	Marilyn	Chase,	“Clinton	Foundation,	Unitaid	Strike	Deals	on	Price	Cuts	for	AIDS	Drugs”,	29	April	2008,	online:	http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120943380712251563	(accessed	on	27	December	2016).	51	MOU,	pg.	1.			52	Ibid.	The	software	tool,	developed	together	with	Microsoft	and	ICLEI,	enables	cities	to	implement	a	common	measurement	system	for	GHGs,	access	data	from	around	the	world	and	conduct	webinars	with	other	cities.	Known	as	HEAT,	which	stands	for	Harmonized	Emissions	Analysis	Tool,	this	software	was	created	by	ICLEI	and	then	further	developed	as	an	online	tool	by	Microsoft	and	CCI;	see	ICLEI,	‘ICLEI	HEAT	software	goes	international’	(23	May	2007),	online:	http://www.iclei.org/details/article/iclei-heat-software-goes-international.html;	and	Microsoft	News	Center,	‘Clinton	Foundation,	Microsoft	to	Develop	Online	Tools	Enabling	the	World’s	Largest	40	Cities	to	Monitor	Carbon	Emissions’	(17	May	2007),	online:	http://news.microsoft.com/2007/05/17/clinton-foundation-microsoft-to-develop-online-tools-enabling-the-worlds-largest-40-cities-to-monitor-carbon-emissions/	(both	resources	accessed	on	29	December	2016).	53	City	of	Melbourne	Council	Meeting,	Agenda	Item	5.3,	C20:	Large	Cities	Climate	Leadership	Group,	4	July	2006,	pg.	2,	online:	https://www.melbourne.vic.gov.au/AboutCouncil/Meetings/Lists/CouncilMeetingAgendaItems/Attachments/2006/EC_53_20060704.pdf	(accessed	on	27	December	2016).		
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designed	the	EEBRP	to	operate	as	a	“matchmaking	consortium”.54	On	the	demand	side,	EEBRP	gives	cities	assistance	to	procure	services	for	retrofitting	their	buildings	for	energy-saving	and	efficiency	purposes.55	On	the	supply	side,	companies	that	sell	energy	efficiency	services	and	technologies	are	invited	to	supply	the	potentially	large	market	of	cities	on	the	conditions	that	they	follow	global	best	practices	and	are	willing	to	provide	their	services	at	reduced	prices.56	The	cities	are	under	no	obligation	to	buy	from	these	companies,	and	final	purchasing	decisions	are	made	independently	of	CCI.57	As	for	the	corporations,	the	terms	of	their	participation	in	the	EEBRP	differ	in	each	case.58	Ultimately,	the	guiding	principle	is	to	create	the	market	conditions	that	are	conducive	to	enabling	cities	and	corporations	to	work	together	to	deliver	transformative,	large-scale	retrofitting	projects	that	have	the	potential	to	significantly	reduce	urban	GHG	emissions.	The	EEBRP	has	been	a	success.	Within	a	few	years,	the	consortium	managed	to	initiate	more	than	two	hundred	and	fifty	projects	to	retrofit	buildings	for	energy	efficiency	in	twenty	cities.59	The	C20	soon	expanded	to	include	thirteen	more	cities,	and	was	renamed	C40.	However,	as	set	out	in	the	MOU	with	the	Clinton	Foundation,	the	group	intended	to	continue	as	a	“small	association	of	large	and	leading	cities.”60		
	
3.3	Membership	
	 To	become	a	member	of	C40,	a	city	has	to	meet	certain	conditions.	There	are	three	types	of	membership	categories:61			
Megacities	(formerly	Participating	City):	Population:	City	population	of	3million	or	more,	and/or	metropolitan	area	population	of	10	million	or	more,	either	currently	or	projected	for	2025.		
OR		GDP:	One	of	the	top	25	global	cities	ranked	by	current	GDP	output,	at	purchasing	power	parity,	either	currently	or	projected	for	2025.		
																																																								54	Mikael	Roman,	‘Governing	from	the	middle:	the	C40	Cities	Leadership	Group’	(2010)	10(1)	Corporate	Governance:	The	International	Journal	of	Business	in	Society	73,	pg.	76.		55	Ibid.		56	Ibid.	57	Ibid.	58	Ibid.	59	Roman,	pg.	81.		60	MOU,	pg.	1.		61	Mike		Marinello,	C40	Announces	New	Guidelines	for	Membership	Categories	(C40	2012),	online:	http://c40-production-images.s3.amazonaws.com/press_releases/images/25_C40_20Guidelines_20FINAL_2011.14.12.original.pdf?1388095701	(accessed	on	27	December	2016).	
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Innovator	Cities	(formerly	Affiliate	City):	Cities	that	do	not	qualify	as	Megacities	but	have	shown	clear	leadership	in	environmental	and	climate	change	work.	An	Innovator	City	must	be	internationally	recognized	for	barrier-breaking	climate	work,	a	leader	in	the	field	of	environmental	sustainability,	and	a	regionally	recognized	“anchor	city”	for	the	relevant	metropolitan	area.		
Observer	Cities:	A	short-term	category	for	new	cities	applying	to	join	the	C40	for	the	first	time;	all	cities	applying	for	Megacity	or	Innovator	membership	will	initially	be	admitted	as	Observers	until	they	meet	C40’s	first	year	participation	requirements.	A	longer-term	category	for	cities	that	meet	Megacity	or	Innovator	City	guidelines	and	participation	requirements	but,	for	local	regulatory	or	procedural	reasons,	are	unable	to	approve	participation	as	a	Megacity	or	Innovator	City	expeditiously.		
		 Only	megacities	are	eligible	for	C40	governance	and	leadership	positions,	for	example,	serving	as	the	C40	chair.	C40	Megacities	include	Bangkok,	Cairo,	Chicago,	Paris,	London	and	New	York.62	Innovator	Cities	include	Oslo,	Rotterdam,	San	Francisco,	and	Santiago,	while	Observer	Cities	include	Beijing,	Nairobi,	Shanghai	and	Singapore.63		 To	obtain	as	well	as	maintain	its	C40	membership,	a	city	does	not	have	to	fulfill	any	formal	performance-based	obligations.	However,	as	noted	above,	a	city	that	is	seeking	C40	membership	has	to	begin	as	an	Observer	City	and	is	subject	to	what	is	effectively	a	one-year	probation	period.	During	this	period	and	thereafter,	a	city	is	expected	to	demonstrate	“serious	commitment”	to	addressing	climate	change	and	that	the	city	will	experience	demonstrable	benefits	from	participating	in	C40.64	The	decision	on	whether	a	city	obtains	membership	lies	with	the	network’s	board	of	directors,	which	examines	the	city’s	track	record	and	potential	for	ambitious	climate	change	action	as	well	as	its	ability	to	contribute	to	C40’s	work.65		C40	membership	criteria	are	not	publicly	available,	but	it	is	widely	known	that	C40	has	demanding	standards	because	it	wants	to	be	selective	and,	to	a	certain																																																									62	C40,	“C40	Cities	Make	a	Difference”,	online:	http://www.c40.org/cities	(accessed	on	27	December	2016).	63	Ibid.	Singapore	joined	C40	as	an	observer	city	in	March	2012.	Singapore	was	invited	to	be	part	of	the	network	as	recognition	of	its	good	track	record	on	balancing	economic	growth	and	sustainable	development.	As	Singapore	is	a	city-state	(and	not	a	city),	it	participates	in	C40	as	an	observer;	Bouteligier,	Cities,	Networks	and	Global	Environmental	Governance:	Spaces	of	Innovation,	Places	of	
Leadership	,	pg.	35.		64	Interview	No.	5.		65	Ibid.		
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extent,	an	exclusive	club.66	C40	has	indicated	that	in	the	long	run,	it	plans	to	move	towards	clearly	articulated	and	formal	performance-based	membership	standards.67	The	Compact	of	Mayors	is	an	agreement	amongst	city	networks	-	including	C40,	ICLEI,	and	UCLG	-	which	was	launched	at	the	2014	UN	Climate	Summit.68	As	a	signatory,	C40	actively	encourages	its	member	cities	to	commit	to	the	Compact	of	Mayors.	As	such,	it	is	likely	that	in	the	near	future,	C40	cities	will	meet	or	exceed	the	compliance	requirements	of	the	Compact	of	Mayors.	To	commit	to	the	Compact	of	Mayors,	a	city	will	first	have	to	register	on	either	of	the	Compact’s	reporting	platforms:	carbonn	Climate	Registry	or	CDP.69	It	should	be	noted	that	CDP	is	already	the	official	reporting	platform	for	C40	cities.	Secondly,	within	one	year	of	its	registration,	a	city	must	create	a	GHG	inventory	with	a	breakdown	of	emissions	for	the	buildings	and	transportation	sectors.	This	GHG	inventory	must	be	compiled	using	the	GHG	Protocol	for	Cities	(see	discussion	in	Part	3.5	Partnerships	below).	The	city	is	also	required	to	identify	its	climate	risks.	Both	its	inventory	and	risk	profile	must	be	reported	via	CDP	or	carbonn	Climate	Registry.	Within	two	years	of	its	registration,	the	city	must	update	its	GHG	inventory	to	include	emissions	from	its	waste	sector.	It	also	has	to	set	a	GHG	reduction	target	and	conduct	a	climate	vulnerability	assessment.	Again,	all	the	information	must	be	reported	on	one	of	the	reporting	platforms.	Within	three	years	of	its	registration,	the	city	is	required	to	deliver	an	action	plan	that	shows	how	it	will	meet	its	GHG	reduction	target	and	its	adaptation	challenges.	Upon	completing	all	these	requirements,	a	city	will	be	certified	“compliant”	and	receive	a	certification	logo	that	may	be	publicly	displayed	online	and	in	printed	materials.	A	new	“compliant”	badge	will	be	issued	to	the	city	each	year	that	it	maintains	compliance	through	annual	reporting.		C40	has	the	formal	power	to	withdraw	membership	from	cities	that	are	deemed	to	be	under-performing.	However,	asking	a	city	to	leave	C40	is	perceived	to	be	a	serious	and	drastic	measure	and	this	has	not	yet	been	done.70	Instead,	the	board	of	directors	usually	engages	in	informal	discussions	with	the	under-performing	city,	which	is	expected	to	take	action	for	improvement.71	According	to	the	Climate	Action	in	Megacities	2.0	survey,	the	global	average	is	137	actions	per	C40	member	city.	Based	on	responses	received	from	fifty-three	C40	cities,	North																																																									66	Interviews	Nos.	2,	7,	8,	10.		67	C40	and	ARUP,	Climate	Action	in	Megacities	(C40	Cities	Baseline	and	Opportunities,	Volumne	2.0,	
February	2014)	(2014	),	pg.	7.		68	Launched	at	the	Climate	Summit	in	New	York	City	on	23	September	2014,	the	Compact	of	Mayors	is	a	high-profile	initiative	by	the	three	major	transnational	city	networks	for	climate	change	that	exist	today	-	the	C40,	ICLEI	and	UCLG	-	in	partnership	with	UN-Habitat	and	Michael	Bloomberg	(in	his	capacity	as	the	UN	Secretary-General’s	Special	Envoy	for	Cities	and	Climate	Change);	Compact	of	Mayors,	online:	http://www.compactofmayors.org	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).		69	The	carbonn	Cities	Registry	is	a	global	reporting	platform	launched	in	November	2010	at	the	World	Mayors	Summit	on	Climate	in	Mexico	City	to	allow	cities	to	report	their	goals	and	actions	to	the	public;	online:	www.carbonn.org;	CDP	collects	and	discloses	environmental	information	of	major	companies	and	cities	around	the	world;	online:	www.cdp.net.		The	information	in	the	rest	of	this	paragraph	is	drawn	from	the	Full	Guide	to	Compliance	for	the	Compact	of	Mayors	(July	2015),	online:	http://www.compactofmayors.org/history/	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).		70	Interview	No.	5.	71	Ibid.		
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American	cities	are	reporting	the	most	action	across	C40	(at	175	actions	per	city)	and	East	Asian	cities	have	implemented	the	lowest	number	of	actions	(77	per	city).	Further,	not	all	C40	cities	have	developed	a	climate	change	action	plan	with	discernible	or	comparable	quantitative	targets.72		
	
3.4	Networks,	Summits	and	Workshops		
	 In	establishing	C40,	London	wanted	to	create	a	platform	for	cities	to	gain	access	to	information	about	climate-related	policies.	Not	having	that	knowledge	itself	when	it	wanted	to	go	beyond	national	climate	policies,	London	became	keenly	aware	of	how	access	to	information	was	a	crucial	first	step	and	that	it	could	have	saved	much	time	if	a	network	like	C40	existed	when	it	needed	such	information.73		Thus,	within	C40,	workshops,	summits	and	conferences	take	place	on	a	regular	basis	to	facilitate	the	exchange	of	ideas	and	best	practices	as	well	as	build	personal	interactions	(in	addition	to	virtual	ones).		The	basic	infrastructure	of	C40	is	made	up	of	issue-specific	networks.	C40	currently	has	16	networks	in	areas	such	as	Adaptation	and	Water;	Energy;	Finance	and	Economic	Development;	Measurement	and	Planning;	Solid	Waste	Management;	Transportation;	Urban	Planning	and	Development.74	When	a	city	becomes	a	member	of	C40,	a	detailed	analysis	is	conducted	to	determine	the	city’s	immediate	priorities	and	preferences.	Based	on	this	analysis,	the	city	will	choose	to	join	specific	networks	that	cater	to	its	interests,	for	example,	in	developing	solid	waste	management	solutions	or	improving	the	city’s	sustainable	transportation	options.	A	city	will	typically	join	four	or	five	networks;	it	is	discouraged	from	joining	too	many	networks	as	the	assumption	is	that	a	city	that	is	involved	in	too	many	networks	will	have	its	resources	stretched	too	thinly	to	gain	or	contribute	optimally.75		In	the	early	stages,	C40	selected	a	set	of	issues	that	served	as	the	focal	point	of	these	networks.	These	issue	areas	are	those	in	which	city	governments	are	most	likely	to	have	the	power	to	act	such	as	waste	management	and	energy	efficiency.76	As	such,	there	will	not	be	a	network	on	electricity	generation	because	cities	usually	do	not	have	the	powers	to	decide	on	the	sources	of	its	electricity.	Networks	have	also	emerged	due	to	demand	from	member	cities	or	at	their	initiative.	There	is	a	director	who	provides	oversight	of	all	the	networks,	in	addition	to	a	team	of	managers.77	Each	network	has	a	manager	that	is	responsible	for	its	day-to-day	operations,	organizes	meetings	and	workshops	for	the	cities	that	are	part	of	that																																																									72	Shenzhen,	for	example,	has	a	target	of	reducing	its	carbon	dioxide	emissions	by	21%	per	unit	of	GDP	between	2010	and	2015	while	Milan	aims	to	reduce	its	carbon	dioxide	emissions	by	20%	by	2020	(compared	with	its	emissions	in	2005).	Sydney	aims	to	reduce	by	70%	by	2030	(compared	with	its	emissions	in	2006).	Bangkok	and	Cairo,	on	the	other	hand,	do	not	have	emissions	reduction	targets.	The	data	relied	upon	in	this	footnote	is	found	at	C40,	online:	http://c40-production.herokuapp.com/cities	(accessed	on	29	December	2016).		73	Bouteligier,	pg.	92.		74	C40,	‘Networks:	Connecting	Cities	on	Topics	of	Common	Interest’,	online:	http://c40-production.herokuapp.com/networks	(accessed	on	30	December	2016).	75	Interview	No.	5.	76	Ibid.		77	C40,	‘Our	Team’,	online:	http://www.c40.org/our_team	(accessed	on	30	December	2016).	
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network,	promotes	new	ideas,	and	gathers	resources	to	meet	the	needs	of	the	member	cities.	In	some	networks,	the	manager	also	serves	as	the	liaison	person	with	external	partners.	For	example,	within	the	Adaptation	and	Water	category,	the	C40	Cool	Cities	Network	was	launched	in	2012	in	partnership	with	Global	Cool	Cities	Alliance,	a	non-profit	organization	that	promotes	research	and	policy	awareness	of	solutions	to	reduce	the	urban	heat	island	effect.78	Members	of	the	C40	Cool	Cities	Network	include	Tokyo,	New	York	City,	Athens	and	Toronto.79		Once	every	two	years,	all	C40	cities	come	together	for	the	summit.	A	flagship	event	for	the	network,	the	C40	summit	has	been	described	as	being	“like	a	low-key	version	of	a	heads	of	state	summit.”80	At	the	summits,	mayors	present	their	“ground-breaking	projects”,	forge	strategic	partnerships,	and	announce	new	initiatives	to	the	public.81	For	example,	Johannesburg	hosted	the	C40	summit	in	2014	during	which	the	Climate	Action	in	Megacities	2.0	Report	was	formally	launched.82	A	quantitative	survey	of	what	C40	cities	have	done	to	reduce	GHG	emissions	and	improve	climate	resilience,	the	report	provides	a	basis	for	measurement	and	evaluation	as	well	as	serves	as	a	public	relations	tool	to	promote	C40’s	message	that	“cities	have	the	power,	the	expertise,	the	political	will	and	the	resourcefulness	to	continue	to	take	meaningful	action.”83	During	the	C40	summit	in	Johannesburg,	Rotterdam	mayor	Ahmed	Aboutaleb	showcased	his	city’s	adaptation	projects	such	as	the	floating	pavilion	and	the	Stadshavens	re-development	project.84		He	also	presented	the	book,	
Connecting	Delta	Cities:	Resilient	Cities	and	Climate	Adaptation	Strategies,	which	showcases	some	of	the	activities	and	projects	initiated	under	the	auspices	of	
Connecting	Delta	Cities,	a	small	network	of	cities	within	C40’s	Water	and	Adaptation	Initiative.85	As	mentioned	in	the	previous	chapter,	Rotterdam	is	the	founder	of	this	network	and	operates	a	secretariat	to	support	the	network’s	activities.	Finally,																																																									78	C40,	‘Cool	Cities’,	online:	http://www.c40.org/networks/cool_cities.	On	the	urban	heat	island	effect,	see	US	EPA,	‘Reducing	Urban	Heat	Islands:	Compendium	of	Strategies’,	online:	https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-06/documents/basicscompendium.pdf	(Both	sources	accessed	on	30	December	2016)	79	C40,	ibid.		80	Anita	Powell,	‘Mayors’	C40	summit	gives	megacity	leaders	a	chance	to	grab	the	global	spotlight’,	
The	Guardian,	7	February	2014.		81	C40	Summits:	London	Summit	(2005),	New	York	Summit	(2007),	Seoul	Summit	(2009),	Sao	Paolo	Summit	(2011),	Johannesburg	Summit	(2014).	The	next	Summit	will	be	held	in	Mexico	City	in	2016.		82	C40	Blog,	‘August	Rewind:	Plenary	Videos	from	the	C40	Mayors	Summit’,	online:		http://www.c40.org/blog_posts/august-rewind-plenary-videos-from-the-c40-mayors-summit	(accessed	on	1	June	2016).	83	C40	Blog,	‘Climate	Action	in	Megacities	Version	2.0’,	online:	http://www.c40.org/blog_posts/CAM2	(accessed	on	1	June	2016).	This	report	shows	that	in	the	two	years	since	C40	last	surveyed	its	members	in	2011,	the	total	number	of	‘actions’	taken	by	C40	cities	has	nearly	doubled	to	8,068	across	a	range	of	sectors	including	transportation,	waste	management,	outdoor	lighting	and	water;	C40	and	ARUP,	Climate	Action	in	Megacities	(C40	Cities	Baseline	and	Opportunities,	Volumne	2.0,	February	
2014),	pg.	6.	84	Rotterdam	Climate	Initiative,	‘Rotterdam	mayor	Aboutaleb	to	Johannesburg	for	delta	city	C40	Mayors	Summit’,	31	January	2014,	online:		http://www.rotterdamclimateinitiative.nl/uk/news/rotterdam-mayor-aboutaleb-to-johannesburg-for-delta-city-c40-mayors-summit?news_id=2053	(accessed	on	1	June	2016).	85	Ibid.	
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mayor	Aboutaleb	also	scheduled	a	meeting	with	the	mayor	of	Durban	to	discuss	potential	opportunities	in	reducing	GHG	emissions	from	the	maritime	transport	and	logistics	sectors.86		The	C40	workshops	are	more	focused	on	specific	themes	of	a	more	technical	nature	such	as	reducing	traffic	congestion	in	cities	and	municipal	waste	treatment.87	In	November	2010,	Hong	Kong	hosted	a	major	international	conference	on	climate	change,	Climate	Dialogue:	Low	Carbon	Cities	for	High	Quality	Living.88	A	C40	workshop	was	organized	as	part	of	the	international	conference	and	its	focus	was	on	the	enhancement	of	energy	efficiency	in	buildings	and	green	transportation	(particularly	the	development	of	electric	vehicles).89	More	than	a	hundred	participants	attended	the	closed-door	workshop,	including	property	developers,	electricity	generation	companies,	car	manufacturers,	research	institutes,	and	officials	from	cities	around	the	world.90		
	
3.5	Partnerships			
3.5.1	Partnering	the	Private	Sector		 From	the	outset,	C40	sought	partnerships	with	the	private	sector	and	non	profit	organizations	like	the	Clinton	Climate	Initiative,	which	are	“committed	to	a	business-oriented	approach	to	climate	change”,	to	implement	market-based	solutions	to	climate	change.91	In	this	regard,	C40	espouses	a	neo-liberal	environmental	approach.92	These	partnerships	are	crucial	to	C40’s	quest	to	be	a	catalyst	for	urban	action	on	climate	change.	Many	city	authorities	have	limited	resources	and	the	implementation	of	climate	actions	requires	significant	time,	money	and	human	resources.	The	partnerships	that	C40	has	forged	help	overcome																																																									86	Ibid.	87	For	example,	Workshop	on	Transport	and	Congestion	(London,	December	2007),	Deltas	in	Times	of	Climate	Change	Conference	(Rotterdam,	September	2010),	Workshop	on	Low	Carbon	Cities	for	High	Quality	Living	(Hong	Kong,	November	2010),	Bus	Rapid	Transit	Workshop	(Jakarta,	November	2013),	Solid	Wastes	Networks	Workshop	(Milan,	October	2014).		88	During	this	month,	Hong	Kong	was	abuzz	with	climate	change	conferences	and	events.	Alongside	this	major	international	conference	were	numerous	side	events	including	lectures	by	world-renowned	climate	scientists,	receptions	hosted	by	the	US,	British	and	Swedish	consulates,	and	a	climate	law	conference	at	the	University	of	Hong	Kong.	For	details,	see	Climate	Dialogue,	“Press	Kit	06:	Side	Events”,	online:	http://civic-exchange.org/materials/event/files/20101103-1106%20Climate%20Dialogue/20101103-1106_ClimateDialogue_SideEvents.pdf	(accessed	on	1	June	2016).		89	Climate	Dialogue,	‘Press	Kit	04:	Conference	Programme’,	online:		http://civic-exchange.org/materials/event/files/20101103-1106%20Climate%20Dialogue/20101103-1106_ClimateDialogue_ProgrammeDetails.pdf	(accessed	on	1	June	2016).	90	Ibid.	91	Bruce	Lindsey,	CEO	of	the	Clinton	Foundation,	quoted	in	Microsoft	News	Center,	‘Clinton	Foundation,	Microsoft	to	Develop	Online	Tools	Enabling	the	World’s	Largest	40	Cities	to	Monitor	Carbon	Emissions’	(17	May	2007).		92	Bouteligier,	Cities,	Networks	and	Global	Environmental	Governance:	Spaces	of	Innovation,	Places	of	
Leadership	,	pg.	99.		
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the	constraints	that	member	cities	face.	For	example,	the	MOUs	signed	with	energy	service	companies	(e.g.	Siemens)	and	environmental	consultancies	(e.g.	Arup)	allow	C40	cities	to	purchase	products	and	services	at	preferential	prices.93	Arup	conducts	UrbanLife	Workshops	for	C40	cities	that,	to	date,	have	focused	on	energy,	waste	and	water	strategies.	These	workshops	allow	C40	cities	to	tap	on	Arup’s	technical	expertise	and	policy	consulting	in	developing	climate	action	plans	and	programs.94	As	part	of	their	collaboration,	C40	and	Siemens	launched	the	City	Climate	Leadership	Awards	in	2013	to	confer	recognition	on	“global	cities	demonstrating	excellence	in	urban	sustainability.”95	In	2014,	a	seven-member	panel	consisting	of	architects,	former	mayors,	representatives	from	the	World	Bank,	C40	and	Siemens	nominated	thirty	finalists	and	selected	ten	winners.96	An	eleventh	prize	–	the	Citizen’s	choice’	was	selected	by	public	(online)	vote.	The	awards	process	also	serves	as	a	platform	for	identifying	and	cataloguing	innovative	case	studies	that	other	cities	can	learn	from.				
3.5.2	Cooperation	with	other	transnational	municipal	networks			 C40	also	cooperates	with	other	transnational	municipal	networks	to	achieve	its	goals.	The	development	of	the	Greenhouse	Gas	Protocol	for	Cities	(GHG	City	Protocol)	is	a	good	illustrative	example.	Briefly,	GHG	accounting	provides	a	detailed	and	replicable	report	of	the	GHG	emissions	generated	by	a	specific	actor.	Just	as	financial	accounts	can	be	kept	at	the	level	of	the	project,	firm	or	country,	GHG	accounting	can	take	place	at	different	levels.	GHGs	are	generally	measured	and	reported	at	the	national,	firm,	facility	or	project	levels.97	In	the	late	2000s,	C40	and	ICLEI	recognized	that	cities	did	not	have	an	internationally	accepted	methodology	for	calculating	and	reporting	GHG	emissions	at	the	city	level.	There	were	many	standards	available	to	cities,	none	of	which	were	considered	complete	in	their	coverage.	They	differed	in	terms	of	what	emission	sources	and	GHGs	are	included	in	the	inventory,	how	emissions	sources	are	defined,	and	how	transboundary																																																									93	Clinton	Climate	Initiative,	‘President	Clinton	announces	landmark	program	to	reduce	energy	use	in	buildings	worldwide’	(New	York,	16	May	2007),	online:		https://www.clintonfoundation.org/main/news-and-media/press-releases-and-statements/press-release-president-clinton-announces-landmark-program-to-reduce-energy-use.html	(accessed	on	30	December	2016).	94	Arup,	‘Tackling	Climate	Change	with	the	C40’,	online:		http://www.arup.com/Homepage_Archive/Homepage_C40.aspx	(accessed	on	30	December	2014).	95	Siemens	and	C40	(joint	press	release),	‘C40	&	Siemens	kick	off	2014	City	Climate	Leadership	Awards’	(Munich/New	York,	21	January	2014),	online:	http://www.siemens.com/press/en/pressrelease/?press=/en/pressrelease/2014/infrastructure-cities/ic201401006.htm&content[]=IC&content[]=CC&content[]=Corp	(accessed	on	30	December	2016).	96	City	Climate	Leadership	Awards,	online:	http://cityclimateleadershipawards.com	(accessed	on	30	December	2016).	97	For	an	example	of	project-level	accounting,	see	Global	Environmental	Facility	GHG	accounting	methodologies,	online:	https://www.thegef.org/gef/ghg-accounting	(accessed	on	1	June	2016).	For	discussion	about	the	Greenhouse	Gas	Protocol	which	calculates	and	reports	GHG	emissions	at	the	firm	level,	see	Jessica	Green,	‘Private	Standards	in	the	Climate	Regime:	The	Greenhouse	Gas	Protocol’	(2010)	12	Business	and	Politics	Article	3.	
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emissions	are	treated.98	These	inconsistencies	made	it	difficult	to	compare	the	performance	of	cities,	raised	questions	about	the	quality	of	the	data,	and	hindered	the	capacity	of	third	parties	to	act	as	watchdogs.99	Thus,	C40	and	ICLEI	decided	to	work	together	to	develop	a	globally	accepted	and	harmonized	standard	such	that	“by	using	the	[protocol],	cities	will	also	strengthen	vertical	integration	of	data	reporting	to	other	levels	of	government,	and	should	gain	improved	access	to	local	and	international	climate	financing.”100		In	June	2011,	C40	and	ICLEI	signed	an	MOU	to	begin	developing	the	GHG	City	Protocol.	A	year	later,	the	partnership	was	expanded	to	include	World	Resources	Institute,	the	World	Bank,	UNEP	and	UN-HABITAT.101	A	draft	of	the	GHG	City	Protocol	was	released	in	March	2012	for	public	comment.	After	the	public	comment	period	ended,	the	draft	protocol	was	updated	and	then	tested	in	thirty-five	cities	worldwide.	The	cities	that	pilot	tested	the	GHG	Protocol	in	2013	included	Kyoto,	Tokyo,	Buenos	Aires,	Lima,	London	and	Stockholm.	During	the	same	period,	six	in-person	stakeholder	consultation	workshops	were	held	in	Beijing,	Sao	Paulo,	London,	Dar	es	Salaam,	New	Delhi,	and	Jakarta.	Over	150	city	officials,	researchers,	and	practitioners	provided	feedback	on	the	pilot	GHG	City	Protocol.	After	revisions,	the	draft	protocol	went	through	a	second	round	of	public	comment	in	July	to	August	2014.	The	final	version	of	the	GHG	City	Protocol	was	published	in	December	2014.102	The	GHG	City	Protocol	will	be	further	discussed	in	the	next	chapter	as	a	type	of	voluntary	standard.	
	
3.5.3	C40-World	Bank	Partnership			Amongst	C40’s	partnerships,	its	relationship	with	the	World	Bank	is	arguably	its	most	significant	one	as	it	gives	C40	member	cities	access	to	the	multilateral	financial	institution’s	resources	including	financing	for	low-carbon	infrastructure	projects	and	its	capacity-building	programs.		The	relationship	between	the	World																																																									98	Greenhouse	Gas	Protocol,	Global	Protocol	for	Community-Scale	Greenhouse	Gas	Emission	Inventories,	pg.	19,		online:	http://carbonn.org/fileadmin/user_upload/cCCR/GPC/GHGP_GPC.pdf	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).		99	For	discussion	about	the	problems	of	incomplete	and	incompatible	data	collection	methods,	see	Angel	Hsu	and	others,	‘Track	climate	pledges	of	cities	and	companies’	(2016)	532	Nature	303.	100	Greenhouse	Gas	Protocol,	Launch	of	First	Global	Standard	to	Measure	Greenhouse	Gas	Emissions	
from	Cities	(2014),	online:	http://www.ghgprotocol.org/Release/GPC_launch	(accessed	on	30	December	2016).	101	Greenhouse	Gas	Protocol,	‘About	the	GHG	Protocol’,	online:	http://www.ghgprotocol.org/about-ghgp	(accessed	on	30	December	2014).	World	Resources	Institute	is	an	environmental	NGO	that	had	worked	with	the	World	Business	Council	for	Sustainable	Development	(a	coalition	of	two	hundred	multinational	corporations	committed	to	sustainable	development)	to	develop	an	emissions	accounting	tool	for	companies	known	as	the	GHG	Protocol	Corporate	Standard.	This	Corporate	Standard	has	gained	global	acceptance,	partly	due	to	its	adoption	by	the	International	Organization	for	Standardization	(ISO)	in	2006	as	the	basis	for	the	ISO	14064-1	standard	(Specification	with	
Guidance	at	the	Organization	Level	for	Quantification	and	Reporting	of	Greenhouse	Gas	Emissions	and	
Removals).		102	This	account	of	the	process	behind	the	final	publication	of	the	GHG	Protocol	standard	is	documented	on	the	GHG	Protocol	website;	online:	http://ghgprotocol.org/GPC_development_process		(accessed	on	30	December	2016).	
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Bank	and	C40	can	be	theorized	as	one	of	orchestration,	a	term	coined	by	Kenneth	Abbott	and	his	colleagues	to	refer	to	a	situation	whereby	an	international	organization	(the	World	Bank	in	the	present	case)	supports	and	endorses	an	intermediary	actor	(C40	in	the	present	case)	to	address	target	actors	(global	cities)	in	pursuit	of	the	international	organization’s	governance	goals.103	Orchestration	is	intended	to	be	mutually	beneficial.	Intermediaries	voluntarily	participate	in	orchestration	because	they	value	the	ideational	and	material	support	offered	by	the	international	organization.	At	the	same	time,	international	organizations	engage	in	orchestration	because	the	use	of	intermediaries	helps	to	overcome	their	resource	constraints,	which	are	significant	relative	to	the	demands	of	their	governance	tasks	even	in	the	case	of	a	well-funded	organization	like	the	World	Bank.	C40	and	the	World	Bank	began	cooperation	in	2009	within	a	wider	partnership	with	Ecos	(a	Swiss	environmental	consultancy),	the	City	of	Basel	and	the	Swiss	State	Secretariat	for	Economic	Affairs	to	develop	the	Carbon	Finance	Capacity	Building	Program.104	Premised	on	the	belief	that	cities	in	developing	countries	can	benefit	from	the	Kyoto	Protocol’s	Clean	Development	Mechanism	(CDM),	the	Carbon	Finance	Capacity	Building	Program	aimed	to	increase	the	ability	of	cities	to	develop	and	implement	CDM	projects	and	therefore	benefit	from	climate	finance.	The	program	adopted	a	‘learning	by	doing’	approach	in	four	pilot	cities.	Dar	es	Salaam,	Jakarta,	Quezon	City,	Sao	Paolo	were	selected	as	pilot	cities	and	the	CDM	projects	there	served	as	case	studies	for	other	cities	in	developing	countries.105	Amongst	the	four	cities,	all	are	C40	members	except	Quezon	City.	It	should	therefore	be	noted	that	C40’s	collaboration	with	external	partners	generates	benefits	for	cities	outside	the	network	too.		In	June	2011,	C40	deepened	its	collaboration	with	the	World	Bank.	Both	institutions	announced	the	launch	of	a	new	partnership	to	address	the	two	main	structural	issues	that	hindered	cities	from	gaining	access	to	carbon	finance.106	Pursuant	to	this	partnership,	C40	and	the	World	Bank	agreed	to	cooperate	to	develop	a	consistent	approach	for	city	climate	action	plans.	At	that	time,	there	were	standardized	methodologies	for	climate	action	plans	at	the	national	level,	but	none	existed	for	the	city	level.	The	lack	of	a	standardized	methodology	for	city-level	climate	action	plans	made	it	difficult	for	investors	to	assess	the	financial	viability	of	urban	climate	action	proposals	and	therefore	reluctant	to	fund	them.	C40	and	the	World	Bank	agreed	to	work	together	to	develop	a	methodology	so	that	cities	would	be	better	placed	to	attract	private	sector	investments	for	their	low-carbon																																																									103	See	discussion	on	orchestration	in	Chapter	2	(Section	2.2).		104	World	Bank	Institute,	‘Carbon	Finance	Capacity	Building	Program’,	online:	http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/about/topics/carbon-finance-capacity-building	(accessed	on	30	December	2016).		105	World	Bank	Institute,	‘Carbon	Finance	Capacity	Building	Program’	(Washington	DC,	2011),	online:	http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/document/carbon-finance-capacity-building-program	(accessed	on	30	December	2016).	106	C40	and	the	World	Bank	(joint	press	release),	‘C40	and	World	Bank	Form	Groundbreaking	Climate	Change	Action	Partnership’,	online:	http://www.c40.org/press_releases/press-release-c40-and-world-bank-form-groundbreaking-climate-change-action-partnership	(accessed	on	30	December	2016).	The	information	contained	in	the	rest	of	this	paragraph	is	drawn	from	this	source.		
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development	programs.	C40	and	the	World	Bank	also	committed	to	working	together	to	develop	a	city-level	GHG	accounting	protocol,	and	the	World	Bank	was	invited	to	join	ICLEI	and	C40	to	develop	the	GHG	City	Protocol.	In	addition,	C40	agreed	to	identify	and	work	with	national	governments	and	private	sector	investors	who	are	interested	to	provide	project	financing	in	C40	cities.	The	World	Bank	committed	to	identifying	opportunities	amongst	sources	of	concessional	finance,	develop	risk	management	instruments	as	well	as	engage	the	private	sector	via	the	International	Finance	Corporation.			The	C40-World	Bank	partnership	has	grown	in	scale	and	ambition,	culminating	in	two	initiatives	that	were	announced	at	the	2014	Climate	Summit	hosted	by	UN	Secretary	General	Ban	Ki	Moon	on	23	September	2014.107	The	Cities	Climate	Finance	Leadership	Alliance	and	the	City	Creditworthiness	Partnership	seek	to	help	cities	improve	their	credit-worthiness,	provide	cities	with	technical	assistance	and	transactional	support,	and	catalyze	capital	flows,	particularly	the	mobilization	of	private	capital,	to	cities	to	increase	investment	in	low-carbon	and	climate-resilient	infrastructure.108		Through	orchestration,	the	C40	and	World	Bank	have	created	a	global-local	relationship	that	facilitates	cities	in	bypassing	the	state	and	directly	engaging	with	other	transnational	actors	when	it	comes	to	governing	climate	change.	Through	initiatives	like	the	City	Creditworthiness	Partnership,	C40	member	cities	have	direct	access	to	the	World	Bank’s	expertise	in	carbon	finance	and	funding	opportunities.		For	many	cities,	the	access	to	such	resources	is	vital	because	climate	financing	is	relatively	new	to	many	city	governments	in	developed	and	developing	countries	alike.109	Many	city	government	officials	do	not	have	sufficient	knowledge	about	climate	finance,	do	not	know	what	funding	opportunities	for	climate	projects	are	available,	and	there	is	a	gap	between	the	“language	used	by	investors”	and	that	used	by	city	governments.110	City	authorities	therefore	face	obstacles	in	securing	funding	for	large-scale	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation	projects.111	As	partnerships	such																																																									107	The	summit	in	New	York	was	widely	hailed	as	a	success	in	galvanizing	public	opinion	in	favour	of	strong	climate	action	ahead	of	the	COPs	in	Lima	and,	more	importantly,	Paris	where	the	international	community	was	expected	to	conclude	an	agreement	that	would	include	GHG	emission	reduction	targets	for	developed	and	developing	countries	alike.	For	discussion,	see	Michael		Jacobs,	‘Five	ways	Ban	Ki-moon's	summit	has	changed	international	climate	politics	forever’	The	Guardian	(24	September	2014);	‘Why	climate	change	is	back	on	the	agenda’	The	Economist	(22	September	2014).		108	Climate	Initiatives	Database,	‘City	Creditworthiness	Partnership’,	online:	http://climateinitiativesdatabase.org/index.php/City_Creditworthiness_Partnership.	According	to	the	World	Economic	Forum	and	World	Bank,	there	is	enormous	unmet	demand	for	investments	in	low-carbon	and	climate-resilient	urban	infrastructure	in	low-	and	middle-income	countries.	More	than	US$1	trillion	per	year	is	needed	to	finance	the	infrastructure	gap,	which	is	attributable	to	a	number	of	reasons	including	lack	of	capacity	at	the	municipal	level	to	formulate	projects	with	adequate	business	plans	and	inadequate	levels	of	municipal	credit-worthiness	(which	limit	access	to	low-cost	capital);	Climate	Summit	2014,	‘The	Cities	Climate	Finance	Leadership	Alliance	Action	Statement’,	pg.	3,	online:	http://www.un.org/climatechange/summit/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2014/07/CITIES-Cities-Climate-Finance-Leadership-Alliance.pdf	(both	sources	accessed	on	13	December	2016).	109	Interview	No.	4.		110	Ibid.	111	Interview	No.	2.	
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as	that	between	the	C40	and	World	Bank	bypass	national	governments	and	empower	cities	to	be	more	financially	independent,	this	has	given	rise	to	mixed	responses	on	the	part	of	national	governments.	Some	national	governments,	South	Africa	being	a	good	example,	are	keen	to	encourage	their	cities	to	issue	green	bonds	and	explore	alternative	sources	of	financing	to	pursue	low-carbon	development.112	Other	national	governments	are	less	enthusiastic	due	to	political	reasons	and	financial	risks.113	Given	that	these	developments	are	very	recent	and	unfolding	rapidly,	it	is	too	early	to	assess	how	states	react	to	being	bypassed	by	orchestration	efforts	except	to	note	that	we	can	expect	a	range	of	responses,	which	are	highly	country-specific,	and	that	the	current	trend	of	building	capacity	for	urban	climate	finance	will	continue	apace	for	some	time	because	of	the	momentum	created	by	the	mobilization	of	vast	resources	from	international	financial	institutions,	development	agencies,	supranational	authorities	like	the	European	Union,	and	the	private	sector.114	At	the	UNFCCC	level,	Executive	Secretary	Christiana	Figueres	has	shown	appreciation	of	the	benefits	of	orchestration	efforts	and	embraces	the	notion	that	polycentric,	multi-actor	governance	ultimately	reinforces	and	strengthens	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.115	In	the	next	chapter,	the	complementarity	between	urban	transnational	climate	change	governance	and	the	UNFCCC	regime	will	be	further	explored	from	the	rule-making	perspective.			
4. Conclusion		This	chapter	has	examined	how	global	cities,	in	seeking	to	scale	up	their	climate	governance	efforts	and	to	learn	from	each	other,	have	found	it	beneficial	to	form	a	network.	The	C40	is	not	only	a	horizontal	network	that	connects	city	officials	around	the	world.	It	has	also	created	significant	linkages	to	private	actors	such	as																																																									112	Ibid.		113	When	a	mayor	is	a	well-known	individual	with	potential	aspirations	at	the	national	level	of	politics,	his/her	city’s	attempt	to	finance	high	profile	projects	with	international	sources	may	cause	tensions	with	the	central	government.	A	recent	example	is	the	city	of	Dakar,	which	was	ready	in	February	2015	to	issue	the	first	municipal	bond	in	West	Africa	after	many	years	of	preparation	but	the	issuance	was	blocked	by	the	Senegalese	government;	see	Sam	Barnard,	Climate	finance	for	cities:	
How	can	international	climate	funds	best	support	low-carbon	and	climate	resilient	urban	development?	(Overseas	Development	Institute,	Working	Paper	419,	2015),	pg.	20.	114	Since	the	launch	of	the	Cities	Climate	Finance	Leadership	Alliance,	there	has	been	a	proliferation	of	urban	climate	finance	capacity-building	programs	and	related	initiatives.	A	working	group	under	the	auspices	of	the	Cities	Climate	Finance	Leadership	Alliance	has	been	put	together	to	carry	out	a	mapping	exercise	of	all	known	urban	climate	financing	initiatives	(Interview	No.	2).	One	of	the	latest	initiatives,	launched	in	early	2016,	is	the	Low	Carbon	City	Lab	(LoCaL)’s	Matchmaker	program,	which	aims	to	connect	investors	with	urban	mitigation	projects;	online:	http://local.climate-kic.org/projects/matchmaker/	(accessed	on	20	June	2016).		115	This	view	finds	resonance	with	orchestration	theory,	rather	than	regime	complex	theory	which	tends	to	see	such	multiplicity	as	a	problem	that	threatens	governance	effectiveness	through	incoherence,	redundancy	and	conflict.	See	the	address	by	Christiana	Figueres,	Executive	Secretary	of	the	UNFCCC	at	the	C40	Cities	Mayor	Summit	in	Johannesburg,	5	February	2014,	online:	http://unfccc.int/files/press/statements/application/pdf/20140502_c40_check.pdf	(accessed	on	1	June	2016).	
	 122	
global	technology	companies	and	engineering	firms,	prominent	foundations	like	the	Clinton	Foundation,	and	international	organizations	including	UN-Habitat	and	the	World	Bank.	These	linkages	serve	to	connect	cities	directly	to	global	actors	to	engage	in	climate	governance.	Through	the	C40	network,	cities	are	also	able	to	develop	standards	and	practices	that	are	uniquely	suited	to	meet	their	needs	and	priorities	such	as	the	GHG	City	Protocol.	When	standards	and	norms	are	created	by	cities	and	implemented	through	transnational	networks,	it	can	be	argued	that	a	specific	form	of	governance	–	lawmaking	–	has	taken	place.	The	following	chapter	will	make	the	argument	that	cities,	through	networks	like	C40,	are	beginning	to	play	a	lawmaking	role	in	transnational	climate	change	governance.	
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Chapter	6:	Cities	as	Transnational	Lawmakers	
	
1. Introduction			 A	key	theme	that	has	emerged	from	the	foregoing	analysis	is	that	global	cities	are	sites	of	innovative	climate	governance.	Importantly,	global	cities	are	not	just	aiming	to	reduce	GHG	emissions	locally.	In	line	with	the	emerging	trend	of	cities	playing	an	increasingly	visible	role	in	international	affairs,	global	cities	aim	to	scale	up	their	climate	actions	to	generate	worldwide	impact	and	to	play	a	role	in	governing	climate	change	at	the	global	level.	This	has	led	to	the	formation	of	numerous	city	networks,	of	which	the	most	prominent	transnational	network	of	global	cities	focusing	on	climate	action	is	C40.	Through	reiterative	interaction	and	frequent	cooperation	within	their	network,	global	cities	develop	and	internalize	certain	norms,	defined	as	rules	that	set	“a	standard	of	appropriate	behaviour	for	actors	with	a	given	identity”,1	and	are	imbued	with	a	quality	of	“oughtness”	that	sets	them	apart	from	other	kinds	of	rules.2		In	the	present	case,	the	norms	are:	First,	that	climate	change	is	a	global	problem	but	can	and	must	be	addressed	locally	by	cities.	Secondly,	that	large,	global	cities	are	not	only	a	source	of	the	problem	because	of	their	high	levels	of	GHG	emissions	but	also	a	source	of	solutions.	As	Anne	Hidalgo,	the	mayor	of	Paris	said	in	an	interview	with	the	Financial	Times,	“[cities]	are	more	practical;	we	have	the	capacity	to	act	faster	and	the	decisions	are	closer	to	reality.	We	can	mobilize	all	actors,	public	and	private…[which	is]more	complicated	for	the	state.”3	Thirdly,	that	cities	can	best	reduce	their	GHG	emissions	and	embark	on	low-carbon	growth	by	committing	to	a	policy	approach	based	on	measurement,	monitoring	and	reporting	of	their	GHG	emissions.	Based	on	this	normative	foundation,	global	cities	have	cooperated	(through	C40)	with	other	actors	such	as	GHG	accounting	consultancies,	development	banks	and	civil	society	to	develop	practices	and	voluntary	standards	to	enable	global	cities	to	reduce	their	GHG	emissions	in	the	short	term	and	make	the	transition	towards	low-carbon	development	in	the	longer	term.	I	refer	to	these	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	developed	by	global	cities	and	implemented	through	their	transnational	networks	as	urban	climate	law.			 Urban	climate	law	is	notable	in	at	least	three	respects.	From	the	viewpoint	of	environmental	effectiveness	and	fulfilling	one	of	the	key	objectives	of	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex	(i.e.	climate	mitigation),	urban	climate																																																									1	Martha	Finnemore	and	Kathryn	Sikkink,	‘International	Norm	Dynamics	and	Political	Change’	(1992)	52	International	Organization	887,	pg.	891.	2	What	is	“appropriate”	is	determined	by	a	community	or	a	society,	which	raises	the	question	of	how	many	actors	must	share	in	the	collective	assessment	of	a	rule	before	it	can	be	called	a	“norm”;	M.	Finnemore	&	K.	Sikkink	suggest	that,	based	on	empirical	studies,	we	can	expect	a	norm	to	reach	tipping	point	when	at	least	one-third	of	the	total	states	in	the	system	adopt	the	norm.	Further,	which	states	adopt	the	norm	is	an	important	factor.	“Critical	states”	are	those	whose	non-adoption	will	compromise	the	achievement	of	the	substantive	norm;	ibid,	pg.	901.	See	discussion	in	Part	3	on	norm	diffusion	below.	3	Michael	Stothard,	‘Mayors	call	for	more	powers	to	fight	climate	change’	Financial	Times	(4	December	2015).	
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law	can	make	an	important	contribution	towards	reducing	cities’	GHG	emissions,	which	constitute	a	sizeable	share	of	global	emissions	(estimated	to	be	37-49%).4	From	a	theoretical	perspective,	understanding	how	urban	climate	law	fits	within	the	broader	transnational	climate	change	governance	landscape	and	interacts	with	other	normative	institutions,	particularly	the	UNFCCC	regime,	provides	us	with	novel	insights	about	the	lawmaking	role	that	cities	have	in	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.	Finally,	this	study	of	urban	climate	law	can	make	a	contribution	to	the	body	of	literature	on	soft	law,	specifically	voluntary	standards	which	tend	to	occupy	a	central	position	in	the	world	of	soft	law	solutions.	Voluntary	standards	are	characterized	by	voluntary	participation	in	the	construction	and	implementation	of	the	norms	and	practices.	Participants	are	free	to	leave	the	voluntary	scheme	any	time	and	there	is	an	absence	of	“police	power	as	a	way	to	induce	consent	and	compliance”.5	In	the	past	two	decades,	industry	and	governments	have	increasingly	turned	to	voluntary	schemes	to	address	social	and	environmental	externalities.	There	has	therefore	been	a	proliferation	of	voluntary	schemes	that	promulgate	codes	of	conduct,	standards	and	indicators	to	address	issues	ranging	from	deplorable	labour	conditions	in	the	global	garment	industry	to	the	deleterious	environmental	effects	of	large-scale	biofuels	production.6	This	chapter	argues	that	urban	climate	law	constitutes	a	novel	type	of	voluntary	standard	and	the	discussion	in	this	chapter	seeks	to	expand	the	analytical	discourse	of	voluntary	standards	by	considering	the	role	of	subnational	actors	in	creating	and	implementing	voluntary	standards.	To	understand	how	urban	climate	law	can	lead	to	cities	reducing	their	GHG	emissions,	this	chapter	identifies	two	key	pathways	of	influence	that	are	critical	for	shaping	how	cities	view	their	interests	and	align	them	with	the	overarching	objectives	of	reducing	GHG	emissions	in	the	short	term	and	developing	low-carbon	alternatives	for	the	future.	These	pathways	of	influence	involve	the	promotion	of	
reflexivity	in	cities	and	norm	diffusion.	At	the	heart	of	the	concept	of	reflexivity	is	that	actors	constantly	reflect	upon	their	social	practices	and	have	the	capacity	to	make	adjustments	to	those	practices	in	light	of	new	information.7	In	this	line	of	thinking,	voluntary	standards	are	regulatory	tools	that	uncover	new	information	for	cities,	which	can	then	reflect	and	act	upon	the	information	by	adjusting	their	practices	accordingly.	Such	information	will	identify,	for	example,	the	most	cost-																																																								4	Cambridge	Institute	for	Sustainability	Leadership,	Cambridge	Judge	Business	School	and	ICLEI,	
Climate	Change:	Implications	for	Cities	(Key	Findings	from	the	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	
Change	Fifth	Assessment	Report)	(2014).	5	John	Kirton	and	Michael	J.	Trebilcock,	‘Introduction:	hard	choices	and	soft	law	in	sustainable	global	governance’	in	John	Kirton	and	Michael	J.	Trebilcock	(eds),	Hard	Choices,	Soft	Law:	Voluntary	
Standards	in	Global	Trade,	Environment	and	Social	Governance	(Routledge	2004),	pg.	9.		6	For	discussion,	see	for	example,	Arthur	P.J.	Mol,	‘Environmental	authorities	and	biofuel	controversies’	(2010)	19	Environmental	Politics	61;	Charan	Devereaux	and	Henry	Lee,	Biofuels	and	
Certification:	A	Workshop	at	Harvard	Kennedy	School	(Discussion	Paper	2009-07,	Cambridge,	Mass:	Belfer	Center	for	Science	and	International	Affairs,	2009);	Allison	Loconto,	‘Assembling	governance:	the	role	of	standards	in	the	Tanzanian	tea	industry’	(2015)	107	Journal	of	Cleaner	Production	64;	Ethical	Trading	Initiative	Base	Code,	online:	http://www.ethicaltrade.org	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	7	See	discussion	in	Part	3.1	below.	
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efficient	climate	mitigation	opportunities	available	to	the	city.8	The	second	pathway	of	influence	is	concerned	with	how	the	norms	of	urban	climate	law	are	disseminated	and	become	widely	adopted	within	a	fairly	short	period	of	time.	I	refer	to	prominent	theories	of	diffusion	to	offer	an	account	of	how	urban	climate	law	reaches	a	“tipping	point”	after	which	it	“cascades”	through	the	transnational	city	network	and	leads	to	climate	action.9		As	for	the	question	of	how	urban	climate	law	fits	within	the	broader	transnational	climate	change	governance	landscape	and	relates	to	the	UNFCCC	regime,	this	chapter	advances	the	claim	that,	in	many	key	respects,	urban	climate	law	has	been	deliberately	designed	to	support	and	reinforce	the	UNFCCC	regime.	In	fact,	urban	climate	law	interacts	with	the	UNFCCC	rules	and	institutions	in	strategic	ways	that	are	mutually	reinforcing.	I	use	the	term	“coupling”	to	refer	to	the	deliberate	effort	to	align	urban	climate	law	in	ways	such	that	its	norms	and	practices	complement	and	strengthen	the	UNFCCC	regime.	The	first	example	of	coupling	involves	cities	reframing	the	issue	of	climate	change	in	ways	that	sidestepped	the	contentious	issues	that	obstructed	the	UNFCCC	negotiations	and	created	gridlock.	By	reframing	the	problem	and	promulgating	urban	climate	law	based	on	an	alternative	framework	of	ideas,	cities	created	a	set	of	institutions	that	complemented	the	UNFCCC	regime	by	providing	less	controversial	ways	of	promoting	GHG	reductions	and	reaching	actors	that,	depending	on	their	location,	were	not	bound	by	the	Kyoto	Protocol.	In	the	second	example	of	coupling,	urban	climate	law	reinforces	the	UNFCCC	regime	by	serving	as	a	means	for	diffusing	the	
norms	underpinning	the	UNFCCC	framework.	I	illustrate	this	point	by	reference	to	the	C40’s	adherence	to	the	principle	of	common	but	differentiated	responsibilities	and	respective	capabilities	(CBDRRC),	which	is	a	cornerstone	of	the	international	climate	regime.	My	third	example	is	the	Global	Mayors’	Compact,	which	deliberately	replicates	features	of	the	post-2020	international	climate	agreement,	especially	the	pledge-and-review	approach	and	Monitoring,	Review	and	Verification	(MRV).	In	this	case,	coupling	also	allows	cities	to	serve	as	social	laboratories	for	generating	experience	and	knowledge	of	new	norms	and	practices	that	are	emerging	from	the	Paris	Agreement.	I	argue	that	coupling	not	only	benefits	the	UNFCCC	regime	but	also	supports	the	development	of	urban	climate	law	by	conferring	legitimacy	by	association	and	implicit	endorsement	by	the	UNFCCC	regime.	The	analysis	on	coupling	also	responds	to	the	broader	criticisms	against	soft	law	by	demonstrating	that	the	soft	law	generated	by	cities	is	an	important	complement	to	hard	law	that	can	facilitate																																																									8	See,	for	example,	the	Low	Carbon	City	Development	Program	Assessment	Protocol	that	is	designed	to	help	cities	plan,	implement,	monitor	and	account	for	low	carbon	investments	and	mitigation	actions;	World	Bank,	“The	Low	Carbon	City	Development	Program	(LCCDP)	Guidebook:	A	Systems	Approach	to	Low	Carbon	Development	in	Cities	(English)”,	online:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/01/24089839/low-carbon-city-development-program-lccdp-guidebook-systems-approach-low-carbon-development-cities	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	9	For	example,	Finnemore	and	Sikkink;	Zachary	Elkins	and	Beth	A.	Simmons,	‘On	Waves,	Clusters	and	Diffusion:	A	Conceptual	Framework’	(2005)	598	Annals	of	the	American	Academy	of	Political	and	Social	Science	33.		
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experimentation	at	multiple	sites	and	levels	of	governance,	generate	knowledge	(through	exchange	of	good	practices,	for	example),	build	trust,	and	transform	norms.10	Further,	soft	law	and	hard	law	not	only	support	and	complement	one	another,	but	the	interaction	between	them	can	result	in	an	overall	expansion	of	governance	and	authority.		This	chapter	proceeds	in	five	parts.	Following	this	introduction,	Part	2	provides	a	brief	overview	of	the	literature	on	soft	law	and	voluntary	standards.	Part	3	advances	the	argument	that,	through	their	networks,	cities	develop	and	implement	law	that	follows	certain	pathways	of	influence	that	can	eventually	lead	to	the	reduction	of	GHG	emissions.	These	pathways	of	influence	involve	the	promotion	
of	reflexivity	in	cities	and	norm	diffusion.	In	Part	4,	I	argue	that	cities	play	an	important	role	in	strengthening	the	UNFCCC	regime’s	normative	influence.	Urban	climate	law	interacts	with	the	UNFCCC	rules	and	institutions	in	strategic	ways	that	are	mutually	reinforcing.	As	a	result,	there	is	not	only	a	lack	of	conflict	between	the	two	sets	of	rules	–	there	is,	in	fact,	complementarity	that	contributes	to	the	coherence	of	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.	Part	5	draws	a	number	of	conclusions	on	the	significance	of	urban	climate	law	and	the	role	of	cities	as	rule-makers.			
2. Soft	Law	and	Voluntary	Standards		
	
2.1	Soft	Law	versus	Hard	Law	
	
	 In	the	classical	international	law	tradition,	international	legal	rules	are	taken	to	be	those	that	flow	from	the	formal	sources	identified	in	Article	38	of	the	Statute	of	the	International	Court	of	Justice.	As	such,	“hard	law”	would	comprise	of	the	rules	created	by	international	conventions,	international	custom	and	“general	principles	of	law	recognized	by	civilized	nations.”11	The	term	“soft	law”	is	used	to	refer	to	legally	binding	instruments	“which	are	only	softly	enforced	(for	example,	with	no	courts	to	resort	to)	as	well	as	instruments	which	are	in	the	grey	zone	of	normativity,	be	they	softly	binding	in	some	respects	only,	or	in	the	process	of	becoming	law	as	part	of	the	formation	of	customary	international	law.”12	Thus,	soft	law	would	include	a	range	of	international	instruments	and	communications	ranging	from	
																																																								10	This	line	of	argument	finds	commonality	with	those	of	constructivist	scholars	who	focus	less	on	the	binding	nature	of	law	at	the	enactment	stage	and	more	on	the	effectiveness	of	law	at	the	implementation	stage,	and	who	stress	how	soft	law	can	“facilitate	constitutive	processes	such	as	persuasion,	learning,	argumentation	and	socialization”,	David	M	Trubek,	Patrick	Cottrell	and	Mark	Nance,	‘Soft	Law,	Hard	Law	and	EU	Integration’	in	Gráinne	de	Búrca	and	Joanne	Scott	(eds),	Law	and	
new	governance	in	the	EU	and	the	US	(Hart	Publishing	2006),	pg.	75.	11	Article	38(1),	the	Statute	of	the	International	Court	of	Justice.	It	should	be	noted	that	this	list	of	not	exhaustive.	Article	38(2)	states	“[t]	provision	shall	not	prejudice	the	power	of	the	Court	to	decide	a	case	ex	aequo	et	bono,	if	the	parties	agree	thereto.”		12	Joost	Pauwelyn,	‘Is	it	International	Law	or	Not,	and	Does	It	Even	Matter?’	in	Joost	Pauwelyn,	Ramses	Wessel	and	Jan	Wouters	(eds),	Informal	International	Lawmaking	(Oxford	University	Press	2012),	pg.	129.		
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informal	understandings	or	conversations	to	memoranda	of	understanding,	diplomatic	letters,	protocols,	codes	of	conduct	and	informal	agreements.13		This	broad	overview	of	“hard	law”	and	“soft	law”	glosses	over	the	considerable	disagreement	in	the	literature	on	the	definition	of	soft	law	and	what	falls	into	this	category.	The	rules	of	recognition	of	international	law	are	not	bright	line	rules	and	are	becoming	more	vague	as	“international	law	is	increasingly	seen	as	a	continuum	between	law	and	non-law,	with	formal	law-ascertainment	no	longer	capable	of	capturing	legal	phenomena	in	the	international	arena.”14	Some	international	legal	scholars	use	a	simple	“binding/non-binding”	binary	to	distinguish	hard	from	soft	law.15	From	a	positive	legal	scholar’s	viewpoint,	the	concept	of	“soft	law”	is	logically	flawed	because	law	is,	by	definition,	of	a	binding	nature	and	there	cannot	be	non-binding	law.16	Proper	Weil,	for	example,	laments	the	“blurring	of	the	normativity	threshold”	and	argues	that	“the	threshold	does	exist:	on	one	side	of	the	line,	there	is	born	a	legal	obligation	that	can	be	relied	on	by	a	court	or	arbitrator,	the	flouting	of	which	constitutes	an	internationally	wrongful	act	giving	rise	to	international	responsibility;	on	the	other	side,	there	is	nothing	of	the	kind.”17		 Constructivist	scholars,	in	contrast,	focus	less	on	the	binding	nature	of	law.	They	are	more	interested	in	how	rules	actually	operate	in	practice.	For	these	scholars,	what	is	salient	is	whether	and	how	those	who	adhere	to	norms,	rules	and	standards	come	to	accept	and	regard	them	as	authoritative.18	Brunnée	and	Toope,	for	example,	argue	“We	should	stop	looking	for	the	structural	distinctions	that	identify	law,	and	examine	instead	the	processes	that	constitute	a	normative	continuum	bridging	from	predictable	patterns	of	practice	to	legally	required	behavior.”19Constructivist	scholars	also	argue	that	formally	binding	rules	are	not	necessarily	more	effective	than	rules	of	a	non-binding	nature.	As	Kal	Raustiala	points	out,	we	should	distinguish	between	effectiveness	and	compliance:		“[c]ompliance	as	a	concept	draws	no	causal	linkage	between	a	legal	rule	and	behavior,	but	simply	identifies	a	conformity	between	the	rule	and	behavior.																																																									13	Christine	Chinkin,	‘Normative	Development	in	the	International	Legal	System’	in	Dinah	Shelton	(ed),	Commitment	and	Compliance:	The	Role	of	Non-binding	Norms	in	the	International	Legal	System	(Oxford	University	Press	2003),	pgs.	25-31.	14	Jean	d'Aspremont,	‘From	a	Pluralization	of	International	Norm-Making	Processes	to	a	Pluralization	of	Our	Concept	of	International	Law’	in	Joost	Pauwelyn,	Ramses	Wessel	and	Jan	Wouters	(eds),	
Informal	International	Lawmaking	(Oxford	University	Press	2012),	pg.	195.		15	See	Jan	Klabbers,	‘The	Redundancy	of	Soft	Law’	(1996)	65	Nordic	Journal	of	International	Law	167	for	argumentation	in	favour	of	retaining	the	binary	conception	of	law.	Wolfgang	H.	Reinicke	and	Jan	Martin	Witte,	‘Interdependence,	Globalization,	and	Sovereignty:	The	Role	of	Non-binding	International	Legal	Accords’	in	Dinah	Shelton	(ed),	Commitment	and	Compliance:	The	Role	of	Non-
binding	Norms	in	the	International	Legal	System	(Oxford	University	Press	2003),	pgs.	75-76.	16	Jan	Klabbers	argues	that	law	cannot	be	“more	or	less	binding”	and	therefore,	the	concept	of	soft	law	is	logically	flawed,	ibid,	pg.	181.	17	Prosper	Weil,	‘Towards	relative	normativity	in	international	law’	(1983)	77	American	Journal	of	International	Law	413,	pgs.	415,	417-8.		18	Trubek,	Cottrell	and	Nance,	pgs.	80-81.		19	Jutta	Brunnee	and	Stephen	J.	Toope,	‘International	Law	and	Constructivism:	Elements	of	an	Interactional	Theory	of	International	Law’	(2000)	39	Columbia	Journal	of	Transnational	Law	19,	pg.	68.	
	 128	
To	speak	of	effectiveness	is	to	speak	directly	of	causality:	to	claim	that	a	rule	is	“effective”	is	to	claim	that	it	led	to	certain	behaviors	or	outcomes,	which	may	or	may	not	meet	the	legal	standard	of	compliance.”	The	definition	of	legalization	in	international	relations	proposed	by	Kenneth	Abbott	and	Duncan	Snidal	offers	another	alternative	for	understanding	the	distinction	between	hard	law	and	soft	law	without	resorting	to	the	narrow	conceptualization	offered	by	classical	international	law	and	the	“binding/non-binding”	dichotomy.	Abbott	and	Snidal	define	legalization	in	international	relations	as	varying	across	three	dimensions	–	(i)	precision	of	rules,	(ii)	obligation	and	(iii)	delegation	to	a	third-party	decision	maker.20	Hard	law	“refers	to	legally	binding	obligations	that	are	precise	(or	can	be	made	precise	through	adjudication	or	the	issuance	of	detailed	regulations)	and	that	delegate	authority	for	interpreting	and	implementing	the	law.”21	International	trade	law	is	said	to	come	closest	to	this	ideal	type	of	hard	law.22	In	Abbott	and	Snidal’s	definition,	“the	realm	of		‘soft	law’	begins	once	legal	arrangements	are	weakened	along	one	or	more	of	the	dimensions	of	obligation,	precision,	and	delegation.	This	softening	can	occur	in	varying	degrees	along	each	dimension	and	in	different	combinations	across	dimensions.”23	They	emphasize	that	soft	law	is	a	shorthand	term	to	refer	to	this	“broad	class	of	deviations	from	hard	law”	and	that	soft	law	comes	in	many	varieties.24		Some	scholars	have	questioned	the	characterization	of	law	in	terms	of	these	three	attributes	(precision,	obligation	and	delegation)	on	the	basis	that	law	encompasses	more	than	these	largely	technical	and	formal	criteria.25	However,	for	present	purposes,	Abbott	and	Snidal’s	definition	is	helpful	in	terms	of	delineating	some	‘indicators’	of	legalization	which,	in	turn,	define	a	continuum	on	which	international	treaty	rules,	voluntary	rules,	and	codes	of	conduct	can	be	situated.	From	this	viewpoint,	we	can	say	that	states,	private	actors	and	civil	society	have	increasingly	used	a	wide	range	of	normative	instruments	that	have	a	relatively	harder	or	softer	legal	nature	in	terms	of	precision,	obligation	and	delegation	to	pursue	their	objectives.			
2.2	Voluntary	Standards		
	 Standards	are	norms	selected	as	a	model	by	which	people,	actions	or	products	can	be	judged	and	compared,	and	which	provide	a	common	language	for	the	judges,	the	evaluated	and	their	audiences.26	Standards	address	technical	and																																																									20	Kenneth	W.	Abbott	and	Duncan	Snidal,	‘Hard	and	Soft	Law	in	International	Governance’	(2000)	54	International	Organization	421,	pg.	424.		21	Ibid,	pg.	421.	22	Gregory	Shaffer	and	Mark	A.	Pollack,	‘Hard	vs.	Soft	Law:	Alternatives,	Complements,	and	Antagonists	in	International	Governance’	(2010)	94	Minnesota	Law	Review	706,	pg.	715.		23	Abbott	and	Snidal,	pg.	422.	24	Ibid.		25	See,	for	example,	Martha	Finnemore	and	Stephen	J.	Toope,	‘Alternatives	to	"Legalization":	Richer	Views	of	Law	and	Politics’	(2001)	55	International	Organization	743.	26	Stefano	Ponte	and	Emmanuelle	Cheyns,	‘Voluntary	Standards,	Expert	Knowledge	and	the	Governance	of	Sustainabilty	Networks’	(2013)	13	Global	Networks	459,	pg.	461.		
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compatibility	issues	by	operating	as	tools	of	simplification	and	specification.27	Voluntary	standards	can	be	found	across	many	domains	of	contemporary	economies,	including	tourism,	construction,	and	mining.28	In	recent	years,	voluntary	standards	have	gained	prominence	as	a	mean	of	addressing	a	product	or	an	industry’s	impact	on	the	natural	environment.	In	forestry,	for	example,	voluntary	standards	have	filled	the	governance	gap	caused	by	the	inability	of	governments	to	come	to	agreement	on	how	best	to	protect	forests	from	unsustainable	use.29	The	increasing	popularity	of	voluntary	standards	has	generated	an	extensive	literature	examining	the	effectiveness	of	voluntary	standards,30	their	legitimacy31,	and	their	potential	to	work	in	tandem	with	“relatively	hard”	institutions	to	achieve	ecologically	and	socially	sustainable	practices	in	various	sectors	such	as	forestry,	shipping	and	food	production.32			Before	proceeding	further	to	consider	some	of	the	voluntary	standards	literature,	I	like	to	note	that	a	significant	amount	of	the	research	on	voluntary	standards	is	premised	on	the	public/private	dichotomy.33	According	to	this																																																									27	F.	Ewald,	‘Insurance	and	Risk’	in	G.	Burchell,	C.	Gordon	and	P.	Miller	(eds),	The	Foucault	effect:	
studies	in	governmentality	(Harvester	1990).		28	Green	Globe’s	International	Standard	for	Sustainable	Tourism	(Version	1.7)	is	a	certification	scheme	that	requires	tourism	agencies	and	businesses	to	report	on	their	sustainability	performance	throughout	their	supply	chains;	see	Green	Globe,	online:	http://greenglobe.com/green-globe-certification/.	Leadership	in	Energy	and	Environmental	Design	(LEED)	is	a	3rd	party	certification	scheme	for	“green	buildings”;	LEED,	online:	http://www.usgbc.org/articles/about-leed.	Fairtrade	Gold	and	Precious	Metals	is	a	voluntary	certification	scheme	that	requires	small-scale	mining	organizations	and	downstream	operators	to	meet	standards	pertaining	to	responsible	environmental	management,	labour	conditions	and	women’s	rights;	online:	http://www.fairgold.org	(all	internet	links	accessed	on	15	July	2016).				29	For	discussion,	see	for	example,	Benjamin	Cashore	and	others,	‘Forest	Certification	in	Developing	and	Transitioning	Countries:	Part	of	a	Sustainable	Future?’	(2006)	48	Environment	6.		30	For	example,	in	response	to	the	question	of	whether	fair	trade	standards	improve	the	livelihoods	of	coffee	farmers,	research	has	shown	that	the	fair	trade	price	does	improve	welfare	of	certified	growers	but	the	higher	price	alone	does	not	address	the	broader	challenges	that	these	marginalized	farmers	face;	K.	Utting-Chamorro,	“Does	Fair	Trade	Make	a	Difference?	The	Case	of	Small	Coffee	Producers	in	Nicaragua”	Development	in	Practice	15:	3/4	(2005),	pp.	584-99.		31	See,	for	example,	Graeme	Auld	and	Lars	H.	Gulbrandsen,	‘Transparency	in	Nonstate	Certification:	Consequences	for	Accountability	and	Legitimacy’	(2010)	10	Global	Environmental	Politics	97;	Steven	Bernstein	and	Benjamin	Cashore,	‘Can	non-state	global	governance	be	legitimate?	An	analytical	framework’	(2007)	1	Regulation	&	Governance	347.		32	See,	for	example,	Guy	Salmon,	Voluntary	Sustainability	Standards	and	Labels	(VSSLs):	The	Case	for	
Fostering	Them	(Roundtable	on	Sustainable	Development,	OECD,	2002),	online:	https://www.oecd.org/sd-roundtable/papersandpublications/39363328.pdf	(accessed	on	15	July	2016).		33	For	example,	Abbott	and	Snidal;	Jessica	Green,	‘Private	Standards	in	the	Climate	Regime:	The	Greenhouse	Gas	Protocol’	(2010)	12	Business	and	Politics	Article	3;	Tim	Buthe	and	Walter	Mattli,	The	
New	Global	Rulers:	The	Privatization	of	Regulation	in	the	World	Economy	(Princeton	University	Press	2011);	David	Vogel,	‘Trading	up	and	governing	across:	transnational	governance	and	environmental	protection’	(1997)	4	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy	556.	Within	the	discipline	of	international	relations,	by	and	large,	the	public	refers	to	the	state	while	the	private	refers	to	the	non-state;	Philipp	Pattberg	and	Johannes	Stripple,	‘Beyond	the	public	and	private	divide:	remapping	transnational	climate	governance	in	the	21st	century’	(2008)	8	International	Environmental	Agreements	367,	pg.	372.		
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public/private	distinction,	only	states	(and	international	organizations,	which	states	create	and	delegate	authority	to	according	to	the	traditional	principal-agent	model)	have	the	authority	to	make	mandatory	rules.	All	other	actors	belong	to	the	catch-all	category	known	as	‘non-state	actors’	or	‘private	actors’	which	have	no	authority	to	make	mandatory	rules	and	therefore	create	voluntary	rules.	This	distinction	is	blurred	when	we	expand	our	conception	of	rulemaking	in	the	global	sphere	to	include	cities	as	rule	makers.	Cities	are	public	in	the	sense	that	they	exercise	functions	of	public	administration	but	they	are	not	states.	They	are	also	not	private	in	the	same	way	that	business	corporations	and	NGOs	are.	For	example,	cities	do	not	share	the	profit	maximization	goal	that	firms	do	by	dictates	of	law	and	culture.	Further,	cities	are	not	non-state	actors.	Cities	are	sub-state	actors.	They	are	not	just	physically	embedded	within	the	territory	of	states,	but	are	also	subject	to	the	authority	of	central	governments.	Cities	do	not	have	authority	to	make	mandatory	rules	at	the	international	level	but	it	does	not	follow	that	cities	are	therefore	private/non-state	actors.	In	brief,	the	public/private	distinction	does	not	capture	the	reality	of	contemporary	transnational	lawmaking	in	which	the	city	plays	a	part	because	of	a	definitional	conflation.	The	public/private	definition	conflates	municipal	authorities,	provincial	governments,	businesses,	environmental	NGOs,	labour	unions,	private	foundations	into	a	single	category.	Yet,	as	I	have	suggested,	cities	have	interests	and	shared	ideas	about	their	identity	that	are	distinctly	different	from	those	of,	for	example,	multinational	corporations.	I	therefore	extend	existing	definitions	and	theoretical	conceptions	of	voluntary	standards	in	the	discussion	below	to	clarify	the	point	that	voluntary	standards	can	be	created	by	non-state	actors	as	well	as	sub-state	actors	such	as	cities.34	This	conceptual	move	is	a	small	contribution	to	the	literature	on	voluntary	standards	that	aims	to	open	up	the	analytical	discourse	to	consider	the	role	of	sub-state	actors	in	creating	voluntary	standards	and	transnational	law	more	broadly.		For	example,	in	Abbott	and	Snidal’s	concept	of	“regulatory	standard	setting”,	which	is	said	to	occur	when	voluntary	standards	are	adopted	by	firms,	NGOs	and	states	on	their	own	or	by	partnerships	involving	at	least	two	out	of	the	three	actors,	the	category	of	NGOs	contains	a	diverse	group	of	actors.35	It	includes	advocacy	
																																																								34	I	recognise	that	scholars	like	Abbott	and	Green	acknowledge	the	role	of	sub-national	governments	in	voluntary	rule	making	but	they	either	subsume	cities	and	other	local	governments	within	the	category	of	“non-state	actors”	or	identify	the	transnational	municipal	network	(e.g.	C40)	as	the	relevant	actor.	My	aim	in	extending	their	definitions	is	to	clarify	that	cities	are	not	non-state	actors	and	to	emphasize	that	cities	are	the	actors	making	and	implementing	these	rules.		35	Abbott	and	Snidal	point	out	that	their	use	of	the	term	“regulatory	standard	setting”	is	intended	to	highlight	that	these	voluntary	standards	adopted	by	firms,	states	and	other	actors	seek	to	go	beyond	meeting	demands	for	technical	coordination	and	to	address	social	and	environmental	externalities;	Kenneth	W.	Abbott	and	Duncan	Snidal,	‘The	Governance	Triangle:	Regulatory	Standards	Institutions	and	the	Shadow	of	the	State’	in	Walter	Mattli	and	Ngaire	Woods	(eds),	The	Politics	of	Global	
Regulation	(Princeton	University	Press	2009),	pg.	45.	These	voluntary	standards	are	therefore	regulatory	in	nature,	with	regulation	defined	as	“the	organization	and	control	of	economic…and	social	activities	by	means	of	making,	implementing,	monitoring,	and	enforcing	of	rules”;	Walter	Mattli	and	Ngaire	Woods,	‘In	Whose	Benefit?	Explaining	Regulatory	Change	in	Global	Politics’,	in	Walter	Mattli	and	Ngaire	Woods	(eds),	The	Politics	of	Global	Regulation	(Princeton	University	Press,	2009).		
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groups,	labour	unions,	social	movements	and	“other	noncommercial	groups”.36	I	suggest	that,	while	cities	can	be	accommodated	within	the	“other	noncommercial	groups”	sub-grouping,	it	would	be	more	apposite	to	specify	the	city	as	an	actor	with	a	unique	contribution	to	make	towards	regulatory	standard	setting.	Nonetheless,	for	present	purposes,	it	suffices	to	note	that	Abbott	and	Snidal’s	theory	of	regulatory	standard	setting	aptly	captures	the	rulemaking	activities	of	cities	through	the	transnational	networks	they	create.	More	specifically,	cities	can	be	regarded	as	
transnational	regulators.			 Green	coined	the	term	“entrepreneurial	private	authority”	to	refer	to	voluntary	standards.	She	specifies	that	non-state	actors	make	these	rules	and	set	these	standards	“without	the	explicit	delegation	of	authority	by	states”.37	A	number	of	implications	follow	from	Green’s	definition	that	are	salient	in	constructing	our	understanding	of	urban	climate	law.	First,	entrepreneurial	private	authority	is	restricted	to	instances	in	which	non-state	and	sub-state	actors	create	rules,	standards	and	practices	that	govern	the	conduct	of	others.	According	to	Green,	this	means	that	operational	activities	such	as	capacity	building,	information	sharing	and	the	publication	of	action	plans	are	not	instances	of	entrepreneurial	private	authority	as	these	activities	do	not	prescribe	rules.38	However,	I	adopt	a	different	stance.	While	these	operational	activities	do	not	constitute	rulemaking,	they	are	important	ways	in	which	those	who	seek	to	govern	persuade	other	actors	to	follow	their	rules.	Further,	these	operational	activities	fall	within	the	broader	ambit	of	governance	and	usually	have	normative	content.	I	therefore	consider	the	operational	activities	that	global	cities	engage	in	to	be	important	and	relevant	for	creating	an	institutional	environment	that	is	conducive	for	the	development	and	implementation	of	urban	climate	law.	The	second	implication	of	Green’s	definition	is	that	those	who	wish	to	govern	have	to	persuade	others	to	follow	their	rules	in	order	to	exercise	authority.	In	Part	II,	I	will	analyze	how	certain	leading	cities	and	their	mayors	engaged	in	persuasion	to	convince	other	actors	to	follow	their	lead.	Thirdly,	the	claimant	to	authority	relies	on	expertise	to	legitimize	its	claim	and	finally,	it	is	able	to	induce	behavioral	change	in	some	relevant	actor	in	global	affairs.39			 Finally,	to	round	up	the	present	discussion	on	voluntary	standards,	it	is	noteworthy	that	voluntary	standards	are	so	pervasive	that	their	existence	has	been	acknowledged	by	the	World	Trade	Organization	(WTO).40	The	WTO’s	Technical	Barriers	to	Trade	Agreement	(TBT	Agreement)	draws	a	distinction	between	regulations	and	standards.	While	compliance	with	the	former	is	mandatory,	compliance	with	the	latter	is	voluntary.41	Drawing	upon	this,	and	upon	discussions	in	the	WTO’s	Sanitary	and	Phytosanitary	Measures	committee	on	voluntary	standards,	Scott	defines	“private	standards”	as		“written	documents	adopted	by	a																																																									36	Ibid,	pg.	60.		37	Jessica	Green,	Rethinking	Private	Authority:	Agents	and	Entrepreneurs	in	Global	Environmental	
Governance	(Princeton	University	Press	2013),	pg.	78.		38	Ibid,	pg.	30.	39	Ibid,	pg.	36.	40	Joanne	Scott,	‘The	Promise	and	Limits	of	Private	Standards	to	Reduce	Greenhouse	Gas	Emissions	from	Shipping’	(on	file	with	author),	pg.	8.	41	Ibid.		
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non-governmental	entity	that	lay	down	rules,	guidelines	and/or	characteristics,	for	common	or	repeated	use,	for	products	or	related	processes	and	production	methods,	including	transport.”42	Again,	urban	climate	law	comes	within	Scott’s	definition	of	private	standards,	save	that	the	term	“non-governmental	entity”,	as	I	have	consistently	argued,	ought	to	be	disaggregated	to	refer	to	both	non-governmental	and	sub-state	entities.		
3. The	Workings	of	Urban	Climate	Law				 Urban	climate	law	refers	to	the	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	constructed	by	cities	and,	through	certain	pathways,	are	transmitted	transnationally	and	adopted	by	cities	across	the	world.	Before	proceeding	further	to	examine	the	pathways	by	which	urban	climate	law	steers	cities	towards	climate	mitigation	and	long-term	decarbonization	strategies,	this	section	will	provide	a	brief	overview	of	the	normative	framework	of	urban	climate	law	and	some	of	the	voluntary	standards	that	have	been	developed.			 As	mentioned	earlier,	one	can	discern	three	key	normative	ideas	that	global	cities	and	their	networks	have	sought	to	promote.	These	normative	ideas	underpin	the	attempts	by	global	cities	to	claim	a	role	in	transnational	climate	change	governance.	Briefly,	these	three	norms	are:	First,	that	climate	change	is	a	global	problem	but	can	and	must	be	addressed	locally	by	cities.	Secondly,	that	large,	global	cities	are	not	only	a	source	of	the	problem	because	of	their	high	levels	of	GHG	emissions	but	also	a	source	of	solutions	because	of	their	concentration	of	human	capital	and	economic	resources.	Cities	are	also	perceived	to	be	more	nimble	political	actors	than	national	governments.	Thirdly,	that	the	optimal	approach	for	cities	to	reduce	their	GHG	emissions	and	embark	on	low-carbon	growth	is	one	based	on	data	transparency.	This	involves	cities	regularly	monitoring,	measuring	and	reporting	their	GHG	inventories	and	the	impact	of	the	climate	actions	they	have	taken.			 Based	on	this	set	of	norms,	cities	have	worked	with	other	actors	to	develop	voluntary	standards	and	related	practices.	The	Compact	of	Mayors	is	an	example	of	a	voluntary	standard.	As	I	briefly	described	in	the	previous	chapter,	C40	and	other	city	networks	came	together	to	create	the	Compact	of	Mayors.	The	Compact	of	Mayors	is	therefore	a	‘network	of	city	networks’.	The	Compact	of	Mayors	offers	a	form	of	certification	of	a	city’s	climate	performance.	In	order	to	demonstrate	compliance	with	the	Compact	of	Mayors,	a	city	has	to	fulfill	a	series	of	steps	that	culminate	in	the	public	reporting	of	its	GHG	inventory,	climate	risks,	and	an	action	plan	that	provides	details	on	how	the	city	plans	to	achieve	its	GHG	reduction	target	and	improve	its	climate	resilience.	Regular	updating	of	its	GHG	inventory,	monitoring	and	reporting	is	a	compliance	requirement.	In	the	document,	Compact	of	
Mayors:	Definition	of	Compliance,	it	is	stated	“A	complete	updated	inventory	shall	be	required	every	four	years,	and	the	inventory	year	may	be	no	more	than	four	years	prior	to	the	reporting	year.”43	In	addition,	“[i]n	between	years	when	inventories	are	
																																																								42	Ibid.		43	Compact	of	Mayors,	“Compact	of	Mayors:	Definition	of	Compliance”,	online:		
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updated,	‘off-year	reporting’,	cities	shall	report	a	list	of:	(1)	improvements	made	to	the	quality	of	their	inventory,	focusing	both	on	data	availability	and	data	quality;	and	(2)	areas	where	outstanding	data	challenges	exist.”44	Upon	fulfilling	these	requirements,	a	city	will	be	certified	“compliant”	and	given	a	logo	that	it	can	use	on	its	publicity	materials.	Like	all	voluntary	schemes,	the	Compact	of	Mayors	does	not	have	any	powers	to	force	a	city	to	comply	except	to	withhold	certification	when	a	city	does	not	meet	the	compliance	requirements.	It	relies	on	reputational	pressure	and	the	perceived	benefits	of	climate	information	disclosure	to	motivate	cities	to	participate.		The	GHG	City	Protocol	was	briefly	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter	as	a	product	of	cooperation	between	C40,	ICLEI	and	other	actors	including	World	Resources	Institute,	World	Bank	and	UNEP.	The	GHG	City	Protocol	was	developed	because	there	was	a	need	for	a	robust	and	widely	applicable	methodology	that	cities	could	use	to	calculate	and	report	their	GHG	emissions.	In	other	words,	it	is	a	compliance	tool	that	advances	the	normative	goals	of	urban	climate	law,	i.e.	that	cities	ought	to	pursue	ambitious	climate	action	because	they	are	a	major	source	of	GHG	emissions	and	ambitious	action	ought	to	be	undergirded	by	monitoring,	reporting	and	verification.	This	leads	to	the	question	of	how	regulatory	tools	such	as	the	GHG	City	Protocol	lead	to	behavioral	change.	In	other	words,	how	does	data	collection	and	disclosure	steer	cities	towards	GHG	emissions	abatement	and	climate	adaptation?	While	the	pathways	by	which	voluntary	standards	influence	the	behavior	of	actors	are	varied	and	often	context-dependent,	two	pathways	are	of	particular	salience	when	it	comes	to	the	reduction	of	GHG	emissions	and	pursuit	of	low-carbon	development	by	cities.	These	pathways	centre	on	the	promotion	of	reflexivity	amongst	city	officials	and	mayors,	and	norm	diffusion.			
3.1	Promoting	Reflexivity			As	compliance	with	voluntary	standards	is	not	mandated	by	law,	advocates	of	these	standards	often	use	them	to	promote	“reflexivity”	to	bring	about	positive	behavioral	change.	Gunther	Teubner	proposes	reflexive	law	as	a	third	and	the	latest	stage	in	the	evolution	of	legal	systems.45	Reflexive	law	“seeks	to	design	self-regulating	social	systems	through	norms	of	organization	and	procedure”.46	Consequently,	“legal	control	of	social	action	is	indirect	and	abstract,	for	the	legal	system	only	determines	the	organizational	premises	of	future	action”.47	At	the	heart	of	the	concept	of	reflexivity	lies	the	idea	that	“social	practices	are	constantly	examined	and	reformed	in	light	of	incoming	information	about	those	very	
																																																																																																																																																																					http://www.bbhub.io/mayors/sites/14/2015/06/Compact-of-Mayors_Definition-of-compliance-082415.pdf	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).		44	Ibid.		45	Gunther	Teubner,	‘Substantive	and	Reflexive	Elements	in	Modern	Law’	(1983)	17	Law	and	Society	Review	253.	Eric	Orts	applied	this	concept	to	regulation;	Eric	W.	Orts,	‘Reflexive	Environmental	Law’	(1995)	89	Northwestern	Law	Review	1227.		46	Gunther	Teubner,	ibid,	pgs.	254-255.	47	Ibid.		
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practices”.48	Accordingly,	the	aim	of	laws	that	incorporate	the	reflexive	concept	is	to	create	procedures	and	incentives	that	induce	actors	to	assess	their	actions	(hence	the	reflexivity)	and	adjust	them	to	achieve	socially	desirable	goals	such	as	reducing	GHG	emissions,	rather	than	dictating	what	to	do	in	all	cases.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	in	environmental	law,	for	example,	the	emphasis	on	reflexivity	has	led	to	a	notable	trend	of	“proceduralisation”.49		 The	use	of	environmental	management	systems	(EMSs)	is	a	prime	example	of	reflexive	regulation.	An	EMS	may	be	described	as	“a	formal	set	of	policies	and	procedures	that	define	how	an	organization	will	manage	its	potential	impacts	on	the	natural	environment	and	on	the	health	and	welfare	of	the	people	who	depend	on	it”.50	Organizations	with	an	EMS	typically	adopt	a	written	environmental	policy;	identify	aspects	of	their	activities,	products	and	services	that	have	a	deleterious	impact	on	the	environment;	set	goals	to	improve	their	environmental	performance;	assign	responsibility	for	implementing	the	initiatives	to	meet	the	targets;	and	have	a	process	for	evaluating	and	refining	the	EMS	for	further	improvement	in	the	future.	In	this	manner,	an	EMS	puts	key	processes	in	place	to	foster	iterative	learning.51	There	are	several	EMS	models,	but	the	most	influential	model	by	far	is	ISO	14001	developed	by	the	International	Organization	for	Standardization	(ISO).52	EMSs	that	require	third-party	certification	such	as	the	ISO4001	standard	and	the	European	Union	Eco-Management	and	Audit	Scheme	(EMAS)	are	routinely	used,	particularly	in	the	automobile	industry.53	Research	has	shown	that	firms	adopt	EMSs	for	reasons	including	regulatory	pressure54,	enhancement	of	their	corporate	image,55	and	stewardship	motivated	by	environmental	values	and	community	relationships.56	Reviews	of	EMS	programs	from	various	industries	have	found	mixed	evidence	of	improved	environmental	performance.	For	example,	Ziegler	and	Rennings	found																																																									48	Anthony	Giddens,	The	Consequences	of	Modernity	(Polity	Press	1990),	pg.	38.	A	related	concept	is	reactivity;	the	idea	underlying	this	concept	is	that	“individuals	alter	their	behavior	in	reaction	to	being	evaluated,	observed	or	measured”;	Wendy	Nelson	Espeland	and	Michael	Sauder,	‘Rankings	and	Reactivity:	How	Public	Measures	Recreate	Social	Worlds’	(2007)	113	American	Journal	of	Sociology	1.		49	Julia	Black,	‘Proceduralising	Regulation:	Part	I’	(2000)	20	Oxford	Journal	of	Legal	Studies	597.	50	Richard	Andrews	et	al,	‘Environmental	Management	Systems:	History,	Theory,	and	Implementation	Research’	in	C.	Coglianese	and	Jennifer	Nash	(eds),	Regulating	from	the	Inside:	Can	
Environmental	Management	Systems	Achieve	Policy	Goals	(Resources	for	the	Future	2001),	pg.	32.		51	The	US	EPA	describes	the	system	as	a	“repeating	cycle”	that	allows	continuous	improvement	to	occur;	online:	http://www.epa.gov/ems/learn-about-environmental-management-systems#what-is-an-EMS	(accessed	on	10	January	2016).		52	Daniel	J.		Fiorino,	The	New	Environmental	Regulation	(MIT	Press	2006),	pg.	102.		53	Toshi	H.	Arimura,	Akira	Hibiki	and	Hajime	Katayama,	‘Is	a	voluntary	approach	an	effective	environmental	policy	instrument?	A	case	for	environmental	management	systems’	(2008)	55	Journal	of	Environmental	Economics	and	Management	281,	pg.	282.		54	Nicole	Darnall,	Why	US	firms	certify	to	ISO14001:	an	institutional	and	resource-based	view	(Best	Paper	Proceedings	of	the	2003	Academy	of	Management	Conference,	Seatlle,	Washington,	2003).	55	Andreas	Ziegler	and	Klaus	Rennings,	Determinants	of	Environmental	Innovations	in	Germany:	Do	
Organizational	Measures	Matter?	A	Discrete	Choice	Analysis	at	the	Firm	Level	(ZEW	Discussion	Paper	No	04-30,	Mannheim,	2004).			56	John	Cary	and	Anna	Roberts,	‘The	limitations	of	environmental	management	systems	in	Australian	agriculture’	(2011)	92	Journal	of	Environmental	Management	878,	pg.	881.		
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that	EMS	certification	did	not	significantly	affect	environmental	innovation	and	pollution	abatement	behavior	at	German	manufacturing	facilities.57	Based	on	Japanese	facility-level	data,	Arimura	et	al	find	that	ISO4001	implementation	was	effective	in	reducing	natural	resource	use,	solid	waste	generation	and	water	wastage.58	A	study	of	the	Finnish	pulp	and	paper	industry	concluded	that	the	greatest	positive	impact	of	EMSs	arise	when	the	system	identifies	previously	unknown	areas	of	environmental	improvement	for	the	firm.59	It	appears	to	be	the	case	that	EMSs	can	promote	effective	learning	that	leads	to	incremental	improvement,	but	it	is	not	likely	to	give	rise	to	major	innovations	that	require	substantial	investment.60	It	can	be	argued	that	EMSs	should	therefore	be	part	of	a	suite	of	regulatory	tools	and	it	is	insufficient	to	rely	solely	on	EMSs	to	manage	environmental	externalities.	Used	alongside	traditional	enforcement	mechanisms,	EMSs	can	lead	to	improved	environmental	performance	over	time.			Many	of	the	voluntary	standards	and	compliance	tools	that	aim	to	help	cities	reduce	their	GHG	emissions	are	a	variation	of	the	EMS.	To	take	part	in	the	Compact	of	Mayors,	city	government	officials	are	committed	to	undertake	a	multi-year	iterative	process	that	will	unlock	the	information	required	for	self-reflection,	and	identify	weaknesses	and	previously	unknown	opportunities	for	GHG	emissions	abatement.61	In	other	words,	compliance	with	the	Compact	of	Mayors	is	about	following	a	guided	process	of	data	collection	and	assessment	that	will	induce	city	governments	to	assess	their	existing	policies	and	programs,	and	adjust	them	to	achieve	GHG	reduction	and	climate	resilience	targets.	Cities,	through	their	networks,	have	also	developed	the	accounting	and	reporting	tools	that	they	need	to	promote	reflexivity.	Global	online	reporting	platforms	like	carbonn	Climate	Registry	allow	city	government	officials	to	easily	peruse	the	vast	database	of	city	initiatives.	They	are	able	to	track	how	their	counterparts	are	performing.	Benchmarking	against	the	performance	of	other	cities	can	be	an	important	component	of	reflexive	learning.62	The	use	of	a	common	set	of	standards	to	account	and	report	city-wide	GHG	emissions	is	crucial	for	promoting	reflexivity	because	benchmarking	and	tracking	can	be	done	effectively	only	when	the	data	reported	by	cities	is	comparable.	Hence,	the	promulgation	of	the	GHG	City	Protocol	is	significant	in	terms	of	strengthening	reflexivity	as	a	pathway	of	influence	by	which	cities	steer	their	behavior	towards	attaining	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation	objectives.	Finally,	there	are	online	GHG	inventory	tools	such	as	ClearPath	that	have	been	developed	by	cities,	through	the	network	ICLEI,	and	are	made	available	free	of	charge	to	city	governments.63	This	helps	to	overcome	the	costs	barrier	to	effective	data	collection,	which	is	expensive.																																																									57	Ziegler	and	Rennings.		58	Arimura,	Hibiki	and	Katayama.	59	Mikeal	Hilden	and	others,	Evaluation	of	Environmental	Policy	Instruments:	A	Case	Study	of	the	
Finnish	Pulp	and	Paper	and	Chemical	Industries	(Helsinki:	Finnish	Environmental	Institute,	2002),	pg.	113.	 	60	Ibid.		61	Interview	No.	6.		62	Interview	Nos.	4	and	6.	63	ClearPath	complies	with	the	GHG	City	Protocol	and	a	city	can	use	it	to	report	directly	to	carbonn	Climate	Registry;	online:	http://www.clearpath.global/features/	(accessed	on	12	July	2016).	
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For	example,	monitoring	the	implementation	of	the	UN’s	Sustainable	Development	Goals	is	estimated	to	require	US$1	billion	in	aid	assistance	to	support	data	collection	in	developing	countries	alone.64		
3.2	Norm	diffusion		
	 Theories	of	diffusion	offer	an	important	account	of	how	norms	and	voluntary	standards	eventually	become	widely	adopted	by	a	community.	According	to	these	theories,	“norm	entrepreneurs”	–	such	as	international	organizations,	transnational	advocacy	networks	and	epistemic	communities	–	play	an	important	role	in	persuading	a	“critical	mass”	of	relevant	actors	to	embrace	a	new	norm	and	become	“norm	followers”.	When	a	“tipping	point”	is	reached,	we	can	expect	the	norm	to	“cascade”	through	the	rest	of	the	community	and	become	widely	adopted	within	a	fairly	circumscribed	period	of	time.65	Diffusion	occurs	in	the	absence	of	formal	or	contractual	obligations.	In	other	words,	the	actor	in	question	(e.g.	a	state	or	city)	does	not	have	any	formal	commitments	towards	a	government	or	an	international	organization	to	implement	the	norm	in	question	unlike	cases	of	harmonization	or	coercion	in	international	politics.66	Briefly,	harmonization	refers	to	the	conscious	modification	of	policies	by	governments	committed	to	transnational	standards	that	they	have	had	a	hand	in	crafting.67	States	are	primarily	motivated	to	engage	in	processes	of	international	harmonization	when	the	problem	that	needs	to	be	solved	cannot	be	addressed	without	collective	action.68	Another	motivation	for	harmonization	is	to	reduce	barriers	to	the	free	movement	of	goods,	capital	and	people.69	Coercion	occurs	when	states,	international	organizations	or	private	actors	use	asymmetrical	power	relationships	to	dictate	policies	to	others.70	Economic	or	political	conditionality	are	more	common	forms	of	coercion	than	the	use	of	military	force.	The	EU,	for	example,	influences	the	domestic	policies	of	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries	by	linking	the	opening	of	the	accession	negotiations	to	political	reforms	aimed	at	improving	the	protection	of	human	rights.71	In	contrast	to	harmonization	and	coercion,	diffusion	is	a	process	whereby	policy-makers	make																																																									64	Jessica	Espey	et	al,	   Data	for	Development:	  A	Needs	Assessment	for	SDG	Monitoring	and	Statistical	
Capacity	Development	(Sustainable	Development	Solutions	Network,	2015),	online:	http://unsdsn.org	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).		65	Finnemore	and	Sikkink,	pg.	895.	66	Helge	Jörgens,	‘Governance	by	Diffusion:	Implementing	Global	Norms	through	Cross-National	Imitation	and	Learning’	in	William	M.	Lafferty	(ed),	Governance	for	Sustainable	Development:	The	
Challenge	of	Adapting	Form	to	Function	(Edward	Elgar	2004),	pg.	252.		67	Michael	Howlett,	‘Beyond	Legalism?	Policy	Ideas,	Implementation	Styles	and	Emulation-Based	Convergence	in	Canadian	and	U.S.	Environmental	Policy’	(2000)	20	Journal	of	Public	Policy	305,	pg.	308.		68	Jörgens,	pg.	251.	69	Ibid.	70	Farizio	Gilardi,	‘Transnational	Diffusion:	Norms,	Ideas	and	Policies’	in	Walter	Carlsnaes,	Thomas	Risse	and	Beth	A.	Simmons	(eds),	Handbook	of	International	Relations	(2nd	edn,	Sage	Publishing	2012),	pg.	461.		71	Ibid.	Also	see	Frank	Schimmelfenniga	and	Ulrich	Sedelmeierb,	‘Governance	by	conditionality:	EU	rule	transfer	to	the	candidate	countries	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe’	(2004)	11	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy	661	
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independent	decisions	but	do	take	policy	choices	in	other	jurisdictions	into	account.72		There	are	myriad	diffusion	mechanisms	but	most	mechanisms	can	be	grouped	in	three	broad	categories:	competition,	learning	and	imitation.73	Briefly,	competition	would	involve	cities	influencing	one	another’s	policy	choices	as	they	compete	to	attract	economic	resources.	Learning	occurs	when	policy-makers	look	across	jurisdictional	borders	towards	other	cities	in	search	for	effective	solutions	to	domestic	problems.	Imitation	takes	place	when	a	norm	is	adopted	because	its	socially	constructed	meaning	matters	more	than	its	objective	consequences.	It	should	be	noted	that	these	categorizations	are	adopted	as	an	analytical	schematic	but	they	are	by	no	means	mutually	exclusive.	City	A	may	choose	to	adopt	a	voluntary	standard	because	it	wants	to	be	perceived	as	being	a	responsible	global	citizen	(imitation).	The	city’s	policymakers	may	have	also	evaluated	case	studies	and	concluded	that	adopting	City	B’s	practices	is	likely	to	deliver	significant	benefits	(learning).	City	A’s	policymakers	may	also	take	into	account	that	implementation	of	a	particular	voluntary	standard	will	enhance	the	city’s	“brand”	as	an	environmentally	progressive	and	attractive	place	to	live	and	work	in,	thus	making	the	city	more	attractive	to	global	talent.74	While	this	may	be	described	as	a	form	of	competitive	behavior,	it	is	not	competition	as	is	typically	understood	in	the	literature.75	In	the	present	case,	learning	and	imitation	best	explain	how	urban	climate	law	has	become	widely	adopted	amongst	cities.			
3.2.1	Learning				 Learning	can	be	characterized	as	a	process	of	rational	and	problem-oriented	‘lesson	drawing’.	Policymakers	focus	on	the	merits	and	outputs	of	a	certain	policy,	and	their	motivation	for	adopting	the	policy	in	question	is	its	perceived	capacity	to	improve	regulation.76	Let	us	take,	for	example,	Chinese	president	Xi	Jinping’s	announcement	during	his	visit	to	Washington	DC	in	September	2015	that	China	plans	to	implement	a	national	emissions	trading	scheme	(ETS)	by	2017.77	Preceding	the	development	of	a	national	scheme,	the	central	government	in	Beijing	authorized	the	establishment	of	pilot	ETSs	in	seven	provinces.	The	central	government																																																									72	Elkins	and	Simmons,	pg.	35.	Gilardi	emphasizes	that	diffusion	is	not	the	same	as	convergence:	“diffusion	is	the	process	that	leads	to	the	pattern	of	[policy]	adoption…[while]	convergence	characterizes	the	outcome	of	the	process”;	Gilardi,	pg.	455.		73	A	diffusion	mechanism	is	“a	systematic	set	of	statements	that	provide	a	plausible	account	of	why	the	behavior	of	A	influences	that	of	B”;	Dietmar	Braun	and	Farizio	Gilardi,	‘Taking	'Galton's	Problem'	Seriously:	Towards	a	Theory	of	Policy	Diffusion’	(2006)	18	Journal	of	Theoretical	Politics	298,	pg.	299.		74	Ida	Andersson,	‘‘Green	cities’	going	greener?	Local	environmental	policy-making	and	place	branding	in	the	‘Greenest	City	in	Europe'’	(2016)	6	European	Planning	Studies	1197;	Mihalis	Kavaratzis	and	G.	J.		Ashworth,	‘City	Branding:	An	Effective	Assertion	of	Identity	or	a	Transitory	Marketing	Trick?’	(2005)	96	Tijdschrift	voor	economische	en	sociale	geografie	506.		75	See	discussion	in	Part	3.2.3	below.		76	Richard	Rose,	‘What	is	Lesson-Drawing?’	(1991)	11	Journal	of	Public	Policy	3.		77	Demetri	Sevastopulo	and	Pilita	Clark,	‘Xi,	Obama	and	the	Pope	raise	climate	hopes’	Financial	Times	(25	September	2015).		
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deliberately	chose	seven	provinces	that	are	at	different	levels	of	economic	and	industrial	development	so	that	emissions	trading	under	different	conditions	can	be	tested	and	better	understood.78	The	provincial	authorities	responsible	for	designing	and	implementing	the	pilot	schemes	were	given	considerable	leeway	to	adopt	different	approaches	to	regulatory	design	issues	such	as	the	choice	of	economic	sectors	included	in	the	pilot	scheme	and	the	methods	of	allocating	allowances	to	regulated	entities.79	At	the	same	time,	Chinese	government	officials	and	researchers	looked	closely	at	the	experiences	of	other	jurisdictions,	notably	the	European	Union	Emissions	Trading	Scheme	(EU	ETS),	which	is	the	oldest	and	largest	emissions	trading	scheme	globally.80		It	can	be	argued	that	when	Chinese	policy	makers	use	the	information	gathered	from	the	experience	of	the	EU	ETS	and	the	pilot	schemes	to	update	their	understanding	of	how	emissions	trading	works	in	practice,	their	understanding	will	shift	towards	what	the	pilot	experiments	have	demonstrated.81	However,	the	extent	of	this	shift	in	beliefs	will	depend	on	the	consistency	of	the	information	received	and	the	strength	of	the	Chinese	policymaker’s	prior	convictions.82	This	leads	to	my	next	point	that	learning	seldom	occurs	in	a	“neat”	and	rational	manner.	Like	everyone	else,	policy	makers	are	bounded	by	cognitive	limits	or	rely	on	multiple	strategies	to	cope	with	cognitive	constraints.83	Herbert	Simon,	the	economist	behind	the	theory	of	bounded	rationality,	argued	that	individuals	do	not	seek	to	maximize	benefit	from	a	particular	course	of	action	as	they	are	not	capable	of	assimilating	all	the	information	necessary	to	do	so.	Even	if	they	could	gain	access	to	all	the	necessary	information,	the	human	mind	is	not	able	to	process	the	information	properly	and	necessarily	adopts	certain	‘short	cuts’	and	restrictions.84		Thus,	when	a	city’s	planners	engage	in	learning,	it	may	simply	be	a	case	of	adopting	a	certain	standard	because	information	about	it	is	most	easily	accessible.	They	may	also	be	more	keen																																																									78	ZhongXiang	Zhang,	Carbon	Emissions	Trading	in	China:	The	Evolution	from	Pilots	to	a	Nationwide	
Scheme	(Centre	for	Climate	Economic	&	Policy	(Australian	National	University),	CCEP	Working	Paper	1503,	2015),	pg.	11,	online:	https://ccep.crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/events/attachments/2015-04/paper_by_professor_zhang.pdf	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	Also	see	Pilita	Clark,	‘The	‘black	hole’	of	Chinese	carbon	trading’	Financial	Times	(13	May	2014).		79	Zhang,	ibid.			80	For	detailed	overview,	see	European	Commission,	EU	ETS	Handbook,	online:	http://ec.europa.eu/clima/publications/docs/ets_handbook_en.pdf	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).		81	Gilardi,	pg.	465.	82	A	good	indication	that	“lesson	drawing”	has	occurred	is	that	all	the	Chinese	pilot	schemes	have	one	feature	in	common	–	they	all	incorporate	mechanisms	to	address	supply-demand	fluctuations	and	resulting	price	volatility,	a	significant	problem	that	has	adversely	affected	the	performance	of	the	EU	ETS.	83	Fiske	and	Taylor	famously	characterized	the	social	perceiver	as	a	“cognitive	miser”;	Susan	T.	Fiske	and	Shelley	E.	Taylor,	Social	Cognition	(1st	edn,	Addison-Wesley	Publishing	1984).	In	the	1991	revised	edition	of	their	classic	text,	they	suggested	that	the	cognitive	miser	metaphor	ought	to	be	replaced	with	one	of	the	“motivated	tactician,	a	fully	engaged	thinker	who	has	multiple	cognitive	strategies	available	and	chooses	among	them	based	on	goals,	motives	and	needs”;	Susan	T.	Fiske	and	Shelley	E.	Taylor,	Social	Cognition	(McGraw-Hill	1991),pg.	13.		84	It	is	widely	believed	that	Simon	first	used	the	expression	“bounded	rationality”	in	his	1957	work;	Herbert	Simon,	Models	of	Man	(Wiley	&	Sons	1957).		
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to	adopt	policies	and	practices	from	jurisdictions	which	they	are	more	familiar	with	(e.g:	similar	cultural	attributes	such	as	the	language	its	people	speak	and	the	country’s	colonial	origins).85	In	this	line	of	thinking,	the	Chinese	chose	to	learn	from	the	EU’s	experience	not	only	because	it	was	rational	to	do	so,	but	because	information	and	access	to	EU	ETS	policymakers	was	readily	available	as	a	result	of	the	EU’s	active	climate	diplomacy	aimed	at	developing	“a	global	network	of	emissions	trading	systems”86	that	will	function	as	a	global	carbon	market.87		In	the	case	of	urban	climate	law,	learning	is	an	important	norm	diffusion	mechanism	that	is	facilitated	by	a	number	of	factors.	In	Mexico	City,	for	example,	when	city	government	officials	explored	a	range	of	solutions	to	reduce	traffic	congestion	and	improve	public	transportation	within	the	city	to	reduce	GHG	emissions	and	conventional	air	pollutants,	the	officials	looked	to	other	cities	known	to	have	successfully	addressed	the	same	problem	such	as	Bogotá	in	Colombia.88	When	it	came	to	efforts	to	make	Mexico	City	more	bike-friendly,	they	looked	to	Amsterdam	in	the	Netherlands.89	In	other	words,	they	tried	to	look	for	instances	of	best	practices.	In	the	past	few	years,	the	number	of	organizations	that	produce	case	studies	of	urban	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation	best	practices	that	are	made	available	at	no	cost	has	grown	exponentially.90	For	many	city	governments,	the	issue	is	not	the	lack	of	information	about	best	practices	but	how	to	evaluate	and	decide	on	the	best	practice	that	will	be	most	suitable	and	effective	for	their	city.91		 Initiatives	such	as	C40’s	Connecting	Delta	Cities	network	also	play	an	important	role	in	facilitating	the	learning	process	as	a	means	of	diffusing	urban	climate	law.	Through	the	Connecting	Delta	Cities	network,	Rotterdam’s	sustainability	advisors	worked	closely	with	their	counterparts	in	Ho	Chi	Minh	City	to	develop	the	Vietnamese	city’s	resilience	strategy	to	manage	flood	risks.92	Through	this	cooperative	process,	the	norms,	practices,	methodologies	and	voluntary	standards	that	constitute	urban	climate	law	were	diffused	from	one	city	(Rotterdam)	to	another	(Ho	Chi	Minh	City)	across	continents.		Official	aid	and	technical	assistance	from	national	governments	also	play	a	role	in	providing	more	information	about	certain	cities	over	others,	and	therefore																																																									85	Elkins	and	Simmons,	pgs.	44-45.	86	European	Commission,	Questions	and	Answers	on	the	revised	EU	Emissions	Trading	System	(2008),	online:	http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-796_en.htm?locale=en	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).			87	For	discussion,	see	Kati	Kulovesi,	Elisa	Morgera	and	Miquel	Munoz,	‘Environmental	Integration	and	the	Multifaceted	International	Dimensions	of	EU	Law:	Unpacking	the	EU’s	2009	Climate	and	Energy	Package’	(2011)	48	Common	Market	Law	Review	829.	88	Interview	No.	6.		89	Ibid.		90	Junichi	Fujino	et	al,	City	Champions:	Scaling-up	Transformative	Sustainability	Innovations	(IGES	Discussion	Paper	prepared	for	the	International	Forum	for	Sustainable	Asia	and	the	Pacific,	2016),	pg.	4,	online:	http://pub.iges.or.jp/modules/envirolib/upload/6671/attach/CTF_ISAP_Paper_070716_final.pdf	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).			91	Ibid.		92	C40,	‘With	Help	from	Rotterdam,	Ho	Chi	Minh	City	launches	Climate	Adaptation	Strategy’,		online:	http://www.c40.org/blog_posts/with-help-from-rotterdam-ho-chi-minh-city-launches-climate-adaptation-strategy	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).			
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influence	the	learning	process.	For	example,	over	the	years,	the	governments	of	the	Netherlands,	the	United	Kingdom	and	Japan	have	provided	Mexico	with	technical	assistance	for	environmental	protection	initiatives.93	Through	capacity-building	programmes,	Mexico	City	officials	became	acquainted	with	examples	from	cities	in	these	countries	and	are	therefore	more	likely	to	learn	from	these	cities.94	Learning	can	also	be	facilitated	by	official	bilateral	cooperation	between	cities.	For	example,	Singapore’s	Centre	for	Liveable	Cities	has	hosted	government	officials	from	Chinese	cities	who	spent	up	to	three	months	in	Singapore	learning	about	its	urban	governance	strategies	with	the	goal	of	ascertaining	how	these	strategies	can	be	transplanted	to	cities	in	China.95		Non-profit	organizations	also	influence	how	learning	proceeds	as	a	norm	diffusion	mechanism.	The	Hewlett	Foundation,	for	example,	is	an	American	private	foundation	that	awarded	approximately	US$400	million	of	grants	in	2015	to	solve	environmental	and	social	problems.96	It	has	actively	supported	civil	society	organizations	and	the	government	of	Mexico	City	by	providing	grants,	carrying	out	training	programmes	and	lending	expertise	to	help	the	city	tackle	its	air	pollution	problem	and	mitigate	climate	change.97	In	this	manner,	Hewlett	Foundation	has	introduced	many	best	practices	from	major	American	cities	such	as	Los	Angeles	and	San	Francisco	to	Mexico	City’s	public	officials	who	have	drawn	lessons	and	incorporated	some	of	these	practices	and	policies	in	their	domestic	strategies.98		The	Rockefeller	Foundation	established	the	100	Resilient	Cities	program,	which	adopts	a	holistic	approach	towards	tackling	climate	change	by	addressing	it	as	part	of	the	numerous,	inter-connected	physical,	social	and	economic	challenges	that	cities	face.99	It	promotes	the	idea	of	resilience,	which	incorporates	adaptation	to	the	risks	of	climate	change,	reducing	social	inequality,	and	a	society’s	cyber-security	practices	(cyber	resilience).100	When	a	city	becomes	a	member	of	the	100	Resilient	Cities	program,	the	Rockefeller	Foundation	provides	it	a	grant	which	pays	the	salary	of	the	city’s	Chief	Resilience	Officer	who	has	overall	responsibility	for	spearheading	and	coordinating	the	city’s	resilience	initiatives.101	The	city	of	Rotterdam	is	one	of	the	first	cities	to	join	the	100	Resilient	Cities	program.102	Today,	it	has	a	progressive	and	ambitious	resilience	strategy	that	involves	numerous	stakeholders	including	the	city’s	social	welfare	agency,	the	environment	and	water	resources	department,	schools,	museums,	small	to	mid-sized	businesses,	and	clean	technology	consortiums.	According	to	one	of	the	city’s	sustainability	advisors	who	has	worked	on	climate																																																									93	Interview	No.	6.	94	Ibid.		95	Centre	for	Liveable	Cities	(Singapore),	‘Shanghai	Officials	Share	Thoughts	on	Singapore	Stint’,	online:	http://www.clc.gov.sg/Training/trainingprogrammes.htm	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).		96	The	Hewlett	Foundation,	online:	http://hewlett.org/about-us	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	97	Interview	Nos.	6	and	10.		98	Ibid.		99	100	Resilient	Cities,	online:	http://www.100resilientcities.org/#/-_/(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	100	Ibid.		101	Ibid.		102	100	Resilient	Cities,	‘First	Resilient	Cities	Announced	by	Rockefeller	Foundation’,online:		http://www.100resilientcities.org/blog/entry/33-resilient-cities-announced#/-_/(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	
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adaptation	and	subsequently	resilience	since	the	mid	2000s,	joining	100	Resilient	Cities	proved	to	be	a	turning	point	for	Rotterdam’s	climate	change	strategy.103	Prior	to	joining	the	program,	Rotterdam’s	focus	was	on	adaptation	to	flooding	and	other	water-related	risks.	However,	“joining	100	Resilient	Cities	was	very	significant	in	terms	of	changing	[city	government	officials’]	attitudes	from	focusing	on	water	adaptation	to	thinking	more	broadly	about	how	we	can	design	public	spaces	to	be	climate-proof.	This	thinking	helped	to	connect	climate	adaptation	to	spatial	design	in	Rotterdam.	Resilience	gave	us	a	new	lens	to	look	at	connecting	policies	and	integrating	policy	fields	in	this	city.”104	To	gain	familiarity	with	the	concept	of	resilience,	Rotterdam’s	city	officials	found	the	100	Resilient	Cities	reading	materials,	research	toolkits	(such	as	the	City	Resilience	Framework105)	and	workshops	very	helpful	for	overcoming	the	initial	learning	curve	and	triggering	new	thinking	about	the	application	of	the	resilience	concept	in	Rotterdam.106			
3.2.2	Imitation			 Imitation	occurs	when	a	mayor	emulates	a	policy	or	adheres	to	a	norm	to	maximize	his/her	city’s	reputation	or	his/her	personal	reputation.	In	this	line	of	thinking,	norms	may	be	understood	as	common	practices	whose	value	to	an	actor	stems	from	their	prevalence	in	a	community.107	The	predominant	benefit	of	norm	adherence	is	reputational;	adhering	to	the	norm	and	thereby	joining	a	growing	majority	of	actors	confers	a	degree	of	legitimacy	upon	the	city	and	its	mayor.108			For	example,	after	a	personal	visit	by	representatives	of	the	Clinton	Climate	Initiative	and	C40,	a	key	factor	that	convinced	the	mayor	of	Rotterdam	to	start	taking	concerted	action	on	climate	change	was	the	potential	reputational	gain.109	It	was,	in	part,	a	strategic	decision	for	Rotterdam,	a	relatively	small	global	city,	to	leverage	on	participation	in	C40	to	build	its	reputation	as	a	global	city	that	is	in	the	same	league	as	New	York	City	and	London	when	it	comes	to	addressing	climate	change.	According	to	the	world	polity	school,	states	enter	into	international	human	rights	treaties	to	signal	their	adherence	to	global	cultural	norms	that	are	perceived	to	be	‘universal’,	‘advanced’	and	‘modern’.110	In	a	similar	manner,	urban	climate	law	performs	an	expressive	function	when	global	cities	sign	up	to	the	Compact	of	Mayors.		Committing	to	the	Compact	signals	a	city’s	adherence	to	the	norms	underpinning	ambitious	climate	action	that	are	perceived	to	be	‘progressive’	and	‘global’.	The	cumulative	effect	of	many	cities	signing	up	to	the	Mayors’	Compact	is	
																																																								103	Interview	No.	11.	104	Ibid.		105	100	Resilient	Cities.		106	Interview	No.	11.	107	Elkins	and	Simmons,	pg.	39.	108	Ibid.		109	Interview	No.	11.	110	Didem	Buhari-Gulmez,	World	Polity	School	(Oxford	Bibliographies	2014),	online:		http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0019.xml	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	
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analogous	to	“peer	pressure”	amongst	cities	and	three	possible	motivations	for	responding	to	such	“peer	pressure”	are	legitimation,	conformity	and	esteem.111	An	alternative	(and	not	mutually	exclusive)	explanation	based	on	the	assumption	that	policy-makers	have	a	less	instrumentalist	attitude	towards	norms	is	that	they	choose	to	adopt	the	norm	because	of	a	belief	in	its	appropriateness.	The	logic	of	appropriateness	means	that	“[a]ction	involves	evoking	an	identity	or	role	to	a	specific	situation.”112	From	a	constructivist	perspective,	actors	can	genuinely	change	their	understanding	of	appropriateness	through	discursive	interaction	that	generates	knowledge,	particularly	so-called	“rhetorical	knowledge”,	that	is	knowledge	that	is	offered	or	created	in	dialogue	and	employed	in	practical	reasoning.113	C40	and	organizations	that	seek	to	instill	particular	aspects	of	urban	climate	law	recognize	the	importance	of	discursive	interaction	and	the	role	it	plays	in	shaping	global	cities’	understanding	of	those	norms	and	practices.	For	example,	C40	organizes	regular	workshops	and	web-based	seminars	(webinars)	to	create	opportunities	for	city	officials	to	interact	and	generate	“new	thinking”.114		 		 Matchmaker	is	a	new	initiative	of	the	Low	Carbon	City	Lab,	a	public-private	partnership	that	aims	to	leverage	twenty-five	billion	euros	worth	of	climate	finance	for	cities	by	2050.115	It	aims	to	be	a	platform	that	introduces	investors	and	city	administrations	to	each	other	with	the	objective	of	helping	cities	secure	funding	for	their	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation	projects.116	Within	its	first	year	of	operation,	Matchmaker	has	organized	a	number	of	workshops	around	the	world	to	bring	representatives	of	cities,	development	banks,	sovereign	funds,	commercial	banks,	and	civil	society	together	to	shape	emerging	climate	finance	practices	and	standards.117	The	underlying	assumption	is	that	norm	adoption	and	adherence	is	much	more	likely	when	the	actor	in	question	believes	in	its	appropriateness.118	Thus,	within	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex,	various	actors	create	forums	for	engagement	and	discursive	interaction	amongst	cities.	These	forums	therefore	play	an	important	role	in	facilitating	the	diffusion	of	urban	climate	law	by	learning	and	imitation	amongst	cities.			
3.2.3	Competition		 In	international	relations,	regulatory	competition	is	said	to	occur	when	states	struggle	to	shape	policy	developments	at	the	international	level	to	accord	with	their																																																									111	Finnemore	and	Sikkink,	pg.	903.	112	James	G.		March	and	Johan	P.	Olsen,	‘The	Institutional	Dynamics	of	International	Political	Orders’	(1998)	52	International	Organization	943,	pg.	951.	113	See	discussion	in	Chap	3;	on	rhetorical	knowledge,	see	Francis	J.	Mootz	III,	‘Natural	Law	and	the	Cultivation	of	Legal	Rhetoric’	in	Willem	J.	Witteveen	and	Wibren	Van	der	Burg	(eds),	Rediscovering	
Fuller:	Essays	on	Implicit	Law	and	Institutional	Design	(Amsterdam	University	Press	1999),	pgs.	442-48.		114	Interviews	Nos.	5,	6,	8,	10,	11.		115	Low	Carbon	City	Lab,	online:	http://local.climate-kic.org/	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	116	Ibid.		117	Interview	No.	2.		118	This	is	a	conclusion	I	drew	from	my	observations	of	a	Matchmaker	workshop	in	progress	(Bonn,	5	July	2016).		
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national	policy	patterns	and	legal	traditions.	In	this	line	of	thinking,	the	state	(or	group	of	states)	that	manages	to	significantly	shape	a	regulatory	policy	according	to	its	preferences	will	yield	the	most	benefits	as	that	state	will	have	the	least	amount	of	political	and	economic	adjustments	to	undertake	in	response	to	the	new	rule.		Conversely,	the	states	that	have	to	make	the	biggest	political	and	economic	adjustments	to	the	new	rule	will	be	deemed	to	be	at	a	disadvantage.119	Norm	diffusion	occurs	when	a	state	(or	group	of	states)	manages	to	successfully	assert	its	regulatory	influence	such	that	its	proposed	rule	or	norm	becomes	the	norm	to	be	widely	adopted	in	the	international	community.		Another	variety	of	regulatory	competition	can	be	defined	as	a	process	whereby	rules	are	selected	and	de-selected	through	competition	between	decentralized,	rule-making	entities,	which	can	be	states	or	other	political	units	such	as	regions.120	The	competitive	process	is	expected	to	yield	a	number	of	beneficial	outcomes.	First,	it	promotes	diversity	and	experimentation	amongst	the	competing	jurisdictions	in	the	search	for	effective	laws.121	Secondly,	when	users	of	the	rules	are	able	to	express	their	preference	for	some	rules	(and	not	others),	it	promotes	the	flow	of	information	on	what	works	better	in	practice.122	Finally,	it	can	be	argued	that	regulatory	competition	leads	to	the	content	of	rules	becoming	more	effectively	tailored	to	meet	the	needs	of	users.123	In	the	model	set	out	in	Charles	Tiebout’s	seminal	article	“A	Pure	Theory	of	Local	Expenditures”,	local	governments	compete	to	attract	residents	by	offering	different	packages	of	facilities	and	public	services	that	are	made	available	at	different	tax	rates.124	The	resident	is	assumed	to	pick	the	community	that	offers	the	public	goods	and	services	that	suits	his	or	her	preferences	best.	The	end	result	is	to	maximize	the	welfare	of	residents	as	well	as	maintain	diversity	amongst	jurisdictions.	While	Tiebout’s	model	was	concerned	with	the	provision	of	public	goods	and	services	by	local	governments,	laws	can	also	be	viewed	as	a	type	of	public	good.	The	diffusion	of	norms	occurs	when,	for	example,	jurisdictions	learn	from	one	another,	seek	to	export	their	norms	and	practices,	and	put	selected	norms	into	practice.	It	can	be	argued	that	both	variants	of	regulatory	competition	described	above	do	not	explain	how	urban	climate	law	is	diffused	across	global	cities.	To	the	best	of	my	knowledge,	there	is	scant	evidence	of	global	cities	actively	seeking	to	influence	the	content	of	urban	climate	law	at	the	transnational	level	in	order	to	secure	first-mover	advantage.	There	is	also	little	evidence	that	global	cities	are	seeking	to	offer	different	versions	of	urban	climate	law	in	order	to	attract	residents																																																									119	K.	Kern,	H.	Jörgens	and	M.	Jänicke,	The	diffusion	of	environmental	policy	innovations:	A	contribution	
to	the	globalisation	of	environmental	policy	(WZB	discussion	paper	FS	II	01-302,	Berlin:	Social	Science	Research	Center	(WZB),	2001),	pgs.	4-5;	K.	Tews,	P.	Busch	and	H.	Jörgen,	‘The	diffusion	of	new	environmental	policy	instruments’	(2003)	42	European	Journal	of	Political	Research	569.		120	Simon	Deakin,	‘Is	regulatory	competition	the	future	for	European	integration?’	(2006)	13	Swedish	Economic	Policy	Review	71,	pg.	74.	121	Simon	Deakin,	Legal	Diversity	and	Regulatory	Competition:	Which	model	for	Europe?	(Working	Paper	No.	323,	Cambridge:	Centre	for	Business	Research,	University	of	Cambridge,	2006),	pg.	4.	122	Ibid.	123	Ibid.	124	Charles	M.	Tiebout,	‘A	Pure	Theory	of	Local	Expenditures’	(1956)	64(5)	The	Journal	of	Political	Economy	416.		
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and	businesses.	Certainly,	there	is	diversity	in	the	practices	and	regulations	to	address	climate	change	in	global	cities	across	the	world.	However,	this	diversity	is	attributable	to	the	need	for	global	cities	to	localize	and	adapt	urban	climate	law	to	suit	domestic	needs	and	circumstances	rather	then	to	the	dynamics	of	regulatory	competition.			
3.3	The	Role	of	Norm	Entrepreneurs				 Norm	entrepreneurs	play	an	important	role	in	promoting	norms	and	strategically	providing	information	on	policy	tools.	Transnational	channels	of	communication	provide	norm	entrepreneurs	with	the	basic	platform	to	disseminate	knowledge	about	new	policy	instruments,	institutions	and	information	on	“best	practices”	that	is	sufficiently	abstract	to	diffuse	and	be	adapted	to	different	politico-institutional	settings.125	One	of	the	important	things	that	norm	entrepreneurs	do	is	to	raise	awareness	of	the	problem	or	the	“wrong”	that	new	norms	or	standards	are	intended	to	address.		It	is	not	difficult	to	see	how	mayors	like	Marcelo	Ebrard	of	Mexico	City	and	Ken	Livingstone	of	London	acted	as	important	norm	entrepreneurs	when	they	made	tackling	climate	change	a	focus	of	their	mayoralty.126	As	chairperson	of	the	World	Mayors	Council	on	Climate	Change	and	the	mayor	of	the	first	city	in	the	LAC	region	to	adopt	GHG	reduction	targets	and	a	climate	strategy,	Marcelo	Ebrard	was	in	a	strong	position	to	persuade	other	cities,	particularly	those	in	the	LAC	region,	to	adopt	some	of	the	policies	that	his	city	had	implemented	and	the	norms	underlying	urban	climate	action.	Ken	Livingstone’s	office	developed	an	energy	strategy	that	committed	London	to	reducing	carbon	dioxide	emissions	by	20%	below	1990	levels	by	2010	as	a	first	step	to	a	reduction	of	60%	by	2050.	The	mayor’s	office	also	publicly	backed	high-profile	projects	that	demonstrated	the	technical	feasibility	of	renewable	energies,	as	well	as	developed	multi-stakeholder	partnerships	for	research	and	development	of	new	hydrogen	technologies.	During	this	period,	climate	change	was	high	on	the	global	political	agenda	and	there	was	a	great	deal	of	public	concern	about	the	stalemate	in	international	negotiations.	By	spearheading	the	development	of	London’s	first	climate	change	strategy,	Livingstone	sought	to	demonstrate	the	potential	that	cities	have	to	address	climate	change	and	to	develop	a	new	normative	narrative	that	cities	ought	to	address	climate	change	because	cities	are	a	main	contributing	source	to	climate	change	but	are	also	capable	of	finding	innovative	solutions.	By	founding	what	is	now	the	C40	network,	Livingstone	created	an	important	transnational	mechanism	for	the	diffusion	of	the	norms	and	practices	that	lead	to	urban	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation.		Transnational	city	networks	like	C40	are	also	important	norm	entrepreneurs.	As	discussed	above	as	well	as	in	Chapter	5,	C40	has	set	up	networks	to	make	information	on	best	practices	available	to	its	members	to	encourage	learning.	It	further	facilitates	learning	by	supporting	these	issue-specific	networks	in	organizing																																																									125	Lukas	Hakelberg,	‘Governance	by	Diffusion:	Transnational	Municipal	Networks	and	the	Spread	of	Local	Climate	Strategies	in	Europe’	(2014)	14	Global	Environmental	Politics	107,	pg.	114.		126	The	information	in	the	rest	of	this	paragraph	is	drawn	from	Chapter	4.		
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webinars	and	workshops	to	disseminate	ideas	and	provide	forums	for	city	officials	to	learn	from	each	other.	C40’s	research	team	also	generates	original	research,	policy	recommendations,	and	case	studies	that	increase	the	availability	of	information	and	thus	facilitate	learning.	It	can	also	be	argued	that	C40	fosters	imitation	as	a	norm	diffusion	mechanism	by	providing	information	on	peer	city	performance	in	addressing	climate	change	and	increasing	transparency.	More	specifically,	C40	integrates	the	adoption	of	a	climate	strategy	and	regular	reporting	into	its	benchmarking	system.	City	members	can	compare	their	results	via	the	CDP	website,	the	C40	website,	and	the	Climate	Action	in	Megacities	survey.	Through	the	practice	of	benchmarking,	C40	seeks	to	enhance	the	perception	that	adopting	a	local	climate	strategy	is	appropriate	and	commendable.	Further,	by	making	information	about	the	performance	of	city	members	easily	accessible,	C40	enables	its	members	and	interested	parties	to	identify	and	place	pressure	on	the	governments	of	laggard	cities.		The	above	discussion	considered	how	cities,	through	their	networks,	create	urban	climate	law	which	includes	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	such	as	the	GHG	Protocol	for	Cities	and	the	Mayors’	Compact.	These	standards	lead	to	the	reduction	of	urban	GHG	emissions	through	two	key	mechanisms:	promoting	reflexivity	and	norm	diffusion	processes.	Through	these	pathways	of	influence,	the	norms	created	by	cities	and	transmitted	via	transnational	city	networks	are	changing	the	behavior	of	cities	that	have	elected	to	adopt	them.	While	cities	are	unable	to	create	mandatory	rules	at	the	international	level,	cities	are	undoubtedly	engaged	in	transnational	voluntary	rule	making.		Urban	climate	law	also	interacts	with	the	UNFCCC	rules	and	institutions.	The	next	section	argues	that	the	interaction	between	urban	climate	law	and	the	UNFCCC	regime	have	mutually	reinforcing	effects	and	results	in	an	overall	expansion	of	governance	within	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.	In	this	way,	there	is	no	conflict	between	urban	climate	law	and	the	inter-state	UNFCC	regime.	On	the	contrary,	we	see	both	types	of	authority	linked	in	strategic	and	deliberate	ways.			
4. The	Interaction	between	Urban	Climate	Law	and	the	UNFCCC	Regime				 The	emergence	of	urban	climate	law	can	be	viewed	as	part	of	a	constellation	of	“governance	experiments”	that	have	emerged	in	response	to	the	inadequacies	of	the	UNFCCC	treaty	regime.127	Cities	have	therefore	had	the	opportunity	to	survey	the	problems	with	the	UNFCCC’s	response	to	climate	change	and	the	issues	that	the	treaty	regime	has	not	been	able	to	address.	It	can	be	argued	that	cities	have	then	sought	to	take	a	different	tack	at	the	climate	change	problem	and	develop	alternative	solutions	to	address	aspects	of	climate	change	that	the	UNFCCC	regime	has	struggled	to.	At	the	same	time,	cities	are	not	apathetic	to	the	role	of	the	UNFCCC	in	governing	climate	change	and,	in	fact,	lobby	for	more	robust	and	ambitious	action	
																																																								127	See	discussion	in	Chapter	2.		
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by	states.128	This	has	led	to	coupling,	whereby	urban	climate	law	is	deliberately	designed	to	complement	and	strengthen	the	UNFCCC	regime.		I	argue	that	cities	have	taken	a	different	approach	towards	the	climate	change	problem	by	reframing	the	issue	and	promulgating	an	alternative	set	of	rules	and	practices	to	those	of	the	UNFCCC	regime.	The	voluntary	standards	promulgated	by	cities	and	their	networks	affect	the	evolution	of	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex	as	well	as	reinforce	the	UNFCCC	regime	by	serving	as	a	means	to	
diffuse	the	authority	of	the	UNFCC	regime.	In	this	view,	cities	provide	additional	venues	for	the	use	and	adoption	of	the	UNFCCC	norms.129	I	will	illustrate	this	point	later	with	reference	to	the	C40’s	adherence	to	the	CBDRRC	principle,	which	is	a	cornerstone	of	the	UNFCCC	and	the	Kyoto	Protocol.	C40’s	adherence	to	the	principle	is	de	facto,	not	de	jure,	as	it	is	not	legally	bound	by	the	international	climate	change	treaties.	By	voluntarily	adopting	this	principle,	and	applying	it	to	its	member	cities,	C40	is	indirectly	expanding	the	authority	of	the	UNFCCC	regime.	I	use	the	Global	Mayors	Compact	as	the	third	illustrative	example	of	coupling.	Cities	have	made	a	concerted	effort	to	ensure	that	city-level	governance	efforts	complement	international	efforts	to	develop	MRV	practices	such	that	urban	climate	law	and	the	UNFFCC	regime	mutually	reinforce	and	support	the	development	of	an	emerging	norm	of	transnational	climate	law.			
4.1	Reframing	the	problem	
	 The	early	stages	of	climate	governance	were	guided	by	a	dominant	definition	of	the	problem	shared	by	the	international	community	–	that	climate	change	is	a	collective	action	problem	on	a	global	scale	and	therefore	required	multilateral	treaty-making	based	on	negotiations	that	involved	all	states.130	This	thinking	was	reinforced	by	influential	ideas	such	as	the	“matching	principle”	proposed	by	Butler	and	Macey,	which	holds	that	the	level	of	jurisdictional	authority	should	match	the	scale	of	the	harm	being	regulated	to	ensure	that	all	of	the	costs	of	the	activity	are	internalized	within	the	jurisdiction	so	as	to	prevent	free-riding.131	In	relation	to	global	environmental	problems	like	climate	change,	the	“matching	principle”	calls	for	international	regulation.	Adler,	following	Butler	and	Macey,	argues	that	climate	change	presents	an	unequivocal	case	for	action	at	the	national	and	international	levels.132	Accordingly,	cities	had	little,	if	any,	contribution	to	make	towards	addressing	the	problem.	A	conflux	of	factors	subsequently	created	a	“policy																																																									128	ICLEI,	‘Local	Government	Climate	Roadmap’,	online:	http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=1197	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	129	This	line	of	argument	was	inspired	by	the	discussion	on	how	private	authority	may	affect	the	evolution	of	a	regime	complex	in	Jessica	Green	and	Graeme	Auld,	‘Unbundling	the	Regime	Complex:	The	Effects	of	Private	Authority’	(2016)	Transnational	Environmental	Law,	DOI:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S2047102516000121	(published	online:	20	May	2016).		130	See	discussion	in	chapter	2.	131	Jonathan	R.	Macey	and	Henry	N.		Butler,	‘Externalities	and	the	Matching	Principle:	The	Case	for	Reallocating	Environmental	Regulatory	Authority	’	(1996)	14	Yale	Law	and	Policy	Review	23,	pg.	25.	132	Jonathan	H.	Adler,	‘Jurisdictional	Mismatch	in	Environmental	Federalism’	(2005)	14	New	York	University	Environmental	Law	Journal	130,	pg.	175-6.	
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window”	for	cities	to	assert	themselves	on	the	governance	landscape	and	successfully	project	authority.133	As	discussed	in	Chapters	3,	amongst	these	factors	were	(1)	the	efforts	by	the	World	Bank,	UN-Habitat,	UNESCO	and	various	other	international	organizations	to	enlist	cities	as	“partners”	to	address	a	host	of	governance	challenges	including	racism,	gender	discrimination	and	public	health	in	city	slum	settlements	and	(2)	the	global	trend	of	political	decentralization	and	devolution.	As	responsibilities	for	providing	services	to	citizens	have	been	passed	on	from	national	governments	to	provincial	governments	and	on	to	city	authorities,	cities	have	experienced	strain	on	their	resources	but	are	emboldened	in	their	claims	to	authority	at	the	same	time.		
	 Taking	advantage	of	the	policy	window,	cities	reframed	the	climate	change	problem	in	ways	that	allowed	them	to	carve	out	a	meaningful	role	for	themselves.	First,	cities	assert	that	climate	change	requires	a	multi-level	governance	solution	–	and	that	includes	the	international	level	as	well	as	the	local	level.	Cities	account	for	37-49%	of	global	GHG	emissions	and	urban	infrastructure	accounts	for	over	70%	of	global	energy	use.134	Accordingly,	cities	play	a	critical	role	in	global	climate	policy	as	it	is	in	cities	“where	the	struggle	to	mitigate	climate	change	will	be	either	won	or	lost”.135	Secondly,	cities	have	sought	to	redirect	the	focus	from	emission	reductions	to	understanding	their	sources.	The	hope	is	that	this	understanding,	gained	from	the	use	of	accounting	and	reporting	standards,	will	promote	reflexivity	and	policy	diffusion	leading	to	future	reductions	in	GHG	emissions.	Norm	entrepreneurs	like	Michael	Bloomberg	and	CDP	(the	official	platform	for	cities	to	report	their	climate	actions)	have	keenly	reiterated	that	the	ultimate	goal	of	climate	action	is	redirecting	our	economies	and	societies	onto	a	low-carbon	pathway.	In	this	regard,	and	this	is	the	third	aspect	of	the	reframing,	cities	position	themselves	as	well	placed	to	lead	the	economic	and	societal	transformations	as	they	are	“laboratories	of	democracy”	that	can	gather	important	experience	with	policy	options	that	will	show	state,	federal,	and	international	policy-makers	that	action	is	possible	and	cost-effective.136	Fourthly,	like	many	other	transnational	climate	governance	“experiments”,	cities	and	their	networks	advocate	that	tackling	climate	change	is	or	will	be	economically	beneficial.137	They	attempt	to	shift	attention	from	the	costs	of	reducing	emissions,	which	is	a	major	bone	of	contention	between	developed	and	developing	countries	in	the	UNFCCC	negotiations,	to	the	benefits	such	as	economic	development	(e.g.																																																									133	On	the	concept	of	a	policy	window,	see	John	Kingdon,	Agendas,	Alternatives	and	Public	Policies	(Longman	1995).		134	Leadership,	School	and	ICLEI,	pg.	9.	135	UN-Habitat,	‘UN-Habitat	launched	Guiding	Principles	for	City	Climate	Action	Planning	at	the	Climate	Change	Conference	(COP21)	in	Paris’,	online:		http://unhabitat.org/un-habitat-launches-guiding-principles-for-city-climate-action-planning-at-the-climate-change-conference-cop21-in-paris/	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).		136	The	term	“laboratories	of	democracy”	was	coined	by	Justice	Louis	Brandeis	to	depict	the	American	states	as	testing	grounds	for	innovative	policies	that	can	be	replicated	by	other	states	or	translated	to	the	federal	level;	New	State	Ice	Co.	v.	Liebmann	(1932)	United	States	Supreme	Court	No.	463.	I	have	co-opted	this	term	to	refer	to	cities	as	policy	testing	grounds	in	the	context	of	transnational	climate	change	governance.			137	Matthew	Hoffmann,	Climate	Governance	at	the	Crossroads:	Experimenting	with	a	Global	Response	
after	Kyoto	(Oxford	University	Press	2011),	pg.	39.	
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developing	the	clean	technology	sector)	and	employment	(i.e.	“green	economy”	jobs).138Finally,	cities	reframe	the	climate	change	issue	as	one	predominantly	about	reducing	GHG	emissions	to	one	about	the	broader	quest	for	sustainable	urban	development,	i.e.,	maximizing	the	benefits	of	urbanization	while	minimizing	its	ills	as	well	as	implementing	the	2030	Agenda	for	Sustainable	Development.139	The	UN-Habitat	has	played	an	important	role	in	this	reframing	as	it	seeks	to	address	climate	change	through	its	specific	lenses	of	managing	urban	growth	and,	through	various	projects	and	programmes,	has	been	encouraging	and	empowering	cities	to	address	climate	change	as	part	of	a	broader	agenda	of	sustainable	urbanization.140	These	initiatives	include	the	Cities	and	Climate	Change	Initiative,	which	“[builds]	on	UN-Habitat’s	long	experience	in	sustainable	urban	development…[to	help]	counterparts	develop	and	implement	pro-poor	and	innovative	climate	change	policies	and	strategies”141	and	the	Urban	Low	Emissions	Development	Strategies	project	that	provides	cities	with	technical	assistance	“…to	integrate	low-carbon	strategies	into	all	sectors	of	urban	planning	and	development”.142	By	reframing	the	problem,	urban	climate	law	purposefully	sidestep	the	contentious	issues	of	mitigating	emissions	and	binding	targets	that	have	obstructed	the	UNFCCC	regime.	In	this	way,	urban	climate	law	serves	to	complement	the	UNFCCC	regime	by	providing	less	controversial	ways	of	promoting	GHG	emission	reductions	and	reaching	actors	that,	depending	on	their	location,	may	not	have	been	bound	by	the	Kyoto	Protocol.	
	
4.2	Urban	climate	law	as	a	means	of	diffusing	UNFCCC	norms				 The	CBDRRC	principle	lies	at	the	heart	of	the	international	climate	change	regime.	Since	the	start	of	the	climate	dialogue,	this	principle	has	underpinned	the	international	community’s	efforts	to	address	climate	change.	At	the	Second	World	Climate	Conference	in	1990,	countries	declared	that	the	“principle	of	equity	and	common	but	differentiated	responsibility	of	countries	should	be	the	basis	of	any	global	response	to	climate	change.”143	The	CBDRRC	principle	is	articulated	in	Article	3	of	the	UNFCCC,	highlighted	in	the	Kyoto	Protocol	and	numerous	UNFCCC	COP	decisions,	including	the	Bali	Action	Plan	of	2007	and	the	Cancun	Agreements	of	2010.	Several	strands	of	thought	are	brought	together	within	this	principle.	First,	the	principle	“establishes	unequivocally	the	common	responsibility	of	[s]tates	to	
																																																								138	Hoffman	argues	that	this	intertwining	of	economic	benefits	and	climate	action	has	the	potential	to	shift	the	emphasis	away	from	the	costs	of	addressing	climate	change;	ibid,	pg.	121.		139	UN	General	Assembly,	Transforming	our	world:	the	2030	Agenda	for	Sustainable	Development	(Resolution	70/1	adopted	by	the	General	Assembly	on	25	September	2015).		140	See	discussion	in	Chapter	3.		141	UN-Habitat,	‘Cities	and	Climate	Change	Initiative’,	online:	http://unhabitat.org/urban-initiatives/initiatives-programmes/cities-and-climate-change-initiative/	(accessed	on	21	July	2016).		142	UN-Habitat,	‘Urban	low	emission	development	strategies’,	online:http://unhabitat.org/urban-initiatives/initiatives-programmes/urban-low-emission-development-strategies/	(accessed	on	21	July	2016).	143	Ministerial	Declaration	of	the	Second	World	Climate	Conference,	6-7	November	1990,	para.	5.		
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protect	the	global	environment.”144	Secondly,	the	notion	of	differentiated	responsibility	is	derived	from	the	differences	in	the	level	of	economic	development	and	capabilities	amongst	states,	as	well	as	a	country’s	historical	contribution	to	climate	change	as	a	measure	of	its	responsibility.145		The	distinction	between	developed	and	developing	countries	is	captured	in	the	rigid	form	of	an	Annex	to	the	UNFCCC;	as	such,	in	UNFCCC	parlance,	“Annex	I	states”	refer	to	developed	countries	and	countries	in	transition	and	“non-Annex	I	states”	refer	to	developing	countries.	Based	on	the	CBDRRC	principle,	the	international	climate	regime	carved	out	a	leadership	role	for	developed	countries.146	The	UNFCCC	states	that	Annex	I	parties	should	provide	new	and	additional	financial	resources	to	non-Annex	I	parties.	Further,	they	ought	to	facilitate	and	finance	the	transfer	of	environmentally	sound	technologies.	The	UNFCCC	goes	on	to	state	that	the	implementation	of	the	Convention	by	developing	countries	will	depend	on	the	effective	implementation	by	developed	countries	of	their	commitments	related	to	financial	resources	and	transfer	of	technology,	considering	that	“economic	and	social	development	and	poverty	eradication	are	the	first	and	overriding	priorities	of	the	developing	country	Parties.”147	The	binary	understanding	of	differentiation	finds	its	fullest	expression	in	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	which	imposes	emissions	reduction	targets	only	on	developed	countries.	From	the	outset,	the	Kyoto	Protocol’s	endorsement	of	such	differentiation	in	favour	of	developing	countries	proved	deeply	contentious.148	Further,	there	were	divergent	interpretations	of	the	CBDRRC	principle	and	how	it	ought	to	be	applied.149			 Starting	with	the	Bali	Action	Plan	of	2007,	which	launched	a	process	to	reach	“an	agreed	outcome”	on	long-term	cooperative	action,	there	were	signs	that	the	binary	notion	of	differentiation	would	give	way	to	a	broader	concept	that	goes	beyond	the	simple	distinction	between	developed	and	developing	countries.150	Eventually,	in	the	Paris	Agreement,	“the	era	of	strict	bifurcation	has	come	to	an	end”151	and	what	we	have	is	“[enhanced]	symmetry	or	parallelism	between	developed	and	developing	countries.”	The	Paris	Agreement	requires	all	parties	to	prepare,	report	and	maintain	successive	“nationally	determined	contributions”	or																																																									144	Lavanya	Rajamani,	‘The	Principle	of	Common	but	Differentiated	Responsibility	and	the	Balance	of	Commitments	under	the	Climate	Regime’	(2000)	9	Review	of	European	Community	and	International	Environmental	Law	120,	pg.	121.		145	Ibid.		146	Ibid;	Lavanya	Rajamani,	‘Differentiation	in	the	Emerging	Climate	Regime’	(2013)	14	Theoretical	Inquiries	in	Law	151,	pg.	152.	147	Article	4(7)	of	the	UNFCCC.	148	The	United	States	refused	to	ratify	the	Kyoto	Protocol	and	the	Senate	unanimously	passed	the	Byrd-Hagel	Resolution	(US	Senate	Resolution	98),	105th	Congress,	1st	session,	25	July	1997,	which	states	that	the	Kyoto	Protocol’s	exemption	for	developing	countries	is	environmentally	flawed	and	differentiation	could	result	in	serious	harm	to	the	United	States	economy.		149	For	a	recent	analysis	of	differing	applications	of	CBDRRC	suggested	by	member	states,	see	Lavanya	Rajamani,	‘The	Reach	and	Limits	of	the	Principle	of	Common	but	Differentiated	Responsibilities	and	Respective	Capabilities	in	the	Climate	Change	Regime’	in	Navroz	K.	Dubash	(ed),	
Handbook	of	Climate	Change	and	India:	Development,	Politics	and	Governance	(Earthscan	2012).	150	Charlotte	Streck,	Paul	Keenlyside	and	Moritz	von	Unger,	‘The	Paris	Agreement:	A	New	Beginning’	(2016)	13	Journal	for	European	Environmental	and	Planning	Law	3,	pg.	7.	151	Ibid,	pg.	13.	
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“NDCs”.152	Countries	are	required	to	update	their	NDCs	every	five	years.153	Each	time,	the	update	needs	to	represent	“a	progression	beyond	the	Party’s	then	current	nationally	determined	contribution.”154	It	also	needs	to	take	into	account	the	five-yearly	“global	stock	take”	exercise	mandated	under	Article	14	of	the	Paris	Agreement	to	assess	“the	collective	progress	towards	achieving	the	purpose	of	this	Agreement	and	its	long-term	goals.”	Maljean-Dubois	describes	the	NDC	process	as	a	reflection	of	self-differentiation,	which	“is	the	result	of	a	fully	bottom-up	(and	voluntary)	process	of	self-determination	of	national	pledges.”155	She	further	argues	that	the	Paris	Agreement	embodies	a	more	dynamic	notion	of	differentiation,	whereby	each	section	takes	a	different	approach	to	differentiation,	“carefully	balancing	what	will	be	differentiated	and	what	will	be	common	in	the	post-	2020	period.”156	For	example,	the	finance	provisions	are	based	on	a	strong	version	of	differentiation.	As	such,	developed	countries	“shall	provide	financial	resources	to	assist	developing	country	Parties.”157	On	the	other	end	of	the	spectrum	are	the	provisions	pertaining	to	the	transparency	framework.	Maljean-Dubois	points	out	that	it	is	in	this	part	of	the	Paris	Agreement	that	“the	obligations	of	developed	and	developing	countries	are	converging	the	most”	as	all “Parties shall account for their 
nationally determined contributions”158 even if the transparency framework takes 
into account parties’ different capacities. These	developments	mark	a	significant	departure	from	the	differential	treatment	between	developed	and	developing	countries	contained	in	the	Kyoto	Protocol.		 	 	 	 	 		 As	the	brief	discussion	above	shows,	the	CBDRRC	principle	is	a	normative	pillar	of	the	climate	change	regime.	Its meaning and application has changed 
significantly over time, and some may say that such changes constitute 
refinements that will bode well for the development of a comprehensive 
international framework on climate change. The CBCRRC principle has also been 
taken into account by cities in their norm-setting actions. The	preamble	of	the	Seoul	Declaration	issued	at	the	C40	Large	Cities	Climate	Summit	2009	states	that	C40	cities	share	the	view	that	it	is	necessary	to	take	immediate	actions	“…based	on	the	principles	of	co-existence,	mutual	benefit	and	common	but	differentiated	responsibilities”.159	Accordingly,	“cities	in	developed	countries	need	to	assist	the	efforts	of	cities	in	developing	countries”160	and	leadership	is	expected	from	more	developed	and	wealthier	cities	that	have	the	resources	to,	for	example,	organize	and	host	summits,	conferences	and	workshops.	C40’s	adherence	to	the	CBDRRC																																																									152	Article	14(2)	of	the	Paris	Agreement;	see	ibid.	pg.	11	for	discussion	on	the	NDCs.	153	Article	4(9)	of	the	Paris	Agreement.	154	Article	4(3)	of	the	Paris	Agreement	155	Sandrine	Maljean-Dubois,	‘The	Paris	Agreement:	A	New	Step	in	the	Gradual	Evolution	of	Differential	Treatment	in	the	Climate	Regime?’	(2016)	25	Review	of	European	Community	and	International	Environmental	Law	1,	pg.	4.		156	Ibid,	pg.	2.	157	Article	4	of	the	Paris	Agreement.	158	Article	4(13)	of	the	Paris	Agreement.	159	Preamble	of	the	Seoul	Declaration,	adopted	at	the	Third	C40	Large	Cities	Climate	Summit,	Seoul,	South	Korea,	21	May	2009.		160	Ibid.		
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principle	is	de	facto,	not	de	jure,	as	it	is	not	legally	bound	by	the	climate	change	treaties.	By	voluntarily	adopting	this	principle,	and	applying	it	to	its	member	cities,	C40	is	indirectly	expanding	the	authority	of	the	UNFCCC	regime.	It	should	be	noted	that	there	are	C40	cities	located	in	states	that	have	not	ratified	the	Kyoto	Protocol.161	Further,	C40	member	cities	Toronto	and	Vancouver	are	located	in	Canada,	a	state	that	withdrew	from	the	Kyoto	Protocol	during	its	second	commitment	period.162	Therefore,	it	can	be	argued	that	prior	to	the	signing	of	the	Paris	Agreement,	C40’s	application	of	the	CBDRRC	principle	was	a	way	for	UNFCCC	norms	to	circumvent	recalcitrant	or	reluctant	national	governments	and	find	articulation	within	states	at	the	subnational	level.		 	 		 Furthermore,	the	CBDRRC	principle	has	traditionally	been	applied	in	the	context	of	the	multilateral	climate	change	negotiations,	but	it	can	have	wider	application	in	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.	For	example,	Scott	and	Rajamani	have	argued	that	the	fact	that	the	CBDRRC	principle	is	a	“fundamental 
part of the conceptual apparatus of the climate change regime also implies…that 
state parties are obliged not just to interpret current obligations and fashion new 
ones in keeping with the CBDRRC principle, but also to take this principle into 
account in their unilateral actions vis-à-vis other parties.”163 C40’s endorsement of 
the CBDRRC principle similarly indicates the principle’s wider relevance, which 
in the present case constitutes horizontal application	of	the	principle	amongst	sub-state	entities	domestically	and	globally.		
4.3	MRV	and	Transparency				 	 The	architects	of	the	Paris	Agreement	intend	to	use	data	transparency	as	a	driving	force	to	build	trust	and	to	create	incentives	for	parties	to	work	towards	climate	mitigation	based	on	domestically	determined	targets	volunteered	on	a	bottom-up	basis.164	Article	13	of	the	Paris	Agreement	establishes	“an	enhanced	transparency	framework	for	action	and	support.”	This	information-based	mechanism	embodies	the	approach	whereby	GHG	emission	reduction	targets	are	determined	nationally	while	MRV	is	organized	at	the	international	level.	In	order	to	“build	mutual	trust	and	confidence	and	to	promote	effective	implementation”165,	the	transparency	framework	is	intended	to	provide	informational	clarity	and	permit	tracking	of	individual	states’	progress	towards	achieving	their	NDCs.	Each	party	is	required	to	regularly	provide	a	national	inventory	report	of	its	GHG	emissions	and																																																									161	For	example,	the	US.		162	Canada	withdrew	from	the	Kyoto	Protocol	on	15	December	2012;	UNFCCC,	“Status	of	Ratification”,	online:	http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).		163	Joanne	Scott	and	Lavanya	Rajamani,	‘EU	Climate	Change	Unilateralism’	(2012)	23	European	Journal	of	International	Law	469,	pg.	477.	164	For	an	overview	of	differing	opinions	on	whether	the	Paris	Agreement	represents	a	step	forward	in	addressing	climate	change	given	that	“country	specific	targets	volunteered	on	a	bottom-up	basis	are	less	likely	to	be	sufficiently	ambitious,	in	the	aggregate,	to	meet	global	goals”,	see	Streck,	Keenlyside	and	von	Unger,	pg.	28.		165	Article	13(1)	of	the	Paris	Agreement.		
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“information	necessary	to	track	progress	made	in	implementing	and	achieving	its	nationally	determined	contribution	under	Article	4.”166	Article	13	is	therefore	described	as	relying	on	a	form	of	‘naming	and	shaming’	to	nudge	states	into	taking	action	not	only	in	connection	with	mitigation	and	adaptation,	but	also	in	relation	to	assistance.167	The	information	submitted	by	states	will	be	subject	to	a	technical	expert	review,	which	will	identify	areas	of	improvement	and	capacity-building	needs	amongst	other	things.168	From	the	outset,	India	and	China	were	strongly	opposed	to	an	international	MRV	mechanism	because	of	its	perceived	intrusiveness.169	At	the	crux	of	their	reservations	was	the	extent	of	differentiation	in	relation	to	transparency.170	As	a	result,	the	final	wording	of	Article	13	reflects	a	degree	of	compromise	and	gives	assurance	that	the	transparency	framework	will	be	“implemented	in	a	facilitative,	non-intrusive,	non-punitive	manner,	respectful	of	national	sovereignty,	and	avoid	placing	undue	burden	on	Parties.”171	 	 		 	 The	extensive	reliance	on	information-driven	techniques	to	implement	the	Paris	Agreement	is	the	first	of	its	kind	in	international	environmental	law.	To	ensure	that	this	governance	experiment	gets	on	the	right	track	to	success	requires	the	energy	and	contribution	of	various	actors	in	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.	In	this	regard,	urban	climate	law	complements	and	supports	the	information-driven	approach	embodied	in	the	Paris	Agreement.	In	Chapter	5,	I	introduced	the	Global	Mayors’	Compact.	Briefly,	it	is	a	voluntary	scheme	that	certifies	cities	that	have	fulfilled	the	compliance	requirements,	which	primarily	involve	accounting	and	reporting	of	GHG	emission	inventories	as	well	as	mitigation	and	adaptation	actions.	It	is	noteworthy	that,	at	the	launch	of	the	Global	Mayors’	Compact	at	the	high-profile	Climate	Summit	in	New	York	City	on	23	September	2014,	it	was	repeatedly	emphasized	that	one	of	the	Compact’s	key	aims	is	to	“[d]emonstrate	the	commitment	of	city	governments	to…more	ambitious,	transparent,	and	credible	national	climate	targets	by	voluntarily	agreeing	to	meet	
standards	similar	to	those	followed	by	national	governments”	(emphasis	added)	in	the	run-up	to	the	UNFCCC	21st	COP	in	Paris	and	beyond.172	Specifically,	the	Compact	seeks	to	have	city-level	initiatives	complement	and	support	the	international	climate	negotiations	by	adopting	the	pledge-and-review	approach	that	underpins	the	Paris	Agreement	and	developing	a	set	of	MRV	standards	and	practices	that	are	similar	to	those	at	the	international	level.	For	example,	the	“City	Climate																																																									166	Article	13(7)	of	the	Paris	Agreement.	167	Jorge	E	Vinuales,	The	Paris	Climate	Agreement:	An	Initial	Examination	(Part	III	of	III)	(Blog	of	the	European	Journal	of	International	Law,	8	February	2016),	online:	http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-paris-climate-agreement-an-initial-examination-part-iii-of-iii/	(accessed	on	1	July	2016)	168	Article	13(11)	of	the	Paris	Agreement.	169	Alex	Barker	and	Pilita	Clark,	‘India	slows	progress	on	ambitious	climate	change	accord’	Financial	
Times	(16	November	2015);	Pilita	Clark,	‘COP21:	China	accused	of	blocking	progress	at	Paris	climate	talks’	Financial	Times	(8	December	2015).	170	Vinuales.	171	Article	13(3)	of	the	Paris	Agreement.	172	Cities	Mayors	Compact	Action	Statement	(Issued	at	the	Climate	Summit	2014),	‘Goals,	Objectives	and	Commitments’,	online:	http://www.un.org/climatechange/summit/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2014/09/CITIES-Mayors-compact.pdf	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	
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Commitments”173	that	cities	are	required	to	pledge	upon	joining	the	Compact	are	similar	to	the	NDCs	that	states	are	required	to	report	pursuant	to	the	Paris	agreement.	In	both	cases	of	the	City	Climate	Commitments	and	the	NDCs,	it	is	expected	that	civil	society,	journalists,	and	other	interested	actors	who	are	able	to	scrutinize	the	publicly	available	data	will	contribute	to	holding	cities	and	states	accountable.	The	hope	is	that	the	public	scrutiny	will	create	incentives	for	city	and	national	governments	to	undertake	more	ambitious	actions	to	secure	reputational	benefits	or	avoid	being	“named	and	shamed”	for	deviating	from	the	standard	of	appropriate	behavior.	At	the	time	of	writing,	the	modalities,	procedures	and	rules	that	will	underpin	the	Paris	Agreement’s	transparency	framework	have	yet	to	be	determined.	It	is	therefore	not	possible	to	undertake	a	more	detailed	analysis	of	MRV	at	the	international	level	and	at	the	subnational	level	except	to	note	that	there	are	already	clear	signs	that	cities	intend	to	develop	a	global	transparency	framework	that	will	mirror	MRV	at	the	international	level	as	closely	as	possible.	In	this	third	example	of	coupling,	we	see	how	urban	climate	law	seeks	to	complement	and	strengthen	the	international	climate	regime.		
5. Conclusion		
	 	 This	chapter	sought	to	advance	the	argument	that	global	cities	are	beginning	to	perform	a	role	in	creating	law.	Based	on	a	set	of	norms	that	posit	that	cities	ought	to	and	can	play	a	meaningful	role	in	global	efforts	to	address	climate	change,	global	cities	have	cooperated	with	various	actors	including	development	banks,	NGOs	and	environmental	consultancies	to	develop	practices	and	voluntary	standards.	I	coin	the	term	“urban	climate	law”	to	refer	to	these	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	promulgated	by	global	cities	and	implemented	through	their	transnational	networks.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 Urban	climate	law	relies	on	two	key	pathways	to	steer	the	behavior	of	cities	and	their	governments	towards	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation	as	well	as	investing	in	low-carbon	development	options	for	the	future.	The	promotion	of	reflexivity	and	norm	diffusion	often	do	not	proceed	in	a	linear	fashion	but	constitute	reiterative,	dynamic	interactional	processes	to	spread	the	adoption	of	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards.	Relying	on	insights	from	the	theoretical	literature	and	empirical	findings,	the	discussion	in	this	chapter	showed	how	cities	and	their	governments	engage	in	learning	and	imitation,	and	the	crucial	role	of	norm	entrepreneurs	in	facilitating	these	processes.		 	 	 	 		 	 Finally,	the	last	part	of	this	chapter	advanced	the	argument	that	the	interaction	between	urban	climate	law	and	the	UNFCCC	regime	has	been	strategic	and	mostly	mutually	beneficial.	Coupling	not	only	strengthens	the	UNFCCC	regime;	endorsement	and	affirmation	of	the	principles	and	practices	of	the	UNFCCC	also	lends	legitimacy	to	urban	climate	law.	The	analysis	on	coupling	also	makes	a	contribution	to	the	enduring	debate	about	the	role	of	soft	law	in	global	governance	by	demonstrating	that	urban	climate	law,	as	a	form	of	soft	law,	plays	an	important																																																									173	Compact	of	Mayors,	online:	http://www.compactofmayors.org/resources/	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	
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complementary	role	to	that	of	the	relatively	hard	UNFCCC	regime	through	norm	elaboration,	facilitating	experimentation	and	generating	knowledge	about	novel	institutional	practices.	As	consistently	argued	in	this	chapter,	soft	law	and	hard	law	not	only	support	and	complement	one	another,	but	the	interaction	between	them	can	result	in	a	synergistic	expansion	of	governance	that	adds	to	the	overall	coherence	of	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.	It	can	be	argued	that	the	international	community	sacrificed	ambition	for	the	sake	of	universal	participation	when	it	agreed	to	put	the	NDCs	at	the	centre	of	the	Paris	Agreement’s	mitigation	framework.	As	a	voluntary,	bottom-up	process,	there	is	the	risk	that	the	aggregate	effect	of	the	NDCs	will	not	be	sufficient	to	meet	the	two	degree	Celsius	target.	There	is	already	evidence	of	this	ambition	gap,	as	the	Paris	Decision	“noted	with	concern”.174	As	such,	it	is	all	the	more	important	that	other	elements	of	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex	help	maintain	the	momentum	and	ambition	that	was	seen	in	the	run-up	to	COP-21	in	Paris	as	well	as	support	the	development	of	the	novel	mechanisms	that	the	Paris	Agreement	has	introduced.	If	the	Paris	Agreement	is	a	milestone	that	marks	the	beginning	of	a	new	era	for	the	international	climate	regime,	it	also	marks	the	beginning	of	a	new	chapter	for	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.	Within	the	regime	complex,	global	cities	have	a	unique	contribution	to	make.
																																																								174	Para.	17,	Decision	1/CP.	21:	Adoption	of	the	Paris	Agreement,	UNFCCC,	Report	of	the	Conference	of	the	Parties	on	its	twenty-first	session,	held	in	Paris	from	30	November	to	13	December	2015.	
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Chapter	7:	A	Normative	Assessment	of	Urban	
Climate	Law		
1. Introduction	The	preceding	chapters	examined	in	detail	what	five	global	cities	are	doing	to	address	climate	change,	and	how	global	cities	have	come	together	to	form	a	transnational	network	to	scale	up	their	climate	actions	and	facilitate	the	diffusion	of	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards.	Chapter	6	examined	the	mechanisms	of	urban	climate	law	and	its	interactions	with	the	UNFCCC	normative	framework.	This	chapter	endeavours	to	take	a	step	back	from	the	intricate	details	and	consider	some		‘big	picture’	questions.	The	first	question	I	would	like	to	explore	in	this	chapter	is	how	the	transnational	cooperative	efforts	among	global	cities	and	urban	climate	law	contribute	towards	the	performance	of	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 Throughout	this	thesis,	Abbott’s	conception	of	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex	has	been	used	to	frame	the	discussion	of	how	multiple	governance	actors	and	institutions	currently	govern	climate	change.	As	mentioned	in	Chapter	2,	Abbott’s	definition	is	a	refinement	of	Keohane	and	Victor’s	conceptualization	of	the	climate	change	regime	complex	in	their	article	published	in	2011	as	“a	loosely	coupled	system	of	institutions…[which]	are	linked	in	complementary	ways.”1	In	this	framing,	urban	climate	law	constitutes	a	regime	or	institution	within	the	regime	complex.	Keohane	and	Victor	offer	six	evaluative	criteria	to	assess	regime	complexes	normatively	as	well	as	identify	some	ways	in	which	the	functioning	of	the	climate	change	regime	complex	can	be	improved.	These	six	criteria	are:	(1)	coherence	amongst	regimes	in	the	sense	of	being	compatible	and	mutually	reinforcing;	(2)	accountability	to	relevant	audiences;	(3)	determinacy	of	rules	in	order	to	enhance	compliance	and	reduce	uncertainty;	(4)	sustainability	in	the	sense	of	being	durable;	(5)	epistemic	quality	in	rules	and	(6)	fairness	in	the	sense	that	“[institutions]	should	provide	benefits	widely.”2	The	choice	of	these	criteria	is	not	random;	factors	such	as	coherence	and	the	epistemic	quality	of	rules	are	widely	used	as	benchmarks	to	evaluate	the	integrity	and	soundness	of	normative	systems.	In	Part	2	of	this	chapter,	these	six	criteria	will	be	used	to	evaluate	the	extent	to	which	urban	climate	law	contributes	towards	enhancing	the	overall	performance	of	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.	The	key	conclusion	is	that	global	cities	and	their	networks	strengthen	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.		 	 	 	 	 	 		 It	should	be	clarified	that	the	aim	of	Part	2	is	not	to	assess	the	overall	performance	of	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex,	but	to	evaluate	the	normative	contribution	of	global	cities	-	through	their	creation	and																																																									1	Robert	O.	Keohane	and	David	G.	Victor,	‘The	Regime	Complex	for	Climate	Change’	(2011)	9	Perspectives	on	Politics	7,	pg.	9.	2	Keohane	and	Victor,	pgs.	16-17.	
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implementation	of	urban	climate	law	–	to	the	transnational	governance	of	climate	change.	As	Keohane	and	Victor	have	pointed	out,	“[w]hether	the	proliferation	of	different	forums	working	on	the	climate	issue	–	such	as	the	G20,	the	MEF,	various	bilateral	technology	and	investment	partnerships,	and	private	sector	and	NGO	initiatives	–	is	an	asset	or	liability	depends	on	their	content	and	how	these	efforts	are	coupled.”3	In	carrying	out	the	assessment	in	Part	2,	I	will	also	elaborate	upon	the	six	criteria	to	provide	a	fuller	basis	for	future	regime	complex	analysis.		 		 Having	concluded	in	Part	2	that	global	cities	and	their	networks	have	a	valuable	normative	role	to	play	in	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex,	Part	3	takes	a	step	further	in	the	macro-level	analysis	and	considers	what	the	emergence	of	cities	as	transnational	law-making	actors	means	for	the	study	of	international	law	and	international	relations	more	broadly.	While	the	growing	prominence	of	cities	on	the	international	level	has	generated	lively	debate	amongst	sociologists,	political	scientists	and	governance	scholars,	international	law	scholars	have	largely	neglected	this	development.4	It	will	seem	that	what	is	unfolding	in	practice	–	that	cities	perceive	themselves	as	having	a	role	to	play	in	global	governance,	that	the	transnational	activities	of	cities	generate	normativity,	and	that	regimes	such	as	the	UNFCCC	recognize	cities	as	stakeholders	in	the	international	climate	change	negotiations	-	is	not	relevant	to	international	law.	This	thesis	has	sought	to	show	that	the	opposite	is	true.	For	one,	the	transnational	governance	activities	of	cities	ought	to	be	of	interest	to	international	law	scholars	because	these	activities	steer	behavior	in	a	law-like	manner.	Further,	as	the	analysis	in	Part	2	of	this	chapter	will	show,	the	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	that	global	cities	have	developed	and	are	implementing	raise	questions	of	accountability,	transparency	and	fairness.	These	are	questions	that	are	central	to	the	study	of	international	law	in	today’s	world.	There	is	therefore	a	case	to	be	made	for	international	law	scholars	to	pay	attention	to	the	rise	of	global	cities	as	relevant	actors	in	the	climate	change	context	and	in	international	affairs	more	broadly.	Part	3	will	also	offer	some	thoughts	on	how	the	responses	of	international	law	and	practice	to	the	emergence	of	global	cities	as	transnational	lawmaking	actors	may	contribute	towards	the	ongoing	multidisciplinary	conversation	about	global	cities.	Part	4	offers	some	concluding	remarks.		
																																																								3	Ibid.		4	There	are	a	few	notable	exceptions.	See,	for	example,	Yishai	Blank,	‘Localism	in	the	New	Global	Legal	Order’	(2006)	47	Harvard	International	Law	Journal	263;	G.	E.	Frug	and	David	Barron,	‘International	Local	Government	Law’	(2006)	38	The	Urban	Lawyer	1;	Ileana		Porras,	‘The	City	and	International	Law:	In	Pursuit	of	Sustainable	Development	’	(2008)	36	Fordham	Urban	Law	Journal	537;	Janne	E.	Nijman,	‘Renaissance	of	the	City	as	Global	Actor:	The	Role	of	Foreign	Policy	and	International	Law	Practices	in	the	Construction	of	Cities	as	Global	Actors’	in	Gunther	Hellmann,	Andreas	Fahrmeir	and	Milos	Vec	(eds),	The	Transformation	of	Foreign	Policy:	Drawing	and	Managing	
Boundaries	from	Antiquity	to	the	Present	(Oxford	University	Press	2016);	Janne	E.	Nijman,	‘The	Future	of	the	City	and	the	International	Law	of	the	Future’	in	Sam	Muller	and	others	(eds),	The	Law	of	the	
Future	and	The	Future	of	Law	(Torkel	Opsahl	Academic	EPublisher	(Oslo,	Norway)	2011);	Helmut	Philipp	Aust,	‘Shining	Cities	on	the	Hill?	The	Global	City,	Climate	Change,	and	International	Law’	(2015)	26	European	Journal	of	International	Law	255.			
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2. Evaluating	Urban	Climate	Law	in	the	Transnational	Regime	Complex	
Context	A	key	question	that	arises	from	the	discussion	in	the	earlier	chapters	is	whether	the	normative	activities	of	global	cities	make	an	overall	positive	contribution	towards	the	collective	efforts	of	states	and	non-state	actors	to	govern	climate	change	more	effectively	and	therefore	bring	us	closer	to	achieving	the	objectives	of	the	Paris	Agreement.	In	their	pioneering	article	on	the	climate	change	regime	complex,	Keohane	and	Victor	propose	six	criteria	as	a	framework	for	analyzing	the	performance	of	the	climate	change	regime	complex	as	a	whole.	This	section	posits	that	it	would	be	meaningful	to	use	the	criteria	to	evaluate	the	performance	of	the	individual	regimes	or	institutions	within	the	regime	complex.	This	presents	one	way	of	answering	the	question	of	whether	urban	climate	law,	as	one	of	the	regimes	within	the	climate	change	regime	complex,	contributes	positively	to	transnational	climate	change	governance	and	what	improvements	may	be	made.			 In	the	discussion	to	follow,	each	criterion	will	be	elaborated	upon	before	it	is	used	to	evaluate	salient	aspects	of	the	creation	and	implementation	of	urban	climate	law.	This	section	will	conclude	with	a	summary	overview	before	the	discussion	in	Part	3	about	the	broader	implications	that	the	rise	of	global	cities	as	lawmaking	actors	poses	for	the	study	of	international	law.	
2.1	Coherence	In	Keohane	and	Victor’s	view,	the	coherence	of	a	regime	complex	depends	on	the	extent	to	which	the	various	specific	regimes	are	“compatible	and	mutually	reinforcing.”5	Coherence	is	perceived	to	be	a	good	thing	in	a	utilitarian	sense:	“[w]here	compatibilities	exist	they	encourage	linkages	that	make	it	easier	to	channel	resources	from	one	element	of	the	regime	complex	to	another…”6	I	will	seek	to	furnish	Keohane	and	Victor’s	definition	with	more	detail	before	proceeding	to	evaluate	the	extent	to	which	urban	climate	law	contributes	towards	building	coherence	in	the	regime	complex.		 	 	 	 	 	 		 The	concept	of	coherence	has	received	significant	attention	in	the	literature	on	the	functioning	of	the	EU,	which	seeks	to	live	up	to	its	self-imposed	commitment	to	ensure	the	coherence	of	its	policies.	Interest	in	coherence	predated	the	creation	of	the	EU’s	single	institutional	framework	given	that,	without	the	unifying	framework,	the	political	functioning	of	the	EU	rested	upon	the	legal	obligation	of	coherence.7	Today,	Article	13	of	the	Treaty	on	European	Union	constitutes	the	legal	basis	for	coherence	in	EU	foreign	policy	and	coherence	has	emerged	as	a	principle	understood	to	impose	a	procedural	obligation	on	EU	foreign	policy	actors	to	coordinate	their	policies.8	From	the	perspectives	of	the	European	Commission	and																																																									5	Keohane	and	Victor,	pg.	16.	6	Ibid.		7	Deidre	Curtin,	‘	The	Constitutional	Structure	of	the	Union:	A	Europe	of	Bits	and	Pieces’	(1993)	30	Common	Market	Law	Review	17,	pg.	27.		8	Clara	Portela	and	Kolja	Raube,	(in-)Coherence	in	EU	Foreign	Policy:	Exploring	Sources	and	Remedies	(Paper	presented	at	the	European	Studies	Association	Bi-annual	Convention,	Los	Angeles,	April	
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the	Council,	a	coherent	EU	foreign	policy	is	a	necessary	precondition	for	effectiveness.9	Several	scholars	have	pointed	out	the	distinction	between	consistency	and	coherence.	In	Hillion’s	view,	for	example,	coherence	goes	beyond	the	assurance	that	different	policies	do	not	contradict	each	other,	to	seek	synergy	and	added	value	in	the	different	components	of	EU	policies.10	Hoffmeister	also	argues	that	the	notion	of	coherence	relates	more	to	the	pursuit	of	positive	synergies	than	simply	avoiding	policy	contradictions.11	Finally,	it	has	been	argued	that	consistency	is	a	binary	definition,	that	is,	policies	in	question	are	consistent	or	not.	In	contrast,	we	can	conceive	of	a	spectrum	of	coherence	whereby	a	set	of	policies	can	be	more	or	less	coherent.12	In	brief,	coherence	can	take	the	form	of	a	legal	obligation	of	a	procedural	nature	to	avoid	inconsistencies	in	a	set	of	policies,	but	it	is	widely	argued	that	coherence	is	more	than	seeking	consistency.	It	relates	to	seeking	positive	synergies	to	maximize	policy	benefits.		 	 	 	 	 		 Recalling	its	definition,	a	regime	complex	is	a	loosely	coupled	system	of	institutions.	It	is	characterized	by	the	absence	of	hierarchy	amongst	the	institutions	and	there	is	little,	if	any,	central	coordination	amongst	institutions.	Thus,	unlike	an	institutional	complex	like	the	EU,	regime	complexes	do	not	have	formal	institutional	arrangements	and	processes	in	place	to	create	coherence.	Instead,	coherence	in	a	regime	complex	has	to	be	orchestrated	through	less	formal	efforts	by	the	actors	involved.	The	literature	on	regime	interplay,	with	its	focus	on	the	goals	and	methods	to	achieve	integration	in	a	regime	complex,	offers	some	relevant	insights.	For	example,	coherence	can	be	enhanced	through	the	adherence	to	over-arching	goals	such	as	the	avoidance	of	conflict,	enhancing	synergy,	achieving	efficiency	and	promoting	equity.13	Coordination	through	markets	and	networks	are	some	of	the	methods	that	can	be	employed	to	create	integration	and	coherence.	Further,	Morin	and	Orsini	remind	us	that	“[t]he	creation	and	development	of	regime	complexes	is	anything	but	a	natural	process;	they	are	actively	constructed	by	agents.”	As	such,	they	contend	that	the	more	coherent	states	and	other	actors	are	in	their	policies	towards	the	specific	regimes	in	a	regime	complex,	the	more	likely	it	is	to	promote																																																																																																																																																																						2009),	pg.	4.	Article	13	of	the	Treaty	on	European	Union	states	“The	Union	shall	have	an	institutional	framework	which	shall	aim	to	promote	its	values,	advances	its	objectives…and	ensure	the	consistency,	effectiveness	and	continuity	of	its	policies	and	actions.”		9	See,	for	example,	European	Commission,	Europe	in	the	World	–	Some	Practical	Proposals	for	Greater	
Coherence,	Effectiveness	and	Visibility	(Communication	from	the	Commission	to	the	European	Council	of	June	2006	COM	(2006)	278	final,	2006).		10	Christophe	Hillion,	‘Tous	pour	un,	Un	pour	tous!		Coherence	in	the	External	relations	of	the	European	Union’	in	M.	Cremona	(ed),	Developments	in	EU	External	Relations	Law,	Collected	Courses	of	
the	Academy	of	European	Law	(Oxford	University	Press	2008),	pg.	17.		11	Frank	Hoffmeister,	‘Inter-pillar	Coherence	in	the	European	Union's	Civilian	Crisis	Management’	in	Steven	Blockmans	(ed),	The	European	Union	and	Crisis	Management:	Policy	and	Legal	Aspects	(T.M.C.	Asser	Press	2008),	pg.	161.	12	Antonio	Missiroli,	Coherence	for	European	Security	Policy:	Debates,	Cases,	Assessments	(Occasional	Papers	27,	The	Institute	for	Security	Studies,	Western	European	Union,	2001),	pg.	4;	online:	http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/occ027.pdf	(accessed	on	29	July	2016).		13	Sebastian	Oberthür,	‘Interplay	Management:	Enhancing	Environmental	Policy	Integration	Among	International	Institutions’	(2009)	9	International	Environmental	Agreements:	Politics,	Law	and	Economics	371.		
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“density”	in	the	regime	complex.14	Density	refers	to	the	number	of	connections	between	the	regimes,	and	the	assumption	is	that	the	greater	the	number	of	connections	between	regimes,	the	more	pathways	and	opportunities	exist	for	the	fostering	of	coherence	amongst	the	norms	and	practices	of	the	individual	regimes.		 The	literature	on	regime	interaction	(denoting	that	one	regime	may	influence	other	regimes15)	is	also	relevant	for	the	study	of	coherence.	Oran	Young	was	one	of	the	first	scholars	to	identify	different	types	of	regime	interactions,	including	“clustered	institutions”	(where	several	indirectly	related	institutions	are	bundled	together,	as	has	happened	in	the	“package	deals”	that	formed	the	World	Trade	Organization	and	the	United	Nations	Convention	on	the	Law	of	the	Sea)	and	“overlapping	institutions”	(where	distinct	institutional	arrangements	affect	each	other	in	mostly	unintentional	ways,	for	example,	the	trade	and	environmental	agreements).16	Stokke	refined	Oran	Young’s	typology	by	introducing	the	notions	of	“normative	interaction”	(where	one	regime	may	confirm	or	contradict	the	norms	of	another	regime)	and	“ideational	interaction”	(where	one	regime	may	learn	from	another).17	The	consequences	of	regime	interaction	can	include	conflicts	or	synergies,	and	it	is	the	latter	that	I	am	interested	in	exploring	for	present	purposes.			 For	Kristen	Rosendal,	there	is	synergy	when	the	aggregate	effects	of	two	institutions	are	larger	than	the	sum	of	effects	produced	on	their	own.18	As	van	Asselt	puts	it,	“the	term	has	a	positive	connotation,	associated	with	enhancing	the	effectiveness	of	one	or	both	interacting	regimes.”19	Van	Asselt	provides	a	list	of	indicators	that	provide	a	tangible	way	of	assessing	whether	regime	interaction	could	lead	to	synergies,	which	can	be	usefully	adapted	to	determine	the	existence	of	synergies	in	a	regime	complex.20	The	first	indicator	is	whether	there	are	shared	principles,	the	assumption	being	that	when	regimes	apply	the	same	principles,	such	as	the	CBDRRC	principle,	it	enhances	the	regime	complex’s	coherence.	The	second	indicator	is	the	existence	of	common	economic	incentives	to	promote	the	same	type	of	activities.	Van	Asselt	gives	the	example	of	the	Global	Environmental	Facility	serving	as	the	financial	mechanism	for	a	number	of	multilateral	agreements	thereby	providing	common	economic	incentives	to	address	global	environmental	problems	including	biodiversity	loss	and	climate	change.	The	third	indicator	is	the	existence	of	streamlined	monitoring	and	reporting	obligations.	Van	Asselt	points	out	that	synergies	are	created	when	the	monitoring	and	reporting	obligations	under	different	regimes	are	streamlined	thereby	reducing	data	collection	costs.	The	fourth																																																									14	Jean	Frédéric	Morin	and	Amandine	Orsini,	‘Policy	coherency	and	regime	complexes:	the	case	of	genetic	resources’	(2014)	40	Review	of	International	Studies	303,	pg.	308.			15	H.	van	Asselt,	The	Fragmentation	of	Global	Climate	Governance:	Consequences	and	Management	of	
Regime	Interactions	(Edward	Elgar	2014),	pg.	46.	16	Oran	Young,	‘Institutional	Linkages	in	International	Society:	Polar	Perspectives’	(1996)	2	Global	Governance	1,	pgs.	2-6.		17	Olav	Schram	Stokke,	The	Interplay	of	International	Regimes:	Putting	Effectiveness	Theory	to	Work	(The	Fridtjof	Nansen	Institute,	FNI	Report	14/2001,	2001),	pg.	10.		18	Kristen	G.	Rosendal,	‘Impacts	of	Overlapping	International	Regimes:	The	Case	of	Biodiversity’	(2001)	7	Global	Governance	95,	pg.	97.	19	van	Asselt,	pg.	55.		20	Ibid,	pg.	56-58.	The	remainder	of	this	paragraph	draws	from	this	source	unless	otherwise	indicated.	
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indicator	is	the	existence	of	shared	supporting	measures	such	as	capacity	building	and	technology	transfer	mechanisms	amongst	the	regimes.	The	fifth	indicator	is	the	extent	of	learning	among	the	regimes.		 	 	 	 	 		 Applying	the	first	indicator	of	shared	norms	and	principles,	it	can	be	argued	that	urban	climate	law	contributes	to	consistency	and	compatibility	because	the	norms	and	practices	of	cities	are	consistent	with	the	goals	of	other	actors	in	the	regime	complex	–	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation	–	and	the	general	adherence	to	the	notions	of	environmental	liberalism.	Further,	cities	acting	through	the	C40	support	the	CBDRRC	principle.	Another	example	is	the	Compact	of	Mayors	initiative,	which	is	intended	to	complement	the	transparency	framework	engendered	by	the	Paris	Agreement.	As	such,	there	is	strong	adherence	by	global	cities	to	a	common	principle	of	transparency	that	forms	a	key	pillar	of	the	post-2020	UNFCCC	regime.	 With	regard	to	the	second	indicator	of	whether	common	economic	incentives	to	promote	the	same	type	of	activities	exist,	it	can	be	argued	that	climate	finance	in	the	UNFCCC	regime	and	other	institutions	such	as	the	World	Bank	and	development	aid	agencies	provide	common	economic	incentives	to	pursue	low-carbon	development,	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation.	The	common	economic	incentives	provided	by	climate	finance	are	being	extended	to	the	realm	of	sustainable	urban	development	and	global	cities	are	being	encouraged	to	engage	in	transnational	climate	financing	arrangements	in	their	efforts	to	address	climate	change.	As	discussed	in	earlier	chapters,	the	various	‘orchestration’	efforts	by	the	World	Bank	and	other	actors	include	training	programs	to	build	the	capacity	of	city	governments	to	gain	access	to	sources	of	climate	finance	and	‘matchmaker	workshops’	to	connect	potential	investors	and	city	governments	that	are	seeking	funding	for	climate	projects.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 The	streamlining	of	reporting	and	monitoring	obligations	creates	further	synergy	between	urban	climate	law,	climate	initiatives	by	private	actors,	and	the	UNFCCC	regime.	The	UNFCCC	has	a	global	platform	known	as	the	Non-State	Actor	
Zone	for	Climate	Action	(NAZCA)	which	tracks	climate	action	commitments	by	companies,	cities,	regions	and	investors.21	The	information	that	cities	report	via	the	Compact	of	Mayor,	CDP	and	carbonn	Climate	Registry	is	automatically	included	in	NAZCA.22	This	enhances	transparency.	At	the	same	time,	a	readily	accessible	platform	for	climate	change	governance	actors	to	learn	about	potential	collaboration	opportunities	has	the	potential	to	enhance	synergistic	cooperation	and	complementary	action	amongst	global	cities	and	other	actors	in	the	regime	complex.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 The	fifth	indicator	points	to	the	extent	of	learning	among	the	regimes.	Cities	contribute	to	the	learning	processes	within	the	regime	complex	when	they	cooperate	with	other	institutions	in	developing	their	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards.	This	has	been	discussed	in	detail	in	Chapter	6,	and	will	not	be	reiterated	here.		
																																																								21	NAZCA,	online:	http://climateaction.unfccc.int	(accessed	on	1	August	2016).	22	NAZCA,	“Data	Partners”,	online:	http://climateaction.unfccc.int/about	(accessed	on	1	August	2016).	
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To	summarize,	the	de	minimis	requirements	of	coherence	appear	to	be	consistency	and	compatibility	of	the	practices	and	outputs	of	the	various	regimes.	Synergies	among	regimes	in	a	regime	complex	create	coherence,	whereby	synergy	is	said	to	exist	when	the	aggregate	effects	of	two	regimes	are	larger	than	the	sum	of	effects	produced	on	their	own.23	A	regime	complex	can	be	said	to	be	more	coherent	when	there	is	more	synergy	amongst	the	regimes	within	it,	and	less	coherent	when	there	is	less	synergy.	Finally,	we	can	use	a	number	of	indicators	as	suggested	by	van	Asselt	to	gauge	the	level	of	synergy,	thereby	also	gauging	the	amount	of	coherence	in	a	regime	complex.	It	can	be	argued	that	urban	climate	law	is	largely	consistent	and	compatible	with	the	norms	and	practices	of	other	institutions	in	the	regime	complex.	Particularly	in	relation	to	shared	norms,	streamlined	monitoring	and	reporting	obligations,	and	the	extent	to	which	global	cities	contribute	towards	learning	within	the	regime	complex,	global	cities	can	be	said	to	be	enhancing	synergies	and	therefore	contributing	positively	to	the	level	of	coherence	in	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.		
2.2	Determinacy	Keohane	and	Victor	draw	their	determinacy	criterion	from	Thomas	Franck’s	work	on	legitimacy.	In	Franck’s	view,	there	are	four	characteristics	of	a	rule	that	determine	its	degree	of	legitimacy	–	determinacy,	symbolic	validation,	coherence	and	adherence.24	To	the	extent	that	a	rule	exhibits	these	four	characteristics,	they	exert	an	inherent	power	over	states	to	comply	with	the	rule	in	question.25	Of	the	four	characteristics,	Franck	argues	that	textual	determinacy	is	“[p]erhaps	the	most	self-evident	of	all	characteristics	making	for	legitimacy.”26	Textual	determinacy	refers	to	“the	ability	of	the	text	to	convey	a	clear	message”	so	that	those	addressed	know	exactly	what	is	required	of	them,	which	is	an	essential	prerequisite	for	compliance.27	“Readily	ascertainable	normative	content”	is	therefore	another	aspect	of	determinacy.28	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 Franck	argues	that	the	indeterminacy	of	rules	can	be	costly	in	the	sense	that	indeterminacy	makes	it	easier	for	actors	to	justify	noncompliance.29	Conversely,	a	more	determinate	rule	leaves	less	room	for	interpretation	and	therefore	is	less	amenable	to	evasive	strategies	that	are	employed	to	justify	noncompliance.	Franck	also	points	out	that	the	degree	of	the	determinacy	of	a	rule	directly	affects	the	degree	of	its	perceived	legitimacy.30	This	point	is	illustrated	as	follows:	“A	rule	that																																																									23	Rosendal,	pg.	97.	24	Thomas	M.	Franck,	‘Legitimacy	in	the	International	System’	(1988)	82(4)	The	American	Journal	of	International	Law	705,	pg.	712.	Franck	defines	legitimacy	to	mean	“that	quality	of	a	rule	which	
derives	from	a	perception	on	the	part	of	those	to	whom	it	is	addressed	that	it	has	come	into	being	in	
accordance	with	right	process”;	pg.	706.	25	Ibid,	pg.	712.	26	Ibid,	pg.	713.	27	Ibid.	28	Thomas	M.		Franck,	The	Power	of	Legitimacy	among	Nations	(Oxford	University	Press	1990),	pg.	52.	29	Franck,	‘Legitimacy	in	the	International	System’,	pg.	714.	30	Ibid,	pg.	716.	
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prohibits	the	doing	of	‘bad	things’	lacks	legitimacy	because	it	fails	to	communicate	what	is	expected,	except	within	a	very	small	constituency	in	which	‘bad’	has	achieved	a	high	degree	of	culturally	induced	specificity.	To	be	legitimate,	a	rule	must	communicate	what	conduct	is	permitted	and	what	conduct	is	out	of	bounds.		 														While	Franck	is	concerned	with	the	textual	determinacy	of	rules	found	in	treaties,	resolutions	of	international	organizations	and	so	forth,	nothing	in	his	analysis	precludes	extending	the	discussion	of	rule	determinacy	to	the	realm	of	voluntary	standards.31	In	a	community	organized	around	rules,	whether	it	is	a	community	of	states,	private	actors	or	cities,	compliance	is	secured,	at	least	in	part,	by	the	perception	of	a	rule	as	legitimate	by	those	to	whom	it	is	addressed.	Whether	the	rule	is	found	in	customary	international	law	or	is	promulgated	by	a	voluntary	certification	scheme	does	not	really	make	a	difference	–	the	question	of	whether	those	to	whom	the	rule	is	addressed	will	comply	turns	on	whether	they	deem	it	legitimate.	Legitimacy,	in	turn,	is	partly	determined	by	the	textual	determinacy	of	the	rule	in	question.			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 As	discussed	in	the	previous	chapters,	the	GHG	Protocol	for	Cities	and	the	Compact	for	Mayors	both	provide	users	with	detailed	user	guidelines	that	are	intended	to	confer	a	high	degree	of	specificity	on	the	accounting	standards	and	criteria	that	global	cities	are	required	to	apply.	The	Compact	of	Mayors	also	publishes	user	guides	that	are	designed	to	help	cities	gain	a	firm	grasp	of	the	scope	of	their	reporting	obligations,	thereby	making	the	normative	content	of	the	voluntary	standard	clearly	ascertainable	to	cities	that	seek	certification.32	The	GHG	Protocol	for	Cities	is	contained	in	a	document	of	over	one	hundred	and	seventy	pages,	containing	detailed	information	about	goal	setting,	determining	the	boundaries	or	parameters	of	the	city’s	GHG	inventory,	the	accounting	methodologies	for	various	sectors	(such	as	waste	and	transportation),	and	methods	of	verification	to	assess	the	completeness	and	accuracy	of	reported	data.33	GHG	emission	standards	enjoy	a	high	degree	of	determinacy	because	they	lend	themselves	to	objective	measurement.	As	such,	it	can	be	argued	that	the	voluntary	standards	and	practices	that	global	cities	have	developed	and	implemented	contribute	positively	towards	determinacy	in	the	transnational	regime	complex	for	climate	change	because	of	their	high	level	of	textual	specificity	and	clarity	in	normative	content.	However,	it	should	be	noted	that	as	far	as	voluntary	standards	are	concerned,	epistemic	quality	and	scientific	knowledge	may	be	more	important	considerations.	Naiki	argues,	“even…[voluntary]	standards	that	appear	to	be	determinate	may	not	be	considered	legitimate	and	credible	if	they	are	not	based	on	epistemic	quality	and	scientific	knowledge.”34	It	is	to	the	dimension	of	epistemic	quality	that	the	discussion	turns	to	next.																																																										31	Naiki	makes	this	point	in	assessing	the	sustainable	bioenergy	regime	complex;	Yoshiko	Naiki,	‘Trade	and	Bioenergy:	Explaining	and	Assessing	the	Regime	Complex	for	Sustainable	Bioenergy’	(2016)	27	European	Journal	of	International	Law	129,	pg.	151.	32	Compact	of	Mayors,	“Resources”,	online:	http://www.compactofmayors.org/resources/tools-for-cities/	(accessed	on	1	August	2016).		33	Greenhouse	Gas	Protocol,	Global	Protocol	for	Community-Scale	Greenhouse	Gas	Emission	Inventories:	
An	Accounting	and	Reporting	Standard	for	Cities	(World	Resources	Institute,	C40,	and	ICLEI,	2014).		34	Naiki,	pg.	152.	
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2.3	Epistemic	Quality			 Keohane	and	Victor	do	not	say	much	about	epistemic	quality	except	that	one	aspect	of	epistemic	quality	is	“the	consistency	between…rules	and	scientific	knowledge”	and	that	epistemic	quality	of	a	regime	complex	bears	importance	for	its	legitimacy	and	effectiveness.35	Epistemic	quality	is	generally	defined	as	“reliable	information	needed	for	grappling	with	normative	disagreement	and	uncertainty”36	that	is	provided	by	experts.	As	modern	societies	grapple	with	complex	risks	pertaining	to	food	safety,	chemicals,	and	the	stability	of	financial	systems,	to	name	a	few,	they	are	increasingly	dependent	on	expert	knowledge	because	“[o]ne	cannot	regulate	what	one	does	not	understand.”37	As	the	risks	that	require	regulation	are	usually	complex	and	rapidly	changing,	regulators	themselves	need	to	be	highly	skilled	or	rely	on	experts.38	Peter	Haas	has	explored	the	role	of	experts	in	global	environmental	governance	extensively	in	his	work,	coining	the	term	“epistemic	communities”	to	describe	the	networks	of	“knowledge-based	experts”	that	play	a	role	in	“articulating	the	cause-and-effect	relationships	of	complex	problems,	helping	states	identify	their	interests,	framing	the	issues	for	collective	debate,	proposing	specific	policies,	and	identifying	salient	points	for	negotiation.”39	 	 	 	
 Epistemic	quality	bears	particular	salience	for	voluntary	standards	because	they	derive	part	of	their	legitimacy	from	claims	of	expert	knowledge.	Within	the	literature	on	voluntary	standards,	scholars	with	an	institutionalist	perspective	have	focused	much	of	their	efforts	on	identifying	how	standards	and	the	organizations	behind	them	achieve	legitimacy.40	One	of	the	central	tenets	of	this	body	of	literature	is	that	standard-setting	entities	rely	on	expertise	to	build	authority	and	legitimacy	such	that	standards	are	made	out	to	be	“expert	knowledge	in	the	form	of	rules.”41	Legitimacy	has	been	defined	as	“the	justification	of	actions	to	those	whom	they	affect	according	to	reasons	they	can	accept”.42	There	are	two	aspects	of	legitimacy:																																																									35	Keohane	and	Victor,	pg.	17.	36	Allen	Buchanan	and	Robert	O.	Keohane,	‘The	Legitimacy	of	Global	Governance	Institutions’	(2006)	20	Ethics	&	International	Affairs	405,	pg.	426.	37	Martin	Shapiro,	‘Deliberative,	Independent	Technocracy	v.	Democratic	Politics:	Will	the	Globe	Echo	the	E.U’	(2005)	68	Law	and	Contemporary	Problems	341,	pg.	343.		38	In	the	EU,	where	the	European	Commission	routinely	consults	around	one	thousand	expert	groups	and	there	are	currently	more	than	forty	increasingly	powerful	EU	agencies,	fundamental	questions	have	been	raised	about	the	legitimate	role	of	knowledge	and	expertise	in	decision-making.	Critics	claim	that	growing	expert	power	and	the	increase	in	depoliticized	(and	therefore	politically	unaccountable)	expert	bodies	erode	democratic	government;	Expertise	and	Democracy	(Centre	for	European	Studies,	University	of	Oslo,	ARENA	Report	1/14,	edited	by	Cathrine	Holst,	2014),	pgs.	2	and	3.		39	Peter	M.	Haas,	‘Introduction:	Epistemic	Communities	and	International	Policy	Coordination’	(1992)	46	International	Organization	1,	pg.	2.		40	Stefano	Ponte	and	Emmanuelle	Cheyns,	‘Voluntary	Standards,	Expert	Knowledge	and	the	Governance	of	Sustainabilty	Networks’	(2013)	13	Global	Networks	459,	pg.	463.	41	Bengt	Jacobsson,	‘Standardization	and	Expert	Knowledge’	in	Nils	Brunsson	and	Bengt	Jacobsson	(eds),	A	World	of	Standards	(Oxford	University	Press	2002),	pg.	41.		42	Melissa	S.	Williams,	‘Citizenship	as	Agency	within	Communities	of	Shared	Fate’	in	Steven	Bernstein	and	William	D.	Coleman	(eds),	Unsettled	Legitimacy:	Political	Community,	Power,	and	Authority	in	a	
Global	Era	(UBC	Press	2009),	pg.	43.		
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input	(process)	and	output	(performance	and	effectiveness)	legitimacy.	Bodansky	explains	that	the	former	“derives	from	the	process	by	which	decisions	are	made,	including	factors	such	as	transparency,	participation,	and	representation”,	whereas	the	latter	concerns	effectiveness	and	“the	results	of	governance.”43	Kerwer	posits	that	a	necessary	(but	not	always	sufﬁcient)	precondition	for	the	effectiveness	of	a	standard	is	that	the	target	audience	believes	that	the	expertise	on	which	the	standard	is	based	is	convincing.44		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	While	expert	knowledge	can	stem	from	many	disciplines,	“science	has	an	institutionalized	monopoly	of	knowledge”	in	contemporary	societies.45	Science	is	often	portrayed	to	be	objective	and	capable	of	eliminating	uncertainty,	and	therefore	is	used	to	lend	legitimation	to	policy	decisions.46	However,	as	the	literature	on	science	and	technology	has	shown,	science	is	not	produced	in	a	social	vacuum	and	does	not	discover	uncontroverted	“truths”	that	are	then	translated	into	policies	or	technologies.47	In	fact,	facts	and	values	are	intertwined	and	uncertainty	is	a	constitutive	feature	of	knowledge.	Science,	however	sound,	cannot	eliminate	uncertainty	and	the	question	of	how	uncertainties	are	to	be	managed	is	a	normative	one.	In	spite	of	these	reservations	about	the	objectivity	of	science,	it	remains	an	important	aspect	of	epistemic	quality,	especially	in	the	case	of	climate	change.	There	is	a	widespread	perception	that	science	is	the	final	arbiter	in	the	climate	change	debate,	and	the	IPCC	goes	to	great	length	to	establish	that	it	provides	assessments	based	on	the	best	available	science	to	guide	governments	on	international	climate	policy.48		 	 	 	 	 	 	In	developing	their	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards,	cities	have	relied	on	the	findings	of	the	IPCC.	C40	endorses	the	IPCC’s	findings	that	larger	cities	consume	two-thirds	of	the	world’s	energy	and	are	responsible	for	more	than	three-
																																																								43	Daniel	Bodansky,	‘Legitimacy	in	International	Law	and	International	Relations’	in	Jeffrey	L.	Dunoff	and	Mark	A.	Pollack	(eds),	Interdisciplinary	Perspectives	on	International	Law	and	International	
Relations	(Cambridge	University	Press	2012),	pg.	330.	44	Dieter	Kerwer,	‘Rules	that	Many	Use:	Standards	and	Global	Regulation’	(2005)	18	Governance	611,	pg.	618.	Perez	has	argued	that	with	declining	trust	in	experts	and	their	professed	expertise,	the	power	of	“…expert	knowledge	to	provide	privileged	accounts	of	the	common	good	and,	hence,	to	serve	as	a	source	and	arbiter	of	legitimacy”	has	also	declined.	As	a	result,	“the	legitimacy	of	transnational	regimes	is	judged,	increasingly,	by	the	nature	of	the	process	that	led	to	the	regimes’	creation,	and	by	the	public	accountability	of	those	who	implement	them”;	Oran	Perez,	‘Normative	Creativity	and	Global	Legal	Pluralism:	Reflections	on	the	Democratic	Critique	of	Transnational	Law’	(2003)	10	Indiana	Journal	of	Global	Legal	Studies	25,	pg.	28-29.		45	Expertise	and	Democracy,	pg.	20.		46	Reiner	Grundmann,	‘The	role	of	expertise	in	governance	processes’	(2009)	11	Forest	Policy	and	Economics	398,	pgs.	401-402.	47	See,	for	example,	Sheila	Jasanoff	and	Brian	Wynne,	‘Science	and	decisionmaking’	in	Steve	Rayner	and	Elizabeth	L.	Malone	(eds),	Human	choice	and	climate	change:	An	International	Assessment	(Vol	1:	
The	Societal	Framework)	(Battelle	Press	1998);	Sheila	Jasanoff	(ed)	States	of	Knowledge:	The	Co-
Production	of	Science	and	the	Social	Order	(Routledge	2004).		48	For	discussion	about	the	IPCC,	see	for	example,	Navraj	Singh	Ghaleigh,	‘Science	and	Climate	Change	Law	-	the	Role	of	the	IPPC	in	International	Decision-Making’	in	Cinnamon	Carlarne,	Kevin	Gray	and	Richard	Tarasofsky	(eds),	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	International	Climate	Change	Law	(Oxford	University	Press	2016).	
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quarters	of	global	GHG	emissions.49	In	addition,	cities	have	sought	to	ensure	that	their	requirements	and	guidance	for	calculating	and	reporting	city-wide	GHG	emissions	are	consistent	with	the	IPCC	guidelines.50	Therefore,	it	can	be	argued	that,	to	the	extent	that	epistemic	quality	refers	to	the	consistency	between	urban	climate	law	and	IPCC	science,	urban	climate	law	scores	well	for	this	criterion.	However,	it	should	also	be	noted	that	urban	climate	law	does	not	only	value	scientific	knowledge	as	a	source	of	epistemic	quality.	As	illustrated	in	Chapters	4	and	5,	a	key	characteristic	of	how	cities	and	their	networks	function	is	the	formation	of	extensive	partnerships	with	other	actors	to	tap	on	their	expertise	and	resources.	In	developing	standards	and	practices,	cities	have	valued	local	knowledge	and	global	knowledge.	Cities	have	also	sought	to	tap	on	the	expertise	of	urban	planners,	architects,	financiers,	entrepreneurs,	environmental	activists,	engineers	and	development	consultants	in	developing	climate	solutions.51			 	 	 	 		
2.4	Accountability		
	 Keohane	and	Victor	draw	on	the	concept	of	accountability	put	forth	by	Grant	and	Keohane	that	“some	actors	have	the	right	to	hold	other	actors	to	a	set	of	standards,	to	judge	whether	they	have	fulfilled	their	responsibilities	in	light	of	these	standards,	and	to	impose	sanctions	if	they	determine	that	these	responsibilities	have	not	been	met.”52	In	other	words,	the	actors	being	held	accountable	“have	to	answer	for	[their]	action	or	inaction’	concerning	“accepted	standards	of	behavior	and	...	they	will	be	sanctioned	for	failures	to	do	so.”53	Transparency,	which	has	been	defined	as	“disclosure	of	information	intended	to	evaluate	and/or	steer	behavior”,	has	been	championed	as	a	means	of	enhancing	the	accountability	of	international	environmental	policy	outcomes.54	As	urban	climate	law	involves	governance	by	disclosure,	I	will	focus	on	the	nexus	between	transparency	and	accountability	in	this	section.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 In	considering	the	consequences	of	transparency	for	the	accountability	and	legitimacy	of	voluntary	certification	programs,	Auld	and	Gulbrandsen	draw	the	distinction	between	procedural	and	outcome	transparency.	By	procedural	transparency,	they	mean	“the	openness	of	governance	processes,	such	as	decision-
																																																								49	See	discussion	in	Part	1	of	Chapter	3.			50	The	GHG	Protocol	for	Cities	states	that	it	“…sets	out	requirements	and	provides	guidance	for	calculating	and	reporting	city-wide	GHG	emissions,	consistent	with	the	2006	IPCC	(Intergovernmental	
Panel	on	Climate	Change)	Guidelines	for	National	Greenhouse	Gas	Inventories”;	pg.	20.		51	See	discussion	in	Chapter	5.		52	Ruth	W.	Grant	and	Robert	O.	Keohane,	‘Accountability	and	Abuses	of	Power	in	World	Politics’	(2005)	99	American	Political	Science	Review	29,	pg.	29.	53	Ibid,	at	pg.	30.	54	Aarti	Gupta	and	Michael	Mason,	‘Transparency	and	International	Environmental	Politics’	in	Michele	Betsill,	Kathryn	Hochstetler	and	Dimitris	Stevis	(eds),	Advances	in	International	
Environmental	Politics	(Palgrave	Macmillan	2014),	pgs.	356-7.	For	discussion,	also	see	Jutta	Brunnee	and	Ellen	Hey,	‘Transparency	and	International	Environmental	Institutions’	in	Andrea	Bianchi	and	Anne	Peters	(eds),	Transparency	in	International	Law	(Cambridge	University	Press	2013).	
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making	or	adjudication.”55	It	has	been	argued	that	procedural	transparency	is	often	used	to	improve	the	legitimacy	of	global	governance	arrangements,	which	are	perceived	to	be	less	legitimate	because	they	are	not	supported	by	norms	of	sovereignty	and	state	consent.56	“Outcome	transparency	concerns	openness	about	regulated	or	unregulated	behaviors”	and	is	considered	important	for	identifying	and	managing	environmental	problems.57	Examples	include	domestic	environmental	laws	requiring	industrial	facilities	to	disclose	their	pollutant	discharges	to	the	public,	and	C40	requiring	their	member	cities	to	report	their	climate	actions	on	a	public	register	like	the	carbonn	Climate	Registry.	 	 	 	 	 		 When	it	comes	to	voluntary	certification	schemes,	the	target	actors	for	procedural	transparency	and	outcome	transparency	are	the	decision-makers	and	the	regulated	actors	respectively.	We	will	briefly	consider	each	in	turn.	When	it	comes	to	procedural	transparency,	it	is	argued	that	the	disclosure	of	information	about	decision-making	processes	improves	accountability	because	the	disclosed	information	enables	regulated	actors	and	the	public	to	ask	relevant	questions	and	seek	answers.58	Secondly,	by	appealing	to	shared	norms	of	openness,	procedural	transparency	can	enhance	the	acceptability	of	the	certification	scheme	and	thereby	increase	its	legitimacy.59	Finally,	transparency	can	help	convince	participants	that	decision-making	is	conducted	in	a	transparent	and	fair	manner,	thereby	facilitating	buy-in	from	more	participants.60	I	will	illustrate	these	points	by	reference	to	the	GHG	Protocol	for	Cities.	As	mentioned	in	the	earlier	chapters,	the	various	stakeholders	involved	in	developing	the	GHG	Protocol	for	Cities	took	pains	to	be	as	transparent	in	their	deliberations	and	decision-making	processes	as	possible.	There	were	meetings	open	to	the	public	and	extensive	consultation	with	cities	that	were	not	officially	members	of	the	working	group	but	were	anticipated	users	of	the	GHG	Protocol.	The	information	that	went	into	the	development	of	the	GHG	Protocol	was	made	available	on	the	Internet,	accompanied	by	glossaries	and	user	guides	to	make	the	information	as	accessible	to	the	non-expert	as	possible.	This	is	important	as	the	attributes	of	disclosed	information	is	often	central	to	the	success	of	transparency	initiatives.	These	attributes	include	whether	the	disclosed	information	is	accessible,	comprehensive,	comparable	or	relevant.61		 	 	 	 	 		 When	it	comes	to	outcome	transparency,	the	argument	is	that	the	disclosure	of	information	about	the	environmental	performance	of	cities	to	the	public	and	stakeholders	can	enhance	accountability	because	civil	society	groups	can	hold	cities	to	account	for	their	practices	and	performance.	As	Meidinger	puts,	it,	“[i]f	a																																																									55	Graeme	Auld	and	Lars	H.	Gulbrandsen,	‘Transparency	in	Nonstate	Certification:	Consequences	for	Accountability	and	Legitimacy’	(2010)	10	Global	Environmental	Politics	97,	pg.	99.		56	Aarti	Gupta	argues	that	this	is	the	central	assumption	of	procedural	transparency;	Aarti	Gupta,	‘Transparency	Under	Scrutiny:	Information	Disclosure	in	Global	Environmental	Governance’	(2008)	8	Global	Environmental	Politics	1.	57	Auld	and	Gulbrandsen,	pg.	100.		58	Ibid.	59	Ibid.	60	Ibid.	61	Klaus	Dingwerth	and	Margot	Eichinger,	‘Tamed	Transparency:	How	Information	Disclosure	under	the	Global	Reporting	Initiative	Fails	to	Empower’	(2010)	10	Global	Environmental	Politics	74.	
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significant	amount	of	information	about	a	given	practice	is	publicly	available,	then	that	practice	becomes	potentially	accountable	to	a	broad	set	of	actors	and	values,	at	least	in	that	it	is	subject	to	their	criticism.”62	Thus,	transparency	can	play	a	role	in	enhancing	what	Keohane	has	termed	“external	accountability”,	which	refers	to	“accountability	to	people	outside	the	acting	entity,	whose	lives	are	affected	by	it.”63	The	raison	d'être	of	certification	schemes	such	as	the	Compact	of	Mayors	is	to	promote	output	transparency	as	a	means	of	holding	cities	accountable	to	their	commitments.	It	is	too	early	to	tell	what	the	effects	of	transparency	are	for	cities	addressing	climate	change,	but	it	can	be	said	that	urban	climate	law	is	characterized	by	a	strong	commitment	to	transparency	as	a	mode	of	governance.	Given	the	positive	correlation	between	transparency	and	accountability,	it	can	be	argued	that	cities	and	their	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	strive	towards	accountability	and	therefore	contribute	positively	towards	enhancing	the	accountability	of	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.	
2.5	Sustainability				 Sustainability	of	a	regime	complex	is	concerned	with	its	resilience	to	external	shocks	and	its	long-term	existence.	In	Keohane	and	Victor’s	view,	sustainability	is	an	important	criterion	because	actors	need	long-term	certainty	about	the	rules	of	the	game	so	to	speak.	In	the	case	of	climate	change,	long-term	certainty	about	rules	plays	a	particularly	pertinent	role	in	achieving	the	goals	of	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation	because	investors,	both	public	and	private,	will	not	be	willing	to	spend	on	long-term	mitigation	and	adaptation	strategies	in	the	absence	of	clear	signals	about	the	long-term	nature	of	rules	mandating	decarbonization	and	climate	adaptation.		A	good	example	to	illustrate	the	importance	of	sustainability	and	resilience	of	a	regime	is	the	European	Union	Emissions	Trading	Scheme	(EU	ETS).	The	volatility	of	carbon	prices	within	the	EU	ETS	in	the	last	few	years	was	partly	triggered	by	the	economic	crisis	in	the	EU	during	the	period	2008	to	2009,	but	price	volatility	was	also	taken	to	indicate	the	existence	of	more	structural	problems	with	the	EU	ETS	that	threatened	the	stability	and	sustainability	of	the	regional	GHG	emissions	control	scheme.64	The	EU	institutions	and	its	member	states	have	also	been	taking	a	long	time	to	reach	agreement	on	a	proposal	to	revise	the	EU	ETS	for	the	period	2021-2030,	further	deepening	pessimism	about	the	future	of	the	EU	ETS.65	Today,																																																									62	Errol	Meidinger,	‘The	Administrative	Law	of	Global	Private-Public	Regulation:	the	Case	of	Forestry’	(2006)	17	European	Journal	of	International	Law	47,	pg.	82.	63	Robert	O.	Keohane,	‘Global	Governance	and	Democratic	Accountability’	in	David	Held	and	Mathias	Koenig-Archibugi	(eds),	Taming	Globalization:	Frontiers	of	Governance	(Polity	Press	2003),	pg.	141.		64	See,	for	example,	Regina		Betz,	What	is	driving	Price	Volatility	in	the	EU	ETS?	(Australasian	Emissions	Trading	Forum,	October/November	2006),	online:	http://www.ceem.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/PagesfromAETFReviewOctNov06_web-2-1.pdf	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	65	For	a	status	update	of	the	EU	ETS	reform	process	and	related	documents,	see	European	Council/Council	of	the	European	Union,	“Reform	of	the	EU	emissions	trading	scheme”,	online:	http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/climate-change/reform-eu-ets/	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	
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due	to	a	confluence	of	factors	including	uncertainty	about	the	future	of	the	EU	ETS	and	low	oil	prices,	the	price	of	an	EU	ETS	allowance	continues	to	be	too	low	to	create	real	incentives	for	industries	to	reduce	GHG	emissions	and	invest	in	low-carbon	technologies.66	The	fall	in	EU	ETS	allowance	prices	has	also	created	unanticipated	challenges	for	the	deployment	of	carbon	capture	and	storage	(CCS)	technologies.	The	Rotterdam	Capture	and	Storage	Demonstration	Project	(ROAD)	is	a	case	in	point.67	The	ROAD	is	a	joint	venture	project	that	is	intended	to	capture	and	store	twenty-five	percent	of	its	annual	three	million	tonnes	of	carbon	dioxide	emissions	beneath	the	North	Sea.68	This	250	megawatts	CCS	plant	was	estimated	to	cost	almost	600	million	euros.69	It	was	to	be	funded	by	the	European	Union,	the	Dutch	government,	the	port	of	Rotterdam,	and	indirectly	by	the	EU	ETS.	In	2009,	the	project	developers	assumed	that	the	price	of	an	allowance	(equivalent	to	one	tonne	of	carbon	dioxide)	would	rise	from	fifteen	euros	to	thirty	euros.70	However,	this	assumption	proved	to	be	grossly	incorrect,	with	the	current	price	of	an	allowance	hovering	at	seven	euros.	This	created	a	funding	deficit	of	more	than	a	hundred	million	euros,	rendering	the	ROAD	project	non-viable	and	therefore	put	on	hold	for	years.71	The	project	was	eventually	completed	and	at	the	time	of	writing,	the	ROAD	project	only	operates	at	a	fraction	of	its	capacity	equivalent	to	the	amount	of	subsidies	and	compensation	it	receives	to	cover	operating	costs,	which	exceed	the	costs	of	compliance	with	the	EU	ETS.72	To	quote	Howard	Herzog,	a	leading	expert	on	CCS	technology,	“[b]ecause	it	is	always	cheaper	to	emit	CO2	to	the	atmosphere	than	to	capture	and	store	it,	markets	will	only	evolve	if	climate	policy	is	put	in	place	that	forces	reduction	of	atmospheric	CO2	emissions.”73	While	the	EU	ETS	is	a	highly	complex	regulatory	system	and	is	prone	to	economic	shocks	because	it	is	a	market-based	mechanism,	its	sustainability	could	have	been	better	secured	if	the	architects	of	the	scheme	had	included	components	to	withstand	shocks.	An	example	of	such	a	component	is	a	market	stability	reserve,	which	will	allow	the	EU	ETS	regulator	to	maintain	price	stability	by	addressing																																																									66	Ibid;	also	see	Sara	Stafanini,	‘Climate	targets	suffer	as	carbon	price	slumps’	Politico	(26	January	2016);	Research	on	the	impact	of	the	Swedish	carbon	dioxide	tax	and	the	EU	ETS	on	productivity	in	the	Swedish	pulp	and	paper	industry	has	shown	that	the	carbon	prices	have	been	too	low	to	create	incentives	for	technological	development;	Tommy	Lundgren	and	others,	Carbon	Prices	and	Incentives	
for	Technological	Development	(Centre	for	Environmental	and	Resource	Economics,	Sweden,	Working	Paper,	2013:4,	2013),	online:	http://www.cere.se/documents/wp/2013/CERE_WP2013-4.pdf	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	67	Rotterdam	Capture	and	Storage	Demonstration	Project,	online:	http://road2020.nl/en/	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	68	Ibid.		69	Tseard	Zoethout,	‘Closing	Modern	Coal-Fired	Power	Plants	With	CCS	Will	Slow	Down	Energy	Transition’	European	Energy	Review	(11	December	2015),	online:	http://www.europeanenergyreview.eu/closing-modern-coal-fired-power-plants-will-slow-down-energy-transition/	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	70	Ibid.		71	Ibid.	72	Interview	Number	13.		73	Howard	Herzog,	CCS	at	a	Crossroads	(Global	CCS	Institute,	Focus	on	CCS	-	Opinion	Leaders	Series,	September	2015),	pg.	4.	
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fluctuations	in	the	supply	and	demand	of	allowances.74	During	periods	when	there	is	a	surplus	of	allowances	in	the	EU	ETS,	the	regulator	can	withdraw	allowances	and	transfer	them	to	the	market	reserve,	and	do	the	reverse	during	periods	of	scarcity	of	allowances.	A	market	stability	reserve	has	been	approved	as	part	of	the	EU	ETS	reform	package	and	will	start	operating	in	January	2019.75	This	will	improve	the	resilience	of	the	EU	ETS,	but	till	then,	the	EU	ETS	regime	suffers	a	sustainability	deficit	in	this	respect.			 Bringing	the	discussion	back	to	whether	cities	and	their	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	contribute	towards	building	resilience	and	sustainability	of	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex,	it	is	relevant	to	recall	the	discussion	in	the	previous	chapter	on	the	reinforcing	nature	of	the	complementarities	between	the	UNFCCC	regime	and	urban	climate	law.	Many	key	aspects	of	urban	climate	law	have	been	designed	to	complement	the	norms	and	practices	of	the	UNFCCC,	while	bypassing	the	issues	that	have	caused	gridlock	in	the	international	negotiations.	It	is	relevant	that	C40	declared	its	support	of	the	CBDRRC	principle	because	this	reinforces	a	core	pillar	of	the	international	climate	change	institutional	framework,	thereby	making	the	regime	complex	more	resilient.		The	commitment	that	cities	have	demonstrated	towards	putting	in	place	a	formal	transparency	framework	based	on	the	monitoring,	reporting	and	verification	of	their	emissions	similar	to	the	international	transparency	framework	under	the	Paris	Agreement	is	also	noteworthy	from	a	sustainability	point	of	view.	By	investing	significant	amounts	of	resources	and	effort	to	implement	a	city-level	transparency	framework,	cities	are	reinforcing	the	message	of	the	Paris	Agreement	to	all	stakeholders	that	data-driven	transparency	and	accountability	will	be	a	key	platform	of	the	future	climate	regime.	This	reduces	uncertainty	about	the	future	rules	and,	it	can	be	argued,	will	reinforce	the	signal	to	companies,	industries	and	governments	to	make	the	necessary	policies	and	investments.		Furthermore,	the	Paris	Agreement	marks	a	milestone	in	the	development	of	the	climate	change	regime	complex,	but	much	remains	to	be	done	to	operationalize	its	mechanisms	and	rules	in	the	years	to	come.	For	example,	the	modalities	and	procedures	regarding	the	NDCs	have	yet	to	be	decided	upon.76	A	lot	of	work	will	also	need	to	be	done	prior	to	the	first	global	stock-take,	which	will	take	place	every	five	years	starting	before	2020.77	In	short,	it	is	still	early	days	as	work	is	underway	to	build	the	institutions	needed	to	implement	the	Paris	Agreement.	Through	voluntary	schemes	like	the	Compact	of	Mayors	as	well	as	ambitious	policies	and	programs	within	their	jurisdictions,	cities	have	collectively	created	a	substantial	amount	of	climate	action	at	the	subnational	level	of	governance,	which	will	go	towards																																																									74	For	discussion,	see	for	example,	Karsten	Neuhoff	et	al,	Is	a	Market	Stability	Reserve	likely	to	improve	
the	functioning	of	the	EU	ETS?	Evidence	from	a	model	comparison	exercise	(Climate	Strategies,	2015).	75	European	Council/Council	of	the	European	Union,	“Reform	of	the	EU	emissions	trading	scheme”.	76	UNFCCC,	Ad	Hoc	Working	Group	on	the	Paris	Agreement	(APA),	online:	http://unfccc.int/bodies/apa/body/9399.php	(accessed	on	5	August	2016).		77	For	discussion,	see	Eliza	Northrop,	Cynthia	Elliott	and	Melisa	Krnjaic,		4	Key	Questions	for	the	
Design	of	the	Global	Stocktake	(19	May	2016),	online:	http://www.wri.org/blog/2016/05/insider-4-key-questions-design-global-stocktake	(accessed	on	5	August	2016).	
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supporting	the	Paris	Agreement	in	its	early	stage	and	the	overall	sustainability	of	the	regime	complex.			
2.6	Fairness			 Finally,	Keohane	and	Victor	include	fairness	as	one	of	the	evaluative	criteria	but	do	not	say	much	about	it	except	that	multilateral	institutions	should	not	be	evaluated	on	the	basis	of	whether	they	achieve	the	“utopian	objective”	of	“reflect[ing]	abstract	normative	standards	of	fairness.”78	Instead,	fairness	simply	refers	to	the	notion	that	benefits	ought	to	be	distributed	widely	and	states	that	are	willing	to	cooperate	ought	not	to	be	discriminated	against.79		The	imposition	of	binding	GHG	emission	targets	on	developed	countries,	and	not	on	developing	countries,	in	the	Kyoto	Protocol	was	used	to	illustrate	the	fairness	point.	In	Keohane	and	Victor’s	view,	“the	absence	of	binding	rules	for	some	states	was	of	questionable	fairness.”80			 Fairness	can	be	said	to	comprise	of	two	key	aspects:	distributive	justice	and	procedural	fairness.	When	considering	whether	fairness	is	achieved	in	a	particular	context,	the	question	of	distributive	justice	would	be	whether	regime	complexes	“create	solutions	and	systems	which	take	into	account	society’s	answers	to	[the]	moral	issues	of	distributive	justice.”81	Procedural	fairness,	on	the	other	hand,	is	concerned	with	“what	the	participants	perceive	as	right	process.”82	I	adopt	Naiki’s	argument	that	the	criterion	of	procedural	fairness		“is	difficult	to	apply	in	the	context	of	regime	complexes,	because	the	question	is	whether	a	regime	complex	is	made	under	the	right	process.	Yet,	regime	complexes	often	emerge	without	the	right	process	or	order,	and	that	is	why	a	comprehensive	regime	was	not	yielded.”83	She	suggests	that	a	possible	line	of	inquiry	is	whether	each	regime	(within	the	regime	complex)	is	fair	in	the	procedural	sense,	for	instance, whether a voluntary 
certification scheme can be said to have achieved input or process legitimacy.84 		 It	can	be	argued	that	the	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	that	cities	have	developed	and	implemented	have	been	able	to	sidestep	questions	of	distributive	justice	in	ways	that	the	UNFCCC	regime	cannot	because	the	latter	is	intended	to	be	an	international	agreement	that	secures	universal	participation.	An	international	agreement	that	fails	to	address	developing	country	needs	and	interests	will	be	perceived	to	be	an	unfair	agreement	that	will	be	rejected	by	developing	countries	that	make	up	the	majority	of	the	international	community.	Consequently,	the	UNFCCC	regime	has	had	to	deal	with	the	issue	of	loss	and	damage,	with	climate	finance,	and	promoting	technology	transfer	to	developing	countries,	to	name	a	few	key	examples.	Urban	climate	law,	in	contrast,	involves	a	select	group	of																																																									78	Keohane	and	Victor,	pg.	17.	79	Ibid.	80	Ibid.	81	Thomas	M.	Franck,	Fairness	in	International	Law	and	Institutions	(Oxford	University	Press	1998),	pg.	8.	82	Ibid,	pg.	7.	83	Naiki,	pg.	156.	84	Ibid.		
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global	cities	that	have	voluntarily	signed	up	to	a	set	of	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards.	As	obligations	are	not	imposed	upon	cities	and	cities	are	persuaded	that	urban	climate	law	only	brings	positive	benefits	such	as	reputational	gain	and	improved	access	to	sources	of	climate	finance,	questions	of	distributive	justice	tend	not	to	arise.	There	is	therefore	limited	opportunity	for	cities	to	contribute	towards	addressing	critical	issues	of	distributive	justice	that,	for	some,	lie	at	the	heart	of	the	climate	change	debate.	As	for	procedural	fairness,	we	have	already	considered	this	when	evaluating	the	related	issues	of	procedural	transparency	and	accountability	earlier	and	the	arguments	will	not	be	repeated	here.	As	concluded	earlier,	it	can	be	argued	that	urban	climate	law	scores	relatively	well	on	procedural	fairness	because	of	its	contribution	towards	enhancing	transparency	and	accountability	of	the	regime	complex.			 To	summarize	the	discussion,	the	question	that	this	part	of	the	chapter	sought	to	consider	is	whether	the	normative	activities	of	global	cities	make	a	positive	contribution	towards	the	performance	of	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.	First,	in	relation	to	coherence,	which	refers	to	the	consistency	and	compatibility	of	the	practices	and	outputs	of	the	various	regimes	within	a	regime	complex,	urban	climate	law	can	be	said	to	be	contributing	positively	towards	the	coherence	of	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.	What	is	particularly	noteworthy	is	the	alignment	between	urban	climate	law	and	the	norms	and	practices	of	other	regimes,	streamlined	monitoring	and	reporting	obligations	that	build	synergies	between	various	regimes	and	urban	climate	law,	and	the	extent	to	which	global	cities	contribute	towards	learning	processes	within	the	regime	complex.		Secondly,	on	the	textual	determinacy	of	rules,	the	voluntary	standards	that	global	cities	have	developed	and	implemented	can	be	said	to	contribute	positively	towards	determinacy	in	the	regime	complex	because	of	their	high	level	of	textual	specificity	and	clarity	in	normative	content.	Thirdly,	to	the	extent	that	epistemic	quality	refers	to	the	consistency	between	urban	climate	law	and	IPCC	science,	urban	climate	law	enjoys	a	respectable	level	of	epistemic	quality.	At	the	same	time,	global	cities	and	their	networks	do	not	rely	only	on	scientific	knowledge	but	also	consult	the	expertise	of	urban	planners,	architects,	financiers,	entrepreneurs,	and	development	consultants,	to	name	a	few,	in	developing	and	implementing	their	practices	and	voluntary	standards.	This	increases	the	epistemic	quality	of	urban	climate	law.	Fourthly,	considering	that	transparency	is	an	important	aspect	of	accountability,	urban	climate	law	contributes	positively	towards	improving	the	accountability	of	the	regime	complex	because	its	dominant	mode	of	governance	is	underpinned	by	transparency	mechanisms.	On	the	fifth	criterion	of	sustainability,	of	note	are	the	complementarities	between	the	UNFCCC	regime	and	urban	climate	law	and	how	the	substantial	amount	of	urban	climate	action	goes	towards	supporting	the	Paris	Agreement	in	its	early	stage	and	enhancing	the	overall	resilience	of	the	regime	complex.	It	is	on	the	final	criterion	of	fairness	that	urban	climate	law	makes	little,	if	any,	positive	contribution	because	the	nature	of	urban	climate	law	is	such	that	it	presents	cities	with	limited	opportunities	to	address	distributive	justice	issues.			
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3. Reflecting	on	the	Significance	of	Cities	for	the	Study	of	International	
Law			 The	preceding	section	sought	to	evaluate	if	global	cities	make	a	negative	or	positive	normative	contribution	towards	the	performance	of	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex	and	concluded	that	it	was	the	latter	case.	If	so,	there	is	a	good	argument	to	be	made	that	contemporary	global	governance	processes	in	other	areas	such	as	healthcare	and	tackling	gender	inequality	ought	to	encourage	greater	participation	of	global	cities	and	further	harness	the	governance	potential	of	cities	and	their	transnational	networks.	However,	before	making	such	recommendations,	it	may	be	apposite	to	pause	and	consider	some	questions	that	the	emergence	of	cities	as	transnational	lawmaking	actors	poses	for	international	law	and	international	relations	more	broadly.	It	is	timely	to	embark	on	such	contemplation	because,	for	a	long	time,	international	law	has	had	highly	limited	engagement	with	the	lively,	multi-disciplinary	debate	concerning	the	growing	prominence	of	cities	in	international	affairs.	As	this	thesis	has	sought	to	demonstrate,	the	rise	of	cities	as	transnational	lawmakers	raises	considerations	that	are	relevant	to	the	study	of	international	law	and	international	law	scholars	are	encouraged	not	to	continue	neglecting	cities	in	their	research.			
3.1	Challenging	statist	conceptions	of	international	law		
		 This	thesis	may	be	considered	post-Westphalian,	as	it	seeks	to	move	beyond	the	focus	of	the	international	legal	system	upon	states	as	the	primary	subjects.85	The	starting	point	in	this	thesis	for	exploring	the	emergence	of	cities	as	lawmaking	actors	was	adopting	the	New	Haven	School’s	approach	to	international	law.	There	are	no	subjects	or	objects	in	the	New	Haven	School	-	only	participants	–	and	participants	“include	those	formally	endowed	with	decision	competence,	for	example	judges,	and	all	those	other	actors	who,	though	not	endowed	with	formal	competence,	may	nonetheless	play	important	roles	in	influencing	decisions.”86	This	recognition	that	many	actors,	apart	from	states,	can	play	a	role	in	international	lawmaking	processes	forecloses	the	argument	about	whether	cities	are	recognized	to	be	a	class	of	actors	in	international	law	and	how	recognition	ought	to	be	conferred.87																																																										85	I	use	the	term	“Westphalian”	to	refer	to	an	international	system	that	is	underpinned	by	the	central	notions	of	states	as	the	primary	subjects	and	objects	of	international	law	and	that	international	law	is	created	on	the	basis	of	consent	by	equal	and	sovereign	states;	see	James	Crawford,	Brownlie’s	Principles	of	Public	International	Law	(Oxford	University	Press	2012),	pg.	287-8.			86	W.	Michael	Reisman,	‘The	View	from	the	New	Haven	School	of	International	Law’	(1992)	86	American	Society	of	International	Law	Proceedings	118,	pg.	122.	87	One	can	also	question	if	formal	recognition	really	matters.	Aust,	for	example,	argues,	“the	more	cities	become	accepted	as	partners	in	global	governance,	the	less	relevant	will	their	informal	status	(as	opposed	to	states	and	international	organizations)	be	in	the	long	run.”	What	matters	is	that	there	is	growing	acceptance	of	cities	by	international	actors	and	audiences,	and	Aust	suggests	that	this	is	just	beginning	to	happen	for	networks	like	C40.	Finally,	he	concludes	that	cities	constitute	an	emerging	“new	class	of	actors	in	international	law”	even	though	it	is	difficult	to	“pin	[this]	down	in	positivist/formalist	terms”;	Aust,	pgs.	273-5.		
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By	positing	that	cities	are	participants	in	the	international	legal	order	from	the	outset,	my	focus	has	been	on	examining	their	norm-setting	practices	and	explaining	their	significance	in	terms	of	how	they	steer	the	behavior	of	cities	towards	climate	change	mitigation	and	adaptation.	Further,	Myres	McDougal	and	Harold	Lasswell,	pioneers	of	the	New	Haven	School	approach,	have	defined	law	as	“a	process	of	authoritative	decision	by	which	the	members	of	a	community	clarify	and	secure	their	common	interests.”88	According	to	this	definition	of	law,	the	norms	and	voluntary	standards	that	global	cities	have	developed	and	subscribed	to	would	count	as	international	lawmaking	as	the	participating	governments	are	authorities	making	collective	decisions	on	the	regulation	of	GHGs	which	they	have	the	power	to	implement	in	their	jurisdictions.	The	governments	of	global	cities	also	articulate	their	common	interests	by	signing	up	to	declarations	and	other	public	statements	issued	at	international	conferences,	for	example.			My	response	to	questions	such	as	whether	the	transnational	governance	activities	of	cities	challenge	our	perspectives	on	actors	and	subjects	of	international	law	and	whether	they	call	into	question	the	traditional	distinction	between	law	and	non-law	is	that	these	questions	do	not	really	get	us	anywhere	because	our	answers	ultimately	boil	down	to	the	jurisprudential	view	of	the	international	legal	order	that	each	of	us	holds.	Depending	on	one’s	jurisprudential	leanings,	the	state	is	the	only	significant	actor	on	the	international	stage	or	it	is	one	of	many	actors	albeit	a	very	important	one,	or	it	is	simply	one	of	many	participants	that	has	the	resources	and	power	to	engage	in	international	affairs.89	Thus,	I	would	suggest	that	the	study	of	cities	and	their	normative	activities	reinforces	the	idea	that	international	law	no	longer	refers	solely	or	even	primarily	to	the	law	that	governs	the	rights	and	obligations	of	states	in	co-existence	and	that	there	are	various	theoretical	conceptions	of	the	international/transnational/global	legal	order.	International	legal	scholarship	is	enriched	by	the	recognition	of	these	various	schools	of	thought	and	a	move	away	from	state-centric	versions	of	international	lawmaking,	which	hinder	the	crafting	of	creative	solutions	to	our	global	collective	action	problems	such	as	climate	change.		By	creative	solutions,	I	mean	solutions	that	recognize	the	importance	of	multi-level	governance	and	which	enlist	the	participation	of	multiple	governance	actors,	including	cities,	to	tackle	global	governance	challenges	more	effectively.			
3.2	Recognizing	the	Impact	of	International	Law	on	Cities		 			 It	should	be	noted	that,	while	cities	are	on	the	margins	of	international	law	and	are	hardly	recognized	as	worthy	of	scholarly	analysis,	international	law	already	directly	affects	the	world’s	cities	by	having	determinative	influences	on	decision-making	processes	and	regulation	at	the	subnational	level.	Frug	and	Barron	have																																																									88	Harold	D.	Lasswell	and	Myres	S.	McDougal,	Jurisprudence	for	a	Free	Society:	Studies	in	Law,	Science	
and	Policy	(Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers	1992),	pg.	xxi.	89	For	discussion	of	how	different	perspectives	on	international	law	might	shape	the	narrative	of	the	international	legal	significance	of	subnational	efforts	at	addressing	climate	change,	see	Hari	M.		Osofsky,	‘Multiscalar	Governance	and	Climate	Change:	Reflections	on	the	Role	of	States	and	Cities	at	Copenhagen	’	(2010)	25	Maryland	Journal	of	International	Law	64,	pgs.	75-79.	
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examined	how	international	institutions	and	laws	are	bringing	the	governments	of	cities	within	their	regulatory	reach.90	They	argue	that	international	law	is	beginning	to	play	a	role	in	defining	the	relationship	between	cities	and	the	states	in	which	they	are	located:	“Parties	negotiating	international	trade	agreements,	international	tribunals	arbitrating	commercial	disputes,	United	Nations’	rapporteurs	investigating	compliance	with	human	rights	obligations,	and	international	financial	institutions	formulating	development	policy	have	all	begun	to	express	interest	in	the	legal	relationship	between	cities	and	their	national	governments.”91	As	such,	a	new	set	of	international	rules	and	regulations	governing	cities	has	emerged	and	they	coin	the	term	“international	local	government	law”	to	refer	to	it.		 Frug	and	Barron	illustrate	the	nature	of	international	local	government	law	with	reference	to	decisions	by	international	arbitration	tribunals	that	have	arisen	from	international	investment	disputes.	One	such	example	is	the	well-known	decision	in	Metalclad	v	United	Mexican	States.92	Briefly,	the	facts	of	the	case	are	as	follows:	Metalclad	is	a	US	company	that	had	purchased	a	landfill	in	the	Mexican	municipality	of	Guadalcazar.	The	dispute	started	when	Guadalcazar’s	municipal	authorities	denied	Metalclad	permission	to	construct	and	operate	the	landfill	despite	the	company	having	received	guarantees	and	reassurances	from	higher	levels	of	government	that	it	could	proceed	with	the	landfill	project.93	Domestic	legal	proceedings	failed	to	determine	this	issue.	Metalclad	then	sought	to	resolve	the	dispute	by	bringing	a	claim	under	the	North	American	Free	Trade	Agreement	(NAFTA).	The	NAFTA	arbitration	panel	ruled	in	favour	of	the	company.	In	the	panel’s	opinion,	Mexico’s	breach	resulted	from	the	central	government’s	failure	to	stop	the	city	of	Guadalcazar	from	asserting	its	expansive	view	of	its	domestic	legal	authority.94	Frug	and	Barron	argue	that,	in	the	extensive	literature	on	the	arbitration	panel’s	decision	in	Metalclad,	what	is	often	overlooked	is	the	fact	that	the	case	turned	on	a	dispute	about	the	scope	of	city	power	in	Mexico.95	In	their	view,	“Metalclad	crafted	a	rule	that	limited	the	ability	of	cities	to	make	their	own	interpretations	of	local	regulatory	authority,	thus	taking	a	position	on	a	central	issue	of	Mexican	local	government	law.”96	Thus,	it	can	be	argued	that	the	concerns	raised	by	the	Metalclad	decision	go	beyond	the	international	legal	system’s	capacity	to	extend	the	scope	of	investor	immunity	from	governmental	regulations.97	The	decision	also	demonstrates	how	the	international	legal	system	can	restructure	the	relationship	between	cities	and	higher	levels	of	government	within	a	state.98			 While	international	local	government	law	focuses	our	attention	on	the	ways	in	which	international	law	can	have	an	impact	on	local	decision-making	processes	in	cities	and	therefore	shape	the	everyday	urban	reality,	my	deliberations	on	urban																																																									90	Frug	and	Barron.	91	Ibid,	pg.	1.		92	Metalclad	Corporation	v	United	Mexican	States	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB(AF)/97/1;	40	I.L.M.	36	(2001).	93	Metalclad	Corporation	v	United	Mexican	States,	para.	50.		94	Ibid.	95	Frug	and	Barron,	pg.	41.		96	Frug	and	Barron,	pg.	43.	97	Frug	and	Barron,	pg.	44.	98	Ibid.		
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climate	law	shed	light	on	a	different	relationship	between	the	world’s	cities	and	the	international	legal	order.	Urban	climate	law	is	evidence	that	cities	can	exert	normative	effect	within	the	transnational	legal	order,	and	that	the	relationship	between	cities	and	the	international	legal	order	does	not	always	have	to	be	mediated	by	the	state.	International	local	government	law	and	urban	climate	law	together	provide	a	fuller	picture	of	how	international	law	has	an	impact	on	cities	and	vice	versa.	Importantly,	the	above	discussion	also	illustrates	the	relevance	of	cities	to	the	study	of	international	law,	and	buttresses	the	claim	that	it	is	timely	for	international	legal	scholarship	to	examine	the	emergence	of	cities	as	transnational	governance	actors	and	the	implications	of	this	development.			
3.3	Critical	Evaluation			 While	this	thesis	has	considered	the	emergence	of	cities	as	international	actors	to	be	a	positive	development,	the	rise	of	cities	should	not	be	praised	uncritically	without	consideration	of	some	of	the	less	positive	aspects.	In	this	regard,	international	law	doctrines	and	scholarship	can	provide	a	critical	prism	through	which	the	transnational	governance	activities	of	cities	can	be	considered.	A	consequence	of	the	emergence	of	cities	as	international	actors	is	the	challenge	posed	to	the	consent-based	structure	of	international	law.99	If	formal	international	lawmaking	processes	such	as	that	of	the	UNFCCC	are	to	include	cities	in	negotiations	and	give	cities	voting	rights,	for	example,	how	would	the	international	system	uphold	the	requirement	of	consent?	Another	related	concern	is	that	the	inclusion	of	cities	is	likely	to	increase	the	complexity	of	international	negotiations,	which	are	already	bogged	down	by	the	immense	difficulties	of	reaching	compromise	on	complex	issues	among	states	with	disparate	interests.	There	are	a	number	of	possibilities.	One	possibility	would	be	to	reform	current	international	legal	decision-making	processes	to	give	cities	greater	participation	rights	in	the	pre-decision	stages.	Hari	Osofsky	has	suggested	that	such	reforms	can	include	creating	forums	in	which	city	governments	can	meet	directly	with	state	representatives	involved	in	negotiations	or	inserting	provisions	into	formal	agreements	that	acknowledge	the	role	of	cities	in	regulating	climate	change.	As	noted	in	Chapter	1,	the	Cancun	Agreements	recognized	local	and	subnational	governments	as	“governmental	stakeholders”	of	the	UNFCCC	regime	in	2010,	so	the	latter	recommendation	has	already	been	taken	up.100	These	reforms,	while	they	would	create	connections	between	urban	efforts	to	tackle	climate	change	and	the	UNFCCC	regime,	would	not	give	cities	a	genuine	voice	in	the	negotiations	that	will	continue	to	take	place	among	states.		Another	possibility	would	involve	more	significant	reform	that	would	allow	cities	and	other	actors	apart	from	states	to	participate	formally	in	international	climate	agreements	that	might	supplement	the	Paris	Agreement.	One	therefore	envisions	a	suite	of	agreements	under	the	UNFCCC	umbrella,	the	Paris	Agreement																																																									99	Aust,	pg.	276.	100	Decision	1/CP.16	The	Cancun	Agreements:	Outcome	of	the	work	of	the	Ad	Hoc	Working	Group	on	Long-term	Cooperative	Action	under	the	Convention,	para.	7.		
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being	one	concluded	by	states	and	other	agreements	being	concluded	by	subnational	governments,	corporations,	industry	associations,	to	name	a	few.	The	structuring	of	such	agreements	is	likely	to	raise	difficult	logistical	issues	as	well	as	normative	concerns	surrounding	inclusion,	fairness	and	accountability.	Further,	the	promulgation	of	such	agreements	within	the	UNFCCC	framework	would	be	considered	revolutionary	and	perhaps	even	sacrilegious	in	the	eyes	of	traditionalists	who	adhere	to	the	Westphalian	model	of	international	law.		I	would	argue	that	it	is	immaterial	if	scholars	and	practitioners	choose	to	explore	the	benefits	and	disadvantages	of	various	options	and	ultimately	decide	that	the	current	approach	to	international	lawmaking	remains	the	best	one.	What	is	important	is	that	such	deliberations	occur	in	the	first	place.	These	discussions	ought	to	be	encouraged	to	reframe	the	discourse	about	the	involvement	of	cities	in	transnational	governance	processes	and	to	explore	creative	possibilities	for	alternative	governance	arrangements	in	the	international	system.	This	is	not	an	academic	point	as	the	international	system	is	already	witnessing	attempts	to	formally	institutionalize	the	role	of	cities	in	global	governance.	The	Global	Parliament	of	Mayors,	which	describes	itself	as	“a	new	global	governance	body	of	cities”,	convened	its	inaugural	meeting	in	September	2016	at	The	Hague.101	Its	mission	statement	highlights	many	of	the	themes	discussed	in	this	thesis.	First,	the	mission	statement	sets	out	that	it	is	“inconceivable	that	national	and	international	bodies	discuss	and	decide	on	policy	actions	without	cities	and	their	mayors	present	at	the	table”,	given	that	more	than	half	of	the	world’s	population	lives	in	cities.102	In	line	with	the	trend	of	cities	playing	an	increasingly	active	role	in	international	affairs,	“the	Global	Parliament	of	Mayors	claims	the	right	not	only	to	be	involved,	but	to	be	(with	others)	agenda	setters	in	supranational	organizations.”103	Specifically,	mayors	“will	cooperate	on	critical	issues	such	as	climate	change,	refugee	crises,	pandemic	diseases,	inequality	and	urban	security…”104	What	distinguishes	the	Global	Parliament	of	Mayors	from	transnational	city	networks	like	C40	is	that	the	former	aims	to	be	an	institution	that	represents	the	collective	interests	of	cities	all	over	the	world	and	participate	in	global	decision-making	processes	on	equal	footing	with	states	and	international	organizations.	In	other	words,	it	seeks	to	break	the	monopoly	that	national	governments	have	on	international	decision-making	processes.	If	the	Global	Parliament	of	Mayors	is	to	issue	recommendations,	resolutions	and	decisions,	this	would	raise	interesting	questions	of	how	the	international	law	made	by	cities	will	interact	with	international	law	made	by	states,	and	if	the	former	will	be	treated	differently	and	in	what	ways.																																																													101	Global	Parliament	of	Mayors,	Press	Release:	Inaugural	meeting	of	Global	Parliament	of	Mayors	in	
The	Hague,	Netherlands,	The	Hague/New	York,	1	September	2016,	online:	http://www.globalparliamentofmayors.org/press	(accessed	on	25	November	2016).		102	Global	Parliament	of	Mayors,	‘Mission	Statement’,	online:	http://www.globalparliamentofmayors.org/mission-statement	(accessed	on	25	November	2016).	103	Ibid.		104	Ibid.		
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	 	 	 		Finally,	the	rise	of	global	cities	and	the	increasing	direct	collaboration	between	cities	and	international	organizations	are	developments	that	may	raise	concerns	about	the	possible	disintegration	of	the	state,	fragmentation	of	the	international	legal	order,	and	the	negative	effects	of	decentralization	(for	example,	its	contribution	to	inequality	within	global	cities).	The	third	issue,	while	very	interesting,	is	one	that	urban	sociologists	and	economists	are	better	placed	to	address.105	The	first	and	second	issues	are	likely	to	be	of	interest	to	international	legal	scholars,	and	it	is	on	these	two	issues	that	I	will	comment.		In	this	thesis,	I	have	sought	to	show	that	the	interesting	question	is	not	whether	the	rise	of	global	cities	contributes	to	the	disintegration	of	the	state,	but	what	the	rise	of	global	cities	tell	us	about	the	changing	nature	of	the	state	and	its	ability	to	take	on	different	structural	forms	on	different	occasions	and	for	different	purposes.	In	short,	the	rise	of	global	cities	provides	fodder	for	the	debate	on	the	nature	of	the	modern	state	and	we	ought	to	contest	the	simplistic	notion	that	the	rise	of	subnational	actors	threatens	the	integrity	of	the	state	as	a	unitary	entity.	I	would	argue	that	the	state	is	far	from	being	a	unitary	entity	at	all	times,	and	the	recognition	of	its	mutable	nature	creates	interesting	possibilities	for	transnational	governance	arrangements.		As	shown	in	this	thesis,	while	states	have	struggled	to	develop	a	comprehensive	climate	change	treaty	and	the	resulting	international	governance	arrangement	is	made	up	of	loosely	connected	institutions,	transnational	networks	made	up	of	non-state	actors	and	sub-state	actors	can	play	a	meaningful	role	in	supplementing	state-led	governance.	The	emergence	of	transnational	city	networks	has	not	threatened	to	supplant	states,	as	the	rhetoric	might	portray,	but	in	a	more	subtle	way,	strengthens	and	reinforces	the	transnational	climate	change	governance	order.	Further,	it	should	be	noted	that	states	facilitate	the	transnational	forces	that	enable	cities	to	engage	in	global	governance.	States	are	not	being	ambushed	and	taken	by	surprise	by	the	increasingly	active	role	of	global	cities	in	international	affairs.	Instead,	it	can	be	argued	that	national	governments	have	been	convinced	that	cities	can	play	a	meaningful	role	in	global	governance,	particularly	in	issue	areas	which	require	localized	action	such	as	tackling	infectious	diseases,	and	are	creating	and	supporting	institutional	platforms	to	enlist	the	involvement	of	cities	alongside	other	actors.	Therefore,	when	the	UN-Habitat	and	the	UNFCCC	create	partnerships	and	programme	platforms	to	work	directly	with	cities,	for	example,	states	often	also	participate	as	partners	in	these	programmes	and	multi-stakeholder																																																									105	See,	for	example,	Remy	Prud’homme,	‘The	dangers	of	decentralization’	(1995)	10(2)	World	Bank	Research	Observer	201;	Yener	Altunbas	and	John	Thornton,	‘Fiscal	decentralization	and	governance’	(2012)	40(1)	Public	Finance	Review	66;	Local	Development	LLC,	The	Role	of	
Decentralisation/Devolution	in	Improving	Development	Outcomes	at	the	Local	Level:	Review	of	the	
Literature	and	Selected	Cases	(Prepared	for	the	United	Kingdom	Department	for	International	Development	(South	Asia	Research	Hub),	November	2013),	online:	http://www.delog.org/cms/upload/pdf/DFID_LDI_Decentralization_Outcomes_Final.pdf	(accessed	on	26	November	2016).				
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partnerships.	States	also	sponsor	many	of	the	capacity-building	programs	for	cities	to	act	on	climate	change	and	other	global	governance	challenges.	For	example,	the	funders	of	the	Cities	Development	Initiative	for	Asia	include	the	governments	of	Germany,	Sweden,	and	Austria.106	There	are,	of	course,	also	counter-examples	of	national	governments	that	have	stood	in	the	way	of	their	cities	exercising	greater	independence.107	Anecdotal	evidence	suggests	that	domestic	politics	weigh	heavily	in	decisions	to	hold	city	governments	back,	rather	than	concerns	about	the	integrity	of	the	state	as	a	political	entity.108	The	disaggregation	of	the	state	into	its	component	parts	is	a	contemporary	reality,	and	I	would	argue	that	it	is	a	source	of	flexibility	and	resilience	rather	than	a	sign	of	weakness	and	fragmentation.	The	ability	of	the	state	to	disaggregate	into	component	parts	which	seek	to	create	networks	and	partnerships	with	their	counterparts	abroad	(e.g.	transnational	networks	of	judges,	parliamentarians	and	regulators	of	the	financial	services	industry)	is	evidence	of	the	ability	of	the	state	to	mutate	and	reconfigure	to	address	different	challenges.	This	flexibility	not	only	benefits	the	state	but	the	international	system	as	a	whole	because	global	governance	has	become	increasingly	complex	and	the	one-size-fits-all	solution	offered	by	traditional	treaty-based	regulation	by	international	organizations	is	no	longer	adequate.	The	challenge	for	international	law	is	finding	ways	to	maintain	accountability,	fairness	and	legitimacy	in	the	international	community	as	transnational	lawmaking	and	implementation	processes	become	more	informal	and	inclusive	of	various	participants.		Finally,	it	is	important	to	maintain	some	critical	perspective	about	the	role	that	cities	can	play	in	global	governance.	This	thesis	has	sought	to	shed	light	on	recent	developments	in	transnational	climate	change	governance	that	show	that	cities	are	playing	an	increasingly	active	role	in	international	affairs.	It	has	also	sought	to	uncover	the	normative	effects	of	cities’	governance	activities.	These	are	novel	developments	and,	in	light	of	the	slow	progress	in	international	climate	change	negotiations	up	till	the	Paris	Agreement	was	concluded	in	December	2015,	are	a	source	of	hope	for	the	future	of	global	climate	action.	However,	this	thesis	does	not	argue	that	cities	offer	a	panacea	for	complex	world	governance	issues	while	the	inter-state	system	has	failed	to	provide	adequate	solutions.		It	must	be	recalled	that	cities	are	also	domestic	political	entities.	Notwithstanding	their	globalist	aspirations,	they	are	able	to	pursue	global	governance	ambitions	only	if	they	have	the	financial	capabilities	to	do	so	–	and	the	ability	of	cities	to	levy	and	collect	taxes	is	a	question	of	national	politics.	Further,	however	intertwined	a	city	may	be	in	the	global	economy,	a	global	city	is	still	enmeshed	in	a	national	constitutional	structure,	which	dictates	the	structure	and	size	of	a	city’s	government.	National	law	and	politics	also	dictate	the	kind	of	powers	that	a	city	government	has.	Hence,	it	is	important	to	retain	some	perspective	on	how	much	of	a	challenge	global	cities	pose	to	states	and	the	international	legal	order.		As	such,	it	is	helpful	to	consider	the	rise	of	cities	less	in																																																									106	Cities	Development	Initiative	for	Asia,	‘Funding	and	Implementation’,	online:	http://cdia.asia/who-we-are/funding-and-implementation/	(accessed	on	26	November	2016).		107	Sam	Barnard,	Climate	finance	for	cities:	How	can	international	climate	funds	best	support	low-
carbon	and	climate	resilient	urban	development?	(Overseas	Development	Institute,	Working	Paper	419,	2015),	pg.	20.	108	Interviews	Number	2,	4	and	5.		
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terms	of	challenging	the	status	quo	and	more	in	terms	of	alternatives	to	state-centrism	when	we	consider	the	international	legal	order.			
4. Conclusion			 This	chapter	sought	to	normatively	assess	the	contribution	of	urban	climate	law	to	the	overall	performance	of	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex	using	six	evaluative	criteria	proposed	by	Keohane	and	Victor:	coherence,	accountability,	determinacy	of	rules,	sustainability,	epistemic	quality	and	fairness.	Keohane	and	Victor	did	not	say	much	about	each	criterion,	leaving	much	room	for	future	elaboration.	Thus,	in	carrying	out	the	normative	assessment,	I	also	sought	to	flesh	out	the	criteria	and,	in	some	cases,	provide	illustrative	examples	from	other	areas	of	climate	law	and	policy.		 	 	 	 	 	 	The	evaluation	highlights	some	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	urban	climate	law.	A	key	strength	of	urban	climate	law	is	its	commitment	towards	transparency.	By	making	information	of	their	climate	actions	available	to	the	public	and	therefore	subjecting	themselves	to	public	scrutiny,	cities	hold	themselves	accountable	and	in	the	process	enhance	the	accountability	of	the	regime	complex.	Where	urban	climate	law	does	not	fare	as	well	is	on	the	issue	of	fairness,	specifically	questions	of	distributive	justice.	By	design,	urban	climate	law	has	reframed	the	climate	change	debate	and	managed	to	avoid	the	contentious	issues	in	the	international	climate	change	negotiations	such	as	binding	GHG	emission	reduction	targets	and	firm	financial	commitments	on	the	part	of	developed	countries	to	assist	developing	countries	in	their	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation	efforts.	However,	these	contentious	issues	are	also	the	ones	that	raise	difficult	questions	of	distributive	justice.	Without	having	to	deal	with	these	issues,	urban	climate	law	has	created	a	substantial	amount	of	climate	action.	This	goes	towards	supporting	the	Paris	Agreement	in	its	early	stage	and	enhancing	the	overall	sustainability	of	the	regime	complex,	but	it	does	not	contribute	towards	answering	issues	of	distributive	justice	and	fairness	in	the	regime	complex.		Finally,	the	chapter	turned	towards	a	set	of	questions	concerning	the	rise	of	cities	in	international	affairs.	These	broad	questions	are	difficult	and	complex.	All	that	this	chapter	has	sought	to	do	is	to	draw	together	some	salient	observations	in	response.	What	is	clear	is	that	international	law	scholars	should	not	ignore	the	rise	of	cities.	If	anything	at	all,	the	rise	of	cities	points	to	interesting	possibilities	for	the	future	of	international	law	as	international	law	scholars	recognize	the	mutable	nature	of	the	modern	state,	and	the	governance	options	availed	by	the	disaggregation	of	the	state.
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Chapter	8:	Conclusion	
	
1. Introduction	
	 The	UNFCCC	entered	into	force	in	1994,	the	first	milestone	in	the	international	community’s	search	for	a	collective	response	to	climate	change.	The	attempt	to	achieve	consensus	amongst	the	197	countries	that	ratified	the	UNFCCC	on	what	needed	to	be	done	next	to	achieve	the	treaty’s	objectives	was	always	going	to	be	difficult.	Social	cooperation	has	been	key	to	the	survival	and	success	of	our	species,	and	we	homo	sapiens	have	created	many	myths	and	fiction	that	have	given	us	unprecedented	ability	to	cooperate	flexibly	in	large	numbers.	Wolves	and	chimpanzees	cooperate	in	groups,	but	they	can	do	so	only	with	a	limited	number	of	other	individuals	with	whom	they	share	intimate	social	bonds.	It	has	been	suggested	that	homo	sapiens	have	managed	to	cross	the	critical	threshold	and	eventually	create	cities	and	empires	of	millions	of	people	because	of	fiction.	“Any	large-scale	human	cooperation	–	whether	a	modern	state,	a	medieval	church,	an	ancient	city	or	an	archaic	tribe	–	is	rooted	in	common	myths	that	exist	only	in	people’s	collective	imagination.”1		 	The	state	is	a	myth,	and	a	powerful	one.	Two	Singaporeans	who	have	never	met	one	another	might	risk	their	lives	to	save	each	other	because	they	believe	in	the	existence	of	the	state	of	Singapore,	its	history	as	a	modern	nation	freed	from	imperial	British	colonialism,	and	a	Singapore	national	identity.	This	myth,	however,	can	also	stand	in	the	way	of	collective	action.	One	of	the	most	contentious	issues	that	marred	the	international	climate	change	negotiations	for	years	can	be	easily	summarized	as	such:	Why	should	my	country	reduce	GHG	emissions	when	yours	is	not	required	to?	Why	should	my	country	bear	the	risk	of	slower	economic	growth	while	yours	is	allowed	to	burn	unlimited	amounts	of	fossil	fuels	to	power	factories,	ports	and	homes?	Homo	sapiens	have	single-handedly	caused	anthropogenic	climate	change	within	the	equivalent	of	a	fraction	of	a	second	in	Earth’s	cosmic	history,	and	our	myths	have	hindered	us	from	effectively	working	together	to	remedy	the	problem.		 	However,	perhaps	not	all	is	lost.	The	lack	of	progress	in	the	international	climate	change	negotiations	has	inspired	other	actors	to	find	solutions.	Universities	have	been	working	together	with	venture	capitalists	and	philanthropic	organizations	to	develop	clean	technologies	for	the	future.2	Engineers	are	working	with	physicists	to	explore	the	potential	for	airborne	wind	energy,	a	renewable	energy	technology	that	uses	airborne	devices	(kites	in	particular)	to	harness	wind	power.3	Architects	and	urban	planners	incorporate	green	roofing	and	other	design																																																									1	Yuval	Noah	Harari,	Sapiens:	A	Brief	History	of	Humankind	(Vintage	Books	2011),	pg.	30.	2	However,	the	clean	technology	bubble	has	burst,	leading	to	a	significant	slowdown	in	venture	capital	investment	in	clean	energy	technology	start-ups	since	2009;	Benjamin	Gaddy	and	Varun	Sivaram,	‘Clean	energy	technology	investors	need	fresh	support	after	VC	losses’	Financial	Times	(26	July	2016).	3	Uwe	Ahrens,	Moritz	Diehl	and	Roland	Schmehl	(eds),	Airborne	Wind	Energy	(Springer	2013).	
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features	to	cool	buildings	and	reduce	the	urban	heat	effect	in	cities.4	Some	financial	regulators	now	require	companies	to	disclose	their	climate	change	risks.5	Regions	and	states	(within	a	federal	system)	have	created	voluntary	GHG	emissions	trading	programs.6	The	list	goes	on.	In	the	midst	of	this	proliferation	of	climate	change	responses,	cities	have	also	crafted	their	unique	response.		This	thesis	has	examined	the	emergence	of	cities	as	climate	change	governance	actors,	particularly	their	contribution	towards	generating	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	that	aim	to	steer	cities	towards	GHG	emissions	reductions	and	developing	low-carbon	development	pathways	for	the	future.	Cities	have	transcended	mythical	state	boundaries	to	create	cooperative	networks	that	allow	them	to	more	effectively	learn	from	one	another,	share	best	practices,	and	diffuse	ideas	about	how	a	city	ought	to	be	responding	to	climate	change.	This	final	chapter	will	conclude	the	research	over	four	additional	sections.	Part	2	will	provide	an	overview	of	the	issue	addressed	by	this	thesis.	It	will	provide	a	summary	of	the	research	and	answer	the	five	research	questions	posed	in	Chapter	One.	It	will	also	address	some	of	the	limitations	of	the	research.	Part	3	will	set	out	some	of	the	implications	of	this	research	for	environmental	law	scholars,	international	legal	scholars,	and	practitioners.	Part	4	suggests	avenues	for	further	research.	Part	5	will	offer	some	final	remarks.			
2. The	Research		
	
2.1	Summary	of	this	Thesis		
	 Chapter	One	begins	with	an	account	of	how	the	international	climate	change	negotiations	in	Paris,	2015,	had	successfully	culminated	in	the	Paris	Agreement.	What	caught	my	attention	was	the	prominence	of	mayors	and	side-events	organized	by	cities	and	city	networks	during	COP21	and	the	preparatory	meetings	leading	up	to	the	conference.	In	recent	times,	cities	have	sought	representation	at	the	UNFCCC.	They	have	undertaken	ambitious	climate	action,	often	surpassing	the	level	of	ambition	on	the	part	of	states.	They	have	become	involved	in	governing	climate	change,	not	only	within	their	urban	territories,	but	also	at	the	global	level.	What	prompted	my	interest	to	embark	on	this	research	was	that	cities’	governance	activities	appeared	to	have	normative	meaning	and	I	wanted	to	better	understand																																																									4	Sarah	Murray,	‘Nature	is	now	a	weapon	against	threat	of	global	warming’	Financial	Times	(1	June	2016).	5	An	example	is	the	US	Securities	and	Exchange	Commission,	though	it	has	recently	been	criticized	for	its	lax	enforcement	of	climate	risk	disclosure	rules;	David	Gelles,	‘S.E.C.	Is	Criticized	for	Lax	Enforcement	of	Climate	Risk	Disclosure’	The	New	York	Times	(23	January	2016).	6	The	Western	Climate	Initiative	(WCI)	and	the	Regional	Greenhouse	Gas	Initiative	(RGGI)	are	two	examples.	WCI	is	a	non-profit	corporation	that	provides	technical	assistance	to	support	the	implementation	of	state	and	provincial	GHG	emissions	trading	programs.	In	2014,	California	and	Quebec	linked	their	cap	and	trade	programs	under	the	auspices	of	WCI.	More	information	is	available	on	http://www.wci-inc.org.	RGGI	is	the	first	cap	and	trade	program	in	the	US	to	reduce	carbon	dioxide	emissions	from	the	electricity	generation	sector.	Its	members	are	the	states	of	Connecticut,	Delaware,	Maine,	Maryland,	Massachusetts,	New	Hampshire,	New	York,	Rhode	Island	and	Vermont.	More	information	is	available	on	http://www.rggi.org	(both	websites	accessed	on	15	August	2016).		
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and	shed	light	on	this	law-making	aspect	of	urban	involvement	in	transnational	climate	change	governance.	After	providing	this	context,	Chapter	One	sets	out	the	questions	that	have	guided	this	research,	my	research	methodology	and	a	brief	summary	of	the	key	theoretical	concepts	that	I	would	use.		Chapter	Two	sets	out	the	analytical	framework	of	this	thesis.	It	sets	out	the	theories	of	regime	complexity	and	transnational	legal	ordering,	Anne-Marie	Slaughter’s	theory	of	the	disaggregated	state	and	trans-governmental	networks,	and	the	theory	of	the	global	city	which	I	combine	to	create	a	framework	for	conceptualizing	the	nature	of	transnational	climate	change	governance,	the	emergence	of	cities	in	this	governance	space,	and	to	lay	the	ground	for	subsequent	analysis	of	C40.		Chapter	Three	situates	the	emergence	of	cities	as	participants	in	transnational	climate	change	governance	within	the	broader	context	of	how	cities	increasingly	participate	directly	and	independently	in	international	affairs	and	global	politics.	It	starts	out	by	describing	instances	of	cities	developing	what	appear	to	be	their	own	independent	foreign	and	security	policies	despite	the	fact	that	such	policy	areas	have	traditionally	been	considered	the	core	domains	of	central	governments	and	states.	It	then	considers	instances	of	cities	implementing	international	law	despite	non-ratification	by	their	state.	Finally,	the	chapter	discusses	the	practices	of	international	organizations	like	the	World	Bank	that	have	contributed	towards	empowering	cities	to	exercise	agency	in	global	governance.		In	Chapter	Four,	I	examine	what	five	global	cities	-	London,	Mexico	City,	New	York	City,	Rotterdam	and	Seoul	-	are	doing	to	address	climate	change.	These	cities	are	internationally	recognized	by	policy-makers,	city	planners,	the	media,	international	organizations	and	researchers	to	be	‘climate	frontrunners’.	By	examining	the	governance	practices	of	these	five	cities,	this	chapter	provides	a	detailed	descriptive	account	of	cities	as	social	laboratories	for	climate	governance	experiments	and	the	inter-connections	between	actors,	practices	and	institutions	that	blur	the	divide	between	public	and	private,	local	and	international.		Chapter	Five	focused	on	the	most	prominent	network	of	global	cities	committed	to	addressing	climate	change	–	C40.	In	order	to	scale	up	their	climate	actions,	share	knowledge	and	norms,	cities	have	formed	networks.	There	are	at	least	four	prominent	city	networks	that	address	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation,	but	C40	is	the	only	one	that	represents	global	cities	and	has	its	sole	focus	on	climate	change.		Chapter	Six	draws	on	the	discussion	in	the	previous	three	chapters	to	advance	the	argument	that	cities	are	emerging	as	transnational	lawmakers.	I	coin	the	term	urban	climate	law	to	refer	to	the	voluntary	standards,	norms	and	practices	that	are	promulgated	by	cities	and	implemented	through	their	networks.	The	chapter	identifies	the	promotion	of	reflexivity	and	norm	diffusion	as	the	two	main	pathways	of	influence	that	are	critical	for	steering	cities	towards	climate	mitigation	and	low-carbon	development.	The	chapter	also	examines	how	urban	climate	law	relates	to	the	UNFCCC	regime	in	positive	and	reinforcing	ways.		Chapter	Seven	evaluated	the	contribution	of	urban	climate	law	to	the	overall	performance	of	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex	using	six	normative	criteria	proposed	by	Keohane	and	Victor.	It	then	proceeded	to	take	a	step	
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back	to	consider	the	bigger	picture.	I	reflected	on	how	the	emergence	of	the	city	as	a	lawmaking	participant	in	transnational	governance	may	or	may	not	challenge	traditional	understanding	of	international	lawmaking	and	the	role	of	the	state	in	the	international	system.			
2.2	Research	Questions	and	Answers		
	 In	Chapter	One,	I	stated	five	research	questions	that	I	set	out	to	answer	in	this	thesis.	I	will	briefly	answer	these	questions	in	this	section.		
	
1. What	recent	developments	suggest	the	rise	of	cities	in	international	affairs?		 It	was	important	to	me	to	answer	this	question	because	early	indications	in	my	research	suggested	that	the	emergence	of	cities	as	global	governance	actors	in	the	climate	change	context	was	part	of	a	broader	trend	in	international	affairs.	Chapter	Three	is	devoted	to	answering	this	question,	thereby	also	providing	the	wider	context	for	understanding	the	rise	of	cities	as	lawmaking	actors	in	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.	This	chapter	also	sought	to	provide	an	account	of	the	involvement	of	cities	in	international	affairs	to	ground	my	argument	that	contemporary	developments	suggest	that	it	is	time	for	international	legal	scholars	to	pay	more	attention	to	cities,	which	have	traditionally	been	neglected	due	to	state-centric	conceptions	of	international	lawmaking.		I	identified	four	broad	categories	of	activity	that	exemplify	how	cities	are	participating	in	transnational	legal	and	political	processes.	What	is	unique	about	their	involvement	is	that	the	cities	have	adopted	practices	and	policy	positions	independent	of	or	contrary	to	that	of	their	state	in	many	instances.	These	four	categories	are:	(1)	a	city	implementing	international	law	on	its	own	accord	when	its	national	government	is	reluctant	or	refuses	to	do	so;	(2)	city	diplomacy;	(3)	cities	developing	their	independent	local	and	transnational	policies	and	strategies	to	manage	global	risks	such	as	terrorism;	(4)	cities	forming	organizations	to	represent	urban	interests	in	international	forums	and/or	to	pursue	governance	objectives.	Two	examples	of	the	first	category	of	actions	I	canvassed	in	the	chapter	are	the	adaptation	and	implementation	by	American	cities	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol	and	CEDAW,	two	international	treaties	that	the	US	has	not	ratified.	As	for	city	diplomacy,	there	are	many	instances	of	bilateral	interactions	between	cities	in	different	states.	I	provided	a	few	examples	such	as	the	mayor	of	Tokyo’s	official	visit	to	his	counterpart	in	Beijing	during	a	period	of	great	Sino-Japanese	tensions	with	the	explicit	goal	of	using	city	diplomacy	to	defuse	of	the	political	tension	at	the	inter-state	level.		
	
2. What	have	cities	been	doing	to	govern	climate	change	and	which	of	these	
governance	activities	generate	normative	effects	transnationally?		 Over	two	thousand	cities	have	developed	climate	change	action	plans	to	reduce	their	GHG	emissions	and	adapt	to	the	impacts	of	climate	change.	In	this	thesis,	I	have	chosen	to	focus	on	a	sample	of	global	cities	to	illustrate	the	local-global	
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connections	in	urban	climate	actions.	The	global	cities	I	focused	on	in	this	research	are	Rotterdam,	London,	New	York	City,	Seoul	and	Mexico	City.	Each	of	these	cities	faces	different	challenges	and	opportunities	in	addressing	climate	change.	For	example,	Rotterdam	has	high	GHG	emissions	because	of	industrial	activities	and	its	port.	The	city	has	therefore	focused	on	reducing	port-related	GHG	emissions,	developing	infrastructure	that	connects	various	parts	of	the	city	such	that	heat	generated	by	the	power	plant	can	be	channeled	towards	greenhouses	and	homes.	As	a	delta	city	with	exposure	to	the	North	Sea,	the	city’s	government	has	taken	water	adaptation	very	seriously	and	developed	significant	expertise.		The	governance	activities	that	global	cities	have	undertaken	generate	transnational	normative	effect	when	they	create	cross-border	networks	to	facilitate	the	sharing	of	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards.	While	there	are	a	number	of	city	networks	that	address	sustainability	and	environmental	issues	including	climate	change,	only	one	network	is	made	up	of	large	global	cities	and	is	solely	focused	on	tackling	climate	change.	This	network,	C40,	is	therefore	the	subject	of	detailed	discussion	in	Chapter	5.	Setting	up	the	network	infrastructure	to	facilitate	the	sharing	of	norms	and	practices	is	not	enough.	What	is	noteworthy	is	that	cities	have	developed	forms	of	voluntary	certification	(e.g.	the	Compact	of	Mayors),	standardized	accounting	protocols	that	cities	can	use	to	measure	and	report	their	GHG	emissions,	and	publicly	accessible	systems	of	data	disclosure	so	that	they	can	be	held	accountable	for	their	commitments.	These	voluntary	certification	schemes,	protocols	and	data	disclosure	systems	are	developed	in	partnership	with	international	organizations,	global	civil	society	actors,	states	and	private	sector	consultancies,	and	are	transnational	in	nature.			
3. How	do	the	norms,	practices	and	standards	promulgated	by	cities	and	
transmitted	by	their	networks	lead	to	cities	reducing	their	GHG	emissions	and	
increasing	their	climate	resilience?			 I	argue	that	there	are	two	key	processes	that	play	a	critical	role	in	linking	the	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	(which	I	refer	to	as	urban	climate	law)	with	changing	actual	practices	on	the	ground.	These	pathways	involve	the	promotion	of	reflexivity	and	norm	diffusion.	Reflexivity	involves	actors	receiving	new	information	and	adjusting	their	practices	accordingly	to	achieve	desired	objectives	such	as	increased	productivity	at	the	workplace	or	improving	energy	efficiency.	In	this	line	of	thinking,	voluntary	standards	are	regulatory	tools	that	uncover	new	information	for	cities	as	well	as	provide	a	systematic	approach	that	cities	can	use	to	foster	self-reflection	and	new	thinking.		The	literature	has	identified	many	norm	diffusion	mechanisms	but	most	of	them	can	be	grouped	in	the	following	categories:	competition,	learning	and	imitation.	I	have	found	that	competition	plays	a	negligible	role	in	shaping	how	norm-setting	practices	are	diffused	across	cities,	but	learning	and	imitation	certainly	offer	credible	explanations.		
	
4. How	do	the	norms,	practices	and	standards	promulgated	by	cities	and	
transmitted	by	their	networks	relate	to	those	of	the	UNFCCC	regime?		
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	 While	some	commentators	claim	that	the	UNFCCC	regime	is	not	at	the	core	of	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex,	I	would	argue	otherwise.	The	UNFCCC	remains	an	important	central	pillar	of	international	cooperation	on	climate	change,	and	provides	the	necessary	institutional	and	normative	frameworks.	While	it	does	not	have	formal	authority	over	other	transnational	governance	initiatives,	the	latter	initiatives	rely	on	the	UNFCCC	regime	for	normative	guidance	and	setting	the	global	agenda	on	climate	change	responses.	In	order	to	ensure	that	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex	performs	well,	that	is,	steers	various	communities	and	actors	towards	climate	change	mitigation	and	adaptation,	it	is	important	to	ensure	that	the	individual	regimes	that	make	up	the	regime	complex	do	not	conflict.	This	research	question	was	posed	with	these	concerns	in	mind.			 Overall,	I	found	that	urban	climate	law	not	only	does	not	come	into	conflict	with	the	norms	and	practices	of	the	UNFCCC	regime,	the	former	has	been	designed	in	ways	that	complement	and	reinforce	the	latter.	For	example,	it	is	noteworthy	that	the	Compact	of	Mayors	is	designed	to	be	the	city-level	equivalent	of	the	transparency	framework	created	by	the	Paris	Agreement.	During	the	run	up	to	the	COP	in	Paris,	the	Compact	of	Mayors	sought	to	have	city-level	initiatives	complement	and	support	the	international	climate	negotiations	by	adopting	the	pledge-and-review	approach	that	underpins	the	Paris	Agreement.		Subsequently,	the	“City	Climate	Commitments”7	that	cities	are	required	to	pledge	upon	joining	the	Compact	are	similar	to	the	NDCs	that	states	are	required	to	report	pursuant	to	the	Paris	agreement.	Chapter	6	provides	detailed	analysis	of	how	urban	climate	law	and	the	UNFCC	regime	are	linked	in	strategic	and	deliberate	ways.			
5. Do	global	cities	make	a	positive	normative	contribution	to	the	global	
constellation	of	climate	change	governance	activities?			 It	is	not	possible	to	answer	this	question	by	referring	to	whether	cities	have	achieved	the	goals	and	targets	they	have	set	themselves	because	we	are	still	at	the	early	stages	of	promoting	the	uptake	and	implementing	urban	climate	law.	It	is	simply	too	early	for	significant	results.	However,	we	can	ask	ourselves	the	question	of	whether	urban	climate	law	contributes	positively	to	the	overall	performance	of	transnational	climate	change	governance	by	evaluating	it	using	well-established	normative	criteria.	In	Chapter	7,	I	undertook	a	normative	assessment	of	urban	climate	law	using	the	six	criteria	suggested	by	Keohane	and	Victor.	I	concluded	that,	overall,	global	cities	contribute	positively	in	normative	terms	to	the	performance	of	the	transnational	climate	change	regime	complex.	While	urban	climate	law	does	not	sufficiently	engage	with	issues	of	substantive	justice,	it	does	contribute	to	the	regime	complex’s	coherence,	accountability	and	sustainability.			
2.3	Limitations	of	this	Thesis		
																																																									7	Compact	of	Mayors,	online:	http://www.compactofmayors.org/resources/	(accessed	on	1	July	2016).	
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In	this	section,	I	will	discuss	a	number	of	key	limitations	to	this	research.	The	first	limitation	of	this	research	is	that	it	would	have	benefitted	from	more	intensive	fieldwork.	It	would	have	been	fruitful	to	gain	more	direct	and	immersive	observations	of,	for	example,	how	city	government	officials	learn	from	one	another	and	how	the	process	of	complying	with	the	Compact	of	Mayors	creates	opportunities	for	reflexivity	and	eventual	policy	adjustments.	For	example,	in	writing	Paper	Tiger:	Law,	Bureaucracy	and	the	Developmental	State	in	Himalayan	
India,	Nayanika	Mathur	spent	nearly	eighteen	months	working	in	the	offices	of	selected	Indian	villages	and	districts.8	Hers	is	a	situated	analysis	of	how	the	seemingly	innocuous	practices	of	local	governments	can	have	far-reaching	consequences	ranging	from	provision	of	employment	opportunities	to	wildlife	protection.	Nonetheless,	the	knowledge	I	gathered	from	observing	participants	at	workshops,	the	interviews	I	conducted,	and	literature	review	has	put	me	in	good	stead	to	analyze	the	normative	effects	of	cities’	governance	activities	and	theorize	about	how	urban	climate	law	steers	behavior	of	cities	towards	climate	mitigation.	I	consulted	publicly	available	documents	produced	by	the	various	actors	studied	in	this	research,	treaties	and	regulations,	and	secondary	literature	published	in	academic	journals	and	respected	media	outlets.	In	addition,	I	interviewed	fourteen	individuals	who	work	for	city	governments,	C40,	private	foundations,	and	climate	change	data	disclosure	platforms.	In	July	2016,	I	attended	a	full-day	workshop	on	urban	climate	action	organized	by	ICLEI	and	widely	attended	by	city	government	officials.	I	also	attended	a	climate	finance	workshop	that	brought	city	officials,	banks	and	development	agencies	together	to	discuss	how	to	assess	the	financial	viability	of	proposed	climate	change	projects.		The	second	limitation	of	this	research	is	that	it	relies	almost	exclusively	on	materials	available	in	the	English	language.	While	this	has	not	been	a	significant	obstacle	to	my	research	as	I	have	managed	to	obtain	reliable	translations	of	foreign	language	materials	by	relying	on	the	good	will	of	friends	and	colleagues,	the	design	of	this	research	was	limited	by	considerations	of	language	proficiency.		The	third	limitation	of	this	research	lies	in	the	exclusive	focus	on	five	global	cities,	four	of	which	are	situated	in	the	Global	North	and	enjoy	high	levels	of	wealth	and	political	stability.	It	can	be	argued	that	my	research	would	have	yielded	different	findings	if	I	had	expanded	my	data	set,	particularly	to	include	rapidly	growing	megacities	of	the	Global	South.	While	it	would	have	been	ideal	to	do	so,	I	do	not	think	that	this	research	is	compromised	by	its	focus	on	the	five	selected	global	cities	for	two	reasons.	First,	as	I	explained	in	the	Introduction,	Chapter	4	is	not	intended	to	provide	detailed	case	studies	but	to	provide	an	overall	picture	that	reveals	the	connections	between	the	local	and	the	global	when	cities	engage	in	transnational	climate	change	governance.	Secondly,	the	global	cities	I	selected	are	widely	recognized	as	climate	frontrunners.	Examining	the	climate	governance	practices	of	global	cities	in	the	Global	South	may	have	yielded	a	more	complex	and	intricate	picture	of	the	opportunities	and	challenges	that	cities	face	in	tackling	climate	change,	but	I	do	not	think	it	would	yield	different	results	about	cities’	norm-																																																								8	Nayanika	Mathur,	Paper	Tiger:	Law,	Bureaucracy	and	the	Developmental	State	in	Himalayan	India	(Cambridge	University	Press	2015).	
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setting	practices	and	engagement	in	transnational	lawmaking,	which	is	the	focus	of	this	research.		
	
3. Implications	of	the	Research	
	
3.1	Contribution	to	Existing	Literature	
	This	research	contributes	to	a	number	of	different	strands	of	literature.	First,	this	research	contributes	a	legal	dimension	to	the	large	body	of	literature	on	cities	and	climate	governance.	This	body	of	literature	has	tended	to	focus	on	cities	within	a	multi-level	governance	system	such	as	the	European	Union,	on	producing	single	case	studies	on	cities,	or	comparative	analysis	of	a	few	cities.	Few	scholars	have	considered	the	role	of	cities	in	transnational	climate	change	governance	as	lawmakers,	and	this	research	seeks	to	fill	this	gap	in	the	literature.	At	the	same	time,	this	thesis	provides	a	fuller	understanding	of	the	governance	capabilities	of	cities.			 The	research	in	this	thesis	also	contributes	to	the	global	city	literature.	The	research	on	global	cities	tends	to	focus	on	their	networked	nature	in	the	global	economy	and	global	city	competitiveness,	which	is	concerned	with	global	trade,	financial	flows	and	investment,	and	quality	of	life	that	each	global	city	offers.	In	recent	times,	scholars	like	Michele	Acuto	have	forged	a	new	direction	in	the	research	on	global	cities	by	focusing	on	their	role	in	international	affairs.9	In	Global	
Cities	and	Climate	Change,	Tae-dong	Lee	coins	the	term	‘trans-local	relations’	to	refer	to	the	involvement	of	cities	in	international	affairs	and	environmental	governance.10	His	work	centers	on	uncovering	and	explaining	what	shapes	the	participation	of	cities	in	transnational	climate	networks	and	how	involvement	in	these	networks	shapes	their	capacity	to	act.	Another	example	is	Sofie	Bouteligier’s	
Cities,	Networks	and	Global	Environmental	Governance.11	In	her	book,	Sofie	Bouteligier	analyzes	two	transnational	city	networks	–	Metropolis	and	C40	–	and	examines	theories	of	the	network	society	and	global	cities	from	the	perspective	of	global	ecology.	Her	work	shows	how	global	cities	perform	the	role	of	strategic	sites	of	global	environmental	governance	by	serving	as	hubs	that	concentrate	knowledge,	institutions	and	infrastructure.	The	research	in	this	thesis	has	benefitted	greatly	from	this	strand	of	the	global	city	literature	and	contributes	to	it	by	exploring	the	hitherto	unexamined	role	of	global	cities	as	norm-generative	actors.	This	thesis	also	contributes	to	the	academic	discourse	on	transgovernmental	networks	and	the	disaggregation	of	the	modern	state.	In	A	New	World	Order,	Anne	Marie	Slaughter	examines	the	emergence	of	sub-state	networks	as	an	important	component	of	the	contemporary	international	legal	order.12	She	suggests	that	international	law	should	not	only	concern	itself	with	international	organizations																																																									9	Michele	Acuto,	Global	Cities,	Governance	and	Diplomacy:	The	Urban	Link	(Routledge	2013);	Michele	Acuto,	‘Global	Cities:	Gorillas	in	Our	Midst’	(2010)	35	Alternatives:	Global,	Local,	Political	425.	10	Taedong	Lee,	Global	Cities	and	Climate	Change:	The	Translocal	Relations	of	Environmental	
Governance	(Routledge	2015).	11	Sofie	Bouteligier,	Cities,	Networks	and	Global	Environmental	Governance:	Spaces	of	Innovation,	
Places	of	Leadership	(Routledge	2013	).	12	Anne-Marie	Slaughter,	A	New	World	Order	(Princeton	University	Press	2005).	
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and	the	relationships	amongst	states.	She	also	argues	that	the	conception	of	the	state	as	a	unitary	entity	is	an	outdated	one.	By	uncovering	how	sub-components	of	states	form	transboundary	networks	to	address	global	governance	issues,	she	argues	that	these	inter-connections	form	a	promising	basis	for	increasing	the	scope	and	quality	of	international	cooperation.	I	have	found	Slaughter’s	analysis	of	the	disaggregated	state	to	be	a	helpful	way	to	understand	and	conceptualize	the	governance	activities	of	cities	and	their	formation	of	transnational	networks.	At	the	same	time,	Slaughter’s	work	“is	a	testament	to	the	invisibility	of	cities	to	international	lawyers.”13	Slaughter	describes	judicial,	legislative	and	regulatory	networks	as	examples	of	sub-state	networks	but	does	not	discuss	transnational	city	networks	at	all.	Her	vision	of	an	international	world	order	based	on	disaggregated	sates	does	not	include	the	involvement	of	cities,	yet	as	this	research	has	sought	to	demonstrate,	global	cities	have	norm-setting	governance	potential	which	can	make	a	valuable	contribution	to	the	world	order.	This	thesis	therefore	adds	to	the	existing	literature	on	disaggregated	states	by	drawing	attention	to	the	role	of	cities.		This	research	also	makes	a	novel	contribution	to	the	voluntary	standards	literature,	which	has	yet	to	address	the	standards	and	voluntary	certification	schemes	that	makes	up	urban	climate	law.	There	has	been	a	steady	increase	in	the	use	of	voluntary	standards	to	address	environmental	and	social	externalities	across	a	range	of	economic	sectors	including	the	global	garment	industry	and	food	production.14	This	has	prompted	legal	scholars	to	consider	the	regulatory	and	normative	issues	surrounding	voluntary	standards	such	as	their	legitimacy,	accountability	and	the	interaction	between	voluntary	standards	and	‘hard	law’	legal	instruments.	This	research	expands	the	voluntary	standards	literature	by	shedding	light	on	the	voluntary	standards	and	norms	promulgated	by	cities	and	transmitted	through	their	networks,	which	have	hitherto	not	been	studied	from	this	perspective.		Finally,	this	research	contributes	to	the	emerging	field	of	climate	law.	Climate	change	law	or	climate	law	has	only	very	recently	taken	off	as	a	distinct	area	of	study.	It	has	only	been	a	matter	of	decades	that	lawyers	first	recognized	the	emergence	of	environmental	law	as	a	distinct	field.	Since	then,	environmental	law	has	developed	rapidly	and	now	encompasses	a	number	of	sub-specializations,	including	water	law	and	international	environmental	law.15	As	Jacqueline	Peel	puts	it,	“[t]he	latest	branch	of	the	metaphorical	environmental	legal	tree	to	take	shape	is	that	of	climate	change	law.”16	Climate	law	can	be	defined	as	the	distinctive	body	of	legal	principles																																																									13	G.	E.	Frug	and	David	Barron,	‘International	Local	Government	Law’	(2006)	38	The	Urban	Lawyer	1,	pg.	23.		14	See	discussion	in	Chapter	6.		15	See,	for	example,	Philippe	Cullet	and	others	(eds),	Water	Law	for	the	Twenty-First	Century:	National	
and	International	Aspects	of	Water	Law	Reform	in	India	(Routledge	2011);	Philippe	Sands	and	Jacqueline	Peel,	Principles	of	International	Environmental	Law	(3rd	edn,	Cambridge	University	Press	2012).	16	Jacqueline	Peel,	‘Climate	Change	Law:	The	Emergence	of	a	New	Legal	Discipline’	(2008)	32	Melbourne	University	Law	Review	922,	pg.	923.	For	discussion	about	the	relationship	between	environmental	law	and	climate	change	law,	see	Chris	Hilson,	‘It’s	All	About	Climate	Change,	Stupid!	Exploring	the	Relationship	Between	Environmental	Law	and	Climate	Law’	(2013)	25	Journal	of	Environmental	Law	359.	
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and	rules	that	have	emerged	due	to	the	growing	volume	and	complexity	of	regulatory	activity	around	climate	change	at	multiple	levels	and	sites	of	governance.		Kati	Kulovesi	has	identified	two	trends	in	climate	law	scholarship.	The	first	trend	is	growing	recognition	that	climate	change	has	to	be	governed	at	multiple	levels	and	not	just	at	the	international	level.	She	argues	that	“[a]s	a	result,	questions	concerning	the	interplay	between	various	sources	of	legal	authority,	including	their	hierarchies,	synergies	and	tensions,	are	particularly	relevant	for	climate	law	research	and	would	arguably	benefit	from	increased	doctrinal	attention.”17	The	second	trend	relates	to	the	involvement	of	multiple	non-state	actors	in	climate	change	governance	and	the	increasing	reliance	on	soft	law	instruments	and	informal	collaboration.18	She	argues	that	accounting	for	this	plurality	of	actors	and	regulatory	instruments	involves	some	important	challenges,	“including	how	to	avoid	becoming	overtly	descriptive	and	retain	a	normative	focus.”19	This	thesis	contributes	to	the	emerging	field	of	climate	law	by	providing	a	focused	study	on	the	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	that	have	the	potential	to	significantly	alter	GHG	emissions	patterns	and	climate	adaptation	practices	at	the	local	level.	This	research	tries	to	uncover	the	unique	normative	contribution	that	cities	are	making	towards	efforts	to	address	climate	change,	thereby	adding	to	the	increasingly	rich	fabric	of	climate	law.	Further,	this	research	takes	heed	of	the	implications	of	the	trends	in	climate	law	scholarship	that	Kulovesi	has	identified,	and	seeks	to	contribute	to	the	existing	climate	law	scholarship	by	providing	a	study	that	maintains	a	normative	focus	on	the	role	of	cities	in	governing	climate	change.		
	
3.2	Practical	Implications		
	
	 This	research	offers	policymakers	and	international	organizations	practical	insight	into	the	potential	gains	that	can	be	reaped	from	working	with	city	governments	to	implement	urban	climate	law.	The	norms,	practices	and	voluntary	standards	that	cities	have	developed	and	are	implementing	through	their	networks	have	the	potential	to	lead	to	tonnes	of	GHG	emissions	reduction	and	to	lay	the	foundation	for	a	low-carbon	future.	This	research	also	bears	practical	implications	for	the	design	of	future	global	regulatory	frameworks.	Cities	are	playing	a	role	in	addressing	a	complex	global	issue	like	climate	change	and	are	also	playing	a	role	in	implementing	global	human	rights	norms	at	the	local	level.	Who	is	to	say	that	cities	and	their	governments	will	not	play	a	role	in	tackling	human	trafficking,	promoting	biological	diversity	and	combatting	infectious	diseases	in	the	future?	These	are	just	a	few	of	the	global	governance	challenges	that	we	face	today,	and	which	require	innovative	and	practical	solutions.	The	research	in	this	thesis	has	demonstrated	that	global	cities																																																									17	Kati	Kulovesi,	‘Exploring	the	Landscape	of	Climate	Law	and	Scholarship:	Two	Emerging	Trends’	in	Erkki	J.	Hollo,	Kati	Kulovesi	and	Michael	Mehling	(eds),	Climate	Change	and	the	Law	(Springer	2013),	pg.	32.	18	Ibid.	19	Ibid,	pg.	33.	
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are	beginning	to	play	a	transnational	lawmaking	role	in	the	area	of	climate	change,	suggesting	the	possibility	that	global	cities	can	perform	a	similar	role	to	address	other	global	governance	challenges.	Those	who	are	placed	in	charge	of	designing	global	regulatory	frameworks	in	the	future	may	wish	to	consider	how	to	incorporate	and	leverage	on	the	governance	potential	of	cities.	Just	as	global	cities	have	created	C40	to	scale	up	their	climate	actions	and	facilitate	the	transmission	of	best	practices,	they	may	be	in	a	position	to	do	the	same	for	global	health	for	example.			
4. Avenues	for	Future	Research		
	 Several	avenues	for	further	research	present	themselves.	The	areas	of	research	that	I	suggest	below	build	upon	the	work	conducted	in	this	thesis	as	well	as	fill	gaps	that	have	been	identified.	First,	this	thesis	has	focused	on	cities,	and	specifically	global	cities,	but	cities	are	only	one	of	many	subnational	entities.	Other	subnational	entities	include	provinces,	states	within	a	federal	system,	and	regions.	These	other	subnational	governments	could	also	play	a	role	in	transnational	climate	change	governance,	offering	interesting	possibilities	for	crossing	the	domestic-foreign	divide	and	linking	domestic	climate	change	policies.	In	a	commentary	on	efforts	by	California	(US)	and	the	Brazilian	state	of	Acre	to	link	the	latter’s	Reduction	of	Emissions	from	Deforestation	and	Forest	Degradation	(REDD)	program	with	the	former’s	cap	and	trade	emissions	scheme,	Ernesto	Roessing	Neto	provides	a	fascinating	insight	into	how	subnational	action	can	provide	a	proof	of	concept	that	may	influence	the	development	of	REDD	at	the	international	level	and	similar	initiatives	at	the	subnational	level	in	the	future.20	In	a	chapter	on	local	climate	change	governance	in	China	published	elsewhere,	I	focused	on	the	role	of	provincial	and	prefectural	authorities	in	what	is	essentially	a	top-down	and	bureaucratic	national	system.21		What	I	found	very	interesting	were	the	incentive	structures	used	to	make	local	government	officials	perceive	GHG	emissions	reduction	to	be	in	their	interests	instead	of	being	a	mere	obstructive	brake	on	local	economic	growth.	The	role	of	subnational	actors	in	climate	change	law	and	policy	nonetheless	remains	understudied	and	provides	a	fertile	area	for	future	research.			 Secondly,	there	has	been	limited	consideration	in	the	literature	about	the	legal	capacity	of	cities	and	other	subnational	actors	to	engage	in	international	relations.	As	Joana	Setzer	puts	it,	“…the	governance	literature	has	made	limited	strides	with	regard	to	the	legal	and	institutional	basis	for	international	climate	action	by	non-state	actors.	Rescaling	processes	are	often	taken	for	granted,	with	little	or	no	consideration	of	whether	the	actors	have	a	legal	basis	for	moving	across	levels	of	governance.	For	instance,	are	the	representatives	of	subnational	governments	legally	entitled	to	meet	foreign	dignitaries,	to	sign	memoranda	of	understanding	(MOUs)	with	other	subnational	governments	across	borders,	or	to																																																									20	Ernesto	R.	Neto,	‘Linking	Subnational	Climate	Change	Policies:	A	Commentary	on	the	California–Acre	Process’	(2015)	4	Transnational	Environmental	Law	425.	21	Jolene	Lin,	‘Climate	Governance	in	China:	Using	the	‘Iron	Hand’’	in	Benjamin	Richardson	(ed),	Local	
Climate	Change	Law:	Environmental	Regulation	in	Cities	and	Other	Localities	(Edward	Elgar	Publishing	2012).	
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establish	emissions	trading	schemes?”22	In	this	thesis,	I	have	not	engaged	with	this	question	of	legal	competence	as	urban	climate	law	takes	the	form	of	voluntary	certification	and	adoption	of	best	practices,	which	do	not	require	cities	to	exercise	legal	powers	and	enter	into	formal	legal	relations.	However,	Setzer	raises	an	important	point	that	in	heralding	the	rise	of	cities	as	governance	actors,	further	research	is	needed	to	understand	the	legal	scope	and	limitations	of	subnational	climate	action.			 In	recent	times,	much	has	been	written	about	the	potential	fragmentation	of	the	international	legal	system,	the	demise	of	the	state	as	it	loses	its	monopoly	on	authority	and	regulatory	power,	and	the	role	of	various	non-state	actors	in	international	lawmaking	and	implementation.	However,	as	I	have	mentioned	earlier,	very	little	consideration	has	been	given	to	the	opportunities	and	challenges	posed	to	the	modern	state	when	the	state	disaggregates	itself	and	subnational	entities	emerge	as	actors	in	transnational	governance.	The	research	in	this	thesis	has	shed	light	on	how	cities	are	emerging	as	norm-setting	global	governance	actors	in	the	context	of	climate	change,	but	this	is	not	the	only	area	of	international	affairs	that	has	witnessed	the	rise	of	cities.	In	a	recently	published	collection,	Barbara	Oomen	and	her	colleagues	bring	together	academics	and	practitioners	to	consider	the	implications	of	the	rise	of	‘human	rights	cities’,	a	term	that	refers	to	cities	that	explicitly	base	their	local	policies	on	human	rights.23	Human	rights	cities	forge	alliances	with	international	organizations	and	develop	new	practices	designed	to	bring	about		‘global	urban	justice’.24	It	is	clear	that,	at	least	in	the	areas	of	climate	change	and	human	rights,	urban	actors	are	becoming	more	prominent	and	it	can	be	argued	that	this	trend	will	continue	and	reach	other	global	policy	areas.	Meanwhile,	international	legal	scholarship	needs	to	keep	apace	with	these	developments	and	can	make	a	valuable	contribution	towards	shaping	the	normative	discourse.		
	
5. Final	Remarks		
	 At	the	start	of	this	research	project,	I	had	an	informed	guess	about	the	extent	to	which	cities	are	involved	in	transnational	climate	change	governance.	In	the	course	of	writing	this	thesis,	I	have	learnt	so	much	more.	Today,	I	have	a	far	deeper	insight	into	the	array	of	climate	governance	activities	that	cities	and	their	networks	are	involved	in	and	the	normative	impact	of	their	governance	practices.	The	interviews	I	have	conducted	and	the	numerous	informal	chats	I	have	had	with	city	authorities,	clean	technology	start-ups,	journalists	and	urban	planners,	to	name	a	few,	have	inspired	me.	Writing	this	thesis	has	cured	me	of	the	cynicism	and	pessimism	that	I	have	developed	over	the	years	about	what	I	perceived	to	be	the	gross	inadequacy	of	humanity’s	response	to	climate	change.		 	 		 It	can	be	said	that	it	is	a	choice	whether	one	views	a	glass	tumbler	as	being																																																									22	Joana	Setzer,	‘Testing	the	Boundaries	of	Subnational	Diplomacy:	The	International	Climate	Action	of	Local	and	Regional	Governments’	[2015]	4	Transnational	Environmental	Law	319,	pg.	326.		23	Barbara	Oomen,	Martha	F.	Davis	and	Michele	Grigolo	(eds),	Global	Urban	Justice:	The	Rise	of	Human	
Rights	Cities	(Cambridge	University	Press	2016).	24	Ibid.
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half-empty	or	half-full.	When	I	first	started	studying	about	legal	responses	to	climate	change	in	2004	as	a	graduate	school	research	assistant,	there	was	a	paucity	of	materials	and	there	was	certainly	no	area	of	study	known	as	climate	change	law.	The	working	paper	that	I	drafted	for	an	international	workshop	had	more	questions	than	answers	in	it.25	Twelve	years	later,	the	amount	of	scientific,	political,	economic	and	legal	debate	on	climate	change	is	staggering.	In	2004,	the	Kyoto	Protocol	had	not	even	come	into	force.	In	2016,	we	are	able	to	have	a	lively	discussion	about	the	normative	governance	that	cities	may	offer	to	address	the	global	problem	of	climate	change.	The	glass	is	half	full,	I	would	say,	and	I	am	particularly	optimistic	about	the	contribution	that	cities	will	make	to	the	transnational	governance	of	climate	change.																																																																																						25	The	Legal	Nature	of	Emissions	Trading’,	Winter	2003,	Resource	Paper	for	“Legal	Nature	of	GHG	Emission	Reductions:	An	International	Workshop”,	jointly	organized	by	FIELD,	the	World	Bank	and	the	European	Commission.	
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